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Country  Comparative  Synopsis  of  Policy Measures SUMMARY 
The  Forschungsstelle  Sozialokonomik der Arbeit  (FSA)  of the 
Freie Universitat Berlin has  been  commissioned  under  the  re-
search programme  .. Evaluation of public expenditure effects 
on  employment  and  evaluation of  labour market  measures  and 
i_nsti  tutions"  with the provision of  a  study on  "The effi-
ciency of  labour market  and  employment  policy measures". 
Purpose of the  study is to provide  a  synopsis  of the avai-
lable scientific evaluation of  the efficiency of national 
and  regional  employment  and  labour market policies for  the 
countries  Denmark,  France,  United  Kingdom  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany. 
As  a  first step surveys of the  employment  and  labour market 
policies persued  in the  early 80s  have  been  provided  for 
the countries  he~dealt with.  The  description of  employment 
and  labour market  policies will be  found  in the  appendix of 
this  study and  is supplemented by  synoptic presentations. 
The  financial effects of the designated policies and  the tar-
geted  employment  effects are given as  far as  possible.  The 
systematic representation of  the policy measures  follows  a 
standardized pattern.  It deals with 
- the  increase of  the  supply of  jobs  by  means  of  supply and 
demand  side orientated employment  policies 
- the  influence  on  the  supply of labour  and  working  time 
policies 
- adaptation strategies to  compensate  for  inequalities be-
tween  the  supply of and  the demand  for  skills 
- measures  to maintain  jobs. 
As  the policy packages  of  the  individual countries are de-
scribed in the  appendix,  the  study itself aims  to work  out 
central controversies  and warranted scientific findings  on 
the effects of employment  and  labour market policies.  The 
analysis of  the effects is orientated on  the criteria effects 
on  the  employment  level  and  on  unemployment  with  regard  to 
size and  structure.  Connexions  to the  financial  burdens  on 
the  budget,  to possible stimuli  for  the development  of the 
price level  and  to questions of external  safeguarding are 
dealt with. 
The  study includes  a  comparative evaluation of  employment 
and  labour  market  policies of the countries here dealt with. 
This  comparative  analysis is being followed  by  individual 
country reports that trace the  state of scientific discus-
sion  on  the  basis of  the  literature available  on  these policy 
programmes  and  that evaluate the policies with  view to the 
declared goals. It is  re~ealed quite  soon  that the  policy designs  of the 
co~ntries here dealt with differ very much.  France,  but also 
Denmark  places  more  emphasis  as  compared  to Great Britain 
and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  on  an  employment  orien-
tated,  expansive  budget  policy.  In  the Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  the  necessity  for  a  consolidation of the  budget is 
more  emphysized,  in  Great Britain employment  policy is strict-
ly designed  on  the  medium  term with  the  goal  to raise employ-
ment  levels  by breaking infla{ionary expectations.  The  com-
parative analysis  makes  apparent  that radical policies ba-
sing on  orthodox  theorems  are  to  less extent  successful. 
The  experiences of  the  70s  made  in all countries here dealt 
with  show  that da,uand  side orientated,  expansive  budget 
policies because  of their positive  influence on  employment 
levels cannot  be  dispensed with.  In the  beginning of  the  80s 
however,  the  lines are  drawn  closer.  An  expansive  employment 
policy not  losing  sight of  demand  conditions  needs  links 
with  supply  side  measures,  monetary  support,  international 
cooperation with  the basic  consensus  of utilizing the whole 
margin  for  expansion  and  the  incomes  policy  safeguarding 
on  the  basis of  microeconomically  found  and  socially agreed 
solidarity contracts.  In all of the countries  here dealt 
with  systems  of  active  labour market policies with different 
emphysis  are established.  In the early  80s  Great Britain bases 
its policy  largely on  supply  side orientated mearsures  for 
occupational initial training to control youth  unemployment 
and  thus  renounces  the  experiences of the  70s  in which  wage 
subsidies  and  policies promoting  occupational mobility played 
a  larger role.  Wage  subsidies  and  temporary  job creation 
schemes  are  in the  beginning of  the  80s  of considerable  im-
portance  in  Denmark,  France,  and  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.  In  addition to this extensive  and quite encouraging 
experiences with special  labour market  policy  programmes  for 
regions with  above  average  unemployment  as well  as  measures 
promoting  labour mobility  and  flexibility are  available  in 
the Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
The  evaluations  show  that  a  conventional  set up  of  wage  sub-
sidies cause of  a  considerable degree  of deadweight  and dis-
placement  appears  to  be  little suited  for  a  lastinq increase 
of  employment  levels.  Alternative  concepts  for  wa~e subsi-
dies with better employment effects,  however,  cuuld  be  de-
veloped.  The  same  is true  for  temporary  job creation  schemes 
that,  however,  ought  to  be  closer  linked  to measures  raising 
individual  skill  levels  than  those  operated  so  far.  A  closer 
incorporation of  the  private sector and  a  closer targeting 
to  workers  disadvataged  in the  labour  market  appears  necessary. 
Working  time  policies,  again with different emphasis,  play 
a  role  in all  co~ntries here dealt with.  An  evaluation  shows 
that,  with  a  different  intensity in the  individual  countries, 
measure  reduci.1g  workinq  time  cannot  be  dispensed with  as 
well  as  making  working  time  more  flexible with  the  goal  of 
adapting  economic  necessities to the  preferences of workers 
regarding  length  and  placing of working-time. The  function  of strategies for  the adaptation of skills of 
labour  supply to  demand  relates to  so-called problem groups 
in the  labour market.  These  persons  are most  affected by 
unemployment  due  to crisis of  the whole  economy.  An  improve-
ment of skills  t:-ler:efo:;~;.:::  r:Ji11  hardly effect a  reduction of 
problem groups.  To  improve  indi·vic.iual  employment  chances 
and  to maintain  individual work  abilities of affected per-
sons  adaptation strategies are very  important. 
We  have  pointed  to  research experiences  allowing at least 
outlines  - certainly with  regard of national particularities -
of  labour market  and  employment policies.  Research deficits 
recognized  can  be  made  up.  An  appropriate  employment  and 
labour market  policy to regain full employment  is perceptible 
as  a  Sllver lining on  the horizon.  If the  ~ationality of 
politics follows  the rationality of  economic  research,  how-
ever,  is quite another  story. - I  -
ABRIDGED  VERSION 
The  research centre for  socio-economics  of  labour(FSA)  of 
the  Free  University Berlin has  been appointed  to carry out  a 
study  on  "Efficiency of  measures  taken as  a  result of  labour 
,_narket  and  employment  policy  ..  within the  framework  of  the 
study  programme  "Evaluation of  public expenditure effects on 
employment  and  evaluation of  labour market measures  and  in-
stitutions".  The  aim of the  study  is to provide  a  synopsis 
of  the  present scientific assessments  on  the efficiency of 
national  and  regional  employment  and  labour market policies 
of  the  following  countries:  Denmark,  France,  Great  Britain 
and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
As  a  first step the  employment  and  labour market  policies 
effected in the  countries dealt with at the beginning of the 
1980's has  been  summarized.  This descriptive  summary  has  been 
carried out  separately for  each  country  and  has  been  supple-
mented  in the appendix  to  the  study  by  synopses. 
The  systemization  o.f  the policy programme  is carried out ac-
cording  to  a  standardized pattern.  It deals with 
- the  increasing of  the  supply of  jobs  through  employment 
policies; 
- the  influence  of  the  supply of  manpower  and  working  time 
policies~ 
- the  adaption strategies on  the offsetting of  inbalances 
between  the workers'  qualifications and  the qualifications 
required; 
- measures  taken  towards  retaining jobs. - II -
Wage-cost  subsidies,  job-creating measures  and  public expen-
di tur'-=  as  well  as  investment  programmes  aiming  at the 
long-term creation of  jobs within  both  the public  and  private 
sector- arc the  decisive  instruments  which  can  be  used  to in-
crease  the  supply  of  jobs.  Short-time  working  (per  life-time, 
per  year,  per week)  as  well  as  measures  taken  towards  the  in-
creasing of  the  flexibility  0~ working  time  are all aimed 
at  influencing the  total volume  of work.and  the  fair distri-
bution  of  jobs  by  way  of redistributing the  working  time  ac-
cording  to the  "(:Jlume  of work.  The  measures  which  should 
decrease  the  inbalances  between  the  demand  for  and  the  supply 
of qualifications and  which  should  increase  the  occupational 
flexibility as  well  as  regional mobility are  summarized  un-
der  adaption strategies.  As  regards  the  measures  taken  to-
wards  safeguarding  jobs the  labour market  policy  schemes  which 
are  most  focused  upon  are  the  ones  which  are to offset  a 
decrease  in employment  in the  short-time only. 
According  to this systemization the central  labour market 
and  employment  policy measures,  as  regards  their feature 
and  working  mechanisms,  are  compiled  in  the  appendix of this 
study.  As  well  as  the  envisaged effects on  employment  of  the 
policy measures,  the  financial  burdens  for  the  taxpayer  and 
the estimated costs  involved  for  the private sector are  set 
out.  The  emphasis  of  the policy measures  is on  those  schemes 
which  can  be  used to bind  a  long-term increase  in the  supply 
of  jobs. 
Should  the  appendix  be  set out mainly  in  a  descriptive  form, 
the  emphasis  of  the  study is on  the evaluation of  employment 
and  labour market  policies.  As  well  as  the  evaluation of  the 
employment  and  labour market policies as  they stood at the 
beginning  of  the  1980's,  the experiences  made  in each  country 
during  the  1970's  using  employment  and  labour market  policy 
schemes  have  also  been  assimilated.  The  evaluation  of  the 
policy measures  is  based  on  not  only  the  existing scientific - III  -
investigations  and  the  working  out of  central  controversies 
but also  on  the  confirmed  findings  of  economic  analyses  and 
empirical  studies. 
The  study  begins  with  a  comparative analysis  of  the  experien-
~s made  in the  countries dealt with here  when  employment 
and  labour market  policy  schemes  were  used.  Linked  up  with 
these  are  studies of  the  individual countries where,  on  the 
basis of existing analytical or even empirically established 
investigations,  specific evaluations of  each country have 
been made. 
Not  only the  comparative analysis  of  the countries,  but also 
the  sections  specific to each  country  follow  a  standardized 
pattern which  for  the  most part corresponds  to  the  systemi-
zation of  policy programmes  within  the  appendix.  After  ana-
lyses  and  empirical  work  have  been  investigated the  indivi-
dual  employment  and  labour market policy  schemes:  aimed at 
increasing the  supply of  jobs,  on  working  time  policies,  on 
adaption strategies and  job-retaining measures  will  be  eva-
luated.  A  matching  comparison of  the efficiency of the  in-
dividual  schemes  is made  in the  reports  on each  country as 
well  as  in the  analysis which  compares  the different countries 
(For  a  summarized  survey c.f.  S.  XVII,  XVIII,  XIX). 
Analyses  which  focus  on  the evalutation of  labour market  and 
employment  schemes  must  answer  questions  related to the mea-
suring of efficiency.  Theoretically there are evaluations 
which  can  be  supported  for  reason of welfare  or which  focus 
an  cost-benef~t analyses  .  In as  far  as  a  prosperity-linked 
argument  or a  cost-benefit principle are related to strict 
economic  criteria,  essential dimensions  of  labour market  and 
employment  policy will not  apply.  Labour  market  and  employ-
ment  policy does  not  only  aim at obtaining economic  efficiency 
but  also consciously  aims at the distribution or  rather social 
dimension  and  consciously  looks  towards  a  socially-backed 
suboptimal  Pareto-situation.  Cost-benefit analyses  are  faced - IV  -
w1th  the  problem that although the costsof  labour market  and 
erllployrner.c  policy  schemes  are ususally precisely definable, 
t.heir l:x:nefit,  ho•...:ever,  can  hardly  be  quantified or  isolated 
where  a  devers  i ty  of aims  must  be  accomodated.  It is further 
relevant that the opportunity costs  and  side effects  (relating 
bo  deadweight  and  displacement  effects)are difficult to de-
termine. 
As  a  result of different internal conditions  international 
comparisons  pr~sent even  more  problems  than  national  evalua-
tion studies.  As  there  have  hardly been  any  international 
comparison  studies made  on  the evaluation of  labour market 
and  emplo)~ent policy up  to the  present day,  the  resorting 
to  traditional prosperity analyses or rather  proce~uresof the 
cost-benefit analysis  seem, ho\ever,  to be  useful.  As  it 
happens,  the argumentative  connection often  replaces the 
exact quantitative determination.  The  argumentative  connec-
tion of  the  evaluation aims  at target conceptions,  which  can  be 
summarized  in  a  survey  (cf.  p.  )  which  views  the target  di~ 
mensions:  ·-employment  -effect,.  influence  on  the  social  se-
curity,  effects  of  allocation,  distribution,  integration and 
socio-political effects.  The  survey  follows  the  systematic 
of  labour market  and  employment  policy  schemes  already men-
tioned,  which  are also evaluated with regard to  the  causes 
of  unemplyoment  (frictional unemployment,  seasonal  and  cy-
clical unemployment,  structural  unemployment  and  growth difi-
cit unemployment).  For  a  comprehensive  evaluation  study 
Schmid,  1982,  for  the  Fed.Repl.of  Germany)  the target dimen-
sions  can be  characterized as  follows: 
(1)  Effects  on  employment  are obtained by  the  creation of 
new  jobs  as  well  as  by  rraintaining existing jobs. 
(2)  Social  security is guaranteed through  the  securing of 
income  when  a  job is lost or when  employment  is termina-
ted. 
., .. 
• 
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(3)  The  efficient employment  of  manpower  should  be  secured 
by  the allocative elements  of  labour  market  policies. 
(4)  A  fair distribution of  income  and  work  (ing  time)  and  non-
work  is the  distr~butional aim  of  labour market measures. 
(5)  The  integrative objective can  be  attained by  the  incor-
poration of marginal  or disadvantaged social groups  in 
working life. 
(6)  The  attaining of  socio-political aims  can  be  measured  by 
the degree  of  participation  in the  social decision and  the 
increasing of  individual option. 
The  following  evaluation of the  individual  labour  and  employ-
ment  instruments  tends  to  be  modest  with  regard to the target 
orientation.  In  the  foreground  are  the effects on  the  level  of 
employment  and  the effects on allocation and distribution are 
often evaluated as well.  On  the other hand,  the  references to 
social security,  to integrative effect and  the socio-political 
dimension are  somewhat  scarce.  Additional  arguments  have,  how-
ever,  been put  forward  and  these work  out the financial  burdens 
of the public hand,  which arise  from  the  labour  and  employment 
policy measures  and  which test problems  of  budget  consolid 
tion.  In this way,, too,  the possible  impulses  are evaluated, 
these arising  from  the  employment  and  labour market policies 
and affecting the development  of  the price level.  Also  put  for-
ward  as  an  argument  are  finally 
ternal  trade  safeguarding  . 
connections with the ex-
It can  be  seen very rapidly that there are essential differen-
ces between the policy drafts of the countries dealt with~Franoe but·also Denmark 
favour  an  employment-orientated,  expansive  budget policy,  this 
being  in constrast to  those  of  Great Britain and  the  ~ederal 
Republic.  In  the  Federal  Republic  the  necessity of  con-
solidating the  public  budget  is more  strongly emphasized  and - VI  -
in Great  Britain the  employment  policy is aimed  at the middle-
·tr;rm,  with the  aim  of  increasing the  level  of  employment 
through  a  break with the  inflation expectations. 
In all the  countries dealt with here  systems  concerned with 
active  labour market  policy have  been established and  these 
have  various  emphases.  At  the  beginning of  the  l98o•s Great 
Britain concentrated mainly  on  supply-orientated measures 
concerning  initial  vocational  training to fight  youth 
unemployment  a:ld  in doing  so dispensed with experiences  made 
during the  1970s where  wage-cost  subsidies  and  the profes-
sional  flexibility of effective labour market policies played 
a  large part.  Wage-cost  subsidies  and  temporary  job-creation 
measures  also play  a  considerable role at the  beginning of 
the  1980s  in Denmark,  France  and  the  Federal  Republic of 
Germany.  In the Federal  Republic of  Germany  additionally ex-
tensive  and positively encouraging experiences  have  been 
made  with  labour market policy creating special  programmes 
for  regions with an above-average  unemployment  quota as  well 
as  with measures  taken to increase the mobility and  flexibi-
ty of  manpower. 
Of  great significance in all the countries dealt with here 
are  the working  time policies which are noticeably different 
in their structure  and  intensity and with which working  time 
reduction policies and  working  time  flexibilization policies 
are  intended.  In  Denmark,  France  and also in the Federal  Re-
public of Germany  models  that allow flexibility  ~f.the age 
limit have  been tried.  Great  Britain goes  to  a  large degree 
for working  time.flexibilization strategies  by  means  of  job-
sharing and  job-splitting.  The  reduction  in the  weekly  working 
time  is an  essential  feature  of  French  working  time  policy, 
developments  in this direction can also be  expected  in the 
Federal  Republlc  of  Gerrnnay. 
In all  the  countries dealt with strategies have  been  developeG ... 
- VII  -
to offset the  imbalances  between the  demand  for  and  supply 
of qualifications of  -iaootir  force ..  The .different dimensioning 
of  the target groups  attracts attention:  Great  Britain goes 
for measures  concerning the initial professional training of 
young  people,  the  Daniscl1  labGur  ma~ket policy concentrates 
on  youth  unemployment  and  the  long-term unemployed.  As  well 
as  these manpower  subdivisions  France  also aids  single mothers 
with children.  In the Federal  Republic  of  Germany  the  exten-
sive  schemes  of  an active and  forward-looking  loabonr market-
policy with  systems that encourage professional flexibility 
and  regional mobility are  implemented. 
The  economic  scientific discussion and the  economic  practice 
in the countries dealt with  seem to be  characterized by  strange 
constrasting features.  on the one  hand there is to a  great 
extent perplexity about  how  state policy can effectively over-
came  unemployment.  On  the other hand  there are patent recipes: 
traditional Keynesian and orthodox monetarists,  i.e.  supporters 
of  supply-orientated economic  policy offer radical solutions. 
Only gradually does  an  economic  pattern of  thoughts  seem to 
establish itself,  whi&avoids  confusion and  perplexity as 
well  as  the resorting to patent solutions. 
Although  considering the complexity of  the discussion and 
the abundance  of  positively reliable economic  investigations 
a  verdict ought  ohly to be  made  with the greatest of  care, 
it seems  that it is possible to  reach  a  summarized verdict  on 
the  strength of  the analytical  and  empirical  considerations. 
As  is  sf.own  by  the  example --of  Great  Bri  tainot,  those  who  have 
confidence  in the growth dynamics  of  the private sectors will 
be disappointed.  A  labour market  and  employment  policy based 
on  monetarism or supply-orientated economic  theory will  be 
successful  in the  fight against higher rates of  inflation.  The 
costs of this ·policy are,  however,  too high.  An  economic  policy 
that  aims  solely at beating  inflation must  take  into account - VIII  -
that  unemJ_Jloyment  will  rise in  the  short  and  middle. term.  The 
long  term effects are  uncertain if the  time  horizon  is not 
clearly stated.  As  supply  and  money  supply orientated economic 
policy  co  not  induce  demand  impulses it remains  unclear 
as  to  how  the  growth  dynami6s  of  the private sectors  by  means 
of  cost relief and  improvement  of  the competitiveness  should 
be  initiated in  a  different way  than  from  external  economic 
impulses.  In reality this  seems  to  be  the  true  element of 
these  policy  draft~:  the hope  of  an  improvement  in competi-
tiveness  compared with abroad  and  with it a  new  version of 
the  "Ba:Jgar-my-neighbour"  policies.  Considering  the external 
economic  complexities  such  a  policy is in any  case neither 
analytically judifiable nor politically sustainable. 
Even  the traditional,  Keynesian-orientated policy of  demand 
management  has  its limits,  however.  Economic  developments  are 
characterized today  by  rapid structural developments  and 
global  demand  management  can hardly  meet  ~hese struc-
tural developments.  In all countries dealt with,  the  compa-
rison between  the  1970s  and  the development at  the  beginning 
of  the  1980s  shows  that the  employment  efficiency of  global 
demand  management  has  decreased.  The  dilemma  facing tradi-
tional  demand  management  in so  far  as it must  be  successful 
in the  short term  and at the  same  time  contribute to  an  im-
provement  in the production structures of  the  economies  be-
come  increasingly clear towards  the  end  of the  1970s. 
This  does  not  mean  that demand  management  measures  must  be 
dispensed with.  On  the  contrary,  a  connection  between  supply-
orientated and  demand-orientated economic  measures  which  solves 
the  dilerruna  of  t.radi tional  demand  management  should  be  sought. 
The  example  of  Denmark,  and  to  a  certain extent  France  also, 
should  be  encouraging here.  Demand  management  measures  can 
be  structured  in  such  a  selective way  that they  focus  on 
target groups  in the  labour  market  and  are  connected with 
the  stimulus  of  those  sectors of the private and  public  economy 
-
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which  show profitable growth dynamics  in the middle  term. 
An  economic  policy  having  in  view  the overall· 
·demand  conditions  is important,  but only  successful 
when it is  bound  to  u  econcr.;ic  and  social overall  concept 
and  is aimed at stabilizing the  expectations of the  economic 
~ubjects in the middle  term. 
As  is  shown  by the experiences  made  in the 1970s  in all the 
countries dealt  wit~,  the middle  term structure of  an  expan-
sive  employment  policy relates to the stabilization of  in-
dustrialists'  expectations concerning the middle  and  long 
term profitability of  the  investments  into technical  means 
of production.  With  the  increasing significance of  industria-
lists'  investments  in company-related  human  capital this aspect 
of  the stabilization of expectations  is also relevant to 
the production factor  work. 
The  socio-economic overall  concept already mentioned  refers 
to the necessity of  international co-operation with  a  view 
to monetary  security and  external  economic  factors,  income 
policiy and  a  selective,  active  labour market policy orienta-
ted  towards  target groups within the  labour market. 
The  experiences made  during  the  last  few  years with  employ-
ment  policy in all the countries dealt with  show that  scopes 
for  an expansive,  employment  effective expenditure policy 
can only be  used if it is financially secure. 
International  cooperation is also necessary 'for safeguarding 
the external  economic  flank.  The  example  of  France  and 
Denmark  shows  that  an  international  expansive  expenditure 
policy soon  clashes with national  boundaries  if it has  not 
been  internationally approved.  There  is  a  growing pressure 
to offset trade  balances  and it is probable  that devaluation 
policies or  import  restriction policies will  be  employed. - X  -
It is of great significance to this  study to  locate more 
exactly the  connection  between  employment  and  labour market 
policy to  the available distributional  scopes.  In view of 
the  care  required when  evaluating the  economic  investigations 
submitted  and  the  ensuing  ev~luation of political practice 
it should,  however,  be  clear that all the  countries dealt 
with here  experience at least in the  short-term the  con-
~itions  of  a  stagnating economy.  With  a  view to the dis-
tributional 'scopY_,  pressure on anployment and labour market policy 
grows  when  the real  income  per worker  decreases.  This  seems 
to be  a  decisive characteristic of  the problems  which  presently 
affect the  employment  and  incomes  policy.  Neither  on  a  micro-
economic  nor  on  a  macroeconomic  level  can  one  find  recog-
nizable  functioning  transformations-mechanics  which  convert 
possible  sacrifices  in  income,  whether it is  individuals 
or social groups  who  are affected,into additional  jobs.  On  a 
macroeconomic  level it is recognizable that the  traditional 
path via  a  reduction in real wages  or  a  guarded real wage 
rise policy from  the trade unions  cannot  show  the desired 
effects on  the short or middle-term  increase in the level  of 
employment.  On  a  microeconomic  level  income  sacrifices made 
by  individuals or  socialgroups are  not  renumerated  by  working 
time  reduction policies or working-time  flexibility policies 
with  a  view to the rising level of  employment.  If is clear 
that there is a  lack of  institutional rulings  on  a  micro-
economic  and  macroeconomic  level  which  could  convert  income 
sacrifices into additional  jobs.  The  creation of  these ru-
lings is essential if an  economic  policy on  employment  is 
to be effective. 
The  investigation into special  labour market  policies  shows 
that  an  active labour market  policy can  make  a  considerable 
contribution towards  the  surmounting  of  structural  unem-
ployment  as  well  as  cyclical  unemployment,  but that it has 
limited effects  on  growth deficit- induced unemployment. 
Tt  is possible to  replace  income  t.rasfers  to  the  un-
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employed  by  job creating measures,  the costs of  which are 
in  same  circumstances less than payments  made  to the  unem-
ployed.  This  applies above  all to  job creation measures li-
mited to  a  particular period of time.  The  experiences made 
with  job creation measures  in the  Federal  Republic of  Germany, 
~s well  as  in France,  show  that these  programmes  are  too  one-
sided affecting the public sector to the disadvantage of the 
private sector.  The  experiences also  show that the  jobs of-
fered  within the  scope  of these programmes  are usually  "dead-
end-jobs".  The  occupations are not  sufficiently linked to  a 
desirable  social priority scale of  production4  At  the  same 
·time  the measures  taken to create  jobs within  a  limited period 
are  not  sufficiently linked to  schemes  designed at the  promotion 
of vocational  training.  The  objections men-
tioned do  not,  however,  as largely agreed,  suggest that 
creation measures over a  limited period are useles  •. Yet, 
there has  to be  more  emphasis  on orientating job creation 
measures  over  a  limited period towards  the targets mentioned 
by using suitable institutional regulations. 
In all the countries dealt with  in this study wage  cost  sub-
sidies have  been considered very thoroughly.  It has  been 
largely agreed that deadweight,  displacement and  substitutional 
effects are to be  expected  when  general or long  term wage 
cost  subsidies are implicated.  As  a  result of the effects an 
unleashed  increase  in the level of  employment  on the market 
through general  long term wage  cost subsidies  seems  unlikely. 
General,  long-term wage  cost  subsidies  seem  on  the contrary 
to amount  to  a  subsidizing of thosedomestic  firms  which  are 
under particular pressure  from  international competition. 
Selectively designed  systems of  wage  cost  subsidies valid for 
a  limited period only are  conceivable when  they  can  be  dimen-
sioned  for  specific manpower  groups.  Since the  significance 
of  company  investments  in company-specific  human  capital  in-
creases,  but those investments are only profitable in the roiddle or lanq terms, 
precisely~  the future  expectations are·uncertain invest-- XII  -
ments  in human  capital are  not undertaken 
an~  the  very  manpower  groups  on  the market  who  are 
especial!~ disadvantaged  and  who  have  a  higher  'risk property' 
are not being  employed.  Selectively designed  wage  cost subsi-
dies  for  a  limited period  can  contribute  to an  increase 
in the willingness of the  firms  to invest  in work. 
In all the  countries dealt with,  questions  on  a  reduction  in 
working  time  and  working  time  flexibility were  discussed, 
not without  a  great deal  of controversy.  Policies  in France 
tend to  aim  a~ shortening the working  week,  a  development 
which  could  also be  expected  in the Federal  Repbulic  of Ger-
many  as  a  result of unionist bargaining policy.  In Great 
Britain the policies tend more  to  aim towards  flexibility 
of working  hours  through  job sharing and  job splitting,  in 
Denmark  programmes  aimed at making  the  retirement  acre  flexible 
are  being testet at company  level.  The  controversies concer-
ning  the effects  on  the  employment  of cuts  in working  time 
andf~xibility in working  time are characterized by  clear 
contrasts.  On  the  one  hand  the cost  burden  on  firms  and  even 
on  the public purse  when  particular forms  of working  time 
reduction are  employed  is referred to  and  on  the other hand 
the  leisure time effect is emphasized.  The  level of  income 
of  dependent  employees  plays  a  decisive role in determining 
whether  reductions  in working  time  and  flexibility could 
become  effective as  an  economic  strategy.  Working  time  reduc-
tion policies and  working  time  flexibilization policies  have 
income  incidences  for  the  workers  affected.  The  previous  wage 
level  and  the  typical  national attitude  towards  w0rk  determine 
the  workers•  willingness to accept  suggested  ways  of  shortening 
the  working  time  and  making it flexible.  The  question of  the 
cost  bruden,  which  is important to firms,  is on  the other 
hand  frequently  over-emphasized.  It is quite conceivable 
and  even realistic that the  contractual parties will agree 
to  the  reductions  of working  time  providing it does  not  nega-
tively affect productivity.  In  addition it must  be  seen that 
working  time  reduction  can  induce  positive productivity  im-
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pulses,  which of  course  could  in the short term  reduce  the 
potentially possible employment  effect. 
The  last aspect discussed  in this  study  concerns  itself with 
the skill adaptation  of  what  is  supplied in the  labour 
market with the  demand.  This  involves training,  retraining 
.:::.:-1d  further training prQJrarnmes  in the most  varying  forms. 
These  measures  have  already been developed  in times of  low 
unemployment,  resp.  qualified manpower  in all the countries. 
They  were  drafted to be  human  capital  investments to ease 
the adaptability to technological progress  resp.  stimulation 
of  investments.  With  the start of the recession in the mid 
1970s  and  the worsening quantitative  level and  structure 
problems  in the  labour markets,  as well  as the availability 
of sufficient offers,  their function  changed:  from  the  in-
dustrialists'  point of view there were  then less definite 
skill shortages at the centre of their worries  than the 
placing of certain  ''problem groups"  within the  labour market 
such as  young  peoples,  the  low-qualified,  the  long  term unem-
ployed and  women.  This  change  in function  can  be  analysed 
in all four  countries  investigated. 
With  reference to the type of effect this programme  has 
on  unemployment  a  disallusionment must,  of course,  be men-
tioned.  The  chances  of  the manpower  groups  affected being 
placed depends  very much  on the cyclical conditions.  The  in-
dividual possibilities of  being placed  can on  the other  hand 
dramatically  improve,  which is important  in relation to  a 
strict target group orientation of the training programme. 
The  comparison  between the different countries  has also 
shown that  a  combination of  the attaining of qualifications 
with on-the-job-training in the  form of  work  experience  is 
advantagous.  The  employment  quota of  those  who  have  taken 
the  corresponding  courses  is significantly high  in comparison 
with other  survey groups.  Deadweight  effects  come  expecially 
to mind,  although they are difficult to quantify.  They  give - XIV  -
rise  abo·le  all to the  replacemen-t  of older employees  by 
younger  probationers.  Measures  that  impede  these deadweight 
effects,  such  as  agreements  on-protection against dismissal 
or  takeover guarantees are therefore to be  recommended.  As 
the  French  and  Brittsh examples. show,  great problems  in 
the  supervision of this naturally arise. 
We  have  referred to experiences  made  through  research,  which 
allow at,least  rl~afts made  of  labour market  and  employment 
policy to be  - these naturally taking the national pecularities 
into consideration. The  located  research deficits are reple-
nishable.  A  suitable employment  and  labour policy aimed at 
restoring  full  employment  is recognizable  as  a  silver lining 
on  the horizon.  Whether  the rationality of politics follo\'is-
the rationality of economic  research . i.s  a  different story. FF.DERN.. 
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0.  ANALYTICS  AND  EMPIRICS  OF  ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
Although  modern  scientific literature on  economy  is charac-
teri~ed by  heavy  controversies relating to the theoretical 
fottndation  and efficiency of  employment  and  labour market 
policy  {Peston  1980),  there are  some  simple  and  helpful  con-
siderations.  The  efficiency of  employment  and  labour market 
policy depends,  as  already revealed  by  simple tautological 
connections,  on  the  interplay of  economic  growth,  labour 
productivity and  the  development  of working-time.  Employment 
and  labour market  policy .only proves  successful if the 
of  both variables  can  be  controlled. 
Thus,  with this  so~ething is said on  the  development  of  the  em-
ployment  level,  but little on  the  problem  unemployment.  Apart 
from  the  development  of  growth, labour activity and  working 
time,concerning the  demand  side of the  labour market,  the 
supply  side playsa decisive role.  Considerable effects on 
unemployment  result  from  a  - however  induced  - growth of  the 
working  population.  Only if employment  stimuli  of the  demand 
side overcompensate  a  potential  increase of  the  working  popu-
lation,ddes unenployment fall  •.  Perhaps  scientific literature 
on  economy  pays  little attention to  a  further  dimension. 
Yet,  this dimension  is of  significant importance,  since the 
economical  development  of all here discussed countries is 
characterized through  slackening growth  dynamics,  partially 
recessive production and  a  given  increase of  the working  po-
pulation.  In order to explain  the mechanism  which  is meant, 
a  variable is being  introduced,  which at first at first sight 
to make  little sense  in strict economical  categories of 
thoughts:  the  term of  labour force  productivity.per unit.Defined as 
real output per unit labour  force  this category elucidates  the 
distribution political margin  for  employment  and  labour mar-
ket policy.  The  category  labour  force  productivity refers  to 
the real  incomeof  labour  force  available  for  distribution. - 2  -
Th~  me~tioned variables  can  be  put to-gether according to 
the  ru~es of  combination  and  can  be  used  for  the discription 
of  sceneries  for  various  growth paths.  We  are setting limits 
to  three  sceneries: 
Survey_j_ 
employment  unanploy- incare per 
level  rrent  larour force 
strongly growirig econany  increases  decreases  increases 
weakly growi:r.g  econany  decreases  increases  increases 
stagnant econany  decreases  increases  decreases 
The  strongly growing  economy  is entering the  golden  era 
if growth-productivity-patterns allow an  increase of  the 
employment  level,  overcompensating  the  increase of  the  wor-
king  population.  At  the  same  time  the  real production of 
a  strongly growing  economy  should  step up  faster  than the 
working  population.  The  weakly  growing  economy  is charac-
terized by  the effect of the ernployrrent  level falling and 
unemployment  increasing  due  to growth-productivity develop-
mentp  the  income  per  labour  force,  however,  still increases, 
yet  to  a  small extent.  In  a  stagnant  economy,  finally,  the 
employment  level  is declining  at  increasing unemployment, 
at  the  same  time  the  income  per  labour  force  goes  down. 
It is possible  to enrich the  sceneries  of  the  here discus-
sed  countries empirically.  In the  following  survey the 
growth patterns in the beginning of  the  80s  are  shown. - 3  -
Table  1: 
q  ge  gi  go/1  go/e 
0 
FRG 
1980  1 .. 9  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0 
1981  0.0  - 0.6  . 0.2  - 0.2  +  0.6 
1982  0.5  - 1.5  0.6  - 0.1  +  2.0 
1980  1.3  0.2  0.7  0.6  1.1 
F  1981  o. 3  - 0.4  0.5  - 0.2  0.7 
1982  2.2  0.4  1.4  0.8  1.8 
1980  - 1.4  - 1.7  - o. 2  - 1.6  - 0.3 
GB  1981  - 2.5  - 4.8  o.o  - 2.5  o.o 
1982  - 0.5  - 4.5  o.  2  - 0.7  4.0 
1980  - 012  - 1 1  1  018  - 113  019  DK  1981  - 0,2  - 1,4  1,5*  - 1,7  1 , 2 
1982  1,  5  - 1,4  1 10  o,s  2,0 
•estimated 
Source:  OECD-economic  surveys,  different issues 
OECD-economic-outlodk, december  1981,  EuroStat-Revue 
Abbreviations: 
go  = growth  rate of  real gross  domestic  product 
ge  = growth rate of  number  of  employees  and  self-employed 
gl  = growth  rate of  number  of  labour  force 
go/1  = growth  rate of productivity of  labour  force  per unit 
go/e  = growth  rate of productivity  per  employee 
all figures  in per  cent 
The  empirical filling of  the mentioned  sceneries  reveals 
that in the  beginning of  the  80s  as  against the  70s all here 
discussed countries  had  to experience  stagnant  economy. 
Thus,  the  problems  for  employment  policy are much more  pres-
sing than during  the  70s,  since  the distribution conflict 
has  gained  acuteness.  This  becomes  apparent  comparing  the 
development  of  employees  with  the  development  of  labour 
force  productivity.  Although  in all discussed  countries  the 
productivity of  employees  increased and  therefore  could al-
low· wage  increments  and  a  reduction of working-time,  the - 4  -
Labour  fc rce productivity per unit is  declining.  This obliges to in-
come  redistributions, unless a  polarisation  of  employment- and 
~~me~~a~ces betwe~n employees  and  unemployed  is being 
accepted.  By  no  means  the distribution aspects  only refer 
to  unionist  wage  policy or the functional  income  distribu-
tion.  The  here  adressed distribution political effect isfur-
ther dimensioned.  and  includes  the personal  income distri-
bution,the distribution of  incomes  between  social groups 
and  the distributiJn of  incomes  between  employees  and  unem-
ployed.  Also it is to consider  that the distribution aspect 
relates to movements  of  resources  between  inland and  foreign 
countries.  A  policy of  a  deficit balance of goods  and  ser-
vices  means  the acquisition of  resources  from  abroad,  a  po-
licy aiming  at an  extention of  the distribution _political 
scope  in  the  inland.  As  it  will  be  shown  later 
it is difficult to stick to  such  a  policy:  On  the  one  hand 
the  inland-policy lowers  the  employment  level,  on  the other 
hand  the  other countries will offer resistence especially 
within  the  scope of  the  European ·Currency  System:  the pressure 
exerted on  the deficit-country to devaluate its currency ·is 
growing  in middle  terms. 
Thus,  the distribution political incidences  on  employment  and 
labour market  policy are noticeable m  several  levels:  With 
view  to the external  trade  connexions  by  a  modification of 
the  exchange  rates,  with view to fiscal political questions 
by  the  form  of  budget  financing. 
Rigid  Keynesian  orientated rrodels of  an  extensive  budget policy 
with active  labour  market  and  employment  policy often 
resist the  understanding of distribution political incidences 
under  condition of  stagnant  economy  in at least short  terms. 
It is printed to  the  fact  that domestic  production  factors 
are  obviously  underemployed  assuming  not  fully utilized 
capacities  and  high  unemployment.  Can it be  managed  to also - 5  -
accelerate  growth  dynamic  of  the private sector by  an  exten-
sive fiscal  policy1 the  upward  movement  of  indebtness  in  short 
terms  can  be  financed  by  higher  tax  revenues  to  be  expected 
in the  future.  Yet,  this the0retical pattern is based  on 
the  hypothesis  that  a  fast return to the  full  employment 
p;:,; th  is possible.  Nevertheless experiences  (see  below)  show 
that also  a  Keynesian  orientated rx:>licy aiming at an  expansion 
of  the overall  demand  has  to cope  with questions  concerning 
the distribution political incidences.  In contradiction to 
this the  supply orientated and monetaristic versions  of  poli-
cy  emphasise  the distribution political  incidences  and  plead 
for  a  strengthemng of  the private sector qua  investment  in-
centive  systems,thus  favouring  a  distribution policy which 
promotes  the profits of  the private sector.  Only  slowly. a 
theoretical pattern  seems  to find  entrance  thatseeks  to  com-
bine  an  active  labour market  and  employmeEt  policy with  a 
social politically sub_s~~i~~n-nappropriate distri_bution 
of  bur§emunder  the  condition of  stagnant economy  in short 
terms. 
Among  the mentioned  also empirically proved sceneries  the dif-
ferent models  of  policies  for  restoring  full-employment  can 
be  extrapolated.  Those  models  relate to: 
1.  voluntary solidarity contracts  for  levelling out  job  and  -
income-differentials 
2.  short- and  middle-term acceptance of  increasing  income-
and  employment  discrepancies  aiming at a  strengthening 
of  the  growth  conditions of private  economy  in middle 
and  long  terms 
3.  short-term employment  and  labour market  schemes  which 
a)  are  funded  by  indebtedness  and/or 
b)  tax political measures  that are  targeted social poli-
t.ically at  a  fair distribution of  burdens,  having  to find 
a  way  of financing - 6  -
4.  re-djstribution of  tight  jobs through  measures  of working-
time  reduction  and  flexible working-time  for  employees 
with voluntary or  forced  in6ome  losses. 
Evidently the  employment  and  labour market  political mea-
sures  primarily rely on  the  demand  side.  Employment  policy 
tries  to  increase  the overall  employment  level.  Labour market 
policy put  more  emphasis  on  structural conditions  of  the 
labour market  as  ~ell as  on  the  promotion  of  flexibility, 
mobility  and  measures  for  the adaptation  of skills of  the 
labour  force  to  changing  requirements  or  such  requirements 
expected  for  the  future.  Nevertheless  the  intensified efforts 
to also control  the  supply  side of  the  labour market  are  notto be 
overlooked.  This  is undertaken  by  measures  for  the  reduc-
tion of  working  time  and  for  the  introduction of  flexible 
working-time.  lJobs  with  reduced  working  time  mostly relate 
to linear regulations  for all employees  or to specific social 
groups  like elder people,  which  is contrasted  "by  the  new 
working-time  policy
11  trying to use  flexibilisation potentials 
in order  to  harmonize  individual  ideas  on  the  length and 
lay-out of  the  working-time  with  the  requirements  of  companies 
resulting  from 'profitability'calculations.  The  following  sy-
nopsis  tries to locate the  emphasis  of policy models  in the 
countries  dealt with here. Policy fields +)  1 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GREAT  BRITAIN 
FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC 
Encouragarent 
of solidarity 
contracts 
- 7  -
2  3  4 
F.irployrnent  IX>- Workin;J-
licy with pro- time 
blems for pub- flexibili-
lic and exter- sation 
nal  indebtedn. 
Active anploy-
rrent :policy 
with problems 
for publ.  but 
mainly f. ex-
ternal in-
debtedness 
workil'X]-
tine 
reductions 
Strictly  Sc'herres  can- Part-ti.ne 
middle- batting youths  -work 
tenn orien- unanployrrent 
tated 
Efforts to  Labour market 
consolidate schemes  (fle-
the budget  xibili  ty,  rro-
by expen- mili  ty) 
diture cuts 
Reduction 
of the an-
nual ¥JOrking-
tirre(trade 
union policy to be 
expected: 
-weekly 
-working-
tirre 
This  synopsis  makes  clear that the policy patterns in the  here 
discussed countries differ distinctly.  International  comparisons 
are  surely difficult because  the  economical,  social,  cultural 
and  political preconditions naturally are also different.  It 
would  be  foolish  to transfer the  model  of  one  country to another 
country.  Nevertheless  the  experiences made  \'lith nacroeconomical  em-
ployment  and  labour market  policy and its effectiveness on  the 
level  of  employment  and  on  unemployment  can  be  evaluated.  The 
specific effects of  the  programmes  on  the working 
of  the  labour  market  will  follow  then  (see  below). 
+)policy fields  see  P.S,  points  1-4 
mechanism - 8  -
The  ~ong View  is too  Long 
Since  the  Thntcher-government  is in office,in particular the 
British employment  and  labour market  policy relates to as-
sumed  connections  between  inflation movements  and  unemploy-
ment  as  developed  by monetaristic thoughts.  Monetaristic 
versions  for  the  foundation  of macroeconomical  emploj!Tilent 
and  labour  market  policy point to the middle  and  long  term 
in-efficiency of  expansive  fiscal  strategies.  This  conception 
is being  substantidted by  argu  .... ,·ing  that extensive  employment 
policies will  lead to an  accelerating inflation.  While  this 
is also accepted  by Keynesians,  monetaristic considerations 
complement  the picture through hypothesis  on  rational  expec-
tations of  the  economic  subjects.  An  accelerated  inflation 
r.::.t-:'>  .is  b0ing  anticipated  by  the  economic  subjects  (in  the 
strictest case:  rational  expectations also anticipate the 
effects of  public policies  completely and  correctly) ,  and 
the  economic  subjects  adapt their behaviour.  Those  conside-
rations  lead to the thesis of  an accelerating inflation: 
for  the maintenance  of  an  employment  levelexceeding the 
natural  rate of  unemployment  continuously  increasing rates 
of  inflation with also continuously  increasing public debts 
have  to be  accepted.  The  natural  rate of  unemployment 
alone  is compatible with  stable and  low  rates of  inflation 
(see  below  in the  country report Great Britain the discussion 
of  public  spending  policy) . 
It surely holds  true,  that the here discussed countries ex-
pc'r  j  er·c:e  the  e Efects  of  increasing  unemployment  s in.ce  the 
beginning  of  the eighties. - 9  -
Table  2: 
DE'  FR  UK  FRG 
1980  ~ 
7,0  6.4  4,9  3,4 
·p  12,3  13,6  18,0  5,5 
1981  u  9,2  7,5  7,1  4,8 
gp  11,7·  13,4  11,9  5,9 
1982  u  10,3  8,1  8,3  7,5 
gp  10,1  11,5  9,0  5, 0 
Legend:  DE=Denmark;  FR= France;  UK;  United  Kingdom; 
FRG=Federal  Republic of.Germany;  u  =unemployment 
rate· in  %;  gp  =  annual  increase of  consumer  price 
in  % 
Source:  Sachverstandigenrat,  1981/82;  EuroStat  Revue 
The  extent of  unemployment  does  not  even elucidate  adaquate-
ly the  problem pressure exerted on  the  employment  and 
labour market  policy.  Additionally the dispersion of  unem-
ployment  is of  significance,  which means  the distribution 
of  unemployment differentiated according certain characte-
ristics like  sex,  age  and  spell of  unemployment.  For all 
countries here  dealtwith it can be  noted  that the disper-
sion of  unemployment  is increasing.  The  problem of  long-
term unemployment  and  youth-unemployment  is of particular 
importance  in all discussed countries. 
Table  3: 
Age-specific  unemployment  quota  in percent - Youths  -
·-- ---------- ,.... 
FR~I  DE  FR  UK 
1980  12,0  15,0  15,1  4,3 
1981  15,5  17,0  19,6  7,0 
1982  20,5  20,5  9,0 
Source:  OECD/Countries  Surveys,  several  issues 
DE=Denmark; FR  =France;UK=United  Kingdom;FRG=  Fed.Republ.Germany - 10  -
In  spite vf  high  and  increasing  unemployment  and  the  no-
ticeable  problem pressure especially for  the  young  labour 
force,particularly  the  British economic  policy decides  on 
the  necessity to  lower  the  rate of inflation for  the  corn~ 
bat against  unemployment.  The  economical  scientific creeds 
of  Elonetar~sn~!'ld the  supply  orienta_t::_ed  __  eco~-o~~~-:theor~ 
(supply-side-economics)  argue  in favour  of radical  cures. 
Price expectations  and  with that the  inflation rates  shall 
be  broken  by  stria-:y control-ling  the  money  supply.  The  con-
solidation of public  budget  is aimed at withdrawing  burdens 
on  private  economy  and at strengthening  the private growth 
dynamic  by  supply orientated rreasures.  Both strategies promise, 
so  the  creed,  increasing employment  and  decreasing  unem-
ployment  in middle  terms.  In Great  Britain this policy is 
being pursued with  remarkable  consequences.  Under  a  strict 
curtailment of  the  increase  of  money  suppl~ the  expenditure 
cuts  aim at the public services,  subsidisation and  labour 
market  schemes  have  been  retrenched.  Only  for the  combat 
against  youth-unemployment  supply orientated progral1'1!es  have 
been  issued  having  in view to at least provide vocational 
tra1ning  oppor~unities for  young  poeple  in the  beginning  of 
the  80s.  For  a  further  consolidation of the  budget  a  restruc-
turing of  the  tax  system for  the  promotion  of private  savings 
and  investments  under  remaining  tax revenue  on  the  whole 
shall  be  achieved.  This  concerns  the  reduction of  income 
and  corporation tax  (Kbrperschaftssteuer)  and  a  simultaneous 
rise of  oiJ  t?.x  ~nd the  value-added-tax rate. 
Undoubtfully  the  British economic  policy does  prove  successful. 
The  measures  are effective with regard to breaking  the price 
expectations  and  with that the  rates of  inflation.  Not  only 
empirical  evidence  (see  above  Table  2)  are  a  point  in  favour 
of  the  pri~ 0  level  stabilizing effect of  Britis  h  economic 
pol1cy,  t.lH:'.''f-_:  effects  can  also  be  explained:  t.Vith  a  distinct 
prr~ssu  re  "''('rt+:'f::  on  wages  and  the overall  demand, cost  -induced 
reliefs  an,i  the  1 imi t.ation of  the  free  play  for  increasing - 11  -
prices are  to  be  expected. 
Yet,  the  individual  and  social  __ ~o~!-~-~!_~uc_~  _  _F_~licy are 
high.  The  stabilization or  decel~ration of the rates of 
inflation is being  paid with clearly increasing  unemploy-
><,cnt  under  a  solidification of  the  labour market,  thus with 
certain groups  being  more  strongly affected by  unemployment 
and  the  loss of  functional  and  extra-functional qualifica-
tions of  unemployed  labour  force.  The  assumption of  a 
raising growth  dynamic  of the private sector induced  by  a 
restrictive economic  policy with  supply-supporting measures 
seems  to  be unfounded.  Growth  stimuli  are  caused  by  the 
private sector in case  of  successfully stabilizing the  sales 
and profit expectations  for enterprises.  A  restrictive policy 
will  not  be  able to realize this target.  In any  case  the 
example  Great Britain illustrates that the expectations of 
the  investors could  not have  been stabilized so  far.  Against 
this argument it partially is  held  that the period for  the 
adaptation of  the  economy  to the  new  equilibrium path under 
a  higher  level of  employment  would still be  too  short.  Un-
fortunately precise economic  theoretical considerations 
on  the period of  the adaptation crises are still outstanding. 
The  principal'hope~replaces the  analysis  and its empirical 
foundation.  Thus, if the expected  growth  dynamic  of  the private 
sector does not materialize, self-defeating-effects for  the 
budget policy have  to be  expected.  Under  increasing financial 
pressure exerted on  public budgets  through  the  system of 
social security it actually becomes  more  difficult to con-
solidate the  budget with  a  restrictive policy.consequences 
are  then unevitable  tax  increases. - 12  -
Tabl_e  4 :. 
State  De.'::icits 
---------------------------=---------
1980 
1981 
19821) 
DE 
-6,2. 
-10,7  + 
-12,1+ 
FR 
+0~3 
-1,6 
-3,0 
UK  FRG 
-3,6  -3,1 
-2,1  -4,0 
-2,5  -4,0 
Legend:  DE=Denmark;  FR=France;  UK=United  Kingdom;  FRG=Fed. 
Republic  of  Germany 
1)  estimated;  states deficit:  financing deficit in 
percent  of  the  growth  domestic  product 
Source:  DIW,  1982;  Council  of· Advisors,  1982/83:  +  estimates 
of  the  EEC  offices 
Evidently all countries here dealt with  have  to  cope with growing 
public  indebtedness.  At  this point it is  just of  concern 
to  show that in particular a  restrictive  policy leads  to 
additional  budget pressure.  Finally it has  to  be  drawn  at-
tention to the  fact  that  the  conclusive connection espe-
cially assumed  by  monetarists  between  rates of  inflation 
and  unemployment  at least withholds  the  fact  that  a  sta-
tlstically significant  nega~e correlation between  infla-
tion and  employment  does  not exist in international  compa-
rison.  Countries with  a  significantly increasing rate of 
employment  in the  70s  proved  above-average,  but partially 
also below-average  rates of inflation on  the price side. 
This  can  be  found  in the  following  table. 
I~bl~ 
Inflation and  Employment  in the  70s 
Fed.Repub1.Ger 
France 
r:;!.E:a.t  Britain 
Denmark 
Japan  (r1em. Item) 
USA  (Mem. Item) 
------- ·-
index of  Employ-1) 
rnent 
97 
104 
101 
105 
108 
123 
average  rate of  2 ) 
inflation 
51  1 
9,6 
13,7 
10,4  1975-1980 
5,7 
7,8 
1)  1970=100,  period  1970-1979,  2) 
Source:  Euro-Stat-Revue,l98l 
increase of  consumerprices 
in percent - 13  -
Viewing  the  connexion  between rates of  inflation and  un-
employment  quota  seems  unappropriate  because  the develop-
ment  of  the  supply  side  which  has  gained  importance  towards 
the  end  of  the  70s  and  the  beginning  of  the  80s, is only 
touched  by  the price  side to  a  small  extent.  Thus,  a  rea-
sonable  conception  should relate to the  connexion  between 
inflation and  level  of  employment. 
Also  keynisian orientated economic  policies need private 
qrowth  dynamic 
In  clear contrast to middle-term orientated  considerations 
expecting  an  increase  of  employment  by  breaking  the rate 
of  inflation Keynesian  orientated political conceptions rely 
on  the  stimulation of  the overall  demand.  In  the beginning 
of  the  80s  those  policies are primarily presented  in  Den-
mark  and  France.  Public deficit  spending  in  Denmark  focuses 
on  the  promotion  of  employment  and  on  active  labour market 
policy.  The  employment  plan  I  towards  the  end  the  70s,  the 
employment  plan II in the beginning of the  80s  and  the 
"March  package"  are  a  significant strain on  the  budget 
having  in view  a  selectively effective employment  policy. 
The  selectivity criterion are designed at target groups 
of  the  labour market,  especially young  people,  but also 
at the  promotion  of  the  competitiveness of Danish  industry. 
A  considerable part of  the  employment  plan II is to  have 
an  impact  on  investment  and  to  improve  infrastructure. 
With  regard to the targetset of  restoring,  full-employment 
the design  of  employment  policy in France it is even stric-
ter,  C<?mpared  to  Denmark  th~ _  ~~-~~ncJ:_~_l~!E~_i_!l  __ g!].n_!:_h:~  __ J?tll2lic  budget 
is higher.  Employment  policy in France  is aiming  at the 
promotion of  employment  in the  public  and private sector, 
working  time  policy and  the  combat  against  youth-unemploy-
ment.  For  the middle-term perspective  the employment  package - 14  -
.is  being  assisted by  the  French  strategy of  selective in-
vestment  management  and  the nationalization of  large  in-
c2ustries  and  private  banks. In an economic  scientifical view 
L8th  policy  models,  Denmark  as  well  as  France,  do  contain 
traditionalJy sounding  elements.  Since  current  resources 
(production  capacities,  labour  force  potential)  are  not 
fully utilized,  a  deficit spending policy is expected  to 
cvok0  private  growth  dynamic  by multiplier and  accelera-
~or effects.  Additional  tax revenues  arising  from  a  success-
ful  stimulation of private growth  dynamic  are  then to  be 
~sed for  the  consolidation of  the public budget. 
Evldent_J:y  __ !b~---~ffE.:_S:.!:  _  _Qf_~___E9_li tical  concepti.on ~rating 
thiL~<?-.L d~end3  on  if it can  be  managed  raising_g_rowth 
9:.Y  __ :_::_~_mics  __ _ey_  sti~1ulating the overall  demand.  Points  in favour 
of  such  policies are  the  income-multiplier,  by  which  the 
private  consumptive  expenditures  can  move  upward.  Yet, 
against  this it has  to  be  held,  that,  given  a  high level 
of  the  soc.ial  security system  by  means  of  payments  from 
tho  unemployment  insurance  the  income  differentials be-
tween  non-employment  and  employment  are  likely to be  low 
and  thus  also the multiplier-effects.  As  far  as  the acce-
lerator-effect might  induce effects on  private  investments, 
the  employment  effect is determined  by  the marginal  capi-
tal coefficient.  The  accelerator-effect is  low  assuming 
a  high  share  of  rationalizating investments.  Finally it 
is also  to consider  to which  extent  investment  goods  are 
imported  and  direct  investments  are  undertaken  in foreign 
countrie::;. 
The  recent  economic  scientifical discussion  tends  to in-
creasingly print  to  crowding-out effects.  Those  effects 
mean  a  1]  1 :s_t."'l  2t.:.~e::n~!1t  of  private activity through public activity. 
The  rat~ of  l!1': ~ost and  by  that the monetary  policy are 
here  of  chief  impcrtance  in this CX>ntext. Yet,simulations of expansive - 15  -
public spending  policy have  revealed that crowding  out ef-
fects  do  not  occur  on  a  considerable  scale  (see  below  in 
details:  Federal  Republic,  Great  Britain). 
The  debate  on  the  efficiency of  public  spending policy often 
refers to the  connexion with  income  policy.  This  means  the 
fact  that assuming  an  expansive  spending  poli~y especially 
the  unionist bargaining policy will  insist on  wage  incre-
ments,  which would  be  excessive even if labour  costs  remain 
neutral  (in  their share of  production costs) .  The  background 
of  this debate  becomes  understandable  by  pointing to  the 
above  mentioned  connexion  between  labour  force  productivity 
per  unit  and  productivity per  employee.  Given  a  reduction 
of  the  productivity of  unit  labour  force  which  also means 
a  reduction  of  the distribution political  scope  of all labour 
force,  also wage  rises within the  scope  of  the  increase of 
the  productivity per  employee  lead to  a  polarisation of  in-
come  differentials between  employed  and  non-employed.  As 
much  evidence  this connexion has,the  dilemma  becomes  just 
as  clear.  Qepet::d~ng_o~-- the  level  of  waq_es!  __  ~~~~rs~~willing to 
accept  a  -~':lt  _l:_~_ i.~s;-~~5:  through decreased  rea  1  wages 
if those  income  losses are translated into jobs.  The. mechanism 
implementing  this on  micro-economical  levelw~re the  con-
nexion  between  the  income  sacrifice  and  increase 
of  employment  becomes  apparent,  does  not  exist in all coun-
tries here  dealtwith.  Thus,  the  income  politically safe-guar-
ding  of  an  extensive  spending  policy,  undoubtfully  necessary, 
forces  to the  creation of  institutional regulations making 
the  sacrifice understandable.  But  by  all means  a  solidarity  ----------------
£_on~_~act  ~-~~_cessary_ which  means  a  strengthening of  the 
above  mentioned· policy field  number  number  1.  French  employ-
ment  policy tries to go  this  way  and  to  encourage  a  social 
political solidarity contract.  In  the  remaining  of  the  here 
discussed countries this is done  less distinctly.  Especial-
ly  in Great  Britain there  is a  lack  of  this element  of - 16  -
reasonable  economic  policy.  Do  micro-economically  founded 
allocation regulations  for  the  transformation of  the  in-
coniC:!  sacrifice  int.o  employment  or socially designed. soli-
darity contracts fail  to safe-guard  the  open  income  poli-
tlcal  flank  of  the overall  derrtand  management 
through  expansive  public  spending policy inflationary de-
velopffients  and effects  on  the  income  transfer between  in-
land  and  forei.gn  countries are  likely to occur.  This  is 
expressed  in deficits of  the balance of  goods  and  services 
under  an  increasing pressure exerted  on  national  currency. 
Surely one  country  can  try to  increase  the  level of  employ-
ment  in  short  or  middle  terms  through  an  expansive  employ-
ment  policy  in the  borne  countrJ  under  the  condition of  above-
avcraqe  rates  of  inflation.  Ye.!:.t.in  middle  terms  deficits of  -- ----------------------
tlle  --~)_a): ~I]_c_~:._  .  .2:f__5125>9.~ _  a_l}_9.. __  §~!;Y_j5:_~-~--ar~_!:_2_  be_.~.?5~S.!:.~.Q_.J!!.1~ 
the  _  .. 9Y..t:c?3:  __ ~  i~_,"J:·~_!?K_. j_~  t-~-~n~!-:_i  q_!?Lal ~.Y__E_i  f ferent  q~v~  lopmen  _!:s  qf. 
Lr_!f 1~  ..  t_lo_D_?.r~sl  ..  _l?_t.9_Ci~~-:~i vi  ty.  The  french,  but also  the danisch 
cxilmp1.e  make  this clear.  But  a  domestic  policy aiming at 
the  acquisition  of  resources  from  foreign  countries  is not 
successful  in middle  terms.  On  the  one  hand  this  policy has 
a  suppressing effect on  the  domestic  level  of  employment 
thus  confl1cting with  the  target of  full  employment.  In 
consequence it 1s  usually tried to settle the  balance of 
trade  by  export subsidies  or  import  restri.ctions. It cannot 
be_ ~b~_f?_  i:  ..  ~~_d__s:!!_9_~_g_!"!  ..  !-~~  !:  ___ !:b~:?-~-~  l_)_~qg~-~.:-.:.~Y.:-_  f_l_~J_g_b.!?_C2_t~_J;:  '_~P.S?_li..-· 
c ~~~  s -.-? ~  i  mp~Jr:_.t  __  F*::~  t:- _r_~  c_~  ~~n.~-·-~-~a~  .  .9- _E~ve~<?  ..  iJ_a_~g§:_r  __  f_9_~  __  _tb_~_. j._!l:: 
t..~K~~t::.J_on_al  ~r~dq_  .. a.!!sl.  .. J~y  __ t hat  a l  :··,  ..  l'!?.~~~:__<~q-~!:T_l:!Q.t._!ye_§_J_f_~~ts 
O.D_ __ t_h0_._[lat.~.Q!}9_l  ____  ~~~O!l9_Il}J~x~- On  the other  hand  the  pressure 
towards  re-defining  the rates of  e~change will  increase. 
Especially  th8  development  in  the  beg1nning  of  the year 
1983  shows  this  through  the discussion within  the  scope  of 
the  European  currency  system. - 17  -
Thus,an  expansive public  spending policy is only  success-
ful  under  ~he condition of  international  coordination.  In-
ternational  coordination  means  harmonizing  public  spending 
policiffi border to use  scopes  for  an  expansive  policy as 
well  as  harmonizing  monetary policy,  at least within  the 
framework of  the  European  Commission  thus  to be  able  to free 
itself to a  qreater extent from its dependency on the American rate of in-
tere&if  the  USA  is operating  a  policy of  continuously high 
real interest.  Further is to mention that the  restrictive 
policy  in Great  Britain has  not  contributed to  a  signifi-
cant  improvement  of  the  balance of  trade.  Also  the  by Great 
Britain presented  concepts  of  an  expansive  spending policy 
under  disconnecting  from  the  world market are  not  convin-
cing. 
Demand  Orientated  Emplyoment  Policy  Need  not  and  Ought  not 
to  Be  Dispensed with 
It is fascinating  to observe  how  fast  economic  political 
paradigma  change.  Also  the  economic  scientifical discussion 
in  the  here  discussed countries,yet also political practice 
prove  uninterrupted optimism regarding the possibility of 
stabilizing the economic  core areas.  The  economic political 
reactions  to the  economic  recession,  to be  observed  in all 
countries here dealt with,  after the first big oil-price 
boom  in  1973/74  and  the  abolishment  of the  Bretton-Wood-
system  in favour  of  flexible  rates of  exchange  were  clearly 
characterized by  the trust in governmental  demand  manage-
ment.  Economic  policy of  the here discussed countries 
responded  to  the  downward  trend  of  the  level of  employment 
and  a  growth  dynamic  becoming  sluggish  through credit-fi-
nanced  expenditure  increases.  The  net credit  loan of  the 
state financed  by  raising money  supply  stepped  up  in the 
middle  of  the  seventies. - 18  -
Table  6:  Budget  Deficits 
(budget deficits estimated as  financing deficits 
in relation to gross  domestic  product) 
r-
I 
I  1974  1975  1979  1980 
~~F~ederal  Republic  --1,4  -5,8  -2,9  -3,4 
France  +0,6  -2,3  -0,7  +0,4 
Great  Brita1n  -4,0  -5,1  -3,2  -3,6 
Denmark  -1,8  -3,3  -6,2 
legend:  budget deficits estimated as  financing deficits  (-) 
in relation to the gross  domestic  product;  budget 
surplus  (+) 
Source:  EuroStat-Revue,  1981;  DIW,  1982 
1974/75  the  here  discussed  countries  reacted  in harmony. 
§y_~~~ea~~_the an~ycyclical financial  p~licy was  unsu_~ 
£_~ssfu1.  In all countries distinct employment  effects of 
an  extensive public spending policy are  to find  {see  the 
country  reports  for details) .  Yet  the  growth effects  on 
the  labour market distribute differently in the  individual 
countries.  Due  to different systems  of  industrial relations, 
different working  time  regulations  and  different  scopes  for 
investment decisions  the  employment elasticities  vary  under 
a  given  advancing  growth  dynamic.  This  phenomena  can  be  ex-
plained referring to different productivity- and  working 
time  reactions.  This  also applies  to  the  labour market  re-
lief effects since  the  supply  side of  the  labour markets 
in the here discussed countries develops  in different speeds. 
Nevertheless  in general it holds  true that the previous  iri-
dications  of  the  employment  multipliers are positive.  There 
is  no  case that an  extensive  spending policy has  not contri-
buted  to  the stabilization of  employment  resp.  expansive 
employment. 
• 
• • 
r 
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Table  7:  Growth  and  Unemplyoment 
Growth  and  Employment 
Selected  Indu~trial Countries  1970-1979 
~ 
Cia  al  a2  r-2  DW 
I Federal Republic  1.278  -0.322  0.912  1.044 
(0-055) 
I  France  1.386  -0.224  o. 903- 1.752 
(0.040)  I  Great BriWn  0.586  -0.119 
.(0.  lOS)  0.393  1.285  ! 
Fe~ral Republic  -0.0395  0.565  0.2Zl8  0.904  0.966 
,0.128)  (0.132) 
France  -0.0093  0.284  0.759  0.806  1.874 
(0.102)  {0.097) 
Great Britain  -0.0075  0.263  0.211  0.807  2.870 
(0.096)  (0.097) 
1)  First three  lines:  Ut-Ut-1  =  ao+a1  9GDP 
2)  last three  lines:gCEP  = a 0 +a1  gGDP  +  a2  9GDP(t-l) 
legend:  u  =  unemployment  rate;  g  =  growth rate;  t  = time  in 
dex;  GDP  = real gross  domestic  product;  CEP  = civi-
lian employed  persons;  a 0 ,a1,a2  = regression coeffi-
cient;  r2  =  correlation coefficient;  DW  = Durbin-
watson-coefficient;  standard deviation  in parenthesis. 
Source:  FSA,  own  estimates 
Nevertheless,  it also  holds  true concurringly,  that for  the 
return  to  the  full  employment  path unrealistically high 
growth  rates would  be  necessary.  Without  a  sufficient growth 
dynamic  a  lasting public  borrowing  policy can  hardly  be  su-
stained.  In this case  tax political measures  for  financing 
growing  expenditures  and  thus  the  expansion  of  public acti-
~ties on  the whole  would  be  the  only  pos~ible way. - 20  -
Against  such  a  policy it is argued  that  a  restraint of the 
scale of  the public sector  seems  necessary.  Yet,  a  rise of 
the  tax  burden  for  the private sector,  as  oftenly  assumed, 
l(:ods  to  a  reduction  of  private  consumption  and private in-
vestments,  ilDd  therefore  to decreasing  overall  production 
or.  account  of  the  overall  demand  becoming  lower.  Th~_2.£_~-
~~-~~----~~--~o_t:__'::':_ali_q_un_?_::_~_!:_h~--~on_9J- tio~ that  an  incr~~sin_g_ 
tax  bur_<:l.§_~  ___ :i.-_s_  fo~_owed by  J.ncreased  public  expen_Qi  tu~. 
The  expend1ture multipliers are  likely to  be  even  higher 
than  the  tax multipliers.  Finally the  argument  of  the  lacking 
efficiency of expenditure rises,  tax financed,  $ems only reasonable 
if a  strict negative  correlation between  scale of  public ac-
tivity and  growth  dynamic  can  be  concluded.  Recent  investi-
gatlonsshow that  a  statistically significant negative  corre-
lation between  private growth  dynamic  and  the  scale of pub-
lic activity cannot  be  confirmed.  The  thesis of  lacking ef-
ficiency of  publ1c  activity proves  wrong  as  being  faced  with 
problems  in the allocation and  distribution sector the pri-
vate market  dynamic  fails to solve  and  that have  to be  solved 
by  multiple  forms  (DIW,  1982;  also  see  country reports). 
The  strictest assumptions  (European  Economy,  1982)  that  un-
animously  call  for  a  renounciation  of_ public expenditures 
ignore  the  national  individualities,  the different historic 
background  and  the different economic  conditions of  the 
countries dealt with.  Yet,  this argument  has  not  in view to 
lower  the  share of  the private sector if profitable market 
dynamics  are  of  long-term effect. 
Only  briefly it finally  is to print to the connectionbet-
ween transfer payments  of  private households  and willing-
ness  to work.  Some  available also empirically confirmed  in-
vestigations  assume  that under  a  given  cut  of  transfer pay-
ments  the  readinE'ss  of  employees  to also accept  such  jobs 
r.C'qu.i.rinq  a  lowc:r  qualification than  the affected  employees 
dispose  of will  _:  ncrease.  Also  cuts  in  income  are  more 
likely to  be  accepted.  Those  connections  are  not dealt with 
• •• 
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in the  following  since  a  reduction of  transfer payments  as 
~ur  market  political strategy for  restoring  full-employ-
ment  is _not  __  PI.~'!l-~_~iE£L~~uccess as  faced  with  a!l  __ eyide~!_ 
shortage of  jobs. 
Selectivity of  Labour  Market- and  Employment  Policies 
So  far  employment- and  labour market policies have  been 
dealt with within  the  framework  of  general  economic policy 
and  with  view to the targets of  the magic  square.  In  the 
following  special  employment  political  and  labour market 
political measures  are  of  concern.  It is disputed  in the 
economic  scientifical literature if it can  be  differentiated 
between  employment  policy and  labour market  policy.  Neverthe-
less  such  a  differentiation seems  necessary  from  the  analy-
tical point of  view  and  for  working  out  the effects of 
single  schemes  more  precisely.  &nployment  policy is taken 
towards  the  influence of the  employment  level  resp.  unemploy-
ment  through  the transmissions  mechanisms  of the market  of 
goods.  Improvement  of  the  entrepreneural  supply  condition 
and  demand  condition aiming  at  the  Simulation of  employment 
as  a  function  of  increasing production  and  investment.  The 
effects of  employmen't  policy on  the  labour market  are  in-
duced  indirectly through the market  of  goods,  whereas  labour 
market  policies directly operate with view to the working 
conditions of  the  labour market.  In this context it is  con-
trover  sE  1  if  _1  ab_c:?l.!~- n~_? r ~~  ~---12_'2_  ~  ~  cy  -~  ~  a b 1-~-!_~--~  ~~-t  r  ~  bu_!:_~_t:_~ 
an _  _j_mp~~ve_rn~n_t:  __  _?~  __  -~-~e _  !~".~}  __ of  emp~~~~-~_!:  ___  o_r;  ___ !_!  ____  !__~~-~~-r  mar-
ke_t__p_~l--~-~-?nly  __ ~<?-~_ds  th~_..P_<?ss_~_?_~~-~-~Y~!~:p~·S2y_~--~!.!.:~-~_!:ura.!_ 
conq_i-_t_i()Il.?_O~ __  1::b.~  ___ 1_~_!2_<2._~E_!!l5i_rket_.  Often_  labour  market  poli-
cy  is dimensioned  in  such  a  mode  that seasonal, frictional 
and  structural  unemployment  is being  combatted,  then  employ-
ment  policy  serves  the  task of  overcoming  growth deficit-
induced  and  cyclical  unemployment. - 22  -
Labour  market  policy and  employment  policy being dimensioned 
this  way  soon  allow  the  classification of  certain policy 
~ilttcrns of  the  labour market  and  employment  policy  in  the 
c ·(,·  .. lntr  les  hc-'r o  dealt with.  In  the  beginning  of  the  seventies 
\L,\;L  lcvc~l  ~)f  er;·,l_;loyment)  labour market  pol.i.cy  was  for  the 
r::u::jt.part aiming at  tfueirr~provcment of  the  occupational.  mobility, 
the  flcxibili  ty and  the  overcoming  of  unbalances  between  de--
~~ndcd and  supplied qualifications.  Essentially labour  mar-
ket policy  looked  for  a  practical  answer  to  the question 
asked  by  theorists  "Why  is the  unemployment  rate  so  high at 
full  employment?~~  (Hall). 
Wit-.hout  giving  up  labour market  political instruments  a 
stronger  emphasis  on  employment  political tasks  can  be  noticed 
wi  tl1  the  emergence  of  recessive  phenomena  in the  middle  of 
t.tJr~  sevent1es  in  a} 1  countries  here dealt with.  More  tradi-
t  i onaJ lt  ori~nt.at.c"'C.'i  and  aiming at  influencing total economic 
dcn:~nd,growth-deficit  induced  and  9yclical  induced  unemploy-
mc~t should  be  combatted.  Nevertheless,  the  role of  an  activ 
and  foreseeing  labour market  policy was  subject to contro-
vc  r S:.1l  deba t2s. _lt  ... J1A·':?.  __ _D_q__t; __ ~_ont_(_~_q_~  c;.ted_.tJ}g_t_  __ _g_l}  ..  -~-Q_t;_iye  _  _gn_Q_ 
f  o_~g  :::? ..  t?.~J  .. l!9 . ~-?l?9  .. ~lr  _rn~~~!<:-~!:-.  __ ES?_!.j.~_x  __  go~.§__SO!}tr  ;i. but_:~--tC2_  the_  ___  C}~§:.J::--
s;_om_i~g_~_f  ____ ~~~so~~}__!._ fFictional  and  structural  compon_~~!:§ of 
unemployment.  Yet,  the  answer  to the question,  if labour 
market.  pol.i tical instruments  influence the  level  of  employ-
ment,the  growth deficit and  cyclical element,  remained  con-
traversal.  This  also applies to  the  role  of  wages  within  the 
goods-rnarkct-labour-market-interc···-··nect ions  .. 
With  increasing  unemployrr~ent towards  the  end  of  the  seventies 
and  the  bcg1nn1ng  of  the  eighties  ccnfl.icti.ng positions be-
came  persistent ctlso  with  view  to  the  evaluation of  employ-
ment  policy.  This r'lclds  true  t.J 11  today  and  has  been  described 
above  i~  ccrnecLJGn  w1th  the classification of  employment 
rolicy v:itbi.n  (  cal  economic  policy  by  rcferrin<J  to  the 
controversy  between  monetarists  and  keyncsians.  Today  con-
• - 23  -
fusion  seems  to dominate  rather  than  clearness.  Only  ortho-
~o~  _  _!"_epre~entati  v~~---~-f  both  schools believe  to  be  able  to 
off~E  ..  p~!:__--~~_lutions. 
The  discussed patterns of  economic  scientifical discussion 
and  the  implemented  labour market  and  employment  politics 
areto  be  found  in all countries dealt with.  Nevertheless 
given  an  obvious  confusion  in the  beginning  of  the eighties 
politics in  the  countries  here dealt with  stake  on different 
concepts.  In  France  and  Denmark  distinct elements  of  an  ex-
pansive  employment  policy can  be  found  as  well  as  a  labour 
market policy designed at the structural  component  of  un-
employment.  The  Federal  Republic  provides  a  comprehensive 
system of  active  and  foreseeing  labour  market  policy.  The 
employment political  component  is characterized by  a  renoun-
ciation of  employment  effective public  spending policy.  This 
becomes  even  more  evident  in Great Britain where  priority 
is given  to the target of  combatting  inflation Labour  mar-
ket political instruments,still being  developed  in the 
seventies,have  been  clearly cut  back.  Yet,  for  influencing 
the  structural  component  of  unemployment,  especially with 
view  to  youth  unemployment,  Great  Britain has  developed  and 
enlarged  one  labour  market political instrument with the 
Youth  Opportunities  Programme.  This  labour market political 
instrument  focuses,  in distinct consistence with  a  supply-
orientated philosophy,on  the  improvement  of  the  vocational 
qualification of  young  labour  force.  Without  denying  the 
extrafunctional  component  of  training,  this  programme  clear-
ly puts  emphasis  on  the  functional  component  of qualification 
relating to those  skills,  which  are  required  by  the  labour 
market. - 24  -
:3ome  fiqures  on  tr1e  quant.i tative scale  of  the  employment 
~nd labour  market  policies  seem helpful.  In  France  employ-
ment  schemes  as  well  as  special  labour  market  policies have 
;,c,_:r.  exteEdcd  in  the  beginning  of  the eighties. 
T~hlL_~:  Ld'oour  :-1arket- and  Employment  Polici.es 
-·  in  Mio.  FF  -
----------------------· 
i 
~----------------------
1 
1 cmoloyrnent  scher::es  !  ~ 
I labour rr2rket  policies 
t----------- ----- -----------
1  tc:'tal 
,  __ ------------·--------
1981 
L19.629 
12.794 
62.423 
Source:  Min1stry  of  Labour,  1982 
1982 
72.751 
18.582 
91.333 
modification 
1981/82  in  % 
49,6 
45,2 
- ------~6,_~ 
Ar.:.~  t.he  ir.d.:.vid~,j_J  components  of  labour market  policy being 
icvc-stiqated  by  2lso assessing  payments  due  to  unemployment 
bEr1~£1ts within  the  expenditures  of  the  labour  market  policy, 
accord.i.r:q  to  the  system of  french ministry of  labour  I  it 
becomf:s  cvidt::nt  I  tl;at exactly those  payments  for  unemployment 
benefits  ar::cunt  to  the  highest  percentage~.  Expenditures  for 
the occupational  training  and  those  expenditures  which  ought 
to  promote  the utilization of the early retirement possibility, 
Schemes  for  the maintenance  of  jobs  and  creation of  jobs  play 
a  comparatively minor  role. - 25  -
Table  9:  Absolute  and  Relative  Expenditures  for  the  Indivi-
dual  Components  of  Labour Market  Policy  1980 
measures  figures  in  in  cent  MJ.o.  FF  per 
unemployment  benefitq  25.817,8  41,7 
~- .  -
early retirement promotion  10.164,4  16,4 
··-
job maintenance  2.361,2  3,8 
job  promotion  and  creation  2.637,9  4,3 
employment  promotion  1.387,1  2,2 
occupatior.al  training  _18.554,1  30,0 
others  10.090,2  16,3 
total  61.864,7  100,0 
Source:  Ministry of  Labour,  1982 
Nevertheless it is to take  into account  that this table does 
not  contain employment political measures  and  the expendi-
tures  have  been  - as  above  mentioned  - been extended  compared 
to  1980. 
In  Denmark  the  system of  employment  and  labour  market  policy 
gives first priority to public expenditure  programmes.  Yet, 
the  employment  effective  programmes  operate selectively this 
with  regard  to the  improvement  of  the production conditions 
(products  and  modes  of  production)  as  well  as  with  regard 
to the  target groups  of  the  labour market  as  being  long-term 
unemployed  and  youth. - 26  -
1.~-!J)lG__lO  ~  Expendl ture  programmes 
- share  of  budget  1983  in Mill.  DKr.  -
r------- ----------------_ -------
~  -·.  r  ._tcyment  a-::::t1on  march- budget ex-
penditures 
total 
expenditure programres I 
in per cent of total  : 
budget expenditures 
1 ~  ~i'";  1 I  p:. OIJrame  package 
L---- --
! 
4.139  4.128  3.425  190.800  6,1 
i 
t  __  ~ --------·--
S8urc~:  Y1nist~y of  Finunce,  1982 
v;  1 i_r-:J  r·  the  syst.C'!~~  of active  labour market.  policy Denmark  fo-
cu~es  upon  the  extension of  vocational  (further)  training, 
the {'Stablishment  ut  more  apprenticeship places  and  - as  ~1-
ready  cntpha3lzcd  -- upon  measures  for  the  combat  of  youth  un-
employment. 
Tab1~=- 11:  Employment  Plan II:  Distribution of  Expenditures 
(in  Mill  ..  DKr) 
·--- -------- ---------- -------------------~.  ---~---------·----~ 
1_9_8_1----+--1-982 ~3--
\ 
l  ________ ---------------------------+---· 
I 
I  pt.::~lic  ex{"2~:ci  i t.urr:-
1 pro~  ramme  ,:; 
!direct labour market  and 
vocaeional  ~r~ining measure~ 
total expenditures 
4.006,9 
1.359,2 
5.366,1 
------- ~-~ ~·  ~  ~------------------------
Source:  Min1slry of  Finance,  1981 
4  .. 100, 2  4.139.0 
1.500,4  1 .. 461,6 
5 .. 600,6  5.600,6 
--------------
Table  11  illustrates the distribution of  expenditures  concer-
ning  the  cmployffient  plan II.  Evidently it is  put  stroriger  em-
phasis  on  public expenaiturc  schemes  as  on direct labour mar-
ket  and  voca~1onal training neasures. - 27  ·-
It has  already  been  mentioned that the  employment  policy in 
the  Federal  Republic  was  characterized by  an  anticyclically 
designed  spending policy.  Additionally  a  number  of  employ-
ment  effective special  expenditures  of  the public  hand  have 
been  affected  in the  seventies  which  amounted  to  73  bil.  DM 
(1971)  and  stepped  up  to  161  bil.  DM  (1980)  - at current 
prices  - within the  course  of  the  seventies.  Thos8  - executed 
by  the  Bundesanstalt  ftir  Arbeit  (Federal  Institute for  Labour) 
special  programmes  concern  schemes  for  job creation,  the  in-
dividual  promotion of  youth  for  occupational preparation, 
occupational  (further)  training or re-training and  the  in-
stitutional promotion of establishments  which  conduct  occu-
pational preparation  schemes.  The  most  important  programme, 
the  scheme  for  regions  with  special  employment  problems  of 
the  year  1979  is taken  towards  labour office areas  with 
unemployment  above  6  %.  It includes  occupational  training, 
the  reintegration of  unskilled,  unemployed  and  those hit 
by  long  spells of  unemployment  and  a  job creation  scheme. 
Further  empl_oyment  effective public  investment  programmes 
1 ike  for  instance the proaraiml for gro\\rth  and envire.rrEnt political 
provision ought  to be  mentioned.  The  progranrne  running  for 
several  years,  was  planned  to have  a  volume  of  16  bill  DM. 
Also  the  expenditures  for active  labour market  policy at the 
beginning of  the eighties prove  a  distinctive emphasis  on 
those  labour market political instruments  aiming  at occupa-
tional  training and  job creation schemes. ~  l 
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Table  12:  E~penditures for Active  Labour  Market  Policy 
- in thousand  -
[ye_a_r  ________ __ 
l  l  :  : )  :-::: c L:. p C.l  t~ i on~  ..L  t r 2  i  r.. i  n g 
I r- ----------------
YC~~ 
1980  1981 
1.380.682  1.667.591 
759.897  615.102 
1.025.441  1.053.882 
[ 
we  ... ~  c.  suL:~-1  C:.lc__:__ 
·---------------------------------------------~ 
__ short  t  i~_mc  _allowance  __  ...___  ___  4_7_1_._2_2_6  ____  1_._2_84. 581 
Source:  A.i'<.B.A.,  Statistic of  the  Year  1981 
Coir:cidiP!J  v.:i t.b  ~he employment  political philosophy  in Great 
Bri  t~<-"lin,  a;.::;  presented  above,  employment  policy is not  taken 
towards  short-term expansion.  This  is i.a. mirrored  by  the 
fact  that  the  portion  of  the expenditures  for  the  department 
of  ~~ploy1nent  within  the  scope  of  the  budget.developrnent is 
relGtively decreasing  . 
.IS!_L.l.<-:.~_]._1:  Dc.velopr.tent  of  Budget  1980  - 1983 
-- in  UVlm  - __________  ......, 
1,-- ~ ;8·0;;;·  .,----1-9~~-~-8-2  --- - 1982/83 
' -·  ~  -- -- --~  ---·-----------~-- -----------+-------------·------
i  total 
defense 
trade,  industry 
and  cner:C]J"" 
~nartmen'.: of 
Dnployment 
hPal  tb and  ~~0c  ial 
securJty 
socj_<J.l  i n.sur0.r:.::e 
1  9 3 . 4 7 5  106 • 13  0 
I  11.178  12.634 
2.234  3.176 
1.956  2.426 
4.675  3.320 
11.366  12.764 
23.440  28.618 
115.150 
14 .. 103 
3.175 
2.670 
3.480 
13.633 
32.030 
rest  --~--_j_  __  3_e_  ..  _6_2_7 _  _L __  4_3_._1·9--2---'---4-6_._o_s_9  __  __. 
Source:  r inar.c ial  Times  I  ~·1arch  198  2 - 29  -
After the  expenditures  of  the  Department  of  Employment  had 
been  increased  1980/81  as  against  1979/80 also  in their 
share of total budget  expenditures,  expenditures  of  this 
budget  sector  stagnated  1980/81 till 1982/83.  Proportions 
amount  to  approximately  2,1  and  2,3  %.  Additionally it has 
to  be  considered  that the  development  of  the  budget  of 
above  table is quoted at current prices  which  means  that the 
budget  expenditures actually did decrease. 
In  the  following  the  single employment  political and  labour 
market  political schemes  are  being examined.  Here  it has 
been differentiated between 
- increase of  the  supply of  jobs 
- redistribution of  available work-load 
- adaptation strategies 
- job preservation measures. 
In  a  comprehensive  synopsis  the  employment- and  labour  mar-
ket political  instruments  are  presented individually.  The 
survey illustrates ·the distribution of  labour market politi-
cal  instruments  for  the  Federal  Republic,  Denmark,  France 
and  Great  Britain on  the  ~ifferent above  mentioned  levels 
(see  the  comprehensive  synopsis  on  page  pp). 
Apart  from  the mentioned classification on  these  four  levels: 
increase  of  the  supply of  jobs,  redistribution of available 
work-load,  adaptation strategies  and  job preservation measu-
res additional  subdivisions  have  been  introduced.  Those  link 
to  the  evaluation of  wage  subsidies,  to  the  employment  ef-
fects  of  public spending policies within the private  and 
public  sector,  direct  job creation  schemes  and  investment 
promotion  as  employment- and  labour market  political instru-
ments  for  the  increase  of  the  supply  of  jobs.  Strategies for 
the redistribution of  available work-load  are  subdivided  in 
redistribution of  available full-time  jobs,  creation of  ad-
ditional  jobs  by  means  of  lowering.the  average  life-time - 30  -
working  time  and  the  creation of  additional  jobs  by  means 
of  lowering  the average weekly  resp.  annual  working  time. 
The  adaptation strategies relate to the  offsetting of  un-
balances  between  demand  for  and  supply of skills,  the  in-
crease  of  regional  mobility and  the  improvement  of  the ef-
ficiency of  the  labour  service.  Very briefly it is dealt 
with  job preservation measures. 
Within  the  framework  of  this systemization in the  following 
the  labour market  and  employment political instruments are 
evaluated  individually. 
Analyses  which  focus  on  the  evalutation of  labour market  and 
employment  sche~cs must  answer  questions  related to  the  mea-
suring of  effici~ncy.  Theore~icallv there  are  evaluations 
wh1ch  can  be  supported  for  reason of welfare  or which  focus 
~  cos~-bene~it analyses  .  In  as  far  as  a  prosperity-linked 
argument  or  a  cost-benefit principle are  related to strict 
econo~ic criteria,  essential  dimension~ of  labour market  and 
employment  policy w1ll  not  apply.  Labour  market  and  employ-
ment  policy  does  not  only  aim  at obtaining  economic  effic1ency 
but  also consciously  aims  a~ the distribution or  rather  social 
di~ension and  consciously  looks  towards  a  socially-backed 
suboptimal  Pareto-situation.  Cost-benefit analyses  are  faced 
~lth the problem that although  the  cos~of labour  ~a~ket  an~ 
e:":iployrnent  policy  scbe:-r.es  are  ususally precisely cefir.c.ble, 
·.·:i-;c;.e  a  devE:r s i ty  o: a i1r.s  r.ust  be  uccorr:odated.  I t  l  s  f t1 r the  r 
relevant that the  opportunity costs  and  s1de  effects  (rcla~i~g 
to  aead~eight and  displace~e~t effects) are diff1cult to de-
terr-:i ne. - 31  -
As  a  result of different  internal conditions  international 
comparisons  present  even  more  problems  than  national  evalua-
tion studies.  As  there  have  hardly been  any  international 
comparison  studies  made  on  the evaluation of  labour market 
and  employment  policy up  to the  present  day,  the  resorting 
to traditional prosperity analyses or rather proceBures of 
cost-benefit analysis  seem,  ho~ver,  to be  useful.  As  it 
happens,  the  argumentative  connection often  replaces  the 
exact quantitative determination.  The  argumentative  connec-
tion of  the  evaluation aims  at target conceptions,  which  can  be 
su~arized in a  survey  (cf.  p.  )  which  views  the target di-
mensions:  ··'employment  ~effect, ,  influence  on  the social se-
curity,  effects of allocation,  distribution,  integration and 
socio-political effects.  The  survey  follows  the  systematic 
of  labour market  and  employment  policy schemes  already men-
tioned,  which  are also evaluated with  regard  to the  causes 
of  unemplyoment  (frictional  unemployment,  seasonal  and  cy-
clical unemployment,  structural  unemployment  and  growth difi-
cit unemployment).  For  a  comprehensive  evaluation  study 
Schmid,  1982,  for the  Fed.Repl.of Germany)  the target dimen-
sions  can  be  characterized as  follows: 
(1.)  Effects on  employment  are obtained by  the creation of 
new  jobs as well  as  by rraintaining existing  jobs. 
(4)  Social  security is guaranteed  through the  securing of 
income  when  a  job is lost 9r  when  employment  is termina-
ted. 
(3)  The  efficient  crnplo'}'•:Ent  of  manpOh'er  should  be  secured 
L•y  the  allocc+ ive  c1c·:-~·..::r.ts  of  labour  r;,ar}\c·t  policies. 
( 4 )  A  i a i  r  a  .1  .s t r i bu  t i on  P  f  i n cor:. c  n n d  work  ( 1 n g  t  i r:. c )  and  nor..-
~ork is  the d1stributional  aim  of  labour  m~rket ffiCasures. - 32  -
(5)  The  integrat1ve objective  can  be  attained by  the  incor-
poration  of  ~arginal or  disadvantaged  social  groups  in 
~orkinc life. 
(6)  The  at~ilining of  socio-political  aims  can  be  measured  by 
the  degree  of partjcipation  in the social decision and  the 
i~creas1ng of  individual  option. 
The  fo1lowing  evaluation of  the  individual  labour and  employ-
ment  instruments  tends  to  be  modest  with regard to the target 
orientation.  In  the  foreground  are  the effects on  the level of 
effiploymcnt  and  the effects on  allocation and  distribution are 
oftPn  ~valuated as well.  On  the other hand,  the references to 
social  security,  to  integrative effect and  the socio-political 
dimPnsion  are  somewhat  scarce. - 33  -
I  INCREASE  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  JOBS 
1.  Wage  Subsidies 
Denmark  has  developed  the  systems  of  wage  subsidies to  a  con-
siderable degree  for  active  labour market  policy.  The  pro-
gra~mes relate to the  Public Relief  Work  as  a  wage  subsidy 
programme  for public sector employers  and  the Job  Offer  Scheme 
as  well  as  programmes  for  the promotion  of private sector em-
ployment. 
The  selective lay-out  and  the selective effect of  these mea-
sures  can  be  designated  as  the particular characteristic 
feature  of  Danish  subsidy programmes.  Target  groups  are main-
ly the  long-term unemployed  and  youth ..  In  comparison with 
the other countries here dealt with it is conspicuous  that 
wage  subsidies are  closely coupled with training and  job 
creation  in the public sector. 
In  France  wage  subsidies are granted as  hiring  and  training 
premiums  since  1977.  These  programmes  have  been  expanded 
since  1981.  It is notable that these  programmes  are  charac-
terized by  a  fiskalisation  of  social  security contribution, 
i.e.  taking  over of  non  .. -wage  costs  by  the public sector.  The 
selective design of the programmes  is also obvious  in France. 
Besides  the  long-term unemployed,  youth  and  older workers 
the  programmes  are also targeted at  female  workers.  Certain 
types  of enterprises are particularly promoted  (craft estab-
lishment). 
In  Great-Britain  wage  subsidies  only play  a  small  role  in the 
labour market  policy presently operated.  This  is  in clear 
contrast to the policy of  the  later 70s.  In  1982  the  That-
cher government  started  a  however  small  programme  subsidizing 
the  wages  of  young  people.  The  last two  large  wage  subsidy .,.. 
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programme~_·.  existing  in Britain were  the  Temporary  Ernploy-
!.en_!_~)  uby i ~¥  .... i_'!:E~)_  ·--~~~~-~~  _ _sma 1 ~  i rms  _!1]1_p} oyme_E~_§_ub  s i dy 
(SFFS) .  Originally  li.mited to special  development  areas  the 
:'E~~  was  later expanded.  Because of arguments  udvanced by other EC-mer;lber 
~'"'0c:rjtr-ics  c1::1iming  that the  expansion of  TES  to  a  national 
Jrvc1  would  distort international  competition  in  favour  of 
British companies  the  programJne  was  eventually discontinued. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  -v.rage  subsidies  are  gran-
ted  in  accordance  with  the  ~!;bej_tsford_~..!-~.!1_g~_g-~_s_~!  .  .?  __ (bf9_L. Em-
@_~ym  0  ~:_t_: _  _!:E_<?~~~!-~?  !:  _.!:~_\)_ in  t  _}}_~  .. _  .fS?..~Pl_9_i_~~  t t 1  JBSJ -:-.!Jl  ___ a_!l_  ow  an-
~~-~...9~--~I-~  ~_!!:~-~-~-- (}f).c_).  _t  ~e  __ )2?.F9_~Q  ___ QL?lce •  vlage  subs  i dies  a 1 so 
mad0  up  a  subs-f::.ar.t: j cal  part of  the  Special  Programme  of 
197~.  In  ~one cases  wage  subsidies  (training grants)  were 
kind  to on-the-job-training provisions. 
Th0  ~cientj_fjc debate  in all countries here dealt with went 
intG  the  fol.lowiGg  essential problem fields: 
- the  selective design  and  effects of  wage  subsidies, 
- the effect8  on  employment  levels  and  unemployment, 
- deadweight,  displacement  and  drug effects, 
the  cof:;ts  of  t.hese  programmes  in  comparison  to payments 
caused  by  unemployment. 
The  di.scu~>sion  on  the  selective design_  and  selectiv_Q_effects 
on  probler;,  \;roups  in  the  labour market  takes  up  the  largest 
space.  On  t..:.hc  one  side it is  clairM~d that  unequal  affected-
ness  by  uncn~loyment in  the  consequence  of  rigid  wage  cost 
structures deviating  from  productivity differentials.  Since 
wage  subsidies  can  very well  tarqeted at specific groups, 
desired  ~electively operating relief effects can  be  obtained 
(Layard,  J 0 F'l;  Metcalf,  1982;  Bonhoff,  1982;  Pate a.o.,  1980~ 
Schmid/Wilke,  1° 0 J·  Kjaersgaard,  1982;  Colin/Expinasse,  1970). - 35  -
Another  position points  out  that selective wage  subsidies 
do  not  increase the overall  employment  level.  Rather  they 
almost  lead to the promotions  of  certain groups  of  employers 
to the  disadvantage  of others.  They  are  therefo~unfit as 
an  instrument  for  raising  employment  levels  (Mertens,  1976; 
Gaspard/Frank,  1981;  Colin/Espinasse,  1979;  Memorandum,  1980). 
Finally it is pointed out  that the  intended selective effects 
do  not  coincide with the actual  selective effects  (Schmid/ 
Semlinger 1  1979).  This  argument  is partly based  on  pure ana-
lysis,  partly statistically founded.  Empirical  results are 
available,  The  analysis  relates to the  following  circumstan-
ces:  under  conditions of  low  demand  and  high  une~oyment in 
the  course  of  the  employment  crisis the  process  of ?electivi-
ty  in  hi:t;i~9_  and  dis~:!--~-~als  increases.  The  requirements  for 
applicants  posed  by  employers  with  a  view to job-specific as 
well  as  general skills rise.  Wage  subsidies  cannot  compensate 
for  the  low productivities of  certain groups  of  employees 
assumed  by  employers  or actually existing  (Schmid/Freiburg-
haus,  1977;  Schmid/Semlinger,  1977;  Gaspard/Frank,  1981). 
To  the  extend that statistically founded  empirical  research 
work  is available similar experiences  have  been  made  in the 
individual  countries.  The  selective utilization of  subsidies 
promotions  make  employers  to the disadvantage of  women,  a 
significant rise in the  employment  of older workers  or dis-
abled persons  cannot  be  observed  (Ministere  du  Travail,  1981; 
Schmid/Wilke,  1980;  M~ller/Lticking,  1977;  KjaerRgaard,  1982). 
La  r~l  _y  ____  ~.?~5>.!_~!:_~I_?._!:_  ___ ~t~  ~---!:.his  ___ __!_t  ___ f  ~_ll_<;>ws  __  ~-~~  _!: _  _!:_'tl~- -~e_sr__t.Q_na!_ 
~~  ~£1~~~-!-:.  r ~51  _!~-t:~  1  j  -~~  t i g~  c;>J _  :1_ ag~  ___ s. _q  1? ~J  die§  ____ iLll_I!  even  1 y__gj,_-
at~bu~~- To  a  large degree  subsidies are used  in construc-
tion,  public  works,  trade,  certain service industries  and 
food  and  drink  industries.  Companies  producing  highly  labour 
intensive and  under  international  competition use  wage  subsi-
dies  to  a  disproportionm  large  degree  (Metcalf,  1982; 
Pate a.o.,  1980;  Schmid,  1982;  Schmid/Wilke,  1980).  Finally - 36  -
~t  is true  that  larger  companies  are  heavier users  of  wage 
~ubsidies than  smaller  ones  (Colin/Espinasse,  1Q79). 
Cf  _partic_~-~~E  __  ~-~:p_o_~-~-~_12_c~_fc_>;-__  !:._1)_~-~~-~~ct~~--but also  fc;>_~  __ !:_he_ 
11 t  ;1 _?:_9_~}:..Ql!  ___ u f. -~~g  e~ ~~  b  ~  ~-~-~  ~  s  _?:__~--the  _s:_ou ~!~9.  _  _!:__~_:': raining 
IJe.~-~l.re~.  The  Danish  model  seeking  a  close tie to training 
froves  particularly well  the  ingenuity of this coupling, 
since  functional  and  extra-functional skill potential  grow 
(Kjaergaard,  1982).  At  the  same  time  the  German  experience 
shows  that the utilization falls,  if subsidies are tied to 
tr·aining  (see  settling-in allowances  for  trainees  (Schmid/ 
Fr~iburghaus,  1977)).  In order to prevent that wage  subsi-
dies  only  subsidize  "Extended work-branches",  stricter app-
licut.ion  requirc~mcnts are  called for  (l"chmid/Semlinger,  1977). 
The  effects of  wage  subsidies,  if they  were  designed  selec-
tive or  linear  (general),  on  employment  levels  and  unemploy-
me~t rates  arc  rated rather pessimistically:  market  theore-
tic21ly oriented arguemnts  point at the  reduction of  the 
pr  i.ce  of  the  factor  labour  and  with that at tre.  adaptation 
of  relative factor  costs  to productivity and  scarcity  con-
ditions  (Sachverstandigenrat  198]/82).  It must,  however,  be 
questioned,  that_  significant rr.acro-econorr.ic  employment  ef---
fects will  be  initiated in the  short  run  solely through the 
improvement  of  relative prices.  Companies  deciding  on  hiring 
and  dismissals  according  to medium  and  long-term profit and 
~-;ales  expectation which are  influenced  by  wage  subsidies  only 
m~rqinaJly.  With  view  to  labour  intensive  producers  that 
are  under  particular pressure  by  i11ternational  competition 
this  .st a tcnent  must  be  qualified.  It _is  ___ tr_\1§> __ t_Q_at __  w~g~  __  f?~u]?_-
s i9;L~~- ~a_!l  ___ ~mp_~_g~e  __ na__tiQ!!.<:i.~-~9Dl~t_!~j-~~n~§  (Nickell,  1979; 
Layard,  1981;  Metcalf,  1982;  Sachverst~ndigenrat,  1981/82). 
As  in particular the British experience with  TES  shows,  wage 
subsidies actually operate  like export  subsidies  (Nickell, 
1 9 7 9 ;  Met  c a l f  ,  J 0  ;· 2 ) . - 37  -
Macro-ecqE~rnic  e~fects of  ~~~~bsidie~_have to ~onsider 
de_ad\o/eight,  an!_!_~~pato~L_~ispl~-~~me~!_-~E_d  dt;_~ effects. 
Deadweight  means  that  the hirings would  have  taken place 
even  without  the  subsidy;  anticipatory effects  mean  that 
the hirings  took  only place earlier than  initially planned; 
drug  effects relate to the habituation to the  subsidy with 
the  consequence  that the  level of the  subsidy must  conti-
nuously  rise to  induce  additional  jobs;  displacement  relates 
to the  fact  that under  different labour intensities  and  wage 
bills of the  companies  competition is distorted. 
Except  for  the  argument  that wage  subsidies are actually ex-
port subsidies the net effects of  programmes  subsidizing the 
production  factor  labour  on  employment  levels  and  unemploy-
ment  rates  considering the  above  mentioned effects and  the 
fact  that parts of  the  hidden reserve are activated are not 
valued high.  So it is  shown  for  France that the  employment 
pacts  as  far  as  they relate to subsidies  generated hardly 
more  than  5.000 lasting jobs.  Similarly designed  studies 
(Colin/Espinasse,  1979)  find  larger labour market effects, 
but still rate the  long-term effects of  these  programmes  low. 
Experiences  in Great  Britain relate to deadweight  and dis-
placement  that are estimated to range  between  30  and  40  % of 
all  jobs  supported  (Dep.  of  Employment,  1977;  Deakin:Pratten, 
1981).  Danish  experiences  reveal  that linear wage  subsidies 
do  not  aff~_~_!:____E_reci~~-~~-y__thos~_g_~ouE.§_wi  th  part~_icular em-
ployment _problems  and_ that employment  effects are  generall~ 
uncertain  (Kjaergaard,  1982).  For  the  Federal  Republic it 
applies  that  under  increasing weakening  of  demand  the  labour 
market  effects of  wage  subsidies also fall.  On  a  theoretical 
level this  is based  on  Keynesian  inspired arguments  (Mertens, 
1976;  Memorandum,  1980),  on  an  empirical  level  this is proven 
by  increasi.ng  costs  per avoided  unemployed  and  low relief 
(Schmid,  1982;  of.  the cost/benefit analysis  of  settling-in 
allowances  in  the  country report).  By  comparisi_ng  tax  rates 
~~  ---~I?--~!:fl__p]_y_C?~~~~_!J~ne_f_i~-~ _  ~~l~_bgw~ve  :r;_!  __ J2Q}:_g ~~-~-9_.l!!__t_ha  t 
even  a  50  - 90  % wage  subsidy  would still be  paying  (Schmid/ 
------------~-----------------------------
Freiburghaus,  1977). - 38  -
~1acro-economically significant relief of  the  labour market 
't:ill  only  be  obtained,  as  the experiences  of  the  programmes 
of  the  individual  countries  show,  if deadweight,  anticipato-
ry,  drug- and  displacement  effects  can  be  avoided.Therefore 
:-- -~,-;uie rmen  t s  for  _<:19_11]_~ n:L~:tf.9  !-jq~  _)I}l..EJ.~!flen._ta  !:.ipl_"!_il_r1Q __  ~<2~~ 
!·_rol  ensue  (Schmid/Frcihurghaus,  1977;  Simon,  1981;  Moller/ 
LLckinq,  1977),  but  most  of all wage  subsidies  should  be  de-
c:lancd  in  a  specific way.  Basing  on  the  assumption  that cer-
tain groups  of  employees  show  lower productivities  compared 
to their wages  and  acknowledging  that  "non-wage  labour  costs" 
cause  labour to  become  a  quasi-fixed factor of  production 
(Bell,  1978;  Oi,  1962}  wage  subsidies  should  be  designed  tem-
pcrarily liffilted  according  to  learning  curves  following  the 
productlvity  increases  due  to on-the-job training under dif-
ferE:ntiating  by  industries  (Rehm,  1975;  Hackmann/Keiter, 
1976).  Experiences  with wage  subsidies  made  in the  US  suggest 
a  sinilar evaluation  (Bishop/Lerman,  1977;  Havemann,  1979). 
As  a  temporally limited measure,  that is differentiatedly 
de~igncd for  productivity-wage-differentials,  wage  subsidies 
arc  useful  provided that  they are carefully administrated. 
As  a  general  policy with across  the  board  rules  wage  subsi-
dies,  however,  operate  like build-in destabilizers. - 39  -
2.  Job  Creation  Schemes 
Direct  job creation  schemes  provide  temporally  limited jobs 
in  the  public  and  priva~e sector.  The  programmes  can  either 
operate selectively with  a  view to the  unemployment  structure 
and/or  the  structure of  goods  and  services that  are  consi-
dered  socially useful.  They  are  financed  by  the  public sector 
either  by  paying premiums  to participating companies  or pub-
lic institutions and/or  by  paying wages  to the workers  affec-
ted. 
In  Denmark  job creation  schemes  are  a  new  type  of  measure 
for  the  Danish  labour market  policy.  Under  the  ~called  March-
Package  (June  1982)  the  legal  foundation  for this was  created, 
job creation  schemes  operate selectively with  view to unemploy-
ed  young  people and  in exceptional  cases  also older unemploy-
ed.  Financing is a  mixture  of  premiums  for  the  creation of  a 
job  and  wage  ?Ubsidy. 
In  France  implementation  of  job creation  schemes  takes  place 
• 
in  two  different  forms.Youths  are offered a  community  service 
in the areas  of  environmental  service and  local  services  in 
small  communities  for  a  period of  6  - 12  months.  The  program-
mes  of  1981 
11Emploi  d'Initiative Local"  (former:  Emploi  d'Uti-
lite Collectif)  were  to provide  young  persons  between  18  - 25 
years  of  age  temporally limited  jobs with local  authorities 
and  non-profit  organisations. 
In  Great  Britain measures  for  job creation have  been  cut  back 
since  the Thatcher  government  took office.  The  programmes  run-
ning  since  1974  until  the late  70s,  the Job  Creation  Programme 
(JCP)  the  Work  Experience  Programme  (WEP  and  the  Special  Tem-
porary  Employment  Programme  (STEP)  provided temporally  limi-
ted  jobs mostly  in  the public sector for  unemployed  adults, 
but  primarily young  people  up  to  19  years  of  age.  Youth  pro-- 40  -
grammes  also applied to  the private sector.  These  have all 
oeen  combined  in  one  programme,  the  Youth  Opportunities  Pro-
gramme (cf.  chapter  III: Adaptation  strategies).  The  Corrununity 
;:nt erprise  Pr-ogramme (CEP)  operates  as  a  larger  job creat.ion 
:~:.:::.cme  providing  ter:1porary  employment  for  the  long-term un-
employment  in  local authorities or non-profit organisations. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  job creation  schemes  are 
set  up  in  an  institutionalized  form  in accordance with  the 
l\FG  (Employr:lent  Promotion  Act)  and  as  parts of Special  Pro-
graM~es of  central as  well  as  federal  states'  governments. 
Only  since  1974  job creation  schemes  play  a  considerable  role. 
Since  1980  the  programrr:es  are  cut back:  financial  restrictions 
and  growing  criticism of  the  programmes  led to  new  regulations 
for  job creation  schemes  under  the  Employment  Promotion  Con-
solidation Act  (AFKG).  The  promotion  area has  also been  shif-
tc:d.  To  tf:e  di:::.;advantage  of  the previously  promoted  seconda-
ry  sector emphasis  is  no-v1adays  laid on  the tert  _  _:!._ary  sector, 
and  i~ partjcular the  social services. 
Experciencc.s  '-''i tb  thf'  programmes  of  individual  countrtes  are  .. 
mirrored  by  the  scientific literature in dealing with  the  fol-
bwing  questions: 
- A  comparison  of  the  costs  of  unemployment  with  those  in-
curred  by  the  system of  social  security 
·- Problems  of  the  social  and  economic  r.elevance  of  the acti-
vi ties 
- Connexion  between  job  creation  schemes  and  measures  raising 
skill levels 
Employment  effects  of  these  programmes  in  connexion  with 
substitution and multipliers 
- The  scale  of:  t>!t.'  prograr:ur!CS  and  their financincr. - 41  -
Job  creation  schemes  can  operate  on  a  short-term basis  and 
therefore represent  an  effective  instrument  for  an at least 
temporary relief of  the  labour market  for  certain problem 
groups  (youth,  long-term unemployed).  Furthermore it can  be 
provided  on  the assumption  that the  work  specific  and  general 
skills of  long-term unemployed  persons  fall  so  that their 
employability  is again  reduced.  This  "vicious  cycle"  for 
the affected is evident:  Long-term  unemployment  leads  to 
skill losses,  skill losses  reduce  unemployment  chances. 
It can  _  _p_e  assumed that  job creation_ schemes  are comparati-
yely  inexpensive.  By  comparing  the total costs of these 
measures  (promotion  and  sponsors'  contributions)  with the 
savings  due  to falling  unemployment  (payments  by  unemploy-
ment  insurance,  growing  public receipts  through taxes  and 
social  security constributions)  job ·creation schemes  are  ge-
nerally considered less expensive  than  unemployment  depen-
ding  on  the specific national  framework  (wages,  system of 
social security)  (IAB,  1981;  Schmid,  1982;  Musgrave,  1980; 
Metcalf,  1982;  Killingsriff/King,  19771  Bonnard,  ;  MSC, 
1981k).  This  argument  of  a  relative cost efficient instru-
ment  also relates to the  consideration that it does  not ma-
ke  sense to  finance  the  idleness  of  persons,  if these pre-
fer  a  productive activity instead  (Musgrave,  1980;  Metcalf, 
19  8 2;  IAB,  19  81) . 
From  the  argument  mentioned  the  necessity immediately fol-
lows  to determine  what  has  to be  considered  a  socially or 
economically productive activity.  If employment  policy is 
not  legitimated only  by  the view that  "work  as  such"  has  an 
intrinsical value,  the question about  the  sense  and  purpose 
of  the activity with  regard  to the  social  relevance of pro-
duction  and  the effects  on  skills has  to be  answered. 
In  the  scientific literature in all countries  here  consi-
dered critical reMarks  about  the contents of  the activities - 42  -
and  the  sociul  benefit are  expressed  (Danish  Finance  Mi-
nistry,  1982;  Schmid,  1982;  Hill,  1981;  House  of  Commons, 
1977;  Colin/Baudrillart,  1981).  Experiences  made  in the  US 
confirm that  the question  of  social  and  economic  usefulness 
of  activiti~s oftenly  can  only  be  affirmed with  reservations 
and  that  most  job creation  schemes  are  a  simple  work  thera-
PY  (Fechter,  1981;  Barocci,  1981) .It must,  however,  be 
pointed out that there are  no  arguments  against  job crea-
lion  schemes  in general,  but  only against certain types  of 
organisation.  In _p~~-~?,_£~--~<2§e~_:§_!?e~~_de\T~-1.~_peq __  ~r_Qrn  __  ~·bJ.~ 
~~-t:_~~d  ed  __ tg  _§  y()  i  ~- _E_t? ~  i ~}  .l..Y_?_X:~~  con  omi_ca_!ly__~~a.-~  i ng  l_~s  s_  ~  <:_-
tiyLti~-~·  Labour  market  councils  control  activities and  the 
obeyance  of  selectivity characteristics with  regard to the 
unemployed  affected  (Danish  Finance Ministry,  1982).  A  dis-
tinctive  \vay  has  been  chosen  in  Fran~~:  __  ~:!:_n~~---J  .  .2.7_2_m_9_d~ls 
fo!~ -~-h-~---C::~E~~~~l~.z~_<{i  __  <?.~~-~~!'sem~nt  ___ of  __  un~!!l_l?}<?.Y:I!!~_l!_!:  ___  ~~!:lef i! 
?r·~  _j:_~:___QE~~ation.  These  models  relate to the  support of 
init.iat.ive  of  unemployed.  persons  to start their own  en-
terprises  (Pelker,  1981).  For  the  Federal  Republic it is 
al:',o  true that effects of  job creation  schemes  like the re-
ten~.ioE  __ Q(_bu~~-f]  ___ ~-~E_!_!:a~-~!ld  ~g-~ial_§_afe.~_ard_~_p_g__f_t!nc_t_i9ns 
are  g~~~£a~l~r~~~~_E~~i~~~~lx_(Schmid,  1982~  Spitznaqel,l9797 
Hellmich,  1982). 
If job creation  schemes  are designed to operate selectively 
for  the benefit of  a  socially desired production of goods 
and  services,  this selectivity can  be  counteractive to another 
selectivity desired.  Job creation  schemes  are  intended to 
offer at least temporary  employment  chances  to certain dis-
advantaged  groups  of  unenployment  persons.  Young  people, 
long-term  unemployed  and  persons  with  low  skills are then 
the target  group  of  these measures.  The  skills of  these 
group  cannot  and  oftcnly will  not  be  equal  to those  re-
qui.red  by  the  de;~land  side of  production. 
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sch~mee_~j._!:_b.  __  '{j.~~-- tq~ecijic  ___  t_<:i_E~t  _groups_ of  the  labour 
mar}<et__Q__J;:_~...§_l_so_c:_;yailable  (Colin/Baudrillart,  1981,  Layard, 
1979;  Bruche/Casey,  1982;  Sachverstandigenrat,  1980/81;  Hell-
mich,  1982;  Jackson/Hanby,  1982;  Jackson/Hanby,  1979).  Con-
currently it is observed,  that  job creation  schemes  can  be 
targeted at certain groups  in the  labour market.  Young  people 
are disproportinately high  represented,  employees  taking up 
their first employment  are  considerably represented.  For  the 
Federal  Republic it is true that persons  showing more  than 
one  "risk property"  are strongly represented  (Spitznagel, 
1979).  It must,  however,  be  pointed out  that  job creation 
schemes  are often to loosely coupled to training  programmes. 
In Britain this  is true  in  a  high degree  for  the  Job  Creation 
Programme  and  in  a  low  degree  for  the  Work  Experience  Pro-
gramme  (Layard,  1979;  similarly concerning  newer  programmes: 
MSC,  1982c).  Similar experiences were  reported  from  France 
(Colin/Baudrillart,  1981:  Gaudin,  1982;  Hellmich,  1982, 
Layard,  1979) .  Consi~~rati_c:2_ns  ____  ~_bou!:_  _  _j_9b  cre_ation  schemes 
tl?_erefore:_  en_~iE__~he call  fo!;  __  ~~~~ally me~_Eing~ull  acti  vi-
ties  __ coupled with skill raising measures  (Musgrave,  1980;  Met-
calf,  1982;  Spitznagel,  1979;  Interdepartmental  Working  Group 
France,  1981~  Jackson/Hanby,  1979;  Danish  Finance Ministry, 
1982).  Activities derived  from  a  vision of  social  demand 
that are  brought  into line with  a  target group orientation 
for  certain groups  of  the working  population considering 
training  should therefore  be  situated in the tertiary sector 
(Sachverstandigenrat,l980/81;  Gaudin,  1982;,  House  of  Com-
mons ,  1 9 7 7 ) . 
If  such  a  harmonizing  were  successful,  the  extend of the 
job creation  scheme  must  be  dimensioned1  While  in the  Fe-
deral  Republic  expenditure  by  the  Bundesanstalt  fUr  Arbeit 
on  job creation  schemes  had  been  considerably  expanded  in 
the late  70s  as  compared  to the  mid  70s  (Schmid,  1982;  Met-
telsieven/Seiffert,  1981),  in France  state labour market  po-
licy is only characterized  by  increased activity in  the - 44  -
field of  job creation  schemes  since the early 80s.  A  fur-
ther  strengthening of efforts  in this field  is  demanded  by 
the  French  labour market  policy  (Bonnard,  1981).  The  cutting 
back  of  job  creation  schemes  in Britain  - except  for  YOP  -
t·Qs  led to  a  considerable criticism  (Metcalf,  1982).  Similar-
ly  this is true for  the  Federal  Republic  for  which  in  the 
op1nion  of  some  authors  job creation  schemes  can  apply  as  a 
contribution to the elimination of  growth deficit  unemploy-
ment  (Schmid,  1982).  Job  creation schemes,  however,  are cri-
tically evalutated  from  the  aspect of  the strain they pose 
on  the  budget  (e.g.  Barre,  1981/82). 
Experiences  with  job  creation  schemes  made  in  the countries 
here  dealt with  and  the  US  suggest to appraise  them  as  short-
term  and  UE2ful  instrument  for  creating and  maintaining  human 
ca~ital as  well  as  a  relatively cost efficient instrument 
compared  to the  system of  social  security.  This  evaluation, 
however,  relates to that  job creation  scheme  design that 
designates  temporary  jobs against  the  background of  socially 
useful  production  and  couples  these with training measures 
for  certain target groups  in the  labour market  that are 
characterized by  the  coincidences  of more  than  one  risk pro-
perty. - 45  -
3.  Employment  Effects of  Public  Expenditures  for  the  Private 
and  Public  Sector 
Public expenditure  programmes  can  be  rated under different 
aspects.  Apart  from  the question of distribution effects of 
public expenditures  and  thoughts  on  the allocation,  the 
target orientation for  and  the  impact  on  the  stability of 
the  economy  are  of  prominent  concern  when  judging public  ex-
penditure  programmes.  Traditionally stability of whole  eco-
nomy  can  be  determined  with  regard to targets of the  "magical 
square
11
:  economic  growth,  balanced  foreign  trade  account, 
price level stability and  a  high  employment  level define  the 
target for ·total econanic  stability.  At  ~_Eis  __ poi_!!_:t  __ !=-b!2  effects 
of public expenditure  programmes  for  the  de9ree ~f employment 
!D_  the  h~~~ discussed  countries  is being  ex?~ined.  Currently 
two  patterns of  economic  theory  and  political practice 
conflicting dichotomicly.  A  keynesian  inspired idea of policy 
refers to the  neccessatiy of  inducing  a  stable  increase 
in the  level  of  employment  through public expenditure  schernesand 
is to guide  the  economy  along the  narrow path  between  the 
Charybdis  inflation and  the  Scylla of  unemployment.  As  opposed 
to that argument  based  on monetaristic  ideas  substantiate po-
licies,  which  - relying on  the  self-adjusting forces  of  free 
market  - perceive state intervention for  the  increase of  the 
employment  level  as  being unefficient  in middle  or  long  terms, 
yet  even  having detrimental effects.  The  political practice 
of  the  here  discussed  countries mirrows  the mentioned  economi-
cal  theory patterns. 
In  the mid-seventies  the  Danish  economic  policy decided  on 
employment  effective public expenditure- and  investment  pro-
grammes.  The  Employment  Plan  I,  already passed  in  1977,  was 
replaced  by  the  Employment  Plan  II in the  beginning of  the 
eighties.  Both  employment  plans  are  characterized  by  a  mixture 
of  supply  and  demand- orientated measures.  The  experiences 
gained  from  the  employment  plans  led  to  an  expansion of  the - 46  -
employment  effective,  extensive  fiscal  policy  by  issueing 
t-he  action  pro_grarnrne.  The  action  programme  is also  composed 
n£  supply- and  demand  oriented measures  and  aimes  at  short 
'-c  rr·1,  but..  al.:;o  long  term  employment  effects  (Ministry of 
':'he  Employment  Plan  II  and  the  action  programme  charge  the 
p~blic budget  with  approximately  4  % of  budget  expenditures  . 
.I9.PJ  __  e  __ j._:  Expenditure  Programmes 
- share  in  budget  1983  in million DKr.  -
1:~  loyr:<'r't ~T  act10n programre  budget  experrli~  ---r-!1 
I  plan Il  :  ture  volume 
I  i 
~  ----------+-- I  I  I 
I  I 
L~-~-1 3  ~-----_  _j _____  -----~~--12_e  ____  __._ ___  19_o_._8_oo  ___  _..:  '-----
source:  Danish Ministry of  Finance,  1983 
pr<::>gramres  in % 
of budget expen-
ditures 
4,33 
For  198?  the  Da~1~h Ministry of  Finance  (Danish  Ministry of 
Finance,  1982)  expects  the  expansion of  public expenditure 
programmes  to  induce  an  increase of  employment  of  approxima-
tely  11.000  jobs  in  comparison  to  1981.  The  employment effects 
of  the  total  programme  till 1985  is estimated at 110.000 
full-time  employed.  ~lithin the  scope  of  t.he  action  programme 
the  costs  for  ~  newly  establish0~ job amount  to  approximately 
375.000  DKr.,  within the  scope  of  the  Employment  Plan  II to 
approximately  140.000  DKr. 
In  _f_r_~_!_1_~_9.  cmpJ oyrnent  poJ Ley  towards  the  end  of  t.hE:  seventies and 
at  the  bcg1nning  ~i0htics was  characterized  by  cautious  con-
solidati.r,g  r~ffort~>  of  the  public  budget.  Since  19_~j.  __  tb~---Hi_:t-
t  e_~  r _.9 n~=-c.t?  v  ~:~1~  ~~·.:  __  -~- t_?..:~~~-~: ____  f:? ~-~)_  !~  ____  l}__e c ~?  s i t y___gf_~~t  9-~-~  i  ~~--1=__1: s =.. - 47  -
~al polycy through  employment- and  labour  marke~ 
E.E..£9E_a~es  _!_~ the public  and  private sector.  According  to 
proponents  of  extensive public  spending policy  (Mauroy,  1982; 
Poperen,  1982)  employment  effective public expenditure pro-
grarrunes  will  contribute to the stability ·of  economic  growth 
and  to the  creation of  new  jobs.  It is also  intended to 
present additional  expenditure  programmes  for  the  promotion 
of  research  and  industry development  as well  as  energy gai-
ning  in the  second  stage  1983  (Mouriaux/Mouriaux,  1982;  Bar-
roux,  1982).  Finally the  French  5pending  policy particular-
ly  stakes  on  the  increase of  job offers  in the public sector. 
With  special  emphasis  in the areas  ·railway,  post,  education 
and  health, till 1983  191.000 additional  jobs are  to be  crea-
ted.  The  intended cunrulated  employment  effects  and  the esti-
mated cumulated  burden  for public  finances  are  shown  in the 
following  table. 
Table-2:  Cumulated  Effects of  Increase of Job Offers  in the 
Public  Sector 
1981  1982  1983 
arploy:rrent  +40.CXX>  +116.(XX)  +191.CXX> 
net costs for public finances!) 
(in bill. FF)  +0,29  +2,83  +5,76 
annual net costs of one unem-
played  (adjusted}  in FF  78.CXXJ  78.CXX)  78.CXX> 
1)budget  costs  minus  the  amount  for  the  reduction of  unemploy-
ment  benefits 
Quelle:  Ministry of  Finance,  1982 - 48  -
Since  the  beginning  of  the  year  1983  it oocomes··noticeable,  that 
the  ambitional  drafts of  the  French  government  meet  their 
limits:  on  the  one  hand  the  financing  has  to be  questioned, 
on  the  other hand  the question of  - with prevailing high 
inflation rates - safeguarding an extensive public  spending  po-
licy with  regard to  the  foreign  trade is to be  solved.  Thi~ 
problem  is being  discussed  above  (see  chapter  one  about  the 
economical  political strategies). 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  economic  policy of the  seventies 
was  characterized  by  stops  and goes.  Periods  of exten-
sive public  b-pending  policy alterPated  with contractive 
behaviour  of  public  expenditure policy,  when  the  failing of 
income  policy  became  apparent.  Since  the  beginning  of  the 
eighties  governmental  expenditure  policy increasingly  ~lies 
on  consolidating  the  budget  by  retrenchments  and  re-
nunciation of  employment  effective public expenditure pro-
grammes.  Even  though  the  spending  side of  the  budget  - cal-
culated at current prices  - shows  an  upward  tendency,  the 
expenditures  of  the public  hand,  price-adjusted, 
have  only  gone  up  negligibly for  the  budget  year 
1981/82  and  have  decreased  for  the  budget  year  1982/83. 
Additionally it is to  take  into account,  that because  of  in-
creasing  unemployment  expenditures  for  the  social  security 
system  have  stepped  up  and  the scale of  other employment ef-
fective  expenditure has  decreased. - 49  -
Table  3:  Development  of  Expenditures  of  the Public  Hand 
1980-1983 
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83 
total expenditures in current 
prices for the budget year  93.475  106.130  115.150 
annual modification of the 
b.ldget experrli  tures carpared  +7.7  +1.5  -0.5  to the previous year at con-
stant prices in per cent 
Source:  Financial  Times,  March  1982 
The  employment  development  in the  public  sector coincides 
with this picture of  a  public  spending policy,  which  is con-
cerned  about  consolidating the  budget.  From  1979  to  1982  em-
ployment  in the  sector of public  services  has  continuously 
decreased  hy 4  %.  Even  though this is an  under-average de-
crease  compared  to the  development  of total employment  which 
fell  by  10,5  %  in the mentioned  period  it becomes  ob-
vious at the  same  time,  that the  sector public  services  had 
not  contributed to the stability of  employment,  but  has  en-
larged the problem pressure  on  the degree of  employment. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  the expenditure  policy of  the public 
hand  of  the seventies was  characterized by  the  attempt,  to 
generate anticyclical  stimuli during  recessive periods  resp. 
periods  of  sluggish growth.  This  becomes  very  apparent  during 
the  recession  1974/75,  when  public  consumption expenditures 
markedly  induced  expansive effects.  The  ther~pon following 
efforts to consolidate the  budget  {budget  structure act)  sug-
gests that the  public  consumption  spending  has  not  been  in-
stalled anymore  as  an  instrument of  anticyclical effects  for 
the  stabilization of  the  degree  of  employment.  Partially this 
also applies  topuhlic fixed  capital  investment.Even though - 50  -
from  1975  till 1977  a  variety of  prograrrunes  in the  sector 
of  public  fixed  capital  formation  has  been exercised,  the 
reductions  of  public  investment  in the  core ·budgets  domina ted. 
:nc per1od  from  1978  to  1980  is to  be  called an  exception: 
t~?.~  ___ JJ:ItU~~-:i r:vestment  proqramm~ has  markedly  revealed anti-
_9-~s:_li  ~§:-~-~tfects.  The  currently effective or still effective 
~rogrammes link to older programmes.  Single areas  of  the 
future-investment  prograrrune  as  well  as  certain elements  of 
the  programme  for  the promotion  of  economical  growth  and 
c~ploymcnt of  the  year  1977  still prove  effective.  Finally 
unticyclically cffccti  ve  expenditure  elements  are  induced  by 
'  c  the  employment  promotion act from  1982  within the  scope  of 
expenditures  for  energy  saving  schemes  in public buildings 
and  the  1ncrcase of  the  investment quota at the  'Bundespost•. 
Neverthele2s it can  not  be  ignored,·  that  in the  beginning of 
thG  eighties the  public  spending  policy is being charac-
ter17ed  by  more  contractive elements. 
_Ta]2J_~  _  _i:  Expenditures  of  the State  (in Mrd.  DM) 
1  ( 1) 
real  volume 
neutrality line 
difference 
( 2) 
real  volume 
neutrality line 
difference 
1974 
132,3 
129,4 
+2,9 
32,3 
30,6 
+1,6 
1975 
138,3 
134,3 
+4,0 
31,4 
32,8 
-1,4 
1978 
147,8 
145,5 
+2,3 
30,4 
29,7 
-+0,7 
{1)  state consumption  at prices  from  1970 
(2)  gross  investments  at  prices  from  1970 
Source:  DIW,  1982 
1980 
156,5 
157,2 
-0,7 
33,5 
33,3 
-+<>,2 
1981 
160,0 
160,7 
-0,7 
31,0 
34,4 
-3,4 - 51  -
Table  4  shows  very clearly,  to which  extent the real  volume 
of  public  consumption  expenditures  and  gross  investments 
deviate  from  the cyclical-neutral path,  defined  as  'neutrali-
ty line'.  Extensive effects have  a  plus-mark,  contractive 
developments  a  minus-mark. 
The  intesified efforts for  consolidating  the  budget  in the 
Federal  Republic  suggest  the probability that public expen-
diture  programmes  are  adopted  to an  increasingly lesser ex-
tent as  anticyclically used  fiscal political  instrument  for 
the  increase  of  the  employment  level.  Even  though politically 
important  groups  in the  Federal  Republic  do  demand  an  expan-
sion of  public expenditure  programmes,  mainly  in the  investive 
area,  it is not  likely,  that these  considerations will  be 
embodied in real politics. 
Scientific literature on  the  evaluation of  the effective-
ness  of  public expenditure  programmes  for  the  increase of 
the  employment  level is concentrated  - with noticeable cru-
cial points  in the here discussed countries  - on  the  following 
problem fields: 
- The  production effectivity of  the private and  public  sector 
is to  compare.  Partially the thesis  can  be  found,  that the 
production of  goods  and  services  in the public sector can 
be  organized  less efficiently than  in the private sector. 
- While  some  assumptions  in favour  of  an  expansion of public 
expenditures  for  the  stimulation of private growth  dynamic 
are  being substantiated by pointing to multiplier- and 
accelerator-effects,  other arguments  are  supporting  'crow-
ding-out-effects'.  This  means,  that governmental  activities 
displace private activities. 
- By  referring to disentanglement .effects it is doubted,  that 
even  under  private growth  dynamic  induced  by  state activi-
ties the  employment  level will  rise.  More  likely are wor-
klng  time-,  productivity- and  price effects. - 52  -
- According  to  the strictest version of  middle- and  long-
term unefficiency,  yet  even  detriment  of  public  expendi-
ture  programmes  for  the  increase  of  the  employment  level, 
acceleratiny.inflation rates  under  an  expansion of public 
!'Xpcnditures  and  o~ly short-termed deviations  from  the 
•natural  rate  of  unemployment'  are  to  be  expected. 
A  variety of  arguments relates to the ·dilemma  of  demand- orien-
tated  public expenditure  policy,  wanting  to be  of  a 
short-term success  and  at  the  same  time  having  to contri-
bute  to  the  updating  of  the  economy  in middle  and  long 
terrr~. 
A  r.t~r:·ber  of  by  al.l  means  serious  economic  scientif  ical  re--
ports  assert,  that  the  public sector is less productive  than 
the  private sector.  It is referred to  excessive  production  costs 
under,  in comparisoil  to  the  private sector less productivity 
and  higher  wages  (Bacon/Eltis,  1978;  Bacon/Eltis,  1979;  Her-
zog,  1982;  Mouriaux,  1982;  Sachverstandigenrat,  1981/82). 
J~C:.c ·i tionally the  experiences  in France  with the  'Programme 
de  creation d'emploi d'initiative local'  show,  that because 
of  adrr:inistration deficiencies  even  the  approved  planned 
jobs  could  not  be  occupied.  Moreover  the majority of  newly 
created  jobs  in the  public  sector is not  targeted at  innova-
tions  (improvement  of  the  social  services)  but  is referred 
to  traditional areas  (Groupe  Interministerielle,  19R2). - 53  -
The  presented arguments,  however,  do  not  allow to  jump  to 
conclusions.  The  public  sector is,  compared  to  the private 
sector,  not  less productive  in any  case  and  by  no  means  ob-
solete.  In those areas,  in which  the  market  mechanism evi-
dent~ fails,  the  state sector has  to interfere,  not  only 
by  means  of  taxes  and  subsidies,  Qut  also  by  becoming direct-
lY_active.  This  view  is not  only  being  founded  by  referring 
to  emplo)~ent political effects,  but  by  the fact,  that allo-
cation lacks  of  the market  mechanism  and  considerations  on 
a  fair distribution of  income  do  demand  state activities. 
Pressing social needs  can  be  satisfied,  if the  performances 
of  the public sector are  being  expanded  (TUC,  1982;  House  of 
Lord  Committee  on  Unemployment,  1982;  Mauroy,  1982;  Groupe 
Interministerielle,  1982;  Memorandum,  1981/82).  Finally it 
has  also to be  seen,  that the state could  use  its  'locomotive-
effect'  thro~gh its entanglement with  the private sector 
(Kahn ,  1 9 7 7 ) . 
Empirically  founded  international  comparisons  establish the 
result,  that  a  statistically significant connection  between 
growth  dynamic  of  economy  and  the  scale of public expenditures 
does  not exist.  Without  any  question the  scale of  the  public 
sector  in the  here discussed countries differs,  this with 
regard  to the  employment  as  well  as  to the  expenditure  share 
in the  gross  domestic  product.  Both  following  tables  summarize 
the differences. r 
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Table  5:  Number  of  Employed  in the  Areas  of  not  Market-Assigned 
Services  in per Cent  of  all  Employed 
··---------------------------- ------- I 
Da.nrrark  France  Great-Britain  Federal RepubliC' 
----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
1975 
1979 
among 
them public 
services 
1975 
1979 
23,6 
16,9 
Source:  DIW,  1982 
17,5  21,1 
18,0  21,5 
Table  6:  Public  Income  and  Expenditure  in  % of  the 
Gross  Inland  Product,  1980 
16,6 
17,7 
13,9 
14,7 
Dannark  France  Great-Britain  Federal  Republi~ 
,expeOO.i. tures  62,1  52,1  54,6  48,1 
incare  55,5  52,5  50,3  44,5 
financing 
-6,6  +0,4  t:elance  -4,3  -3,6 
Minus-mark  means  a  financing deficit,  plus-mark  a  financing 
surplus. 
Source:  DIW,  1982 - 55  -
With  evident differences  as  to the  scale of  the  public sec-
tor  long-term correlation analysis  based  on  time  series  allows 
the  conclusion,  that  there  is  no  significant connection bet-
ween  growth  dynamic  of  economy  and  the  extent of state ac-
tivities  (DIW,  1982) ;  for reasons  of  national  differences  in 
the  system of  production,  training of  labour  force,  histori-
cally grown  areas of  intervention of  the  state  and  the  social 
attitude towards  state intervention the  scale of public inter-
ference  for  the solution of  allocation--,  distribution- and 
stabil1ty problems  follows  national  characteristics.  The  the-
sis of  a  general  inferiority of  the public sector compared 
·to the private sector cannot  be  accepted. 
The  question of  the  efficiency of  an anticyclically structured 
financial  policy qua  variation of  public  expenditures  is 
being  answered  in modern  scientific literature beyond  tradi-
tional  and  balance orientated  keynesian models.  Recent  work 
on  microeconomically  founded  macroeconomy  and  of the  third 
generation of modern  macroeconomy  have  proved,  that the ef-
ficiency of anticyclically designed expenditure  programmes  can 
only  be  conceived insufficiently in using  simplified equili-
brium  models  of  the traditional  Keynes-understanding.  The 
old question of  Keynes  "is the  economic  system self-adjusting" 
requires  the analysis of  inbalance  models  (Malinvaud,  1977~ 
Phelps,  1970;  Hahn,  1973~  Peston,  1980;  Buiter,  1980;  Artis, 
1979;  Artis/Green/Leslie/Smith,  1982).  At  this point the  theo-
retical debate  has  not  to  be  presented in details.  Empirically 
founded  considerations  on  employment  effects of public  spen-
ding policy predominantly relate to  •crowding-out-effects'. 
Crowding-out  effects are  to  be  defined as  a  possible displace-
ment  of private activity under  expansive  fiscal  policy.  The 
crowding-out-effects  can  be  transferred  by  increasing interest 
rates,  effects  on  private property  composition  and  by  - under 
increasing inflation rates  - induced  external  trade factors. 
Empirically  founded  studies  on  crowding-out effects are avai-
lable.  Those  relate to the  simulation of policies in econome-- 56  -
trically founded  macro  models.  The  experiences  in the  Fede-
ral  Republic  and  Great  Britain reveal,  that only  negligible 
crowding-out  effects have  to  be  presumed  (Bladen/Hovel!, 
19S2:  Artis/Green,  1982;  DIW,  1982). 
IJrc2Jsc  qua:r.titC~tive analyses  on  employment  effects of  varia-
tions  of  public expenditures  are  hard  to  compare,  because 
the  1nterconnect1ons  in  the  macro  system qua rnultiplier-
a~d accelerator effects,  the already mentioned  crowding-out 
effects  and  the  reactions of wages  and  prices as  well  as  the 
external  trade  impulses  have  to be  calculated.  Yet  empirical 
studies  confinr.,  that an extensively operating public  spending 
po 1 icy clearly re-\?eaJ s  employment  effects  (DIW,  1982;  Carn-
brldq~ Econom1c  Policy  Group,  1981;  moderate:  Artis/Green, 
198:).  Estimations  which  have  not  been  elaborated  on  basis 
of  simulatio~ developments  by  using macroeconomic  models, 
arc  in general  eve~ more  optimistic.  Thus  for Great Britain 
an  i~crease of  th~ employTient  level  of  677.000  jobs  is as-
sumed  given  that the  expenditure  volume  amounts  to  8,3 bill. 
UKl  (TUC,  1982),  other analysis  also indicate positive ef-
fects  on  the  employment  level  through  an  increase of state 
expenc i tures  (f:-iouse  of  Commons,  1979) •  In  the  Federal  Re-. 
.2_ublic  the call  for  an  expansion  of  public activities refers 
to experiences  gained  in connection with  the  'programme  for 
the  improvement  of  construction and  other  investments'  and 
the  'prograrmne  for  future  investments'  (Spitznagel,  1976; 
Mei~ner/Hodl,  1982;  Roth,  1982;  more  critical:  Tofaute,  1977). 
As  far  as  exr~eriences with the  Fr~nch employment  policy since 
the  beginning  of  the  eighties arE  available,  it is to be  seen, 
that private growth  dynamic  could only  be  stimulated  to  a 
little extent  by  state activities  (Braner,  1982;  Mauroy,  1982). 
Yet1 actual  controversies  do  in the first place  not relate 
to  the  measurable  effects for  the  labour  market,  but  to the 
financial  -~_train  on  the ~lie  budge~ and  the  funding  of 
th~_ernplo_y:ni~:-n~.-~s,-·h,-~"T~e§.  (L 't:xpansion,  1981;  DGT,  1982;  Le 
Mende,  198 2) . - 57  -
In~ernational comparisons  make  clear,  that  the  reactions  of 
the  private sector to  a  stimulation of  the overall  demand 
varies  according to the  individual  country.  On  the  basis  of 
considerations  on  the  Okun's  law  (Okun,  1975)  it can  be  exa-
mined,  how  an  increasing volume  of  production,  resulting 
from  a  successful  demand-oriented  expenditure policy,  is 
translated into employment.  Evidently enterprises  can  reach 
an  increase of  the  volume  of  production gua three strategies: 
working  time  can  be  prolonged,  productivities  can  be  im-
proved  by  rationalization investments  and  organizational 
changes,  the  employment  level  can  be  increased.  For  some 
countries it is proved  that  there  are dispersing  tendencies 
between  economic  growth  and  employment.  This  refers to the 
fact,  that companies  tend  to react with working  time  and 
productivity  increases  instead with  an  expansion of  the  em-
ployment  level.  Those dispersing  tendencies  are  noticeable 
for  the  Federal  Republic  within the  scope  of the here dis-
cussed  countries  (Bolle,  1979;  Bolle,  1983). 
The  strongest ·critique on  antieyclical public  spending 
#aiming  at  the  increase of the  employment  level is being 
presented by  a  monetaristic orientated economy policy.  The 
considerations relate to the  following  mechanism:  according 
to  a  Phillips-curve of  short-term stability higher  inflation 
rates  are  to  be  expected under  an  expansive  expenditure po-
licy.  Do  the  economic  subjects anticipate the  increasing in-
flation rate,  t·hey will adapt  their behaviour. - 58  -
A  short-term ~ncrease of  the  employment  level  will  then  be 
wasted,  and  the  economy  falls  back  to  the  "natural  unemploy-
ment  rate".  Meanwhile  the literature on  this topic  has 
reached  such  a~ enormous  amount,  that here it is only  referred 
to  the  excellent  survey of  Santornero/Seater  (Santomero/Sea-
ter,  1978).  The  answer  to the question  if an  expansive  pub-
lic expenditure policy is likely to fail  due  to anticipated 
price expectations,  finally depends  on  the question if the 
concept of  rational price expectations  and  the  ''natural  rate 
of  unemployment"  can  be  regarded  as  making  sense.  On  the 
other hand  it is to consider,  that  human  beings  can  not  be 
stored like machines  and  can  not  be  ordered to  work  on  call 
or not.  This  also gives  actual  meaning  to the  phrase  initial-
ly stated  by  Keynes  ~'in  the  long  run  we  are all dead";  a 
young  person cannot  be  comforted  by  referring  to the  employ-
ment  chances  in 10 years. 
Even if an  expansive  public spending policy can  be  substan-
tiated employment politically  ~llocational effects  have  to 
be  considered.  The  dilemma  of  public demand  orientated policy 
is easy to  recognize.  Do~_§---~--...!2..21-i~  of  demand  stimulg_tion 
"'[~lf!:  __  t_o  sho\!.._  short-term success,  the distribution of  pub.J..ic 
expenditures  has  to be  aimed at  those areas  which  suffer 
~p~cial employmen~_pr,QQ~ (Bolle,  1977).  This  can easily 
lead to  a  perpetuation  of antiquated  : production structures 
and,  thus,  consequently to  a  long  term  subsidization of 
jobs.  Thus,  an  extensive  expenditure policy of  present days 
has,  on  the  one  hand,  to have  in  Vlew  short-term employment 
and  has,  on  the other  hand,  to provide  stimuli  for an  up-
dating  of  economy  {Bolle,  1977;Scharpf,  1980;  Tofaute,  1982). 
Finally it has  to be  taken  into account,  that an  effective 
extensive  financial  policy might  be  followed  by  skill require-
ments  which  do  not  coincide with  the skills the  unemployed 
dispose of.  Therefore  an  expensive  spending policy has  to 
be  flanked  by  measures  for  the  promotion  of mobility and 
flexibility of  the  labour  market  (Bolle,  1979;  Mertens,  1982). - 59  -
Even  though  these  considerations are accepted  on  theoretical 
level  they  appear  to be difficult to  implement  on  the prac-
tical-political  level.  The  experiences  gained  from  the  fu-
ture  investment  programme  in the  Federal  Republic  but  also 
the  experiences  gained  from  the expenditure policy  in France, 
but primarily the  lay-out of  the  Danish  spending policy of 
public hand  should be encouraging.  Public  e·xpendi ture  programmes 
should  be  targeted  towards  those  areas,  where  there  is  a  con-
siderable social  need  and  profitable market  dynamic  can  be 
developped  in  longer  terms  (MeiBner/Hodl,  1981;  HWWA,  1981). 
French  spending  policy tries to link employment  policy with 
allocation policy  by  designing expenditure  programmes  at 
certain areas.  Target projection is the accelerated  re-gai-
ning  of  the  domestic  market by  a  structural alteration of 
the  industry  and  an  improved  competitiveness  in export by 
means  of productivity increases,  the updating  of the  techno-
logical  level  of production  and  products  as  well  as  a 
priority scale  for  social services  (Mauroy,  1982).  Danish 
employment  policy within the  scope  of  the  employment  plan 
and  the action  programme  are characterized by their special 
selectivity,  aiming at  a  rniddle  and  a  long-term structural 
improvement  of  Danish  economy.  Thus,  chief target of the 
employment  plan II is to strengthen the  competitiveness of 
various  economic  sectors  and  to enable  them to  integrate 
new  technological  development.  At  the  same  time  the develop-
ment  of  energy  saving measures  and  alternative energy  supply 
is to  be  promoted  (Danish Ministry of  Labour,  1981;  Kjaers-
gaard,  1982).  In particular the  employment  programme  II,  the 
action programme  and  the  "Investerings-Programm  '82"  seem 
to hold  the possibility of  combining  short-term effects with 
long-term structural  improvements. With  regard  to  a  reasonable 
energy policy an  improvement  of  the  balance of  payment  is 
possible  in  long  terms,  measures  for  the  clearance of  slum 
areas  and  city modernisation  show  good  employment  effects 
and  are of  social political relevance,  structural  improve-
mentsof  the  transportation net contribute the  mobility of - 60  -
labour  force  (Danish  Ministry of  Labour,  1981;  Kjaersgaard, 
1982). 
Controversial positions  on  public  spending policy either 
monetaristically substantiated or keynesian  inspired have 
to  be  cautiously evaluated.  Nevertheless  available  studies 
and  the  experiences  gained  from  actual policies  seem  to 
suggest  that demand  oriented,  extensive public  spending 
policy cannot  be  dispensed with.  Yet,  an  exten-
sive public  spending policy at least requires 
- the  international  cooperation of  the  European  Commission 
countries  and 
- support  through  an  extensive monetary  policy 
As  the  example  France  illustrates,  financial  problems  have 
to  be  faced  qu1te  soon,  if,  within bounderies  of  the  EEC, 
one  country alone  tries to stick to an  extensive  spending 
policy.  Subsequent  to  a  probable deterioration of  the  ba-
lance  of  trade  and  payment depreciations will  become  neces-
sary,  which  are  not  likely to  remain  uncontradicted  by  the 
other countries.  The  recent experiences  of all countries 
here  discusses being confronted with  the effects of  high 
interest rates,  in particular induced  through the  USA,  re-
veal  the  necessity of  a  monetary political support of  an 
expansive  spending policy.  Interest has  a  double  function: 
one  is to  control  the  international  flow  of  capital  and  the 
other  is  to  influence  the private overall  demand  on  the 
domestic market.  Further  a  high  interest rate adds  difficul-
ties to  the  funding  of  public expenditure  programmes.  A 
stronger  commitment  of  the  growth  of  money  supply  and  inter-
est rates  to the  requirements  of  an  extensive  employment 
policy  is  necessary  at  international  cooperation. 
With  particular emphasis  evaluations of  public  spending  po-
licy in Great  Britain refer to  the  necessity of  an  income • 
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politically safe-guarding of  Keynesian  d~d-orientated mana-
gement  (Artis et al.,  1982).  Without  denying  the  necessity 
of  an  income  politically safe-guarding of  the  open  flank 
of  Keneysian  policy which  does  hold  the  possibility of  con-
trolling demand  but  riot  the cost development,  comparisons 
between  the here discussed  countries are  hardly possible. 
The  openess  of  the  income  political flank  is too strongly 
dependend  on  the  system of  industrial relations  in 
the  countries dealt with here  • - 62  -
4.  Promotion  of  private  investment 
In  France  a  far-reaching  system of  investment  promotion  in 
the  private sector within  the  scope  of  reagional  policy has 
bee~ devclopped.  The  Mitterand  government  links to policies 
and  experiences  of  the  70s.  The  regional  promotion  of  the 
70s  has  had  clear  employment  effects.  (Ministry of  Labour, 
l982a,b).  The  programmes  relate to  a  specific  regional 
promoting  elements  (PDR)  ,  the promotion  of  the  settlement 
of  industries  (rLAT) ,  the  promotion of  research  (PLAR)  and 
the  promotion of  urbanisation.  Priority was  clearly given 
to political measures  in the  frarne~work of  the  PDR. 
In ·~ga·t Br  1_tain  promotion of  investment  had rrost.ly been arrl is 
being practiced within  the  scope  of regional  policy.  The 
•  most  important  instruments  for  this are  the areasfor expan-
sior:',  .speciflcd  lL  the  1972  Industry Act  and  the  1973  Em-
p loy:nent  Act,  the  number  of which  has,  however,  been  reduced 
ln  l'.ngust  1982.  According  to  a  scale of  urgency  those are 
subdivided  into Special  Development  Areas,  Development  Areas 
and  Intermediate Areas.  In  addition  to this  a  number  of pro-
graiTmes  offering support  for  innovation  investment  are of 
importance.  But  also the  tax  system provides  specific 
amortisation possibilities for  innovative  investments.  The 
system of  investment  promotion  in the private sector is supple-
mented  by  the  establishment of enterprise  zoned.  Those  poli-
tlcal measures  lntroduced  in  the  beginning  of  the  80s,  base 
on  the  assumptior..  t-hat  government  intervention are obstruc-
tive  to  investment.  Accordingly  they are  reduced  in enterprice 
zones,  only  secondarily this political measure  relates to 
monetary  incentives. 
The  Fedt:~r9]  __ ._8.t:'_P_!:!_t?_J._~_g_  operates cxtensi  ve  political  packages 
for  the  promotton  :E  private  investment.  The  investment  grant, 
.subsidies,  a~ortisation possibilities,  tax policies  and  all - 63  -
instruments  of  regional  economy  promotions  aim at the sti-
mulations  of private  investment  activities_.  Emphasis  is put 
on political measures  of  investment grants  as  anti-cyclically. 
effective  financial  political  inst.rurnent  and  on  the  promo-
tion of  regional  economy  structures.  As  anti-cyclical ele-
~Jents the  investmehts  grant-systems  have  been  used  twice. 
1974.  CU1  investment grant  model  has  been  iDJ,I.)lemented  far 
_6 mQnths  amounting  to  7.5%  of  the production costs.  Within 
bounderies of  the  employment  promotion act  1982  10~~  of  the 
investmentsum  has  been  granted for  the  period of  one  year 
if the  investments  exceeded  the average  investment  of  the 
last  3  years.  An  additional  investment  volume  of  40  bill.DM 
had  been  expected.  In the Federal  Republic  the  promotion of. 
private  investment within  the  scope  of  regional policy is 
~iz~d  on  the  basis of  the  common  task  "improvement  of  the 
L~:lon~_~conomic structure".  The  Federal  Republic  obtains 
financial  means  of  the  European  Community-Regional  Fund. 
Within  the  frame-work  of  the  common  task  "improvement  of  the 
regional  economic  structure"  the  lOth  scope  plan,  valid  from 
1981 till 1984  intends  the  promotion of  72  900  to be  created 
and  the  promotion of  209  200  jobs to be  maintained.  As  before, 
this  is to  be  performed  by  the possibility of  increased 
amortisation,  differentiated according  to  the quality of  the 
promotion area,  by  tax  free  investment grants  and  allowances. 
This  type  of  subsidisation is being  commended  with regard 
to its target  se~ting and  administrative  coordination as 
against  to other  forms. 
Scientific discussion  on  general  investment grants primari-
ly refers to experiences,  gained  from  the  investment  grants 
in the  FedeLal  Republic.  Arguments  relate  to  3  problem 
fields: 
- technical details of  the  implementation of  investment  grant 
systems - 64  -
-·  short-term effects with  long-term expectations 
- emplo=·.ment  effects  assuming  dead-weight-effects. 
r  .... s  "one  step  towards  the right direction"  (Employers  Associa-
tion  Comment)  investment grant  systems  are oftenly critized 
by  reviewing their technical  implementation conditions.Is 
the  financial  pressure  exerted on  enterprises being perceived 
as  chief  reason  for existing  investment barriers,  a  funda-
mentally  positive  judgement  of  investment grants  can  be  ex-
pected  (Council  of Advisors,  1981/82;  Association of  Economic 
Research  Institutes,  1982).  This critic  refers to the  tem-
porary limitation of  the  investment grants,  to  the discrimi-
nation of sizable  technical projects with  a  longer  running 
time,  the  funding  of  investment grants  under  increasing 
financial  strain on  federal  governments  and  communities  and 
the discrimination of  smaller  compan~~s on  behalf of  their 
averagely  smaller  investment  volume. 
Other positions point to the  sales- and  profit-expectations 
in  longer  terms  as  essential variable  influencing entrepre-
neural  investment  decisions.  Short-term and anti-cyclically 
operating  investment grants do  not  have  an  impact  on  long-
term expectations,  thus  the  investment  volume  is not likely 
to rise  (Memorandum,  1982~  Tofaute,  1982;  DIW,  1982; 
Gerstenberger/Neumann,  1976;  GErstenberger,  1977;  Hemmerich, 
1982). 
Thus  it heavily  depends  on  the question if the  investment 
volume  increases or only  dead-weight  effects -are  to 
observe,  if and  to which  extent  investment grant  systems 
induce  employment  effects.  Skepticism predominates:  the 
anticipation  of trose investments which also would  have l:een un-
dertaken without  investment  grant  systems,  is to find as  well 
as  a  clearly uneven  distribution of  investment:  While  a 
overproportional  increase of  receipts of orders  in the motor-
vehicle  construction  took  place  due  to  subsidizing business - 65  -
and  duty  cars  (Stabbatin,  1977),  decisions  on  long-term 
planned  innovative  investments  had  not  been  influenced  by 
the  investment grant.  The  selectivity of  investment decisions 
does  not favour  long-term profitable  investment.  Dead-
weight- and  time-lag effects dominate.  Based  on  these  con-
~-ide  rations  and  recognized mechanism s\JCh  concepts llave been de-
veloped rt'.at tie the  investment grants to stricter criteria 
for  energy  saving  and  energy substituting investments  as 
well  as  for  smaller  and rrediurn  sized  companies  (Roth,  1982) . 
Consideration  of  dead-weight- and  displacement-effects 
of  a  regional politically  founded  investment  promotion 
examplarily  refere  to Great Britain.  The  concept of  pro-
motion,  based on  the establishment  on  enterprise  zones  only 
seems  to  have  generated  "windfall profits 
11  (Taylor,  1981) • 
Since  a  number  of  investments  is not  undertaken  by  new,  but 
by  ready existing companies,  leaving old production places, 
the  dead-weigh~and displacement-effects  are  intensified. 
Additionally the  establishment of  enterprise  zones  leads  to the 
displacement of non-subsidized companies  by  subsidized  com-
panies  (Tayler, 1981).  Similar experiences  apply  to the  FOR-
programme.  The  presumably most  important  study  (F~ench 
Ministry of  Labour,  1982)  establishes  the result,  that. the 
economic  power  and  employment  could have  only  been  increased 
in  longer  terms in one third  of  the  survey_ed  regions.  The  in-
tended  promotion of  the  industrial sector hardly  succeeded. 
Finally it is printed to the  complicated allocation procedure. 
Employers  prefer aids  by  means  of  tax concessions  (French 
Ministry of  Labour,  1982,  b). 
On  the whole  it can  be  summarized,  that the promotion of 
private  investment within the  system of  regional  promotion 
can  only  serve  the  al~viation of unevenly distributed disadvan-
tages.  As  growth policy it seens to  be  of  little success.  This 
is also true  for tllvcst·ment  grant-systems operating anti-
.cyclically and  in  short-term. - 66  -
II  RESTRIBUTION  OF  AVAILABLE  WORK-LOAD 
Stagnent growth  rates of  economy  together with  increases 
in productivity constitute the  background  for  prognosis  about 
- constant working  time  provided  - a  further  gap  between  the 
supply  and  demand  of  jobs  (Klihl,  1983;  Ministere  du Travail 
1982a,b;  OECD,  1982).  Thus,  in all surveyed countries stra-
tegies  for  the  reduction of working  time  are discussed as  a 
major  employment  political option.  Beside  the degree of the 
potential employment  political effect also the  time,  extent 
and  form of working-time  reduction are heavily disputed. 
Of  all surveyed countries only France  has  introduced mea-
sures  for  the  reduction of working-time  qua  legislation and 
bargaining agreements  to  a  large extent.  In all other coun-
tries it is limited to isolated single measures.  In the 
Federal  Republic  the  reduction of working-time  has  come  to 
a  standstill during  the  last years,  legislative initiatives 
are primarily to be  expected concerning  reduction of life-
time  working-time.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  inter alia the 
creation of part-time  jobs is promoted,  in  Denmark  an  early 
retirement  (60  years)  has  been  made  possible,  all other ways 
of working-time  reduction are  subject to  - as  in all other 
countries  - political and  scientific discussions.  Within  the 
academic  debate it is uncontrvoersial,  that  a  reduction of 
working  time  could relieve the  labour market  yet  the esti-
mation  as  to which  extent differ.  As  a  rough  figure it is 
quoted  an  increase  in demand  (which  can  be  satisfied by  the 
hidden  reserve or  the  labor market)  of  60%.  This  ffgure,  how-
ever,  is based on  experiences  gained  from  past reductions 
of working-time  (Belle et al.  1982a,b;  Mertens  1982;  Metcalf - 67-
1982;  Lesley  and  Wise,  1980).  Thus,  the real problems  that 
emerge  j1 connexion with  a  reduction of working-time,  can 
be  illustrated the best  by  referring to the  French  example. 
National  specific characteristics of the other countries 
will  be  presented thereupon. 
First scientific evalutation of the  economic  policy which  is 
adopted  since  1982,  prove  the  success of  ~!~~measures. 
The  limitation of over-time work  is regarded  as  a  special 
employment  po 1_itical effect;. ·:the  potential net  employment 
effects are estimated at  50  000 persons  (L'Usine nouvelle, 
2/1981). 
The  effect of  the  39-hour week  is being  jugded  ambivalently. 
In  particular,  the question of wage  compensation  is heavi-
ly disputed:  on  the  one  hand  prognoses  - based  on  experiences 
gained  so  far  - are  presented that there is a  reciprocal  re-
lation between  wage  compensation  and  employment effects.  On 
the other hand  trade unionist representatives  (CGT,  CFDT) 
print  to  the  pos~ive macro-economical  feed  back effects 
of  a  wage  compensation.  At  least the maintenance  of  the overall 
demand  is considered as  being absolutely necessary  for  the 
expansion of production  and  employment. 
The  legal option  between  an  one-hour  reduction of working-time 
or  the  payment  of  an  overtime  allowance  would  have  led to 
lower  production  in cases of working  time  reduction  and  in 
cases of overtime  allowances  to  a  rise in costs  (~'Usine 
nouvelle,  29/1981).  Optimistic estimates are  supported by 
studi~s of  the  CEE,  that prove  that the  increases of pro-
ductivity subsequent  to higher working  motivation,  the  re-
duction of  the  rate of  absence  and  work  accidents  as well 
as  rationalization measures  would  have  compensated  the  ad-
ditional costs  (see o.p.,  Pernet,  1981;  Duval,  1982;  for 
United  Kingdom:Lesly  and  Wise,  1980;  for  the  Federal  Republic: 
Bolle et al.  1982  a,b). - 68  -
The  company's  adoption of  reduced working-time  is accompanied 
by  drastic modifications of  the work-organiszation  (Le  Due, 
1982;  Duval,  1982)  Yet,empirical  studies  have  established 
as  results that in principle there are  no  technical  and 
organisational obstacles agalnst  a  further  reduction of wor-
king-time.  Completely different  forms  of work  organization 
Ior an  improved  utilization of plants  (e.g.  expansion of the 
production  time  under  the  introduction of  new  shift-systems) 
have  to be  expected. 
Concerning  the different  types of  agreements  of working-time 
reduction  as  set up  in the  'solidarity contracts'  the  follo-
wing  results are available:  the solidarity contract  ·~arly 
~tiremens' has  had  positive effect.  The  employment effect 
is estimated at ca.  100 000.  The  scherr.e  finds  the approval  of 
employers  artd  employees,  which  is also mirrowed  by  the 
high percentage of early retirement arrangements within  the 
'solidarity contract'.  These  regualtions offer several  ad-
vantages  for  employers:  dismissal of elder employed  seems 
to be  financially  favourable  because  the costs are minimized. 
At  the  same  time  processes of restructuring have  been  made 
easier for  employers.  Though  companies  ar obliged to  keep 
up  the  employment  level,  they  are  by  no  means  obliged to 
employ  the  same  skills  (Europen  Industrial  Review,  1982). 
Thus  not  only trade  union  representatives express their 
fear,  that the early retirement  system  runs  the risk  o~ 
lowering the qualification level. 
The  fact that weekly  working time  reduction has  hardly been 
subject of  'solidarity contracts  so  far,  is being explained 
with  insufficient financial  incentives expecially for  in-
dustrial sectors  (Rigaudiat,  1982;  Bevan,  1982). 
The  solidarity contract  'part time  pension'  as well  as  the 
expansion of part-time work  in general  is not very success-
ful  regarding employment  effects.  Problems  concerning the - 69  -
organization of work  as  well  as  an  increase of  fixed  costs 
related  to  the  individual  employee  would  have  prevented  em-
ployment  effects  so  far. 
Thus, sumrnerizing1  a  reduction of working  time  was 
su~cessful in  those  cases  in which  (as  in  some  solidarity 
contracts)  i.t  was  linked to an  expansion  (resp.  mainte-
nance)  of the  number  of employees  together with  a  simulta-
neous  cost relief for  employer~  (Mercerau,  1982). 
The  expansion of part-time work,  introduced  1980 with the 
part-time act  for  employees  in the private sector,  is also 
being  jugded ambivalently.  Proponents of this measure  are 
refering to  the  labour market  situation and  point out that 
only one  job is offered  for  five  part-time  job  seekers.  They 
also plead  for  improved  legal conditions  for  part-time work. 
Critical voices,  especially expressed by  union  representa-
tives  base  their argument  on  a  clause which  is likely to 
modify both positive evaluations.  Subsequent  to  the  new  law 
the  establishment of  new  part-time  jobs  (all  jobs done  be-
low  the  normal  working  time)  does  not  need  the  approval  of 
the  Committee  of  the Enterprise  (Comite  d'Entreptise)  any 
more,  hence  it can  not be  prevented that full-time  jobs are 
substituted by part time  jobs. 
Undoubtedly  the situation on  the part-time  job market  has 
been  eased temporarily by  the  increase of employment  in the 
service  bectcr.  As  to which  extent the  assumed  st.ostitutional  ---- -~ __  .... _  __..._ 
.effE:_ct~  __ }1..aV:c..AS!  been materialized,  the qualification  structure 
of part-time work  has  improved  and  the  new  part-time  jobs 
~uarantee a  secure ocaupation  in  the  long  run,  has  not  been 
~~~~~-~-9.  ..  -~Eff_~_s:ie~- so  far  (Fiechter,  1981;  Archambault,  1981; 
Pt:.EE~:~::.! ..  ~.~ 9~--1~!.-~issenschaftszentrum Berlin,  1982'. In  the  United  Kingdom  similar steps were  taken with  the 
Job  Release  Scheme  as  with  the early retirement  incorpo-
rated  in the  'solidarity contract':  The  Job  Release  Scheme 
is linked to condition that  for  every employee,  who  gives 
up  his  job,  a  new  employee  has  to  be  hired.  Replacement 
must  not  be  dircet,  i.e.  employers  can fill the  vacancy 
through internal promotion  and  put  the  new  employee  to the 
end  of  the  line. 
Since  employer  have  the possibility to evade  the hiring  con-
troll,  about  30%  of  jobs opened  due  to the  programme  are 
not  filled  (Layard,  1981). 
In  Denmark  a  similar result is established with  a  volunta~ 
earlv retirement without obligatory  re~hiring  (Kjaersgaard, 
1982;  Det  ¢konomiske  R~d,  1982).  Those- overall- positive 
experiences with the·early retirement ,revitalized the dis-
cussion  about  a  reduction of life-time working  time  also 
in the Federal  Republic. 
Considering,  however,  that  in 1980 only  264  000  men  aged  60 
to  65  were  employed  (women  generally are not  considered  in 
this new  regulation,  since their legal retirement  age  is 
60)  actual  take  up  should be  considerably  lower.(cf.  Backer 
and  Naegele  1981).  Pealistic assumptions  estimate that only 
110  000  persons  wo~ld make  use  of early retirement.  On  the 
reasonable  assumption of  a  70%  rate of filled vacancies  and 
that  20%  of  this  ~rould be  recruited  from  the  hidden  reserve 
"a  reduction of registered unemployment  by  61  600  persons 
is foreseen.  This  cost account would  accordingly turn out 
to  be  considerably worse  than that calculated by optimistic 
proponents  (Vilmar,  1982):  While  the  retirement  insurance 
would  be  charged trith  an  additional  DM  1.716  billion,  unem-
ployment  insurance  would  only be  relieved by  DM  739.2  billion. 
This  would necessarily have  to be  financed  by  reducing  pen-
sions  and  raising contributions. -7 1  -
But  other disadvantages  of early retirement are  pointed out 
as  well.  Older  persons  could be marginalised  in the  long 
run,  the  companies'  age  structure could be  changed,  rationa-
lizations would  thus  be  encouraged  (Blume  et al.,  1979). 
The  latter arguments  would  also  be  true  for  reductions of re-
tirement  a0e  by  bargaining agreements.  Aggravating thing 
furth_er  would  be  that  only  financially  sound  firms  would 
be  able  to  cope  with  the additional costs  incurred.  An  ef-
fect necessarily detrimental  to the  social order would  be 
the  further dispersal of  the  retirement  age  system  (compare 
with  Backer  und  Naegele,  198~). 
On  the whole it can  be  summarized  that measures  for  the re-
distribution of available work-load  by  means  of  a  reduc-
tion of working-time  are  - under deteriorating employment 
problems  in middle-terms  - of  growing  importance  in all 
survey  countries 
On  Companie's  level,  the cost problem can partially be  com-
pensated  through  productivity gains.  Yet,  isolated strate-
gie.s  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  cpmpeti  tion conditions 
of  branches  or states.  Thus,  a  coordinated iniative is to 
recommend. - 7 3-
'III  ADAPTATIO~ STRATEGIES 
Of  adaptation  strategies discussed  - a)  the adaptation of 
the skills of  labour  supply to  demand,  b)  the  promotion of 
regional  mobillt.y  and  c)  the  improvement  of  employment  ser-
''jce efficiency  - the  adaptation of skills represents the 
most  important  set of  measures. 
ad  a) 
These  measures  had  already been  developed  in time~;  of  low 
unemployment  or skilled labour  shortage  in  ~11 countries. 
They  were  either designed as  ex-post  oriented retraining or 
further training  schemes  or as  long-range  adaptations  to 
technical  change.  With  the beginning  recession  in  the mid-70s 
and  aggravating  structural  labour market  problerrts  their func-
tion  changed:  Now  no  longer certain skill shortages are  seen 
by  employers· as  the err.ployabili  ty of specific  "problem groups 
11 
of  the  labour market  as  the youth,  the  low  skilled,  the  long-
term unemployment  nn~ women.  This  functional  chanae  can  be 
traced in all four  countries. 
In  Denmark  further  training courses  for all groups  of the 
wcrking population had  been  set up  on  a  large scale.  For  the 
latter a  strong selectivity is demonstrable:  It is primarily 
aiw.ed  at young  people  and  the  long-term  unemployed  and  only 
in  a  less degree  at women.  The  central  role of occupational 
training  in  Denmark  js also expressed  by  the  large network 
on  in-plant training  schemes  resting on  private initiative. 
Publicly sponsored  training schemes  have  grown  by  almost 
60%  between  1979  and  1981.  For  1982  a  further  increase of 
activities by  14%  was  planned.  This  was  inter alia to be  ob-
tained under  the  so-called March  Package.  Target  of the  March 
Package  is  a  training guarantee  for all young  persons.  It in-
cludes  the creation of  500  training and  work  experience 
plans  annually mainly  located  in  the  public  sector;  as  far 
as  possible  engagement  should  take place  in  areas  that - 74  -
importing  skills that allow participants to be  employed  in 
the private as  well  as  the  public sector afterwards.  The 
short3ge  of  training  and  work·experience  places  is  intended 
to  be  miligated  by  subsidizing training place offers.  Dead-
weight  is prevented  by strict application  requirements. 
The  socialist-communist  coalition government  in  France  adop-
ted the  instruments  of  its predecessor modifying  them  in 
certain points:  Employment-training contracts  were  marked-
ly  expa~ded,  the promotion of  in-plant work  experience  was 
initially dFastically reduced until this was  eventually abo-
lished  in the  latest  employment  pact.  The  duration of  the 
corresponding training  schemes  was  extended,  female  workers 
were  planned to be  incorporated  into the  promotion  more 
strongly.  In  the  programmes  operated  by  the  permanently 
existing public training centres  (AFPA)  a  shifting of  the 
emphasis  from  further  and  retraining to the training of 
young  people  can  be  observed.  From  1922-1975  total expendi-
ture grew  by  73%,  1975-1978  only  by  1%.  The  share of  funds 
for  the  integration and  training of  young  people  increased 
by  55%  between  1977  and  1980. 
In  Great  Britain the  system of occupational  training is sub-
ject to  a  large-scale  change.  The  New  Training Initiative 
(NTI)  is  in the  long  run  intended to effect an  increase of 
the skill level.  This  is to be  reached  by  two  ways:  Firstly 
by  improving  initial training;  secondly  by  improving  oppor-
tunities for  occupation further training. 
Falling with this  is  an  expansion of  already existing oppor-
tunities  such as  the  Youth  QEportuni~ies Proararnrne  (YOP), 
T,rainin_g_ fo_I:  SJs.i!J-s  -.:_CL_Pr_9gramm_~  __ for  Action  (T.5_?A)  <  Unified 
_yg_c_~_tiq_nal  Program~e  _iQyP)  ___ _?..nd _Training  Opportunities  Pro-
9!:.~!.t1n::~e  _(':f'_C?RS).  Largest  measure  is the  transformat-ion  of  YOP 
into the  Youth  Training  Scheme  (YTS)  there  by  putting  a - 75  -
greater emphasis  on  the training element.  The  YTS  guarantees 
(from  September  1983,  when  it will  be  fully operational) 
all unemployed  school  leavers  the  opportunity of  a  year-long 
basic training  intended to  improve  their employability by 
acquiring  a  sklll level  oriented along  generally  acknowled-
ged  occupational  requirement. 
More  important,  however,  than  the  YTS  is the  promotion  of 
occupational training according to recognized  standards  like 
e.g.  apprenticeship training.  For that on  the  one  side al-
ready  existing programmes,  UVP  and  TSPA  are  expanded  and  on 
the other hand  the already existing system planned to pro-
mote  occupational  training through the  Industrial Training 
Boards  (ITB)  will be  changed to the effect that  ITBs  will 
only  support  training programmes  meeting  thes.e  goals. 
The  Training Opportunities  Programme  (TOPS)  is mostly  con-
cerned with providing opportunities for  further  training. 
Under  this programme  a  number  of  schemes  is offered provi-
ding  the opportunity  to re- or further  training in  a  variety 
of  occupational  fields.  Following the general  trend this 
area has  been  also been  cut  in the last years  although 
it is still of great  importance providing  60  000  places an-
nually. 
The  Federal  Republic  is cutting  down  on  funds  for  re-training 
and  further  ~raining under  changed  labour market  conditions. 
According  to the growing  structural  problems  on  the  labour 
market  now  promotion  is concentrated on  problem groups,  thus 
to  improve their employability.  Career  promotion  and  the  con-
sideration of  individual  career aspirations have  been  re-
trenched.  Apart  from  further  education  and  re-training the 
re-integration of  unemployed  disabeld  and  otherwise disad-
vantaged  youths  is being  promoted. - 7 6  -
Accordinq  to  the  function  of_g~alification measures<  which 
l.LQD_tb_c~ one  l>and  to  consider the requirements  of  the  em~ 
pJo_ying  __ e_~d~  __ a!l_cL!:_Q_ tak_e  into account  skill deficits, of 
J2T.:"__9 b l  <~_l"D._  _  _g£_<2~§  _  _9_!::; __ t  h_~ _q~  f!_~  ___ }1 a n9  _  _,  scient  i fj.___c:_ d i !3 cuss  ions 
g_£_~---R~_;hn_g___f_Q_cu~QQ  ___ ...Q!l_t..f_aining  contents.  This  concerns  the 
question of  the  improvement  of  the  implacement  chances  of 
course participants,  their  long--term  employment  perspec-
tive and  the  importance  of  further education  (training) 
against  the background of  structural economical  problems. 
The  scientific debate  in the  Federal  Republic  serves  as 
an  example  for  similar basic positions. 
Positions  that  interprete the· above-average  percentage of 
unemployed  without  vocational  training as  a  function  of 
c:mployers' select.ivity processes,.  argue  that vocational 
training and  further training does  rise the allocational effi-
ciency but  does  - under  the  condition of  lacking  demand  -
not  induce global  employment  effects,  but  only  a  redistri-
but.ion  of unemployment.  According to  supply orientated ex-
planations  a  considerable part of  unemployment  is  'search 
unemployment'  resp.  'voluntary unemployment'.  Thus  the  improve-
ment  of  vocational  training would  automaticly lead to an  in-
crease  in  employment.  According  to the  so-called  'bottle-neck' 
theory,  th8  shortage of skills on  the  labour market  only  ham-
pers  growth potentials  in certain areas  (see  for this debate 
Schmid,  1982).  In particular small  and middle-size  companies 
seem  to suffer  from  such  bottle-neck skills(s.Schmid,  1980). 
A  pragmatic  posltion,  as  for  example  represented  by  Schmid 
(Schmid,  ~982)  supplies  arguments  in  support  of  short-term 
traininq measures.  In  spite of  the  impossibility to restore 
fuJl-E:rnployment  through  means  of  vocational  training measures,. 
·:_:--~i~·.  poJ.:..cy  vc:ric.r:te  is acceptable  as  labour market  political 
1 n.:.t rv:i;(.r,  :.. .  s 1 ·.- r·f~  it helps to  ea::-;c  the  labour market  temporari-
..,  ·.·  ::.rd  t:.:·;  t·,:_·~·.:-~erve  or  to  create the skill potential  for  an - 77  -
Apart  from  registering the target groups  evaluation studies 
deal with the outlet of  participants of training  schemes. 
A  sample  published by  the  Danish Ministry of Labour  about 
the outlet of  young  people after leaving the courses  for 
vocational  preparation established the result,  that  41%  of 
the participants took  up  a  job,  18%  work  in publicly spon-
sored  employment  projects,  23%  take part  in further trai-
ning  and  10%  are  subject to unemployment.  It is undisputed 
that the  implacement  chances  of participants of  these 
courses  do  have  improved. 
Similar results are established by  the  evaluation of  corres-
ponding  french  programmes:  51%  of the participants were  em-
ployed  10 months  after having  left the course.  Of  more  suc-
cess  was  the  linkage of vocational training and  working  by 
means  of  employment-training  contracts  and in-plant work  ex-
perience:  about  7  months  after the  end  of  employme~t-trai­
ning~Q~tract~ 79%  resp.  86%  of the participants still were 
employed.  For  the ~9.r~_ex.Eerj~~~~- the corresponding fi-
gures  amounted  to  62%  and  65%  for  resp.  six months  after 
leaving the training. 
Colin et al. (1981)  conclude  from  these results that proba-
tioners  have  been  recruited instead of  normal  employees. 
This  explains  why  a  great  number  of  probationers have  not 
been  dismissed after leaving the training contract. 
However,  they  are  emphasising  the negative  consequences: 
especially the  work  experience  has  hardly  reduced the 
insecurity of  the  employment  situation for  young  people. 
55%  of all probationers  left their company at the  end  of 
the  programm,  21%  found  a  new  job.  As  far  as  the work-trai-
ning  contract  is concerned the  number  of those  who  changed 
their company,  14%,  was  markedly  smaller. - 78  -
The  efforts of qualification adaptation processes  within  the 
traditior.dl  frame-work  of  AFPA.  which are also accessable  for 
non-youth  are  jugded  even  more ·criticly.  Thus,  1979,  28%  of 
all participants  of work  experience  organized  by  the 
AFPA  were  unemployed  6  months  later.  1974  this rate had  only 
amounted  to  5~7~. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  employment  quota within the  frame 
work  of  the  Youth  Opportunity  Programme  (YOP)  differs widely 
dependi.ng  on  the  individual  programme.  The  employed  percen-
tage of  leavers of  YOP  is just under  35%  in case of  WEEP 
(Work  Experience  on  Employer's  Premises),  for  PBWE  (Project 
Based  Work  Experience)  appr.  15%,  for  TW  (Training Work 
Shops)  belOiN  30%  and  for  CS  (Community  Service)  below  35% 
for  school  leavers  and  below  10%  for  non-school-leavers 
(all  figures  from  O'Connor,  1982). 
The  participants of TOPS-courses  are predominantly  unemployed 
persons  (O'Connor,  1982:  52.5%,  MSC,  1982:  80%).  59%  are men 
41%  women.  Courses  teaching technicals are mostly taken  by 
y0unger  male  participants,while clerical  and  commercial  skills 
are mostly  acquired  by  older and  female  persons. 
The  mcvin0  into employment  after TOPS  is again  heavily de-
pendant  on  the  general  labour market  conditions.  Still  80% 
of participants are  in  employment  15  to  17  months  after com-
pletion  (in  comparison  68%  after  3  months);  only  6%  had  not 
~12ve  2r.y  nmp1 r)yn,ent,  that means  half of the  number  that 
could  hav~ been  expected without  TOPS  (O'Connor,  1982).  The 
skills gained  through  TOPS  are actually used  by  58  %  of  former 
TOPS  part;cj_pants.  This  number  is,  however,  decreasing  for 
some  fields  (o.g.  construction).  The  employment  distribu-
tion afrcr  TOPS  reveals  that more  th~n  40%  are  employed  in 
::  ~-~:i•pr1n l·  ,_.  f··rnp 1  c·y:i. ng  less  than  2 5  workers,  while  only  13% 
~=rk  ~n  c~~panics employing  more  than  500.  Also  remarkable • 
• 
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is the fact that more  than  60%  find  employment  one  month 
after completing  TOPS. 
For  the  Federal  Republic  evalutations are available for all 
programmes:  A  comparative  .analysiA  of participants and  non-
participants of work-preperation-schemes  reveals,  that the 
occupational  integration of course-participants is only  un-
considerably higher than the  integration of non-partici-
pants.  Against  this result it is held,  that both groups  are 
barely comparable,  thus  a  final  evaluation of the  success 
of  the course would  not  be possible  (see  Schober,  1980). 
The  percentage of  successful participants of  the  .. year of 
basic occupational  training"  is being  indicated with  69%r 
this  refers to the  share of youths,  which were  able to enter 
in another training  scheme.  84%  of those  have  found  an  in-
company-employment. 
The  duration of unemployment  after successfully completing 
training  schemes  decreases  by  an  average of  10.5 weeks  for 
further  education  schemes  and  by  12  weeks  on  average  for 
retraining compared  to  a  non-participants. 
11Success
11  is 
directly related to  age. 
In these  studies evaluated employment  adequate with regard 
to the training received is  an  important criterion for the 
~ffe~tivity of further  education.  About  70%  of  successful 
participants  had  been  adequately  employed  1  to  2  years after 
completion.  Whil~ the kind of measures  is relatively insig-
nificant with  regard  to  in-trade-placement,  training contents 
show greater differences.  The  effectivity of  re-training for 
employment  rehabilitation  shows  only  negligible  differences 
regarding  unemployment  or adequate after completion  to the 
placement  rates of  non-disable trainees  (cf.Hofbauer,  1981). - 80  -
Regarging  the  costs  of  vocational  further training  a  study 
of  Sch~ld  (Schmid,  1980)  is of  interest.  According  to this 
study the  costs per  avoided  unemployed  (DM  29.000)  are un-
considerably higher than  the costs per unemployed  for  the 
social insurance  system  (appr.  DM  25.000). 
Nevertheless  the training places defecit for  the  coming  years 
caused  by  cyclical as well  as  demographic  reasons  poses  a 
problem which  in .niddle terms  can only be  ~alleviated  by  an 
increased supply  of apprenticeships  by private industry.  Thus, 
CDU/CSU  and  FDP  propose to stimulate the privat initiative 
by  appeals,  social  contracts  and  reliefing companies  of the 
costs  of  training and  by taking back administrative  injunc-
tions  {CDU-Stellungnahme, 1982;  FDP,  1981),  (before the elec-
tion of the  new  governmentthese  appeals  appeared to materia-
lize).  Furthermore  increased subsidization or grants for 
companies  in case of  a  raised provision of training places 
are  being discussed.  Programmes  of this kind are operating 
on  regional  level.  Of  particular interest is a  programme  ope-
rating  in  Bavaria;  there  companies  training young  people with 
low  school  acquirements  in excess of their actual  needs  re-
ceive  a  grant of  DM  15.000 per training place- e.~ more 
money  than  they  pay  trainees to re-training.  The  DGB  (Bildungs-
politische  Informationen  7/81)  and  parts of the  SPD  (SPD-
Stellungnahme  1982)  favour  a  levy collected to finance training 
or  a  training liability by  companies. 
As  a  common  result of the  country-comparison it can  be  summa-
rised,  that  the  general  placement  chances  of  leavers of trai-
ning  coursE:s  heavily  depend  on  cyclical  conditions.  Yet
1the 
indivj_du~l employability can  be  strongly  improved,  a  fact 
~t.~h~.ch  i  :.~  irn:>r"Jrta.nt  with  regard to  a  strict target-group orien-
•. - 81  -
Further,  it has  been  revealed,  that it is advantageous  to 
tie training efforts to on-the-job-training in  form  of 
.1!:Q.~~-~~!"J_enc~-·- The  employment  rate of participants of 
corresponding  courses  is significantly high.  Nevertheless 
deadweight  effects are  ~  although  lktl'd  to quantify  - not 
to  exclude totally.  Thus, schemes  which impede  these  dead-
weight  effects are. to  recommend. 
A  general  lay-out  concerning curriculum and  training contents 
cannot  be  found.  In particular the  share  of general  resp. 
specific training contents  is being  disputed~  In practice 
this depends  on  country  - specific school  systems,  the 
economic  structural environment  and  the target group-specific 
conditions.  Since· a  high mobility  and  flexibility is demanded 
of  the participants trained out-of-plant as well  as  in-plant, 
·it is to  assume,  that the  share of general training has  to be 
high. 
The  available material  does  not prove  a  promotion of  invest-
ment  or of technological  changes  subsequent  to  improved 
skill  supply.  Yet,  such  long-term effects can  - regionally  -
not  be  excluded.  The  long-term positive consequences  for 
the  self-esteem of affected persons  and  the maintenance of 
their work ability are unquestionable. 
ad  b)  and  c) 
The  promotion  of  regional  mobili~ and  the  improvement  of 
the efficiency of  implacement  represent  a  minor  factor within 
the  here  discussed  problem  field.  On  the whole  the  readiness 
towards  mobility has  increased,  existing  unemployment 
is hardly attributed to  lacking mobility readiness  anymore. 
In  case of  France  where  the mobility allowances  have  been 
increased  this  instrument  experiences  a  functional  change: - 82  -
To  a  lesser extent it has  the  function  of  being  an  incen-
tive  fer  moving  house,  but  of alleviating hardships  due  to 
moving  and  changing  the  job.  Further mobility aids might 
gain  importance if they  are  outline~ as  travelling allowan-
ces,  to explore  the  supra-regional  labour market. 
The  improvement  of  the  implacement  system is a  continuing 
process,  aiming at an  increase of  information  and  decen-
tralization.  Especially  in France with  several uncoordinated 
implacement-j~stitutions the  reform of the  implacement 
channels  of the last years  ha$  proved  successful. - 83  -
IV  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
The  economic  discussions  and  the actual  economic  policies 
carried out  in the  countries dealt with  seem  to be  characte-
rized by  a  strange contrast.  On  the  one  hand  there 
is perplexity over  the question of  how  unemployment  can  be 
effectively countered by  government  policy.  This  perplexity 
is reflected in the  analyses  and  suggested policies which 
refer to 
11exogenous  causes".  The  concept of  exogenity  is 
usually referred to  in an  international  sense:  oil price 
rises or  recently also oil price decreases,  the  transfer of 
standardizable mass  productions  to expanding countries. 
Aggressive  export policies or  import restriction policies 
towards  other countries are  the  cause  of  those  exogenous 
shocks,  which,  together with  the demographically dependent 
development  of  the  size of  the  labour  force,  lead to un-
employment.  On  the  othe~ hand  there are patent recipes: 
traditional Keynesian  and  orthodox monetarists,  or rather 
supporters of  the  supply-orientated economic  policy offer 
radical  solutions.  Only gradually does  an  economic  concept 
(which  is able  to avoid  confusion  and perplexity)  appear  to 
emerge. 
Although considering  the  amount  of discussion and quantity 
of  positively reliable economic  investigations the question 
should be carefully considered,  it appears  that it is pos-
sible to reach  a  comprehensive verdict on  the  strength of 
the analytically and  empirically backed considerations dealt 
with. 
Those  who  have  confidence  in the  growth  dynamics  of  the pri-
vate  sector will be  disappointed,  as  is  shown  by  the example 
of Great Britain. A m::netary backed labour market and emplQ't.;nent policy 
or one  that is based  on  a  supply-orientated economic  theory 
will  certainly be  successful  in the fight against higher rates 
of  inflation.  The  costs of  this policy are,  however,  too 
high.  Those  following  an  economic  policy that is strictly - 84  -
based  on  combatting  inflation ·must  accept that unemployment 
will  rise  in  the  short or middle  term.  The  long  term effects 
are  not clear when  the  time horizon is undeterminable.Since 
demand  impulses  ar~ not  to  b~ expected  in supply  and  money 
supply-orientated economic  policies it remains  unclear as 
to  how  the  growth  dynamics  of  the  private sector  should be 
initiated if it is not  to  be  through cost relief and  an  im-
provement  of  the competivity.  This,  in  fact,  seems  to be  the 
only element  in  these  policy drafts.  The  hope  of  improving 
cornpetivity  in  fa...:e  of rivalry of  the  "beggar-my-neighbour" 
policies.  When  one  considers  the high external economic  com-
plexities  such  a  policy is naturally neither analytically 
justifiable nor politically stable. 
Even  the traditional Keynesian-orientated policy of  demand 
management  has  its limits.  Economic  developments  are  nowa-
days  characterized by  rapid structural developments  and glo-
bal  demand  management  is hardly equipped to cope  with  these 
structural developments.  In all the countries dealt with 
here  the  comparisons  made  between  the  situation during  the 
1970's and  the  development at the beginning of  the  1980's 
show  that the  employment  effects  of global  demand  manage-
ment  measures  has  decreased.  The  dilemma  facing traditional 
demand  management  in that it has  to be  successful  in the 
short term and at the  same  time  contribute to an  improvement 
of  the  economic  production  structures became  increasingly 
clearer towards  the  end of  the  1970's. 
~his does  not  !TI(:>"ln  that demand  management  measures  should be 
dispensed with.  On  the  contrary,  economists  should aim at 
attaining  a  connection  between  supply-orientated and  demand-
orientated economic  measures  which  would  solve  the  dilemma 
of  traditional demand  management.  The  example  of  Denmark  and, 
to  a  certain extent,  France  too  should  be  encouraging here. 
Demand  nt3n?gement  measures  can  be  structured  in  such  a  selec-
tive  way  that  they  focus  on  target groups within the  labour 
market  dl:d  a.r.e  connected with  the  stimulation of  those pri-- 85  -
vate  and  public  sectors which  show profitable growth  dyna-
mics  in the middle  term.  It has  not yet been  sufficiently ex-
plained by  economic  research as  to which  growth  sectors  in 
the countries dealt with could be  meant.  A  simple  reference 
to  improvement  of  the  produ~tion process  and  the  development 
of  intelligent products  is not  sufficient. 
A  selectively established expansive  policy which  considers 
the  supply  and  demand  aspects  does  not have  to be  limited 
to  the growth  sectors.  On  the contrary,  the  growth bearers 
must  be  determined.  Today  we  know  that company  growth  dy-
namics  can be differentiated between  according  to their size 
as well.  The  experiences  made  in the  USA  during  the  1970's 
as well  as  those  made  by  France  and  the Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  at the beginning  of  the  1980's almost  suggest that 
the  small  and  middle-sized firms  are  becoming  increasingly 
significant as  the  bearers of  growth  and  employment.  As  a 
result of the  experiences  made  it seems  that investigations 
should be carried out  into the  role of  small  and middle-
sized  firms  in growth  areas. 
One  of  the overall exonomic  supply conditions with  a  view to 
the  economic  policy is  important,  but only then  successful 
when it is used  in conjunction with  an  economic  and  socio-
political overall concept and  when  it attempts  to stabilize 
the expectations of  the  economic  subject under  consideration. 
As  the experiences  made  during  the  1970's in the countries 
dealt with  show,  the  middle  term structure of  an  expansive 
unemployment  policy is related to industrialists'  expecta-
tions  about  the middle  and  long  term profitibility of  the 
investments  made  into technical means  of production.  With 
the  increasing  significance of  industrialists'  investments 
in  company  spezific human  capital this aspect of expectancy 
stabilisation is also relevant to the  production  factor 
work.  Stop-and-go policies which  also try to correct slight 
deviations  from  the  path of virtue are  more  damaging  than  a 
constant,  expansive  employment  policy aimed at the middle 
ter~. - 86  -
The  socio-economic  total concept  already mentioned refers 
to the  necessity of  international cooperation with  a  view 
to money  security and  external  economic  conditions,  income 
policy orientated towards  target groups  within  the  labour 
market. 
'I'hc  experiences  made  in  recent  years  with  employment  policy 
in all the countries dealt with  show  that scope  for  an  ex-
pansive,  employment-effective expenditure policy can only 
be  used if it is backed  by  monetary policy.  A  hi~h interest level 
hampers  the  financing,  additional public expenditure and 
the external  economic  security,  gained by  the offsetting 
the balances of payments.  The  objective of this  study is not 
to point out the monetary rules supporting  an expansive 
budget policy within  international cooperation.  Merely  the 
necessity of  monetary  security within  international coope-
ration should be mentioned. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  1970's the  economic  discussion as 
well  as  the  economic  political practice  (above  all due  to 
pressure  from  the  USA)  held  the  theory that developed  indu-
strial countries could set - as  "locomotives"  - the world 
economy  in motion.  The  locomotive  theory was  far too daring. 
Locomotives  in  the  size required are  now-a-days  hardly concei-
vable within  a  national  framework.  If single countries at-
tempt  to use  the  scope  of employment-effective expenditure 
policy the national  limits are quickly  recognizable,  as  is 
shown  by  the  example  of  France  and  Denmark.  Pressure  to off-
set  the  tra~e balances  grows,  devaluation policies or  import 
restrict1.on policies are  then to be  expected.  It is once 
again  not  the  task of this  study to determine  the  rules  for 
an  international cooperation on  the use  of  an  expansive,  em-
ployment-effective expenditure policy within  the  framework 
cf  t.he  Et.J:ropean  Community,  but  once  again the  necessity of 
such  a  p(}.1_l.cy  must  be  pointed out. - 87  -
It is of great significance for  this study to locate more 
exactly the  connection between  employment  and  labour market 
policy and  the distributional  scope  that is available.  Even 
though  the evaluation of the current economic  investigations 
and  the  resulting evaluation of  the political practice  should 
be  undertaken with  the greatest of caution,  it should be 
clear that all the countries dealt with experience,  at least 
in the  short  term,  the  conditions of  a  stagnating  economy. 
With  a  view  to the distributional  scope  this means  that the 
distributional pressure  on  the  employment  and  labour market 
policy grows  as  the  real  income  per employmee  decreases. 
This  seems  to be  a  decisive characteristic of  the  problems 
which  at present face  employment  and  labour market policy. 
Neither  on  the microeconomic  nor  on  the  macroeconomic  level 
can  there be  found  recognizably functioning  transformation 
mechanisms  which  transform  a  possible  income  sacrifice on 
the part of  individuals  and  social groups  into additional 
jobs.  On  the macroeconomic  level it is recognizable that 
the  traditional path via  a  real wage  reduction or  a  restrained 
real wage  rise policy on  the part of  the  trade unions  does 
not  show  the  desired effects on  the  increase of  the  level of 
employment  in the  short or middle  term.  On  a  microeconomic 
level  income  sacrifieces made  by  individuals or social groups 
via working  time  reduction policies or policies of working 
time  flexibilization with  a  view to the rising level of  em-
ployment  cannot be honoured.  On  the microeconomic  and macro-
economic  level  there is obviously  a  lack of instititional 
regulations which  can  transform  income  sacrifices into addi-
tional  jobs.  The  creation of  such  regulations is essential 
if an  economic  policy is to be  employment-effective.  Social 
solidarity contracts which  achieve  this on  a  microeconomic 
level  are urgently needed.  In France  attempts are being  made 
to try to set up  these  regulations by  means  of  the  "Contracts 
soicales".  Within  the present economic  discussions  there is 
a  lack of considerations as  to  how  one  could create micro-
economically  justifiable institutional  pre~onditions which 
could  transform the distributional  insights  into effective 
employment  policy. - 88  -
The  investigation of  special .labour  market  policies  shows 
that  an  active  labour  market  policy  can  make  a  considerable 
contribution towards  overcoming  structural  unemployment  as 
well  as  cyclical  unemployment,· but  the efficiency fighting 
growth deficit induced  unemployment  is limited.  It is pos-
sible that  income  transfers  for  the  unemployed  can  be  replaced 
by  job creation measures,  the costs of  which  - among  other 
things  - are  even  lower  than  the  payment  made  to  the  unem-
ployed.  This  appli~s,  above  all,  to  temporary  limited  job 
creation measures.  Experiences  in the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  as  well  as  in France,  show that these  programmes 
have  a  one-sided effect;  they  favour  the  public  sector 
at  the  cost of  the private sector.  The  experiences  also 
show that the  jobs offered within the  framework  of this pro-
gramme  are  often  "dead-end-jobs".  The  jobs  have  too little 
in  common  with  a  desired social  scale of priorities of pro-
duction.  At  the  same  time,  the measures  taken towards  crea-
ting  jobs  for  a  limited period only  are  not  linked to  large 
enough  extent with  schemes  for  the  promotion  of  vocational 
training.  The  objections already mentioned,  however,  are 
not  an  argument  against,  as  largely agreed,  job creation 
schemes  on  a  limited time  scale.  Far more  important is the 
orientating of  job creation measures  towards  the  targets 
already mentioned  by  means  of suitable institutional regu-
lations.  There  exist  no  definite findings  on  the  arrangement 
of  these  regulations.  It has  also been established that there 
are  research deficits  in this sphere. 
In all the  countries  concerned  the wage  cost subsidies  have 
been  dealt with  to  a  large extent.  It has  been  generally 
agreed  that  when  general  wage  cost  subsidies are  made  over 
an  unlimited  period  deadweight,  displacement  substitutions 
effects  ~re  (n  be  expected.  As  a  result of  these effects it 
is unlik0l1  that there will  be  an  unliashed  increase of  the 
~mployme~t level  within  fue  market  sector resulting  from  general 
wage  subs1~i~s over  an  unlimited  period of  time.  General  wage - 89  -
cost  subsidies over  an  unlimited period of  time  seem,  on  the 
contrary,  to  amount  to a  subsidizing of  those  firms  within 
a  country which are  faced with an especially high level  of 
competition pressure  from  abroad. 
Selectively implemented  systems  of  wage  cost  subsidies  on 
a  limited time  basis which  could be dimensioned  towards  cer-
tain manpower  groups  are,  of course,  conceivable.  Disadvantaged 
manpower  g~pups within the  labour market  which  have  a  multi-
tude  of  risk features are often less productive,  with the 
consequence  that the cost  burden  for the  firms  is too high 
when  it is compared with the wages.  Productivity will  not 
rise to the desired extent until qualified measures  i.e.  in-
vestments  into work  are made.  Investments  into work  are  only 
profitable in the middle  or  long  terms.  The  time  horizon is 
determined  by  the stability of the  job and  the  speed at which 
the  'learning curves•  rise.  At  the very  times  when  the  futures 
of  firms  are uncertain these  investments  drop off and  the 
employment  of  those  especially disadvantaged  'risk property• 
manpower  groups  within the  labour  market  is not  undertaken. 
Selectively implemented  systems  of  wage  cost subsidization 
on  a  limited time  basis  can contribute towards  firms  being 
willing to  increase their investments  in labour.  There  are, 
of  course,  only very  few  investigations available which  deal 
with the  connection of  non-wage-labour-costs  as  investment 
costs  concerning labour and  wage  cost  subsidies.  This  also 
applies  to the in~y  speed of'learning curves•  and  the de-
termination of  the productivity effects of  wage  cost subsidies. 
It is often maintained that wage  cost  subsidies  do  not  in-
crease  labour productivity as  there is no  incentive system 
to encourage  firms  to  improve  the  labour productivity.  In 
the  face  of  the  increasing significance of  the production 
factor  labour  as  a  'quasi-fixed-production-factor•  there 
appear  further  attempts at investigation which  are urgently 
required:  these  focus  on  the  connection  between  labour  in-
vestment,  selectively  implemented  wage  cost  subsidies  and 
company  incentive  systems  that  improve  productivity. - 90  -
In all the  countries dealt with questions  concerning  reduc-
tion in working  hours  and  working  time  flexibility are dis-
cussed,  not  without  a  grat deal  of  controversy.  Policy in 
France  tends  towards .reducing the  weekly  working  hours,  a 
Jevelopment  that could also  be  expected  in the  Federal  Re-
public of  Germany  as  a  result  o~. unionist bargaining policy. 
In  Great  Britain the  government  policy tends  towards  the 
flexibility of .working  time  through  job sharing  and  job-split-
ting,  whereas  in Denmark  programmes  aimed  at flexibilizing 
the  retirement  aqe  are  being tested within firms.  The  coptro-
versies concerning  the  employment  effects of  a  reduction in 
working  time  arc  characterized by distinct contrasts.  On  the 
one  hand  the  cost  burdens  for  firms  and  the  taxpayer  - the 
latter when  particular  forms  of  reduction  in working  time 
are  employed  - are  referred to,  on  the other the  leisure 
time  effect is emphasized.  The  level of  inco~e of  the depen-
dent  employe~lays a  decisive role  in the determination whe-
ther  reductions  in working  time  and  working  time  flexibili-
zation policy can be effective as  an  economic  strategy.  The 
previous  wage  level  and  the specific national attitude to-
wards  work  determine  the  readiness of acceptance  of  the  sug-
gested  ways  of  reducing  and  flexibilizing the working  time. 
The  question of  the  cost  burden,  which  is  important  to  firms, 
is,  on  the other hand,  often over-emphaized.  It is completely 
conceivable  and  also realistic that the contractual  partners 
will  agree  to  a  reduction  in working  hours within pro-
ductivity rises .. In addition it must  be  realized that po-
sitive productivity  impulses  are  induced  when  there  ~re re-
ductions  ~n  ~ur~i~g time  and  these,  of  course,  CO\lld  reduce 
the potential  employment  effect in  the short  term. - 91  -
These  questions  are  documented  in scient1fic investigations 
which  sufficiently cover all the countries dealt with.  On 
the other hand,  questions  concerning working  time  flexibili-
ty  have  not  been  covered  to  such  a  great  extent.  The  current 
investigations,  1::1· .i  c :l  "'V-:c cc·  c: -ftpn  carried out  wi. th  1 i ttle re-
latlon to  compan1es,  often point  out  too  quickl.y  the possi-
~ility of  using  working  time  flexibilizations  to try to meet 
the  w1shes  of  those  who  want  to  individually organize  the 
duration of  working  time.  Investigations  related to  companies 
should  assirnilate,  systemize  and  make  use  of  the experiences 
made  with models  that have  already been tried and  tested 
(there  are plenty of  ~xamples of these  in all the countries 
dealt with) . 
The  last aspect discussed refers to the skill  adaptation 
of  what  is supplied  on  the  labour market  to the  demand.  This 
consists of  training,  re-training  and  further  training pro-
grammes  in their most  varying  forms.  These  measures  were  de-
veloped  in times  of  low  unemployment  or rather when  there 
was  a  lack of qualified manpower  in all the  countries.  They 
were  drafted as  human  capital  investments  intended to  ease 
the  adjustment  to  technological  prograss/stimulate  invest-
ments.  When  the  recession  came  about  in the middle  of  the 
1970's,  the quantitative and  structural  problems  on  the  la-
bour  market  sharpened,  and  there was  an  adequate  supply, 
these  measures  took  on  a  different function:  the  firms  did 
not  have  so  much  the  problem of  specific lack of qualifica-
tions as  the  focus  of their interest,  instead,  they  faced 
difficulty of  placing definite  labour  market  problem groups 
such as  young  people,. those with  few qualifications,  the 
long  term  unemployed  and  women.  This  change  in  function  can 
be  located  in all four  of  the countries  investigated. - 92  -
Wl  t  1~.  rc.:f ere  nee  to  the  type  of effect this  prograrrune  has 
o~  une~ploy~ent a  disallusionrnent must,  of  course,  be  men-
tio~cd.  Th~ chances  of  the  manpower  groups  affected  being 
p~aced dcpend3  very  much  on  the  cyclical  conditions.  The  in-
divldual  possibil1ties of being placed  can  on  the other  hand 
6ramatically  1mprove,  which  is  important  in relation to  a 
strict target group  or1entation of  the training programme. 
The  comparison  between  the d{fferent  countries  has  also 
shown  that  2  comb1nation  of  the attaining of qualifications 
w1th  on-the-job-training in the  form  of work  experience  is 
advanta~ous.  The  employment  quota  of  those  who  have  taken 
the  corresponding  courses  is significantly high  in  compariso~ 
w1th  ether  survey  groups.  Deadweight  effects  come  expecially 
:_,_j  :-::ir1u,  C!lt!1ough  they are difficult to quantify.  They  qi- .. ,.;e 
rise above all to the  replacement  of older employees  by 
younger  probationers.  Measures  that  impede  these  deadweight 
effects,  such  as agreements  on  protection against dismissal 
or  takeover guarantees are therefore to  be  recommended.  As 
the  French  and  British examples  show,  great problems  in 
the  supervision of this naturally arise. 
A  general  direction linked to curriculum and  training contents 
cannot  be  derived  from  the  country comparisons.  In the  scien-
tific debate  in particualr the  share of general  resp.  specific 
traininq  content is being disputed.  In  practice this depends  . 
on  the  country-specific school  system,economic-structural  and 
cultural  fra.P~e  as  well  as  on  the  target-group-specific  condi-
tlons.  Further  investigations which  research  into this  - in 
connection with  country  specific growth  potentials  - are still 
outstandi~q.  Com~on results of available  research  assume, 
that  the  share of  a  general  range  of skills as  opposed  to 
the  Rpec~f~c ones,  concentrating  on  certain technolog1es  and 
proc(=:'il.~rc:=-:.  cu(;rht:.  to  increase  further  more. - 93  -
The  available material  does  not prove  a  promotion of  invest-
ment  or  of  technological  changes  subsequent  to  improved  skill 
pupply.  Yet,  such  long-term effects  can  - regionally  - not 
be  excluded.  The  long-term positive  consequences  for  the 
self-esteem of  affected persons  and  the  maintenance  of  their 
work  ability are unquestionable. 
The  function  of the  training courses·.for  the maintenance 
of  the  self-esteem of the persons  affected  should  be  empha-
sized as  a  factor  by  no  means  to neglect.  Especially the main-
tenance  of  the work  ability for  those  affected by  long  spells 
of  unemployment  is an  indispensable  condition  for  a  potential 
re-entry  in case of  a  cyclical  upswing.  Yet,  the  lay-out pre-
dominantly  designed at traditional  emplo~nent areas  seems  to be 
the  deficit of  the  training courses  analysed here.  The  in-
corporation of  so-called alternative employment  (in  the  sector 
of  informal  economy)  or  the  promotion of  private initiatives 
seem  to have  been neclegted.  This  eventually holds  an  inno-
vative potential,  that will  alterforms  as  well  as  contents 
of training measures.  We  have  referred to experiences  made 
through  research,  which  allow at least drafts made  of  labour 
market  and  employment  policy to be  - these  naturally taking 
the  national pecularities  into consideration.  The  located 
research deficits are  replenishable.  A  suitable employment 
and  labour policy aimed  at restoring full  employment  is re-
_cognizable  as  a  silver lining on  the horizon.  Whether  the 
rationality of  policitcs  follows  the rationality of  economic 
research is  a  different  story. FUA·J{.I.J_. 
Pf:Plffi!  lK 
(IF  Gf:r{MANY 
FW·.NC:F. 
0'Nl'Jln 
KI~T:CI-1 
I~CRbASI::  IN  THl-~  sur-PLY  OF  JCUS 
1 •  Wage  subs  1dies 
::'Rtt lu•J- r,  allowan-
·.:::t' •  .i  for the  traHit..""es 
-·  ~-:.t,ttlinq-l.n  allo..ran-
Cf.'S  for  tht· hard-to 
ploce  1 
- 1'ra1n1nc.; qrar.ts  Hl 
accurdance w1th  Part 
~ ')f the Spec1al 
hcqramre 1979 
Waq(•  subsui.tes for 
thP seriOU!;ly dls-
abkd 
..  Woqe  substdies for 
c;eunans  frcn Eastern 
l:.'Ucopean  CU!ntrtes 
Inccea.-;e  1 r;  the 
.suwly uf  jobs  w 
the publ1c sec-tor 
94 
3.  D~rect job crt•atwn 
sct"ute.s 
- Job creat.ton sdores 
1n accordance with 
the fllt>loyrrent  Pro-
notion N..-t  \t\FG} 
- Job creat  1on  schon.  •:; 
1n  aca:>rdan~ w1th 
Part  3 of  the Spec1al 
Prograrrrre  1979 
4.  I'Ubllc- ex}el')(hture 
pr·cqr  dlttl.':--; 
- FUture  Investnent 
Ptcqr~ (ZIP) 
- Hequ.:•::;t  to U11::  Bun-
dt~SJ.ost  for  advance 
1  nve:-:. tsoc:nt s  dCCOr-duw;; 
t u  the  Dnployrrent 
Prcqramre  1982 
- ld:hthJI'lal e>.-panda-
t 1011  on ccn:struction, 
espec1ally energy 
o~.:n.5ervat 1on !K'a::;ur't":f. 
1n accordance w1th 
the  Hnp.loyrrent  Pro-
gr<IlTOC'  1  ':182 
-·  Prumt  1011  of p..tbllc 
author1ty hous1ng 
(lxn:b) 
5.  Investm:~1t prCXJram-
rnes 
- Improvee deprec1atlcr 
C'Ol"ldl. t 1on.s  HI  accor-
dance wtth Operation 
1982 
-·  Investncnt grants in 
acc.:ordance  w1 th the 
Itnploytrent  PraJrcm~ 
1982 
- Investm2nt loans at 
prefcrentlal 1nterest 
rates 1n c.tcoordance 
Wl.th the Elnployrrer.t 
Progrcmne  1982 
- Pegialal praootioo 
~-------------------+----------------------~--------------------+--------------------+-------------------~ 
- Job offer sc-heme  for 
long-term unemployed 
- Publlc relief work 
- Einployrrc>Jlt  of yout  h..s 
- Job creat1on  1n ac-
cordance  Wl th t h2 
'!'4arch-package' 
- En;plo}'T'OC'nt  plan  I 
- HrpJ oyrrent plan II 
- Action pra:Jrantne 
by pnvate arploye~~ ______  ·····-·--·------- -------~-----~-·-------+---------; 
-·  H1nng  prffill~ 
·- 1\pprentl.rt.•ship con-
tracts 
- Incure guarantee  fo.c· 
dtsablt..>d  work.l'r:.; 
-- .1\.sslstanc.'(?  for the 
employment  of dis-
abled persons 
- Tncrea.·.>('  1n  th.:!  supp- - C:reat1on of  jotJ.•;  of 
ly of  jolJS  u.  ttx~  camtumty l::.enef1t 
public sec.-tor 
- C'A.mrurnty  serv1ce>  l'Y 
youth.s 
- InCf'!flt 1 vPn  fur new 
JobS 
- Pron1~, hx cr·eallll-J 
jobs equ1.pped  for db 
abled persons 
- Progra-rme  for tu nng 
managers  over 45 
- Pra!Otlon of fenale 
anploYln:~nt. 
··  PrO'Tl:)t tor. of hou:.unq 
constn.lct  1on 
- Prcnnt1on of p..;hllc 
h.nld1nq 
- Tax  allowances oo 
investment prov1d1ng 
errploynent 
- Prcr!otioo of regio-
nal develcprent 
- Research prcm1tioo 
~-----------------4------------------~------------------~------------------~~-----------------;  - Y~  workers  scheme 
- Tf.lllf-'.Jl'ai)'  anplOytre.Itl 
suhs1dy 
- ~inall  f  urn.~,  •.1r11-•l oy-
rrerll  sub..<; 1  dy 
- Canr1Lll1Ily  ..  ~t•:>r}.,rlst.• 
prCXlri'll•T'>t' 
- Cannurnty  H1du.'-'try 
l'n::>grillmlP 
- Entf'r·pr1S('  zcne 
- RL>glonal  developuellt 
grants 
- Reg10nal  st'lect1ve 
Cl.~·~l8tC\n<..."'{: 
t- PrcJduct  and  process 
developrent sclsne 
~ Microprocessor appli.;. 
caticn project 
....  M.icrne lectronic in-
dustry  SUP{.ort pro-
grU~~~e F1DEJ~JIJ. 
P!T'IJBUC 
~~r  CH<tWiY 
UNlTED 
hll'O'X't-1 
96 
I i  REOl.:;TIUBU'~·ro~  ;lF  TliE  A'/l-.Il ABLE  WORK-LOAD 
l
! 1.  Herltstr 1b1.1t1on  uf 
ava1laole full-
1  t 1mc  ?  oi.Jb 
2.  Cn"at1oo of  ac.khtwnal  jr:>b$  by n-eax1s  of 
n3dt.o.'<1  1 if  e-t.l.ITe  1oo0dd.ng 
L  C:reat1on of d&l1tionaJ  J<.:>bci  by rreuns  of 
reduc<.>t.l  weekly  and  ar.nual  wo.d<  .. l.rK,J-t.ure 
'-----------·--------+-----------------------------------~-------------------------------------1  I  -
I 
P:u"l-'.l.m.:  working 
t  .L'Tt:? 
- r  'n:r.ot J·,)n  {)f  part-
t lJTe  W\..)l'k 
-- ~roo spl.1tt1.ng 
scha:e 
Prarotion of p:rrt-
tilll£!  wurk 
- Flex1ble  ret 1 rerrent  age 
- Early retuarent 
- Early  r~t1rement 
- f'..:;lldanty  cr.r~tract:  part tine pension 
- .Jc:.i::  release scheoc"> 
- Collectl  ve barga1mnq agreaJenls on the 
mtn.x:luct1on of the  35-hour-wet~k,  the 
fl  ft  h  week  of  pa1d hohdays and the reduc-
t  1ur1  of overtllre 
- ~rol(ogat1on of paid hol1days  from  4  to 5 
WE.'(:'ks 
- New  act on overt.l..lTle 
- Rt..•duct.ion  of weekly  ~'JrkiNJ  tl.l'\'1:'? 
R£..'1..1uct.loo  of  c........ert.u~ 
Introduct  ~on of the f 1fth week of pa1d 
lul1days 
Solldanty contra::t: reduct.10n of ~rking­
tl.!Te 
~------------------J-------------------------------------------~~------------------------------------------~ F'f~)fFJ\L 
REPI!BLIC 
OF  GFJ~Mi-\N't 
UNITI-Tl 
KI~ 
r  ~ 1  AllAPTION  :-·  fRATECl 1-,;; 
1.  Maptton of tre 
sk.1. Us of  1  al:xJur 
supply to d~ 
- Promotion of trainee 
0pp0rtun1  t:  tf'S  tor 
senously disublE'd 
youths 
- Schcr!T's  for OCetlpa--
ticJilal  rchabi lttat10n 
- Prcqr  arlT:l?\ for the  im-
,tJITNnrcnt of tratnHq 
apport  urn tles and 
labour rrarket  en-
lrance of  yout~s 
- F\lrther edUcat1oo and 
r('trdming  sc-hore:~ by 
the Dundesanstal  t  fUr 
Arbett 
- FUrther educatv:.o  and 
retrau:inq for unan-
ployed persoos by tte 
Bundesan~:tal  t  fi.ir  Ar-
t"elt 
- Part  1  of the  Spec~al 
Programre  197<~ 
- Courses  for  serrd-
sk.l 1 k>d  ~rkers 
- Cburses  for skilled 
'ftOrkers 
- Re-traimn;~ program-
!TE'S 
- Courses for  ~~atio­
nal  preparatioo 
- Courses  for  lcng--tetn" 
\.J'le'l"ployed 
- Calrse.s for waren 
- creation of  ~.ooo 
traimng plans in the 
fA.lblic  sector 
- Praroti0f1 of trainina 
opporttml  ties in the 
private sector 
2.  Pnvotion of  n~:no­
nal rrotulity 
- Pra~1on in accor-
dan('(·  w  1 tb  t hE•  rm-
ployrr£~t  Prrx:nt 100 
1\ct  (nr··b i 1 it  y  <md 
S<..'Iar..Jtion  ajd) 
- Job 1ntroduction cuur  - 1\obvmg  assistance 
ses 
.._  Carpany introductie1l 
courses 
~ Traini~-employment 
ccntracts 
- AssiRtance for occu-
pational  change into 
agri<.."lllture 
- MbPility allowance 
for  )'CA.lths 
- Allowances  for rrovinc 
abroad 
- Premi  \..1'1\S  for hi  r 1.nq 
young  f a.t'lrer  in cer-
taln  region~ 
- Assistance for rural 
migrat1on 
'-), 
3 •  Improvaocnt of the 
efficiency of the 
anplo}'IT1E"J1t  SE>rvi.ce 
lV  JOB  PRE~ERVATION 
MEASURE.S 
- CJCcupatiooal  cour,sel- - Short-t  i.me  allowance 
1 inq  in  accordanc'f~ 
wah t_he  Dnployment 
l'rtxrr)t ion  Act 
- Onployment  serv1ce 
- Job search 
- Bad-weath?r  allowance 
and prarotion of 
winter construction 
- .Short-time allowan-
ces 
- Bad-weather all<Mm-
ces 
~--------------------~-----------------------~-·-------------------4~--------------------~ 
- Youth  o~rtuni  t  1c~ 
Proqr  al'flYc> 
1- New  training 1m  t 1a-
ttve 
- ~loym'~t transfer 
1-"C~' 
- Job  rf.'S€'arch  serene 
-·  TnnrX~rary slv)rt-time 
worlu  no  curpensat im 
schare l  t 
I, 
I.  II.  III. 
wage  sub- increa.c;e in  job creatiol'l p.lblic ex- prarot1on  redl.strioo- adaptatl.on  pra!l:)tion of ~t 
Sl.dl.CS  too  suwly  schercs  perrliture  of pnvate  tion of  of skills  reglooal no- of the- effi-
of jobs in  programres  invesbrent  available  bill.ty  ciency of 
the public  work  load  larour 
sector  servioo 
~ 
F  K  s  w  F  K  s  w  F  K  s  w  F  K  s  w  F  K  s  w  F  K  s  w  F  K  s  'lr1  F  K  s  w  F  h:  ·- "" 
_, 
tc 
( 1 l etployrrent  ri-+  ++  ++ ++  r+  f+  ++  +  +-+  ..:..  ++  .  ++  ++  - +  - ++  +  ++  +  f+  +  +  +  +  + 
effect  1- - +  - - -
contrib..t-
( 2) tion to  +  +  +  +  +  +  f+  +  +  +  +  +  :+  - - t  '++  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
SOCl.al 
secur1ty 
( 3) allocatio- - - - - .- +  +  +  - - - +  ++  +  +  +  +  ++  +  +-f 
nal  - ...  -
effects 
(4) distnru- +  +  +  +  t  I+  ++  +  +  1- +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
tior.al  - - -
effects 
:'))  ir:t:egra- +  +  f+  +  +  ft- +  +  I  +  +  I  +  ~  +  +  - I 
t1-re cf--
I 
- - I  l  - -
fects  I  i  I  I 
1,  __ 
I 
I  I  I  I I  I 
I  ~·I 
l J 
so:ial  ..  f.  ...  .  ...  r  .I 
- +  t- - . 
j· 
,\':;)  +  ....  +  ....  . !  r 
I  p:>lltical  - - - - - - - - 1-
i  I  i 
F  ~  frictional  unemploym~nt;  K  = seasonal  and  cyclical  u~employmcnt;s  structural  unemployment; 
w  growth  de£1ci t-induced  uncmployr.,cnt  ; 
++  pos1t1ve  effects  +  side  ~ffccts w1th  posit1ve  tendency 
= negattvc  effect~  - = s1dc  effects w1th  neqRt1ve  tcrdency 
IV. 
job preser-
vat1on rrea-
sures 
F  K  s  w 
!  +  + 
+  +  + 
+  +  - -
++ 
-
..... 
1-
-
\.0 
00 CONTINUATION  I 
-------------- --------------
COUNTRY  REPORTS - 99  -
D E N M A R K 
============= - 100  -
DENMARK 
0.  Analytics  and  Empirics  of  Economic 
Policies 
I.  Increase  in the  Supply  of  Jobs 
1.  Wage  Subsidies 
2.  Job  Creation  Schemes 
3.  Employment: Effects of  Public 
Expenditure  Programmes  for  the 
Private  and  the Public  Sector 
II.  Redistribution of Available  Work  Load 
III.  Adaptation Strategies 
IV.  Conclusion .... 
·- 101  -
0  ANALYTICS  AND  EMPIRICS  OF  ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
Denmark's official  numb2r  of  unemployed  persons  reached 
270  000  persons  in  August  1982  (10,3  %)  •  With  that Denmark 
owns  one  of  the highest  __  ~~~mEfoyment rates  of  the  OECD  membe~ 
sountries.  From  7,0%  in  1980 it grew to  9,2  %  in  1981  main-
ly on  account  of  lay-offs  in  the private sector which  not 
even  increased hiring  by  the public sector could  compensate. 
With  an  actual quote of  10,3%  the  anyhow  not  very optimistic 
forecasts  of  1972  (OECD:  9  %;  EC:  9,8  %)  have  been  proven 
too  low.  This  development  is not  only attributable to  the 
loss of  jobs,  but  also pressures exerted  on  the  labour mar-
ket  by  demographic  trends  additionally aggravated  by  growing 
feffiale  participations rates. 
Compared  with other countries  Denmark  experienced  a  strong 
working population growth  of  150 000  persons  for the period 
from  1975  to  1981.  At  the  same  time  the  number of  jobs  in-
creased only  by  30.000,  the  number  of persons  unemployed  grew 
by  120 000. 
Table  1 : 
Working  population,  employees,  unemployed  (in  thousands) 
1973  1975  1978  1979  1980  1981 
~ior'king 
population  2.357  2  438  2  538  2 526  2  547  2  586 
en.ployees  2  339  2  324  2  368  2  388  2  385  2  351 
unemployed  18  114  170  138  162  235 
Source!  Eurostdt  anc":  OECD,  1982 - 102  -
~clcctivj  t.y  _i_u  hirinq  on<.l  dit..>miBf>al  processes  led  to markedly 
stronger disproportional degrees  of  affectedoess  for  different 
aqc  and  socia1  groups. 
Table  2a: 
Distribution of  unemployment  by  age  - in per6ent  -
under  2S  25-54  over  54  total 
1979  10  6  5  6 
1980  12  6  5  7 
1981  15  8  6  9 
Table  2b: 
Distribution of unemployment  by  sex  - in percent  -
Male  Female  total 
1979  5,1  7,4  6,1 
1980  6,4  7,8  7,0 
1981  8,9  9,5  9,2 
;·ourcc  Ministry of  Labour, 1982 
.,Yout.:h0~_l'!~~e_~.-:?~!."s  of  age  are  among  those  affected by 
~~_:.!n_Eloyrnen_!::_Y.:__~~~  Until  1981  the  female  unemployment  rate 
was  above  the  national  average.  In  the first quarter of  1982 
this  changed  which  can  mainly  be  explained  by  g~eater move-
ments  of  women  into the  "silent reserve'!. 
Wh£'n  differentiating according  to the duration  of  unemployment 
an  increasing  share  of  long=term  unemployed  can  be  noticed  . 
.:~~?_C  E. d  i:~~J  !· y  ___  J_  ,~ bo  ~a- _!n a :t: ~  e ~- _  .? !1 d  _  ~m  p l_? y!]1en  _!:_pc;>) i  ~J  ~J?  __  2.:C.~  __ _rn_p.l:i.t~ 
_lx  _  t?_~!]s-;_t_r<1  __ ? t  ___ )-.~>.!.!st:-_!":_~!:!T~_as  _y.rel_!_~§  _  _y__o_uth_y_~~rn_pJoyment  ( cf. -, 
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The  financing  of  this measure  is becoming  increasingly di-
fficult being  faced  ~ith the current budget  situation:  the 
budget deficit of 51 bill.  DKr  in  1982  is going  to  amount. 
to  73.5  Bill.  DKr  in  1983.  At  an  expected  GNP  of  525  bill.DKr 
this means  a  defic~t of  14%.  As  against  that the  budget  from 
1973  still proved  a  positive balance  of  5.8%  of  GNP  at  a 
proportion of  the public sector of  40%,  1981  this proportion 
had  stepped up  to  60%,  the  budget deficit ~ted  to appr. 
7%  of  GNP. 
The  growing  budget deficit in periods of  sluggish growth 
(increase of  real  GNP  of  11%  from  1973  to 1981)  is predomi-
natly  ~~xpcndi  ~-~rc-i.n9uceCL._ The  deterioration  in  1980  and  1.981 
has  primarily to  be  attributed to the effects of build-in-
stabilizers  in connxion with  a  decline of the  real  income 
and  a  rapidly growing  number  of  unemployed  (OECD,  1982). 
The  build-in stabilizers do  exist in the controlling system 
as  well  as  in the  unemployment  insurance.  Both  taking together 
they  cause  a  permanent  increase of  the  number  of the  income 
and  transfer payment  recipients.  Thus,  the  strong expansion 
of  the public sector was  decisively determined  by  the  in-
creasing  numberof transferpayment  recipients  (OECD,  1982). 
The  concern  for  social  justice and  effects of  previous  laws, 
that  had  been  enacted as  long  as  a  long-lasting strong growth 
of  economy  was  being  expected,  are to note  as  further  in-
fluencing  factors. loll  -
The  result of this  legislation was  that the  development  of 
the  real  incomes  of  those  receiving transfer payments  (mostly 
retired and  unemployed  persons)  equalled this of wage  and 
ir:come  earners. 
The  wage  settinJL~~tem of  Denmark  is characterized by  a 
FiWl.degree  of ceptralization on  industry and  national  levels. 
All  wage  settlem~nts include  an  indexation to inflation.  The 
adaption  takes  place  twice yearly.  This  is payable  in the 
form  of  a  surr.  equally  high  for all  income  groups.  In ad-
diton  to this certain parts  of  the private sector intitled 
to  local  bargaining,  while  bargaining contract are still 
valid.  Although public sector employers  are  not entitled to 
do  this,  their wages  are automatically adapted  twice yarly 
according  to private sector wage  indexation. 
The  close relation  between  price  and  wage  developments 
is also  one  of the  causes  for  the rigid nominal  wage  structure 
that because  of  the  linkage  to transfer payments  affects the 
expenditure of public households. 
An  oddi t.ional,  important  component  affecting the  publi.c deficit 
is the  increasing  interest burden  due  to  growing  public debt. 
This  becomes  obvious  when  the expenditure of 'the last ten 
years  is  looked at  in detail. Table 
'!ear 
I 
• 
3a: 
, .  I  I 
Public Expenditure  ( 1)  as percent of GNP 
Fiscal Cbnsumption  Capital  Social  Subsidies 
of which:  personal costs  expenditure  expenditure 
11970  12,3  R,1  4,9  18,5 
.1975  15,2  10,6  3,9  22,7 
11976  13,9  9,9  3,7  23,1 
1977  14,2  10,2  3,7  23,5 
;1978  14,5  ]0, 3  3,6  24,7 
11979  14,7  10,4  3,8  25,7 
;-~980  15,8 
I  11,0  3,3  27,2 
Table  3b:  Structure of Social Expenditure - in percent -
sickness, 
Year  ·  invalidity 
occltpational 
health 
11970 
tl975 
11976 
!1977 
:1978 
!1979 
43,0 
41,8 
41,7 
40,2 
39,6 
37,8 
age,  death, 
survivors' 
insurance 
36,3 
32,7 
32,4 
31,7 
32,1 
34,3 
adult training 
errployrrent service 
career service 
0,5 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
2,7 
1,8 
1,8 
1,5 
1,5 
1,6 
2,1 
tmauployrrent 
3,0 
9,8 
10,0 
12,5 
12,7 
12,0 
Int.erest 
paytrents 
1,7 
1,3 
1,9 
2,8 
3,4 
4,8 
6,4 
maternity,  family, 
housing support, 
miscillanous 
17,7 
15,2 
15,3 
15,0 
15,0 
15,3 
L----~~~~~--~------~~--~------------------------------------~  1  territorial authorities and national insurance 
Source:  DIN  l~henbericht 3/82  ---- -
......... 
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The  new  Danish  government  with  the  leader of  the  'Konserva-
t.i vcn  Vc)lksparh~1.'  (conservative  people's  party)  with  Paul 
Sch ''jtcr  <J~;  prime  minister,  in office  since  September  1982, 
announced  savings  of  20 bill DKr  in the  current budget  year. 
Tt1t:~  :->oc.i.a.ydt~nlo~~at  Jorgensen  had  resigned,  because  he  failed 
in  finding  a  parlamentary majority for  his  plans  of  consoli-
dating  the  budget.  For  1983  a  saving  package  of  10 bill.  DKr 
was  planned,  for  the  most  part  including massive  subsidy cuts 
in the  commun~ty sector,  this in the health- and  school-system, 
welfare assistance  and  lower.wage  rises  in the  public sector. 
Chi-ef  reason  for _the  breaking apart of  the  former  government 
~;.~a.--.,  .:!: t.~  _  _H_;_s.;posaL  t.o  tax high interest  revenues  of life in-
-~-~I_.;!nce. anQ._perr_f~l:_on funds.  Because  of  this proposal  the  non-
so~ialists dismissed  the entire  saving  package,  a  fact that 
led to  the  resigning of J6rgensen. 
The  restrictive policy practiced by  the  new  government  links 
to the  strategy of  J6rgensen:  qualitative  and quantitative 
cuts  in the  social  security net  were  to undertake.  Thus,  all 
non-socialist parties declare that their approval  of  the 
budget  depends  on  the  final  abolishment  of  the  automatic  in-
fldtion  adustmcnt,  which  is to offset the  inflation losses 
for  wage  and  salary earners  between  the contractual  partners. 
Yet,  the  inflation adjustment  is relatively low  (60%  to  70%) 
(OECD,  1982)  and  thus  presumably  not  an  essential  factor 
preventing  ~he restoration of  full-employment. 
Meanwhile  considerable cuts  j_n  the  social  assistance have 
f?.9..£.Q. _  _Q~~hrough._ Till 1st of  March  1983  a  general  wage  freeze 
was  in  force,  the  indexation  linked  to  inflation of  wages  and 
unemp2.c)y:n.:-r.t.  benefits  had  been  abolished.  The  introduction of 
one  ~:-;i.ck--(1ay  without  payment  and  the  lowering  of  the  unem-
pl\"~\-tlt\;nt  p{1ym:..•nt  from  90~;  ..  to  80~;  have  been  renounced. - 107  -
Estimation  of  the  EEC  and  OECD  agreeingly assess that 
the  measures  for  surmounting  the crisis can  only  be  success-
ful  if the  government  is willing to cut  down  on  the  scale 
of  the  public  sector not  only by  means  of  retrenching public 
services but also  by  means  of  reducing  transfer payment  to  1_ 
private households  (European  economy,  1982). 
--4.- _.~  ,' 
~.~::·"·  ' 
The  inavoidable  downward  movement  of  the effective demand,  -~m· 
which  is already being mirrowed  - even without  the  recent  ·  ;;~_:;. 
saving  decrees  - in  a  decline of the  private  consumption,  ·:t":f:~.' 
;;- "<-i~  ' 
..-:.,;-- ... :.' 
is to hold against  those measures.  Furthermore  the  experien~~· 
~ t  i~~:: 
ces  with measure  of cutting public expenditures  in the  ;··f  ... : 
area of social politics  from  the year  1974  clearly  illustrat~d 
~~  ~~  t 
limits  and  dangers  of  an  austerity policy.  -~~-:.:_ 
<  ~';.T'  ~ 
,'  ,;>'~-.·? 
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Employment  and  labour market policy 
The  main  direction of  the  general  economy  policy  in  Denmark 
during  the last  few  years  was  aiming at the  combat  of infla- ~ 
tio~-and  __ ~r_:-~~:eE_~~~~-~-l]_t  _?.~---?:~~-~-~_!?.a tional competitiveness,  b~£a  u~_e 
thjs  mea!}!-_  the -~nl...L..E.Q_~si~i l_i ty  _  _!:.o  achieye  a  long  term  im-
..J2.L~e~e_!!.t  of~~e ~_!!.l.P._lo~~-~~-si  tl..!ation ._ 
l-..gainst  this background  thsLP.romotion  of  job-mobility plays 
~-important role within  the  Danish  labour market policy. 
Furthermore it was  early recognized that selective labour 
market  policy was  more  advantagious  compared  to global orien-
tated policies. 
Thus, resides a reduction of  labour  supply  and  the  improvement 
of  the qualification of all gainfully employed,  especially 
~§~lectiye growth  of  labour  d~mand for  special groups  of 
the  labour market  was  promot~q~ The  already existing selec-
tivly effective measures  since  1975  have  been  expanded during 
the last years. 
The  most  extensive  packages  are  concerning youth,  long-term 
\!!}employed  SlllQ._glder__~loye~§.- (Madsen).  For  young  people  long 
spells of unemployment  can  lead to a  permanent  loss of their 
work-ability.  In  connection with  the  Employment  Plan  I  of 
1977  the  combat  against  youth-unemployment  has  gained high 
priority.  The  government  tries to  reduce  youth-unemployment 
by  its  Employm__§nt  __  :p_]=~II,  in  form  of  additional  trainee 
places,  job creation  schemes  and  a  job guaranty  for  long. 
term  unemployed. 
This  Employment  PJan  !!implicates  a  redistribution of  expen-
diturer:;.  Wh(~reas  the  first programme  had its stressing con-
cerning  measures  to  promote  employment  market  directly,  now 
additional  measL.:-__.s  with  long  term effec·ts  are initiated 
which  shall  improve  the  compet:i tiveness  of  Denmark  by  the  promo-- 109  -
tion of  the adaptation  ability of  commerce  and  industry. 
Therefore  the  Employment  Plan  II is devided  in  two  parts: 
~'h~---~~-r:·s  t: ... P  .. a~!  ..  -~~~:!-~--~~J:.0  ...  !Tlea~~I-t?..~sii  r  ~ly_£_QQ_~erq_ing_QffiiLl_9...Y:-. 
!!l.~E_!:J.  __  -~~e  ___  ~-~~.<?!19  __  <:?-~ al_~---- ~~-!:_~_h  ____ !:_h~--~_n_crease of __investment.s  and 
..tb.9 _  j._m_p_rqy_~m~_n.t.._gf  __  t_q_~_.  __ t_n. _  _f r ~'i!:.fJd.~_t ure. 
Table  4:  Employment  Plan  II  Devision of  Expenditure 
- in million  DKr  -
1981  1982  1983 
publ1c  expenditure  4 • 00()  1  9  4.100,2  4.139,0 
programmes 
direct  labour market  1.3~)9,2  1.500,4  1.461,6 
and  educational  measures 
total  5.366,1  5.600,6  5.600,6 
-
Source: Ministry of Finar.ce,  1981 
The  distribution of expendituresclearly reveals that the  ~ain 
importance  lies on  measures  influencing the  2mployment  indi-
rectly  (about  3/4  of  the total  expenditures).  The  main  part 
of  the directly effective measures  airos  at young  unemployed. 
For  the total  running  time  the part of the expenditures  for 
the  Second  .t:mployment  Plan  w·ill  be  about  3%  of  the total 
expenditures  of the public budget  (planned total expenditures 
1983:  190 billion DKr.). 
In  march  1992 the  government  proposed  an  additional  number 
of  measures  to  combat  youth-unemployment:  this bill passed 
in June.  The ~~_?.rc~pa<;_t~.<J~constitues  the first period of 
attempts  t:o  introduce  a 
11youthguaranty"  from  lq84  onward  which 
is meant  to  guaranty  trainee places  and  jobs  for all young 
persons. - 110  -
The  "march-package''  emphasises  the  following  5  points: 
- training and  work  experience places 
- youth  counseling 
- job creating 
- job offer 
employment  promotion  in  communal  and  local authorities 
Table 5:  March-package 
1982  1983  1984  1985 
public  total expenditures  1.554  3.425  3.735  2.947 
employment  effects  32.900  43.800  51.500  56.400 
Source: !'1lnistry of  Finance prn  forslag til finanslov for 
1983,  Kopenhagen  1982 
1983  the  ••march-package''  demanded  2%  of  the total expendi-
tures of the budget.  Though  the state has  to bear the main 
part of  the expenditures  for  funding  the  "march-package", 
this is met  by  savinqs arising through  reduced transfer pay-
ments  and  further  subsequent  costs of  unemployment. 
Basicl::t. nobo~.E_~_P.enmark raises objections against  stronger; 
labour  rna~ket political activities or against  the fiLqin 
direction of the measures  (expansion of vocational  training. 
roore  trainee-places). 
Employe=s  o~ly offered restistance to  a  planned 
compensational  training place  Jevy  which  was  meant  to sufe-
guard  the expansion of  the training-place supply.  This  had 
been  substituted by  a  voluntary  arrangement.  (Wissenschafts-
zentrum Berlin, 1981). 
Further indirect employment  stimuli are  expected from  an 
action  programme,  which  constitutes  an  expansion of the 
'Investmentprograrrrrne  '82 ''  - thus  of  the middle-term financial 
planning  from  1982-1985. - 111  -
.T.!JQ_most  important  measure  to  reduce  the~our supply  iR 
th~_QErlY_retirement  (which  is possible since the  lst.of 
Jan.l970).  The  measure  ist extremely successful,  it was 
used  to. siqnificant.ly  larger extend  than originally assumed. 
According  to studies,  70%  of  the  new  vacancies  were  occupied 
again.  It was.estimated that this measure  brought  down  un-
employment  by  totally 29  ooo_~e~~L That  means  approximate-
ly  2%  of  the gainfully employed  (Kjaersgaard
1 1982). 
Thepolicy  combating  long-term unemployment  plays  a  pro-
rninent  role.  Long-term  unemploy~d have  an  employment  guaran-
~y.Employers are  given wage  subsidies  as  incentive to 
engage  long-term unemployed.  The  eligible unemployed,  who 
do  not get  a  job in private enterprises,  have  to  be  employed 
in  the public sector.  The  fact  that only  24%  (1981)  were 
employed  by  private enterprises,  led to  a  strong expansion 
of  the public sector.  This  connection  explains  that  in  DenmarY. 
- different  to other comparable  countries  - an  expansion of 
the public sector as  a  labour market political measure  is 
not being  conducted.  It is being expanded  indirectly by  the 
Job-Offer-Scheme  and  the  Public ~~Work  (programme  against 
youth  unemployment),  thus  only for certain target groups. 
As  already mentioned  above, the  permanent  technological  de-
velopment  of  the  industry and  the structural  changes  in  the 
economy  (c.f.Employment  Plans)  promoted  by  government 
policy postulates  a  steady adaptation of  the develop-
ment  of  skills to the  requirements  of  demand.  Vocational trai-
ning  responds  to this requirement  in two  aspects:  first,  there 
is  a  steady offer of  further education- und  re-training-
measures,  secondly,  there are  further education  courses  for 
unemployed  which  are  serving  better individual  labour 
market  chances.  The  latter are  selective.  Target  groups 
are  young  persons  and  long-term .unemployed.  To  a  less  extent 
also women  participate in  this courses. -- 112-
The  irr~rtant  role  of  vocational  training  schemes  becomes 
evident  because of its expansion  by  60  %  between  1979  and 
1981.  The  Minstry of  Labour  estimates,  that within  one  year 
20  % of all employed  in  the  age  group  from  25  to  69  are  ta-
r::_lr:~;  part  ir.  tralnir.g measu.res. 
Thus,  Danish  employment  policy in general  aims  at  long-term 
en~loyment effects,  by  means  of  structural  economic  changes 
and  at  short-term effects by  selective  labour market politi-
cal  measures. -- 113  -
I  INCREASE  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  JOBS 
1.  Wages  subsidies 
Wage  subsidies  play  an  important  role  in  the  Danisch  labour 
market  policy.  The  selective character of  the measure  is 
apparent;  target groups  are first of all long-term unem-
ployed  and  younger  persons.  The  classical marginal  groups 
of the  labour market  are  not  included,  or only  in so  far  as 
they are hit by  long spells of  unemployment. 
Wage  subsidies  for  marginal  groups  lead  to considerable 
crowding-out effects:  enterprises prefer members  of  so-called 
marginal  groups  to other employees.  There  are  no  estimations 
regarding  the  level of this effect.  Furthermore  a  distrubance 
in the  competition between  those  firms  which  work  with or 
without  subsidised employees  is being  caused.  Supporters of 
wage  subsidies  for  marginal  groups  claim that a  lot of un-
employed  are only being recruited under  the  condition  of pro-
vided  wage  subsidies,  which  means  that it  does  bring about  an 
employment  growth  in any  case. 
In  the discussion  about  wage  subsidies  for  marginal  groups 
during  the  years  of  1976/77  the  assumption  about  possible 
employment'  effects  had  proved  to be  not exact  enough  to 
justify the  considerable costs  for  such  a  programme  (Kjaers-
gaard,  1982) .  _Linear  wage  subs..l,.O.ies  qq__  e_:xac_t_ly __ fiQt  ___ .bene_fi_t __ 
those _  _g]:'o~. which  have  __  ~cial inq.ividual  problems,  and_ 
g~_l}:_§_~--~Eecia!.__§oci?_l_  co~ts.  But  in spite of  and  because of 
wage  subsidies  those  employees  are preferred  who  have  a 
higher  level of qualification/  thus,  such  persons  that are 
likely to  be  hired  also without  wage  subsidies.  The  social 
costs  for  linear wage  subsidies are  regarded  as  being  too 
l1igh,.  because  on  the other hand  savings  that arise  (for 
example  by  relieving the  unemployment  fund)remain  uncertain(v.s.) - 114  -
Based  on  the  necessity  that  social  and  individual costs of 
unemployment  have  to  be  avoided,  the  Danish  government  con-
ducts·sel9ctive~effcctive subsidy  programmes.  Since  1978 
it is conducting  a  programme  combined  with  job creating for 
ir:-;:1<;.)-term  Ur1employed.  rrhis  programme  offers special  promo-
tion possibilities for  long-term unemployed  young  people. 
Be?  _  _.!de_th~~-J:h~re  ~s  the_'_'P~_blic  Relief Work",  _Cf!..  wage  S1_1_b-
~?.:.S_Y.___E!ogran~_e  for  publi~--eJE.El<;?y_ers,  which is targeted  tqwards 
~_<.?-~!l!;L  __ E_E?2E.J:5!..L. _  _?n4_~E~Sral11n!~-to promote  employmE?nt  by pri-_ 
.Yft  .  .t..Q .... ernployers. 
The  advantages  of  the  long-term une;nployment  programme  are 
primarily  found  in their specific selectivity.  The  functio-
nal  and  the  extrafuctional qualification of  the  long-term 
unc,Jif.-'loyed  are kept  because  an  _en}E!oym~n~_~arai)_IT_  _  _!.§_g_!_ye_n_ 
!:9_  ~JJ  _Jo~'-Lter_g!__~!}§..~l?1.9Y~· Thus,  a  loss of skills because 
of  ::...ong  spells of  une.mployment  is being avoided.  It 
is also being. prir..ted  to  the preservation of extrafunct-ional  qua·-
lification,a target which  is enfilated by additional edu-
cation offers  (see:  courses  for  long-term unemployed). 
In  particular the existing  comb~na-t:-ion of  wag~ subsidies  to-
_g~_.Q_9.!:__wt  .  .tl!  __  job_s_:ri~-~tio.tf_ within  the  long-term unemployment 
programme  is emphasized.  Not  only  the  employment  of problem 
groups  but also  preserving  long-term  jobs  (i.e.  after 
the  end of  the  promotion  time)  instead of  short-term jobs 
lS  intended  by  this measure.  55%  of all  employed  long-term 
unemployed  had  rnaintaind  their  job after the  end  of  the pro-
motion,  45%  were  laid qff.  Almost  ~11 employed  in  the  private 
sector  could maintain their  jobs(Ministry of  Labou~ 1982, 
Kjaersgaard,  1982). 
1-~--- t~e  __ _p~~ents  __  :e~r--~~~h  _  _I~c~-~-!~:d  --~~-eyed are  compared 
wi_th  ____  tb_~  ____ ?lt.~_;rna_t!Y.~---·c_9s!_~J~----~S?Ets_Jor  _t_f1_~-~~§rnE_loyment  bene-
.t~_t_§)  __  ~.J.  _  12  ..  ~9g  r ~-~?  _  --~9-~-_Q~-_c _aJ  ~.§:Q  __ ? d van  _!:~_g~g  ~§_.~e_gsg:-di  ng  their 
-~~-(~-~:t.Ei.·  A  D~H~isch  1.1;-1nmplov"'"d,  who  has  payed  his  unemployment 
~nsuranrx~ for  at  l.L ast  12  rr.onths,  qets  90%  of his previous 
wage  up  to  2  1/2  years, (averaae of  the  last 12  weeks)  as - 115  -
unemployment  benefit,  which  is accomodated  every  6  months 
to the price·index.  On  the other hand  a  job  for  a  long-term 
unemployed  is subsidised with  30  DKr ~  this corresfX)nds to 46,5  % of 
of avarage wage  ( 1981  in industry and craft) .  This calculation leaves 
out  of  account  that there are  two  different sponsors  of the 
programme  (unemployment  insurance  and  State) .  Furthermore 
it has  to  be  considered that nearly all  jobs  created  in the 
private sector are  preserved  for  a  longer period than  the 
year  promoted,  thus,  Qeither  subsidies  nor  unemployment  be-
.!.!_e f i  t§_l}.~V~-- _t.Q_Q_~id.  Nevertheless  only  15%  (lately  2 5%) 
of  the  jobs  are  located  in the priate sector.  The  rest is in 
the public  sector or  in  communities;  here  the rest of the 
wages  (wages  minus  subsidiesed  share)  have  to be  paid  by 
the  general  public  (Ministry of  Labour,  1982). 
The  following  table  shows  the  costs per  each  person. 
Table  1: 
Expenditures  per Person  1980  - in thousand  DKr,  Costs  in 
mill  DKr. 
Programme  Costs  Persons  Costs  per person 
Job  Offer  Scheme  340  11  000  0,0309 
Public Relief  Work  524  15  650  0,0335 
Promotion  for  the  15  2  400  0,0063  employment  of  youths 
by  private employers 
The  extremely  small  costs  for  the  youth  employment  programme 
in  the  private sector are attributable on  the  one  hand  to 
the  small rate of  subsidy  (unter  18  years  14  DKr/hour,  over 
18  years:  20  DKr/hour  for  the  first  13  weeks,  afterwards 
14  DKr)  on  the other hand  to  the  short promotion  term  (26  weeks). 
The  other  two  projects cover  a  promotion  term upt0  1  year. 
The  subsidies  per  hour  are  between  20.5  and  32.5  DKr. - 116  -
The  remarkably positive success  of the  combination of wage 
subsidy  programmes  and  job creating measures  have prompted 
the  Danish governments  to extend the programmes.  The  expan-
ded  measures  are  shown  in the  following  table: 
Table  2: 
Long-term  Unemployment  Programme  - costs  in mill.DKr. 
year  expenditures  persons 
19$0  340  11  400 
1981  630  25  000 
1982  1.635 
1983-85  1.425 
Source:  Ministry  of  Labour,  1981 
Tht2  so-called  ••march-package"  (  cf.  job creation measures) 
tries to support the  communities  regarding their difficul-
ties  in creating  jobs for  long-term unemployed  (regulation 
for  job supply).  This  is realized by  doubling the financial 
means,  that cornmunties  obtain for  performing  employment  ef-
fective measures.  Now  the state covers  50%  of all expendi-
tures  for  employment  promotion.  The  additional costs  for 
1aLour  supply  regulations  amount  to  4  mill.  DKr  in  1982, 
to  30  mill  DKr  from  1983-1985. 
Criticism is  expres~as in  regard to very little work  offers 
in the private sector compared  to the heavy  increase of of-
fers  in the public  sectors within the  frame/work  of  the  long-
term  unemployment  programme.  15%  of  jobs  promoted  by  the 
long-term unemployment  programme  are  located  in  the private 
sector  (Per  Kongshoy-Madsen,  1982/0rganization for  Economic 
Operation  and  Developemen~ 1982) .  The  Minstry  of  Labour 
states  an  1ncrease of  job offers  in  the  private sector of 
:~ 5?~  of  t h( ·  t.ot~d.  supply  in  autumn  1981  and  explains  this 
sudder1  increa:...;c  ·  ... 1tr1  t0L  extention of  the  prograrrune  and  with 
raised re-training grants. - 117  -
Participants  of  this  programme  which  has  its emphasis  on 
preserving  and  broadening skills are  given  the opportunity 
to take  part  in  courses  for  further  vocational  training 
(see  III,  1.) 
Thus,  an  improve_ment  of the  indi  vidu~l chances  on the  labour 
market  and  the  adaptation of  the qualification level to the  ----- ~-----·- -~---------- -~----------------
qualification reguirements  of  the  employing  companies  is be-
ing_£~alized,  this with  rega~d to functional  as well  as 
.!:  .  .o.  extrai;_up_g__tt_o~.9.1 ~~lificat~~  The  increase  of  the 
subsidies  up  to  30  DKr  per  hour  and  the  expansion  of  the 
programme  helps  to  installan employment  policy which  does 
not  adopt  employment  creating as  a  therapy  for  long-term 
unemployed,  but  is connected with the  improvement  of quali-
fications  and, thus  with the essential element  of  Danish 
labour market  policy:  the  improvement  of vocational training. 
This  policy  follows  the  idea  ,that the  improvement  of 
individual  labour market chances  is of  eminent.  importance 
within the combat  against  unemployment,  because it contri-
butes  to the  elemination of unequalities  between  skill 
requirements  and  existing skills.  This  concept is 
~lso  reflected  by  the  heavy  utilization of  the  long-
term  unemployment  programme.  1981  30.000 subsidised  jobs 
were  offered,  25.000 of  those were  taken  up  by  long-term 
unemployed.  This  corresponds  to  a  utilization of  83%  (Ministry 
of  Labour,  1982). 
The  high  number  participants prematurely  leaving those 
programmes  not  being  combined  with training  schemes  is 
explained with the  non-identification with their  jobs. 
Accordingly- only  66%  of  the  juvenils participating in 
the  public relief work  stayed till the  end  of  the  programme. 
An  iquiry  among  the  young  persons  and  employing  companies 
(Clemantide/Ibsen,l982)  suggests that especially young  people 
did  not  see  their  job being related to their own  career 
aspirations.  In their vies  these  programmes  are often only 
occupational  therapies.  In  future  applications - 118  -
most  of  them  conceal  that  they  had  been  employed  within 
the  scope  of  a  programme. 
Regarding  wage  subsidy policy  in Denmark  its linkage with 
job creating  schemes  has  to be  emphasized  (Job  Offer  Scheme). 
Different to the Public  Relief  Work  in this programme  each 
granted  wage  subsidy means  the  recruitment of  a  long-term 
unemployed. 
Furthermore this programme  helps  to preserve and  to broaden 
skills,  a  fact  wh1ch  gains  special  importance  in respect 
to  the  specific selectivity of  this measure. - 119  ··-
2.  Job  Creating  Schemes 
In  Denmark  job creating  schemes  are  only very  lately intro-
duced  within the  frame-work  of  an  increase of  the  supply  of 
jobs.  With  the  issue of  the  so-called  "March  package"  (June 
]._~~2J  ___  §ta_t.~.~§-~_  for  job creating measures  were  enacted. 
As  for  wage  subsidies the  selective  lay-out  of  the measure 
is obvious.  It is exclusively designed  at unemployed  young 
poeple  between  18  and  25  years  and  in very  few  cases at older 
unemployed.  Besides  the selectivity of  the measures it 
leaps  into the eye  that it is not  a  wage  subsidy but  a  mix-
ture of  subsidies  and  premium  for  the creation of  a  job. 
Usually  one  single payment  is made  but it can  be  repeated 
up  to three  times  in  the  course of  three years.  Abuses  are 
excluded  because  employment  benefits of  Danish  unemployed 
are higher  than  the yearly promotion  premium.  Unemployed  who 
received  a  wage  on  or  above  the  average  get  about  100  000  DKr 
yearly.  A  fictious  establishment of  a  job for  an  unemployed 
only  in order to receive the  premium has  been  proved  un-
attractive.  Based  on  an  average  wage  of  64,52  DKr  per hour 
(1981)  in industry and  commerce,  the  premium  amounts  to  59.6% 
of  the  average wage.  This  makes  it rather desirable for  a 
company  to be qualified to receive the  premium. 
Furthermore there  is the possibility to employ  young  people 
instead of  regular unemployed.  Possible  deadweight  on  behalf of 
the  companies  can  lead to  displacement effects on  the  labou~ 
market;  thus,  unemployment  is not  being  lowered but  only  sub-
ject to  a  structural change. 
~or preventin~ deadweight  and  df~placement effects  job crea-
ting measures  should only  be  implemented,  when  the  p~d~  and 
2~-~-Y:i._~es  produced  ]:)y  the  new  jobs  are not  already being fur, 
.n.i_pJJ.g_Q._l?__y_g~_:t._sti_Il_g  jobs  in  the  company,  This  is meant  to 
guarantee that  a  real  increase  in performances  can  be  accom-
plished.  To  safeguard the  rise  of  useful  output  by  this mea-
sure  is  regarded  as  being  highly problematic.  (Ministry  of - 120  -
Finance,  1982)  Legislation responded  to this difficulty with 
the  establishment of  so-called labour market  committees. 
They  are  controlling if the  performances  of  a  newly  established 
j oL arc not  a] ready  bc.ing  furnished  by  existing  jobs.  F'urthcrmore 
t:-_cy  arc  n:or.ltorinc;  the  obf~ervance of  the  selective design;i.Jcncrc:d1y 
oniy  you~g un2mployed  are to be  recruited,  but  for  require-
me~ts of  the  newly  established  jobs it is also allowed  to 
employ  persons  above  25. 
Estimations  of  the  employment  effects are only available for 
the  employment  promotion part of the  ,.March-package"  on  the 
wtole.  Beside  the  job creating programme  the  employment  pro-
motion  part  covers  the  expansion  of the  job offer scheme  and 
further  employment  promotions.  T:1e  share of costs,  however,  is rela-
tively  small  as  it is  shown  in the  following  table: 
Table 3; 
Participants  and  costs  of  the  March  Package  - in mill  DKr  -
- E~ployment Promotion  -
Thus,  the estimated effects  are  predcminantly  a  result of 
the  job creating  scheme.  (Ministry of  Labour). 
'rhe  costs  o-f  th~s progrurrune  arc very  high,  this  with  respect 
to al  t.rrnativt~ :::;sts  of  nnempl~Jyment  - about  80%  - as  well 
as 1 n  compar  j_ son  to other  programmes.  The  expenditures  per - 121  -
annum·for  the  Job Offer  Scheme  and  the Public Relief  Work 
amount  to  30.000  DKr.  per person  and  employment  effects are 
found  even  for  a  longer period than  the  time of  promotion. 
For  the Job  Creating  Scheme  about  80.000  DKr  have  to be  raised. 
There  are  no  figures  about  the  number  of  jobs that can  be 
maintained after  the  time  of  promotion. - 122  -
3.  Employment  Effects  of  Public  Expenditure  Programmes  for 
the  Priva~r and  Public  Sector 
T'hc  Danish  government  responded  very early  - compared with 
other  European  countries  - to the  increase of  unemployment 
in  the middie  of  the  70s;  employment  effective public  ex-
penditures  and  investment  programmes  were  issued.  The  three 
most  significant  programmes  of this kind are  a  mixture of 
supply  and  demand  orientated elements.  The  first of  these 
programmes,  the  employment  plan  I  was  already passed  1977. 
rhose  programmes  that direct.ly aim at employfl1ent  effects 
pose  the  ;)r0bJ em  that.  they  ·~re  - for  achieving  a  short dated 
success  - targeted  towards  sectors  i.n  which  the  unemployment 
rate is extremely  high.  On  the other hand  such  measures  can 
only  solve  structural problems of  the  economy  to  a  very 
liffiited extent or not at all. 
This  can  only  be  rendered  rossjblc  by  a  middle-term alteration of 
the  production structure,  which  means  for  Denmark  expecial-
ly an  lEQ~overnent Qf_ the  trage balance  situation.  That  requires 
measures  aiming  at those  industries which  are  able to ef-
fectuate  an  expansion of  the  export  volume  or  a  reduction 
the  import  volume.  ~<;_Q_:p_~;!.ict  __  betw~en having  ~!:2.._  ach:!:_E}..Y.§_ 
J?_hort:  __ ~_t:"l!!__.§.!!!i?lo_yrnel'"!t~_fects .on  the one  hand  and  to solve 
E..truc_t\!J.:.~],._ Q.~.O~bl_~ms_._on  the  oth.EEr  hand,  determines  the  employ-
ment  ~ffective  expend~ture programmes.  This  contradiction 
is met  by  the  government  with  the adoption of  supply  and 
demand  orientated measures  in  ·S:o.ch  employment  plan,  which 
again are  a  combination of  investment  promotion  and  public 
expenditure  programmes. 
Furthermore  the  employment  plan  contains direct  labour market 
and  occoupational  training measures  (about  25%  of  the total 
expenditures),  which  will  be  discussed  later  (  e.g~he Job 
Offer  5chciT'.r·) , - 123  -
'rhc  predecessor  of  the current  employment  plan  II  (1982-1983) 
referred to  a  markedly greater extent to  demand  orientated 
measures.  The  main  direction of the  employment  plan II  aims 
at the  strengthening of  the £_9mpet_itiveness  of_ various  eco-
nomic  s~~tors and  to enable  these sectors to integrate  new 
technologies  in their production.  At  the  same  time  the  q~~el~ 
_ment  ___ ,Q_f  el}.ergy  savi~ measures  and  new  .~.ays  of  energy  su..2E.=... 
~y_shall be  promoted.  Thus,  the major part of  furos is spent 
on  the  promotion  of trade  and  export, including measures 
to facilitate the  founding  of  enterprises  for  young  entre-
preneurs  and  the  promotion  of  regional  development. 
Energy  promotion  measures  which  could  lead to  a  long- term 
improvement  of  the trade balance situation hold the  second 
position in the  plan.  The  first one  deals with energy  saving1 
which  concerns  the  reduction of  consumption  as well  as  a 
better utilisation of  the existing energy  production.  The 
second  group  includes projects that open  up  new  energy  sour-
ces  and  the  exploration of  new  technologies  {Minstery of 
Labour  1981). 
Kjaersgaard  (1982)  in particular emphasizes  the  foreseeing 
policy of  Denmark  in this field  and  with  regard to its promotion of 
~pergy sa~j.ng_technolo_g_ies.  Compared  with other  European countries 
Den~ark  would  have  become  active very early.  Therefore 
short-dated employment  possibilities have  been  created;  long-
dated  an  improvement  of  the  trade balance situation will 
be  possible  by  energy saving. 
Rll pJ: -~~x  pe  ~§J!:.~!..  re  __prog r a_~me_~  __ f or  t l:_l~_pu_i  1  §_i ng  _  _l_!?. d ~  s try and 
~-KP~ll_9.l tuse.§  for_.12~bl  i...£_!;±:".9-.P.:.~.QQ!::.!:  and  servic~.§.....J.?l.gy__a  spe-
£.i. U._~  __ _£_ole.  Though  they  do  not  meet  all  intention of  the 
plan as  to promote  the  trade balance  situation as  well  as 
to bring  up  employment  their benefit for  the  public wel-
fare  is being stressed. - J24 
Measures  for  the building  industry1 for  the restauration of 
slum·c!earance areas,  city modernisation  and  renovation 
h&ve  very  high  employment  effects,  at the  same  time  they 
contribute  to  a  solution of  housing  problems  (Ministry  of 
Labour11981).  Measures  concerning the  public transport are 
emphasized  as  being  important  in respect  to  a  rea~onable 
enerqy policy.  At  the  same  time  the  importance of  a  well_ 
~~rating_tr~~l~Qrt network ~or the mobility of all employed 
is pointed out. 
The  distribution of  expenditures  for  the different sectors 
is  shown  in the  following  table: 
Table  ..!___;_ 
Employment  Plan II  - Distribution of  Expenditures  1981  -
i.n  percent 
building  industry 
energy 
promotion  of  commerce  and 
export 
public  transport 
public  services 
city modernization  and 
residential building 
total public expenditures 
1981 
5,3 
18,3 
62,7 
3,9 
2,2 
7,6 
100,0 
Source:  Ministry of  Finance,  Budgetdepartment,  1981 
own  estimates 
~nnota~  Expenditures  for direct  labour market  policy 
(e.g.  long-term unentp.ioyed  programme}  within 
the  scope  of  the plan have  not  been  taken  in 
account. 
For  the first  employment  plan  running  from  1977  to  1980,  with 
a  volume  of  10 bill.  DKr.  (prices  of  1977)  Kjaersgaard esti-
mated  a  direct  employment  effect of  50  000  persons  per  annum 
u.nd  expect::-;  u  ....  J. ••• 2.2-u{·  "·;feet  for  the  employment  plan II.  Yet, 
on  behalf  of  other  sources  only  a  short-term  employment 
effec~ of  30  000  jobs p.a.  is expected  (Ministry of  Labour,81). ... r 
- 125  -
Common  to both  positions  the  employment  effects are  only 
short  dated  resulting  from  the  increase  of  demand,  which  of-
fersthe  basis  for  an  expansion  of  production  and  the  crea-
tion of  jobs.  When  evaluating the  employment  effects it is 
regarded  as  difficult,  to consider  further  economical  measures 
or  economical  developments  in  a  suitable way.  But  primari-
ly it  is to  be  kept  in mind,  that the  employment  plan  is 
aiming  at structural  changes  and  the  improvement  of  comp~i­
tion  conditions.  Above  all, the  permanent  effect of  the plan 
is its irrluence  on  export  and  on  those  sectors,  which  are 
competing with  imports.  Therefore it is not  adequate 
to the  plan to assess  its short-term effects only. 
The  success  and  experiences  regarcB.{ng  the  employment  programme 
led to the  issue  of  the  so-called  "action programme".  It 
represents  an  expansion of  the public  expenditure planning 
between  1982  and  1985  and  aims  - even  more  distinctly than  the 
employment  programmes-at  structural  changes.  The  expansion 
js concentrated on  energy  supply  and  the building industry. 
Different to the  employment  plans, an  explicit promotion  of 
commerce  and  export  is not  provided.  The  action  programmealso 
is  a  mixture of  supply  and  demand  orientated measures. 
·  It envisaged  short-term as  well  as  long-term employment 
effects  (Ministry  of Labour,  198~). 
Expenditures  for  the  energy  industry  focus  on  a  different tar-
get.  Even  though  employment  effects  can  also  be  expected,  the 
programme  aims  - as  distinguished from  the  promotion  of  the 
building sector- at  a  relief of the  balance of  payment. 
The  programme  is dealing  with  the utilization of existing 
cnerqy, wi.t.h  a  more  reasonable utilization of  surplus-heat 
and  the  promotlon  of  a  natural  gas  project.  Although  expen-
ditures  for  the  energy  industry  have  negative effect on 
the  balance of  payment  in  the  short  run,  long-term  savings 
can  be  expected  as  far  as  energy  import  is concerned.  But 
th1s  relief can  only  be  realized  in  the  long  run.  The  esti-I 
-·- 126  -
mated  effects of  the original  expenditure  programme  and  the 
11 Inversteringsprogram
11  are  shown  in the  following  table. 
'I'ubl_L~ 
Effects  of  the·"Investeringsprogram 1982
11  on  the  balance of 
payments  - in bill.DKr at prices  from  1982  -
1982  1983  1984  ~  I  c,riqinal" Investcr  ings-
I  I program  '82"  - 9.2  7.9  7 .. 7  7.3 
I 
programme  0.2  0.2  -0.6  -1.2  Gtion 
otal  9.4  8.1  7.1  6.1 J 
So:,.ircc:  .l-1lni. stry of  Finance,  1982 
T~:e Ministry of  Finance  expects  an  increase of  employment 
of  11 oo  p.a.  as aaainst  1981  by  the public expenditure pro-
gramme.  The  employment  effect of the total programme  is to 
amount  to 110  000  full-time  employed  for  the entire period. 
The  expenditures  for  each potentially created  job  amount  to 
approximately  375.000  DKr.  This  means  that the action pro-
gramme  is  much  more  expensive  than  the  employment  plan  II, v1ith 
expenditure  for  each created  j~amounting to 140.000 DKr. 
Nevertheless  a  comparison  of  these  figures  with  the direct 
labour market  measures  appears  to be  unadmissable,  because 
the latter show  significantly less  long-term effects than 
expenditure  programmes,  especially those which  are  designed at 
structural  changes  like  in  Denmark. 
All  mentioned  programmes  charge the public  budget  to  a  simi-
lar extent.  The  burden  for  the  budget  1983 through  the  employ-
ment  plan II amounts  to  4.139  mill.  DKr.,  through  the action pro-
9ran~ne  4.128  mil.l.  DKr.  Doth  programmes  charge  the  budget  with 
4 . 3%  of  tllE-.'  budy  ::.~t  expenditures. -- 127  --
Table  6: 
Expenditure  programmes 
- percentage of  budget  1983  in mill.  DKr.  -
Employment  action  budget  expenditure progranwes 
Plan II  programme  expenditure  in percent of  budget 
expenditures 
4.139  4.128  190.800  4.33 
The  percentage of  expenditure  programmes  in  the  public  bud-
get  seems,  compared  to other countries,  relatively  high 
(e.g.  Federal  Republic  of  German).  This  is to  emphasize 
especially  in  reviewing the fairly high  employment  effects 
of  those  programmes. 
I 
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II  REDISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  AVAILABLE  WORK-LOAD 
Within  the  framework  of working-time  programmes  the  Danish 
policy essentially stakes on th0 reduction  of  life-time working-
time  by  lowering the  age  limit  from  66  to  60  years.  The  possi-
bility  of early retirement exists since the  1st of January 
1979  on  a  voluntary basis.  Beside  that the  annual  vacation 
was  prolonged  from  4  to  5  week~.  Issues  like the  reduction 
of weekly  working  time,  job sharing and  a  re-arrangement  of  the 
overtime  law  are  controversial. 
Measures  to  achieve  an  early retirement  are  generally  judged 
more  positively with  regard to the social  and  employment 
effects  than  schemes to  reduce  the weekly  working  time 
(Kjaersgaard  1982,  Det  ¢konomiske  R~d 1982).  Concerning the 
reductions  of weekly  working  time  there is  a  far-reaching 
agreement  that these are  only  employment  effective if no  -
or only  a  certain  - wage  compen_sation  ·takes  place.  Opponents 
of  a  weekly  working-time  reduction  define this as  a  trans-
formation  of  involuntary  into voluntary  unemployment,  and 
emphasize  subsequent  costs  (Det  ¢konomiske  R~d,  1982),  pro-
ponents  are  emphasizing  social  and  employment  effects. 
Kjaersgaard  (1982)  stresses the social character of  an  early 
retirement  from  a  job.  Employees  whose  physical  and  emotional 
condition require it,  would  have  the opportunity to retire 
from  labour-market without  suffering  from  a  drastic loss of 
income.  For  1981  he  refers  to an  utilization of  75%  of all 
who  are digitible. 
The  distribution of the utilization is described in the 
following  survey: - 1 29  -
Table  1:  Number  of participants  in the  "Voluntary  Early 
Retirement  Pay"  by  sex and  age.  Key-date:  30.9.1981 
-------- ·-- ·-- ---------- - ---- ------ -------- ----------~--·------------ ----·  --- ---------- --- ------~ 
I 
!'-~en  Women  Total 
number  %  number  %  number  0' 
/c  .. _______  ~- ---- ------------------
.f.~O  years  3  151  7  2  292  12  5  443  9 
61 
II  5  386  12  3  262  18  8  648  14 
':>2 
II  5  684  13  3  020  16  8  704  14 
II  6  866  16  3  045  16  9  ~11  16 
II  7  220  16  2  752  15  9  972  16 
7  606  18  2  455  13  10  061  16 
7  726  18  2  020  '10  9  746  15 
43  639  100  18  846  100  62  485  100 
Source:  Directorate of  Labour 
Arbejdsoirektoratets,  1981 
A  relatively equal  distribution of participants  can  be  observed 
in the  age-group  from  61  to  66.  This  however  only applies  to 
the total participation,  not  to the distribution by  sexes. 
While  the majority of  women  in  the  age  from  61  to  63  are 
participating in  the early retirement programme,  the male parti-
cipants  reach  the highest  level  in  the  age-group  from  64  to  66. 
The  heavy  use  of  the early retirement  system  by  men  leaps 
to the  eye.  It  is more  than  twice  as  high  as  by  women.  This 
can  only partly be  attributed to  the  lower  labour  force  participation 
of women:  In  the  age-group  from  45  to  54  activity  rat~ is  94,7  % 
and  of  women  71,9%.This difference of  22,8% does not totally 
explain  the use  of  the early  retirement  programme  by  men 
being  more  than  twice  as  high.  It is obvious,  however,  that 
the activity rate of  women  in the  age-group  of  55  to  64  is 
decreasing  disti,~tly. - 130  -
Table  2:  Employment  Rates  by  sex and  age-groups 
1976  to  1981 
45-54  55-64  65-74 
----·-·-·  ---·---------
f--·-· -------
35-44 
97,3 
97,5 
97,7 
97,7 
97,7 
1 
Hen 
\•1om en 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
75,5 
77,9 
81,0 
82,8 
84,4 
94,8 
94,9 
94,7 
94,7 
92,7 
n.v. 
69,9 
67,0 
70,4 
71,9 
n.v. 
83,9 
84,4 
84,5 
77,4 
71,9 
41,4 
43,7 
45,5 
44,4 
80,2  40,3 
33,9 
34,2 
31,9 
25,1 
20,4 
8,2 
8,3· 
9,3 
7,5 
5,9 
L-·---------------------
Source:  Ministry of Labour  1982 
The  falling rate of the  number  of  persons  in dependent 
employment  in the age-group  from  55  to  64  suggests that women 
do  leave the  labour market but that they do  not participate 
in the early retirement system. 
This is probably  due  to  the  fact that  a  10 year's  member-
ship in  the  voluntary  unemployment  insurance within the last 
15~ars is the  p..r~:::_c_g_ndi t .  .ton_for:__tJ.l~_I?_articipa~tion  __  ~n- tl}_~  _  _p_£2_:-
9£~~  Especially women  who  tend to leave the  labour market 
because of their double  burden  by  household  and  job are 
hampered in  using  the possibility  of participating in the 
early retirement  system. 
The  decrease  of the male  gainful  employment  from  1979  to  1980 
is evident;  also  a  decrease  of female  gainful  employment 
between  1979  and  1981  can  be  noticed.  Most  certainly this downward 
movement  can  also be  led back  to the introduction of the early  retirement  programme  (Ministry  of  Labour  1982). 
70~~  of  the  new  vacancies  ~ve been  occupied  again.  This  is 
regarded  as  a  good  success  considering the fact  that it is 
a  voluntary early retirement  system.  It  corresponds 
to  a  reduction  of the  unemployment  figure of  50 000 or  a 
reduction of  the  unemployment  of  about  2%.  In  general  there 
is no  doubt  about the success  of the  programme  also with 
regard to the re-entry of  unemployed  persons  (see  ¢konomisk 
Statistik Konsulent  1982,  Organization for  Economic  Co-opera-
tion  and  Development  1982).  It is shown,  however,  that are-
duction  of life-time working  time  among  the  scht~nes to 
reduce  working  time  is  "the less of  two  evils..  but would 
constitute financial  problems  in the  long  run. In short terms 
the  progra~~  is being  financed  throuqh  savings  in the  unem-
ployment  insurance  fund  which arise from the re-entry of 
unemployed.  But  long-dated it is to be  foreseen  that the 
financial  burden  for the  unemployment  benefits fund  will 
~2 that high that a  compensation of the deficit has  to be 
financed  by  a  tax increase  (Det  ¢konomiske  R~d,  1982). 
Tite  public expenditures  for  the programme  and  the planned 
expansion of  the programme  on  behalf of the  success  can  be 
found  in  the  following  survey: 
Table  3:  Flexibilisation of age-limits 
- public expenditures  in mill.DKr  -
80 
Persons  55  000 
Expenditu~es  1.365 
81 
63  000 
1.410 
Source:Ministry of  Labour  1982 
70  000 
1.590 
83-85  -
240  000 
4.855 
• Furthc:nnort·  - and  tlu.~;  concet n~ all  types  of  W<..)l:king  time 
reduction  - it is printed to .the  irreversibility of this 
measure.  In  times  of  cyclical  upswings  the  labour  demand  will 
rise to  such  an  extent that  the  decreased  number  of  labour 
force  will  not  be  sufficient to satisfy this  demand. 
An  exact  analysis  on  the macroeconomical  employment  effect 
of  a  prolongation of  the  annual  vacation  from  4  to  5  weeks 
is still outstanding.  Debated  are questions  concerning 
sector-specific effects of  a  prolongation of  the  annual 
vacation  (¢konomisk-Statistik Konsulent,  1982).  Thus  it is 
being discussed if this measure  will  lead to an  extention 
of  public  services or if additional  employees  will  be 
recruited  in the  private sector. 
The  creation of  lo  ooo  addional  jobs  is being expected  by 
the  limitation of  overtime  to  loo hours  every year. 
Part-time work  is condidered to  be  employment  effective. 
It enables  a  flexible  lay-out of  the production process. 
The  establishment of  more  shifts will  be  possible,  thus 
production  losses  can  be  avoided.  Further  more  it is to 
assume  that the decision of  women  to take  up  a  job or not, 
depends  on  the possibility of  part-time work.  This  becomes 
obvious  against  the  background  of the extremely  high  pro-
portion of  female  part-time workers  in all sectors. 
This  is illustrated in the  following  survey: '  ' .  ~ 
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Even  the very bigh  numbe~ of  part-time workers  in  1981  - as 
being  21,4  % of  the  Danish  working  population  - can  be  led 
back to the  high percentage of  female  parte-time work.  On  the 
other  hand  the great percentage  of  female  part-time employees 
also  counts  for  the high  female  activity rate  - compared with 
other countries. 
In  spite of the  labour market  relieving effects of part-time 
work  an  extension of the  supply  of part-time jobs is proble-
matic  since it may  lead to  an  increase of  female  employment 
which  is  ~ taking  into account  the  high  unemployment  (¢kono-
misk Statistisk Konsulent,  1982)  - not  unconditionally desi-
rable. 
The  significantly high percentage of part-time employees  in 
the administration  - especially of  female's  - is also appa-
rent  as  against other countries.  Almost  half  the  number  of all 
part-time workers  is employed  there;  a  relatively small  num-
ber of part-time  employees  is engaged  in the  - as  in other 
countries preferred  - service sector. 
Against  the background of  the  current  economic  situation it 
i§.._  unanimouslY  acknowledg~q  ___ :tbat  -~  succ~_~sful weekly  V{Q_rking  time 
.£_educti_<2~___c,ap.....illlL_J).JL..Q._chiev~_Q  __  un9eJ:. the condition of  full 
~~gg-comQensation.  A  working-time  reduction with wage-com-
pensation would  lead to higher  hourly earnings  and  thus  would 
be  contraproductive with  regard to  employment  effects because 
of  the  increase of unit  labour costs.  The  possible expansion 
of  the  consumptive  demand  by  higher  employment  would  in every 
case  have  less effects  on  the growth  than  supply-orientated 
measures  like e.g.  investment grants which  are  aiming  at  a 
~;trcngthening of  the  international  competitiveness.  The  ef-
f~cts are rated  less disadvantageous  without  wage-compen-
sation  - in  the  sense that  'sharing of  work'  would  be  equi-
valent  to  'sharing of  income'.  Nevertheless  capital costs 
would  tend to rise because  more  jobs  had  to  be  created then 
(Det  ¢konomisk  R~d,  1982). - 135  -
On  the  contrary another position points  out  the  traditional 
increase of  labour-inten!::;i  1y,  which  would  improve  - combined 
with  the working-time  reduction without wage-compensation  - the 
comprti ti  wnesS:0konomisk Statistisk Konsulent  1982) -The  poss  i  ... 
b:i lity of  precisely cstiruatinCJ  the  scale  of  the  capacity  loss 
·?JLC!  its consequences  for  the  propcnsi ty · t.o  invest  is  be.ing  denied. 
In  the current situation,  however,  it has  to  be  assumed  that 
in quite  a  number  of economic  sectors hidden  labour  forces 
were  existing and that the  loss of production  and  capacity 
on  account of working-time  reduction  would  not  be  as  big 
as  under  regular conditions.  According  to calculations  of 
the  Budget  Department  a  substantial  increase of the  propensity 
to  invest  - as  a  result of  a  possible  capacity loss  - is 
to  be  expected.  But  if this expectation  comes  true in  view 
of  the  current unfavourable  economic  development,  remains 
questionable. 
The  question of wage-compensation  for certain  groups  of the 
labour market  and  its financing  is controversial.  At  any 
rate  the  employers  should not  pay  any  sort of  compensation 
(Det  ¢konomiske  R~d,  1982) 1  since  then  eventual  programmes 
would  lose their attraction.  Compensation  is to  be  covered 
by  the  government  and  should  be  guided  by  the level of 
unemployment  benefit~  But  even  under  the condition of govern-
ment  allowances it would  seem unrealistic  that those  schemes 
could  contribute  to  a  substantial  decrease of unemployment. 
Moreover  governmental  compensation-payments  would  be  followed 
by  budget  problems  which  would  harol.y  be justified in  the 
current situation.  Form  another point of view  a  compensation 
for 
11problem  groups"  is regarded  to  be  reasonable  (¢konomisk 
Statistik Konsulcnt  1982) .  A  compensation paid  by 
employers  runs  the  risk of  inducing displacement  effects which 
mt~ans  that  they recruit other employees  than the above 
mentionPd  marginal  groups.  Publicly  sponsored it would  cause 
u.~  excesr,ive  b:.l:-·-1  -n  :o:- ~~e budget.  Furthermore  the  success 
of  working  time  reduction  schemes drpends  on  the  fact  if 
Denmark  by  itself will  reduce  worki.ng-time  or if this will  become 
an  element  of  internationally coordinated  policy. - J i6  -
III  ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES 
The  permanent  technol~ical development  of  the  Danish  industry 
claims  a  constant  adaptation of the  development of skills 
to the  requirements  of  labour  demand.  The  policy responded 
to that  in  two  different ways:  on  the  one  hand  by  further 
training courses  for all groups  of gainfully employed,  on 
the other hand  by  further  training for  unemployed  persons 
which  were  meant  to solve  adaptation problems  by  an  im-
provement  of  the  individual  labour-market  chances.  Con-
cerning  the latter a  considerable selectivity  similar tp the Job 
Offer  Scheme  is to be  seen:  they  are mainly  aiming at youth 
and  long-term unemployed  and  only to  a  certain extent at 
women.  The  central  role which  occupational  training plays 
in  Denmark  is also illustrated by the  far-reaching  net 
of  in-company further training  schemes  resting with private 
initiative. 
It is undisputed that the  occupational training is one  of 
the  most  important  elements  in the  labour market  policy. 
(Det  ~konomisk  R~d,  1982,  Arbejedsdirektoratet,  1981;  Kjaers-
gaard,  1982),  but  the  statutory underpinning  (Hansen,1981)  and  the 
quality of  the adaptation  function  (OECD,  1982)  are being 
discussed. 
The  generally positive  judgement  of  occupational training 
becomes  apparent  in  the distinct expansion of the occupational 
training measuresw  The  following  table  shows  the extent of 
the different training mearures  for  the period  from  1979  to 
1981,  which  means  an  increase of  about  60%  for  the  above 
mentioned  period.  An  expansion of activities by  14%  is planned 
for  1982  (Ministry of  Labour,  1980). - 137  -
_Tabl e__l_;_ 
Occupational  training measures  1979-1982 
- Number  of training weeks  in  thousand  -
- Number  of  the  individual measures  in  .%  -
Measures  1979 
-------------------· 
courses for 
semi-skilled workers 
courses for skilled 
workers 
127  51,0  l:::  ~:.5 ~;5811~)  4:~~=-~]2::_2 ~~):~ 
i 
.64 
3 
25,7 
1,2 
70  22,7  90  23,2  99  22,3
1 
1.41  Re-training 
Occupational pre-
_paratory c.f.youths 
courses  for long-
tenn unarployed 
courses  for "W''rren 
43 
7 
5 
17,3 
2,8 
2,0 
2 
69  22,3 
6 
9 
1,9 
2,9 
total  249  100,0  309  100,0 
6  1,5  6 
86  22,2  95  21,5 
16  4,1  25  5,6 
15  3,9  15  3,4 
388  100,0  443  100,0 
L------------------------------------------------------------------
1)  estimated 
2)  planned-
Source:  f'Jiinistry of Labour 1982 
The  biggest part of the  measures  are courses  for  semi-skil-
led workers,  which  reveals that there  is  a  general  need  for 
knowledges  and skills which  are  required by  the  technical 
development  and  the  labour market  situation.  The  goal  of 
these  courses  lies  in  compensating  the  lack  of  general 
occupational  elements.  Therefore  they partially have  the 
character of  a  basic occupational  training,  whereas  the 
considerably  smaller  scale of the  courses  for  skilled 
workers  indicates that  they  arc  not  designed  as  subsequent 
compensation  of  basic  lacks  in  the occupational  training 
system,  but  intend to  familiarize  skilled workers  with 
~e~-££QQ~ction methods  on_the  ba~!? of  a  we~l- orQ~nded t~ai­
~-!!?:9  __ _( CF.DEFOP,  198 2) . - 138  -
Occtlpational  preparatory  courses  for  youths  were  certainly 
extended  in  absolute  figures  but  their percentage of  the 
occupational  training measures  altogether  remained  unchanged. 
This  is particularly regretted,  facing  the high  unemployment 
of  youth  and  the unquestionable  success  with occupational 
preparatory courses. 
The  courses  are heavily  claimed  because  most  of the  course 
leavers are  likely to take  up  a  job,  to participate in 
vocational  training or further  training after the end  of  the 
course. 
A  sample  published  by  the Ministry of  Labour  (198o)  on  the 
outlet of  the  young  persons  after completing the occupational 
preparatory  scheme  shows  the  following  picture: 
Table  2: 
Occupational  Preparation:  Outlet of the participants in  %  (1980) 
occupation  41  41 
training/further training  23 
occupational projects  18 
unemployment/no  further 
information  18 
Source:  Ministry of  Labour  1980 
41%  of  the participants take  up  a  regular  employment  after 
the  termination of  the  schme.  Since  those  do  not  operate  as 
employment  projects it is to  assume  that at least  a  large  number 
these  groups  will  be  occupied  in long  terms.  As  far  as parti-
cipants  in the  employment  programmes  are  concerned it is 
also quite probable  that they  remain  employed  after the_end  of 
the project,  yet at least their individual  chances  on  the  labour 
have  improved  which  also  hold  true  for participants  in training 
and  further  training  courses. - 139  -
There  are  no  exact  data  concerning  the  number  of participants 
in  the  occupational  training  schemes.  118  000  are estimated 
for  1980  (Ministry of  Labour  1982),  this is  12%  in relation 
to  the potential  number  of  participants of  980  000.  This 
even  goes  down  to  8,6%  of all potential participants,  because 
the occupatlonal  training for  semi-skilled workers  and  skilled 
workers  partially include several  courses.  Besides  those 
measures  for  occupational training initiated by  the  govern-
ment  a· great  number  of initiatives resting with private enterprises 
is assumed.  The  lack of  informations  concering privatein-com-
pany-training initiatives is being regretted  (Ministry 
of  Labour) •  It is estimated that  2o%  of all employees 
aged  25  to  69  do  actually take part in training  schemes  with-
in the course of  one  year.  These  initiatives include short 
courses  of instruction similar to the occupational training 
courses,  evening  courses  and  longer-lasting courses  (about 
1  year).  lt is estimated on  this basis that the number  of 
persons  undertaking(further)  occupational training amounts 
to  43o.ooo  annually. 
The  insufficient extent of the occupational training  schemes 
for  young  people  on  the  one  hand  and  the  success with  such 
progra~~es on  the other hand  were  the background  for  passing 
the  so-called  "March-package" .. Thus.,  in particular the  so-called 
"rest-groups"  who  have difficulties  in finding  a  qulified 
education shall  be  provided with training possibilities. 
Goal  of  the training part of the  "!~arch-package 
11  is the 
establishment of  a  so-called youth  guarantee,  which  is meant 
to offer training opportunities to all young  people. 
The  current discussion,  however,  indicates that this target 
is not  likely to be  politically workable. 
Nearly  90  000  vac~ncies in  schooling  and  occupational  training 
for  young  people  are  available  in  1982,  confronted with  85000 
primary  school  leavers  of which  a  certain percentage will - 140  -
invade  the  labour market.  It has  to be  taken  into account, 
however,  that,  because most  of those primary  school  leavers 
and  young  people,  who  have  not  taken  up  a  training place 
directly after having left primary sctool  in  the last years, 
want  to  move  into  training now,  the  number  of  training 
places will  probably  not  be  sufficient,  a  fact,  which will 
make  additional  measures  neccessary  (see  above). 
The  "March-package"  includ~s the creation of  5  000  apprentice-
ships  and  work  experience places every year,  predominantly 
in the  public sector.  As  far  as  possible recruitment  is to 
be  realized  in  branches  able to give skills which  make  a 
subsequent  hiring  in  the private as  well  as  in  the  public 
sector possible.  Because  there is still a  lack of  apren-
ticeship  and  work  experience places  in  the private sector 
their creation and  conservation  is promoted with  an  allowance 
of  30  000  DKr,  possible  deadweight is being  prevented by  the  fact 
that the  average  number  of training places of the last two 
years  minus  one  must  be  increased  (see  above). 
With  the  adoption  of the  "March-package"  the  number  of 
training places will  amount  to  22  800  in  1982  and  up  to  45  000 
in  1985.  The  total expenditures are estimated to be  just under 
1,4 billions of  DKr  (Treasury,  1982),  1982,  stepping  up 
to  a  little more  than  2,5  billions of  DKr  until  1984.  They 
should  amount  to 1,8 billions of  DKr  in  1985.  The  costs of 
60  000  DKr  for every  created training place are  justified 
by  the fact that it is not  an  "occupational  therapy" or 
1  a 
job-creation for one  1:-_i.m~~~~ but  training  that is designed 
atthe  improvement  of  future  employment  chances. - 141  -
'J'hc  ucneral  expansion  of  training  schemes  will  presumably 
cunl.inu<·  wit~hin  the  next·  y<·ars.  Thi:~  is partially  t.he  rc··· 
sult of  the general  development  of  the  labour market,  indu-
cing  a  great  demand  for qualified and  skilled workers  be-
cause  of  the  incessant  technological  development,  partially 
this is  on  account  of  the  growing  number  of participants 
in  the  courses  having  in view  the improverrent of  individual  chances 
on  the  labour market as being faced  with  increasing unem-
ployment  throughout  the last years  (Ministry of  Labour,  1982). 
ConfrQD.ted with the  technoloqi~l deveJogrent to be expected in the 
80s  the necessity of  adaptation  strategies of skills is 
~Qn~~estion. A  reform  aiming at  a  wider  range  of  occu-
pational  training  and  general  education  is considered as 
being of chief  importance  (Okonomisk  Statistisk Konsulent, 
1982).  With  regard to the creation of  equal  opportunity it 
is emphasized  that,  above  all,  the general  education  has  to 
be  intensified  (Hansen,  1982) .(Two  Thirds  of the  Danish  trade 
union  members  only posses  a  7  yeard primary  school  education). 
Limited  courses  for  occupational  training  can  not  compensate 
this  lack.  Further,  problems  of education  and  training cannot 
be  isolated  from  other factors,  like it is proved  that the 
social  group  holding  the worst  jobs,the lowest  income,  the 
worst  accomodations  also have  the  lowest  educational  level. 
Inter alia Hansen  points  out,  that the  system of  the occupa-
tional training has  to be  extended  by  the general  right  for 
all persons  in dependent  employment  to paid educational  leave 
(Hansen,  1981,  OECD,  1982),  since otherwise  equal  oppor-
tunity would  not  be  guaranted within the utilization of 
further training measures. 
As  a  solution to questions  of  jurisdiction between  private 
and  public institutions for  occupational  training it is  sug-
gested that public  educational offers  should  aim at more 
basic skills whereas  the  responsibility for  progra~es which - 142  -
are  aiming at their skill  requirements  should rest with 
the  companies.  The  planning of  education  and  training should 
be  realized in close  cooperation of all institutions and 
social partners  concerned  (OECD,  1982). 
Kjaersgaard  {1982)  considers  the  current  schemes  to  be  suffi-
cient.  To  his opinion  they  are  a  well-working  system of 
general  education  and  occupational  training including  an 
adaptation ability to demand,  which  has  been  constantly 
improved;  thus,  the  risk of 
could  have  been  reduced. 
••bot tle-neck  ••-programmes - 143  -
IV  CONCLUSION 
In  the  following  a  comprehensive  comparison of  the  most  im-
portant policy measures  is  intended. Im  this context  not  only the 
efficiency  but  also  and  above all it has  be  reviewed  as. 
~o which  extent the  individual  programmes  meet  their actual 
_:Ln_t.ention. 
Taking  notice of this is of particular importance  for  Dan-
mark,  because  the  whole  of the measures  concerning  labour 
market  and  employment  policies is characterized by  purely 
selective labour market  instruments  on  the  one  hand  and  on 
the other hand  by  instruments  aiming at structural  changes 
of the  economy.  The  following  survey indicates the expendi-
tures  per  capita for  the  individual  programmes. 
Expenditures  per  capita of  the  individual programmes  in 
DKr  - related to the  time  of promotion: 
- Job-Offer-Scheme 
- Public-Relief-Work 
~~e=~~~~~~~2=~~~~~~~ 
- Job-Creating-Schemes 
- Employment-Plan 
- Action  Programme 
Redistribution of  the available 
work-load 
- Early-Retirement-Scheme 
(1)  Maximum  amount 
n.a.= not  available 
DKr 
30.900 
33.500 
80.000 
140.000 
375.000 
94. 800  ( 1) 
n.a. 
Source:  Ministry of  labour,  Treasury  an  own  estimates - 1'14  -
c  or:-1pa ring  the  p rog  r arr  .  .rr1c s  the EJ,J rc2J 1_~_::-)~-~-li e f-\i9  .£~_33.!1  cL._t he  __  ..1 o b-
Cffer-Scherne  prove  to  be  the  most  inexpensive.  'I'he 
per  capita-costs  for  the  Emplyoment-Plan  and  the action-pro-
crar.~e are  remarkably higher  than  the costs  for the Job-Offer-
Scheme  and  the  Public-Relief-Work.  This  can  be  led back to 
the different goals  of  the  programmes.  The  expenditure pro-
grammes  are not only aiming  at the elimination of  unemploy-
ment  but also at structural changes  of the  economy.  In  con-
tradiction to those the Job-Offer-Scheme  and  the Public-Relief-
Work  are  genuine  labour market  orientated measures  whose  expen-
diture level has  to be  compared  primarily with the alterna-
tive costs  for  unemployment.  The  job-creation  scheme  for 
youth also has  to follow this criterion.  Compared  with un-
employment  benefits of  about  90.000 DKr.,  however,  it seems 
to be  less  favourable  than  the  two  other programmes.  A part 
of  the high costs  can  certainly be  justified by  the fact 
that additional  jobs are created by this programme where-
-as  the  Job-Offer-Scheme  and  Public-Relief-Work are only 
aiming at the  recruitment of certain problem-groups  b~t 
are  not  linked with the  creation of  a  new  job  - consequently 
higher  crowding  out  and deadweight effects can  be  assumed. 
The  Early-Retirement-Scheme plays  a  special role  in  so  far 
as  it only  aims  at indirect labour market relief effects, 
but not at  a  direct elimination of  unemployment.  Provided 
that the expenditures  for  one  unemployed  person  correspond 
approximately to the expenditures  for  one  pensioner and  the 
latter are also mainly  being paid by  unemployment insurance 
fund  this  programme  exerts  aaditional  financial  pressure 
on  the  fund  since eligibility  does  not depend  on  previous  unem-
ployment. 
Thisl  however,  is partially compensated  by  the  fact 
that  70  % of  the vacancies  caused  by early retirement  are oc-
cupied  again,  most  certainly mainly  by  former  unemplyoed 
persons. - 145  -
The  following  synopsis  presents  the effects of  the  individual 
programmes  with  regard  to the duration  of  the created jobs. 
The  second  column  shows  whether  the  jobs are  created 
in  the private or in the public sector. 
Programme 
Wage-subsidy 
programmes: 
-Job-Offer-Scheme 
Duration of the 
employment effect 
promotion  time  9  months 
partly hiring for  longer 
than  promotion  time 
-Public-Relief-Work promotion  time  26  weeks 
no  further  employment 
Job-creating-
schemes: 
-Job-Creating-
Scheme 
Expenditures 
progranunes: 
-Employment-Plan 
-Action  Programme 
Redistribution of 
the available 
work-load: 
-Early Retirement 
Scheme 
skill adat?tation 
schemes 
duration of promotion 
usually  1  year with  the 
goal  of long-term employ-
ment  effects 
short-term effects by 
expenditure programmes 
long-term effects by 
structural changes 
Medium-term effects by 
labour  market relief 
effects 
exclusively long-term 
effect.s 
Sector 
private + 
public 
public 
public  + 
private 
public  + 
private 
public + 
private - 146  -
Th9  m.tJStt!._~~---of  __ s[.lort=-._and  long-term effes:tive measures  is 
_§.!J:.~J};ing_.  All  progranunes  but  the  Public-Relief-Work are ai-
mi.n<;.r  explicitely  at_  long-term effects even  those  with  a  limited 
time  of  promotion.  Yet, it has  to be  asked,  if this  intension 
h~~ng realized:  only  about  12  % of  the  long-term  unemployed 
~.trod within  the  Jo~-Offer-Schcmc,  remained  occupied after 
t.he  end of  promotion  time.  It cannot  be  disregarded,  however, 
that  on-the  job-training and  the participation  in  further-
training  courses  during  the  running  time  are  improving  the 
individual  chances  on  the  labour market  substantially.  There-
~cre  non  quantifiable long-term effects are to expect. 
Up  till now  there  are  no  findings  avaiable  on  the 
employment  effects of  the  Job-Creation-Scheme  since it was  passed 
in the middle  of-1982  only. The  Employment-Plans  and  the  Ac-
tion  Progra~m should have  short-term effects  by  an  increase 
of  publ. ic  dcrnand  as  well  as  long-term  effect.~ by  structuraL._. 
~~har.<]f':.JL  Q_f.._!:_b~_f'  __ QQX~~ Medium-term effects are  obtained  by 
the  voluntary  ~arly retirement  system;  since the  measure  is 
implemented  on  voluntary basis,  short-term employment  effects are 
not achievable.  The  jobs  becoming  vacant  are  gradually being occu-
pie~ by  unemp·loyed,  which  should  l·ring  down  - in middle  terms  - the 
unemployment  rate by  2  %.  Improvements  of skills do  not  induce di-
rect  employment  effects  but  serve  the  adaptation of  labour 
supply to  demand  and  improve  individual  employment  chances . 
."'\11  prograr.unes  but  Public-Relief-Work are  being  operated  in the 
public as  well  as  in  the private sector.  There  is  no  analysis 
on  iQQ  _  __£[_.QQ.!-LGt.i.Y.ili..e..s...  of  jobs  created  by  programmes.  It 
can  be  assumed,  however,  that  theE~(:;  are  lower  in the  public 
sector than  in the private.  This  especially affects those 
programmes  which  implicate  a  hiring-guarantee  for  certain 
groups  and  where  no  possibility for  further  employment  exists 
(e.g.  Job-Offer-Scheme  in  the public service). - 147  -
The  fear that  schemes  only  serve  employment  but do  not  produce 
any  real  so~i__a1.1_y  _  _!n~_9.:~_!_l}g_ful  out-put is only  expressed 
regarding  the  Public-Relief-Work.  A  questioning  among  parti-
cipants  established the result that most  of  the  young  people 
considered the  programme  to be  a  kind of  "occupational the-
rapy".  The  Job~Creating~Progra~me demands  social benefit even 
as  a  condition  for promotion.  For  the expenditure  and  in-
vestment  programmes  the special  social benefit is determined 
beforehand.  They  are  related to the  promotion  of house-buil-
ding,  the  energy  industry,  of  commerce  and  export.  Within 
the  framework  of  the Job-Offer-Scheme 1jobs  are  done  which 
would  also have  been  performed  under  regular  conditions,  the 
only diffference is that these  jobs  are  occupied with  former 
long-term unemployed.  The  following  synopsis  shows  the  spe-
cific effects of the  labour market  relief of all schemes: 
Effects  of  the  labour market  reliefs: 
Wage  subsidy  programmes 
- Job-Offer-Scheme 
- Public-Relief-Work 
Job-creating programmes 
-Job-Creating-Scheme 
Expenditure  programmes 
-Employment-Plan 
-Action  Programme 
Redistribution of  the 
available work-load 
-Early  Retirement-Scheme 
-Part-Time-Work 
- skill adaptation 
schemes _ 
target group orientated towards 
long  term unemployed 
target grouporientated towards 
youths 
target group  orientated towards 
·youths 
with  view to  employment: 
globally,  aims  at structural 
changes  of  economy 
target group  orientated towards 
elder people 
global 
global  and partially target group 
orientated towards  young  people - 148  -
The  relief  9.f  the  labo'?-_!"_!f1arke_!._  is  .....  to  a  large extent  .... 
t, a rge  t _  _g_£_QU p  o_r i en~  (l_t ~-g__J__!:J1  U_§_ _  _sl ~Sig-ned at 
..I?_r_ob)..el}l  __ grQl:lJ2S  ol__ _  _:!=.h~_l._ab_our  market,  that is at young  people 
§_l}d  __ ]-on....9.=_term  unemployed.  Indirect effects relieving the  la-
~our market  result  from  the voluntary early retirement ar-
rangements  and  from  qualifying measures.  Those  are training 
measures  which  keep  young  people out of the  labour market 
while  participating.  A  global  labour market  relief is  induced 
by  part-time work  which  is open  for all groups  and  branches. 
But  actually predominantly  women,  who  are occupied  in· the 
administration,  work  part-tirne.The  Employment-Plan  and  the 
Action  Programme  do  not  have  any  tarqet  group orientated ef-
fect.s  with  regard  to the  structure of  unemployment,  but  are 
aiming  at the  solution of  structural  problems  of  the  economy 
which  are  only partially identical with  the  structure of  un-
employment. 
'::'h~----~ff_~s:_ie~cy  ~-~  the  Danish  l_~bou~arket policy is rcflec-
t~_g  ___ R_y_!:_h~__b.ig_h  utilization.  of  th~ individual  prograrrunes.  The 
lonq--term  work  programme  shows  an  utilization of  83  %.  There 
are  ~o figures  concerning  FUblic-Relief-Work,  Job-Creating-
Progra~nes and  qualification measures.  Until  September  3oth, 
1981  62.485  persons  have  made  use  of  the voluntary early re-
tirement.  That  corresponds  to  approximately  two  thirds 
of  the gainfully employed  in this  age  group.  The  oroportion of 
part-time workers  is also very high.  Its part of the labour 
force  amounts  to  21,6  %. 
In  relat.i.ng  the cost-intensi.ty of  the  prograrrunes  to the 
planned  period until  they induce effects,  it becomes  obvious 
that  programmes  aiming at  short-term effects are usually less 
cost-intensive than  programmes  aiming  ac  long-term effects, 
except  for  training  measur0s  which  are mostly  less cost-
int.ensive.  Typicul  examples  for  programmes  being  almost  ex-
,:lns.iveJ.y  short-term  effective  and  cost effective are  the 
.~ob-Off0.t:.-~:chcme  and  the  l?ublic-Reli~~f-Work.  The  Early  Retir·e--·  149  -
ment  Scheme  has  long-term effects  and  is expensive.  The 
fact  that  programmes  with  long-term effects usually 
cause  high  costs  and  are,  moreover,  not  immidiately success-
ful,  is met  by  linking  supply  orientated and  demand  orienta-
ted measures  in the  Employment-Plans  and  in  the  Action  Pro-
gramme. 
On  the one  hand  public expenditures  lead to  an  increase of 
demand  for  goods  and  - through  investment activities  - to  a 
possible creation of  jobs  (only  within  the  framework  of the 
Employment-Plan II 50.000  jobs  should  be  created every year), 
on  the other  hand  investment  grants  lead to structural  changes 
of  the  economy,  thus  to  a  long-term elimination of unemploy-
ment,  for  example  by  giving  investment  grants  to export-orienta-
ted branches  with the effect that they  remain  or  become  com-
petitive on  the  international markets.  The  extremely high  costs  seem 
to be  justified considering the  fact that both  programmes 
are short-term as  well  as  long-term effective.  A  goal 
conflict  continues  to exist,  however,  for balanced pro-
grammes:  long-term  designed  instruments  are  aiming at  a 
structural  change  of  the  economy  which  means  that short-term 
effects, bringing about  a  structural  change  of  unemployment. 
are  almost  excluded.  Vice  versa,  however,  measures  which  are 
aiming  at  a  structural  change  of  unemployment  cannot  create 
a  structural  change  of  the  economy,  which again  is the  long-term 
pre-condition  for  maintenance  and  improvement  of  the  employ-
ment  level.  The  Danish  policy meets  this contradiction with 
a  mixture  of  policy patterns which  provides  long-term effects 
on  the  one  side  and  short-term effects on  the other side. • - .1!:>0  -
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Supply  to  Demand 
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V.  Conclusion 0.  ANALYTICS  AND  EMPIRICS  OF  ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
The  French  government  H.:u  ... tc;::T2.l:dJ'r'.1auroy  in off  ice  since  May 
1981  intends  to  introduce  a  new  economic  and  labour market 
policy  and to  l,ead France  back to  a  stability path,  characte-
rized by  the  "magic  square••  within  a  few  years.  Failures, 
mistakes  and  socially detrimental developments  of  the  former 
government  shall  be  avoided.  Priority is given  to the offen-
sive  combat  against  unemployment.  In  spite of  the  new  begin-
ning,  however,  the  new  government  must  and  can  refer to the 
general  condition~ and  experiences  of  the policy of  the  former 
government.  Therefore the short analysis  of  the French  labour 
market policy  is divided  in  a)  the period of  the  70s  and  b) 
the  new  policy of  the  80s. 
a}  The  development  of  the  economjc- and  labour market  policy 
in the  70s 
The  economical  policies  in the  70s  still were  influenced by 
the experiences  of  constant growth  in the  60s.  Still 1978 
an  II early end  of  the crisis  II  was  predicted  e·tinistry of 
Labour,  1982a,  P.21).  Consequently  the  economic  policy 
was  focused  on  the  combat  against  inflation,  improvement  of 
the  infrastructure and political  ITBnagerrent  .  The  employment-
and  labour market  policy was  restricted to the  improvement 
of  the operation of  implacement  processes  and  to training-
·and  further  training schenes  as  well  as  to the  financial 
compensation  of  unemployment.  The  constant growth  of  employ-· 
ment  was  regarded  to be  a  success  of this policy  (see  ib) . 
Labour  market  problems  seemed  to result only  from  t.he  demo-
graphic  development  and  the  increased participation rate 
of  women  (cp.Farge,  1978).  Though  the  employment  even  rose 
by  380.000  people  from  1973  to  1980,  the qrowth  however 
remains  far  below  the  rate of  past years.  Only  betwe8n  1969 
and  1973  the  increa~.;e  umounted  to 1.  8  mi 11 ions. - 153  -
~-; c c t c r a 1  shi  ft..s  are conccu.led  ~hind those!  global  data,  above 
all  from  the  rural  sector to  the tertiary sector.  Even  though 
the  1ndustrial sector did ·sticceed  in  compensating  contracting 
branches  because  of  i~comparatively high  employment  rate, 
it is subject to extensive  business  fluctuations  and also 
aifectcd by  an  absoulute  decrease  since the mid-seventies. 
The  following  diagram  shows  this development. 
Dtaqram~:  De~ elopmcnt  of  Employment  by  Sec-tors  (1959  =  100) 
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Source:  Economie  et 
Statistique, 
Nov.  1980 - 154  -
This  development,  however,  has  become  a  labour market problem only 
since the  emergence  of disparities  between ·the  de~ographically 
cause~ increase of  the working  population  and  the  growth 
of_ ei]ployment  in the n!_id-seventies.  I1ere  it has  to be 
taken  into consideration that also because  of  declining 
rates  in working-time  reduction  employment  could not  reach 
the growth  rates of past years  any  more.  The  following  sur-
vey  elucidates  the  connection  between  the  increase of wor-
king  population  and  unemployment.  The  table following  there-
upon  illustrates the relationship of  productivity develop-
ment,  working  time  and  employment. 
Diagram  2:  Working  Population,  Employment,  Unemployment  in 
mill.  (1955-1981) 
1955 
Source: 
working  population 
employment 
1960  1965  1970 
Census  1980,  quoted after  Ministry 
April  1982 
1975  1980 
of  Labour, 
23 
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21 
20 - J :; r,  -
_Tc:b_le  1:  Average  ~.nnual  Growth  Rates  of  Hourly  Productivity, 
Working  Time  and  Employment  in per  cent 
l'  - -- - ---- -
1979-PO I 
I 
i 
1968-73  1973-76  1976-7S  i 
r-
I 
j hourly  productivity  5,5  3,8  3,6  0,9 
l real  working  time  -0,9  -1,3  -0,7  -0,3 
real  employment  1,5  0,3  0,5  0,3 
source:  Census  1980,  quoted_ ~fter Department  of  Employment, 
1982 
This  survey also  suggests  that the  economic  growth  ·continues 
to  slacken  since the beginning of the  seventies experiencing a 
slight  improvement  in the  second half of  the decade.  The 
indicator industrial production makes  this even clearer. 
Confronting this  indicator with the movement  of  inflation, 
further  the  dilemma  between  growth  - and  stabilization policy 
can  be  seen. 
Jable  2:  Industrial  Production  and  Consumer  Prices  (1975  =  100) 
1970 
1971 
1972 
!1973 
I 
\1974 
I 
1'1975 
! 1976 
11977 
!  1978 
I 
11979 
I 
i 1980 
! 
Source: 
consumer 
65,4 
69,0 
73,3 
78,7 
89,5 
100,0 
109,6 
119,9 
130,8 
144,8 
}64,1 
..... _. .  ....._ ____  ..,. ______  ' 
OECD  r  1982 
prices  industrial production 
87,8 
93,4 
98,6 
105,2 
107,8 
100,0 
108,6 
110,7 
113,2 
117,6 
117,0 
·-----··-----------------+ - 156  -
The  austerity policy of  the  beginning  seventies which  was 
designed to stop the trend to speculate  and  consequently bring 
down  inflation,  was  interrupted by price  increases  of  raw 
materials.  Recessive  trends  wi~h ccntinuously  increasing 
prices  followed.  Accordingly  in  1975  an  anti-cyclical growth 
promotion  led to  a  re-increase of  production,  but  also to 
a  new  stimulation of  inflation,  which  in  1975  jumped  up  to 
11,8  % and  remained  above  9  % in  subsequent  years. 
In  1978  as  a  response to this development,  a  wage- and 
price freeze  combined with  a  restrictive money  supply policy 
was  put  through.  But  as  the  figures  of  1979  and  1980 prove, 
thedevelopment  of  inflation with stagnant  growth  rates  could 
not be  slowed  down  after the  suspension of the wage  freeze. 
High  subsequent  wage  claims with  dwindling  investments  and 
still increasing prices  for  raw materials  led to high price 
increase rates  towards  the  end  of  the seventies which  had 
to be  compensated  by  falling exchange  rates  in the inter-
national  co~~erce.  The  result was  not  only  a  deterioration 
of  the  ~titivera:;sof the  French  economy  on  international, 
but also on  national markets.  The  percentage of  imported  in-
dustrial  products  on  the  French  market  rose  from  31,8  %  in 
the  beginning of  1979  to  35  %  in the beginning of 1980  (in the be-
~nning of  1982  it amounts  to  37  %)  (Insee,  Business  Report, 
1982,  a,b,c). 
This  scenery  is reflected on  the  labour market  as  a  3,7  fold 
multiplication of  the  demand  for  labour with  stagnant  supply 
of  jobs  in the period  from  1973  to  1980.  The  unemployment 
mte went  up  from  1,8 to 6,1  %.  The  dispersion of  unemploy-
ment  by  sex,  age  and  duration  indicates  a  trend to the for-
mation  of  a  basic  level  of  unemployment  which will  continue 
in  the  cightecs.  The  following  diagram  shows  the  increase of 
the  percentage of  long-term unemployed. -·  157  -
Didgr2m  3:  Duration  of  Unemployment  in  % of  Total  Un-
employment 
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Source:  L'~xpansion,  3/1980 
In  1980  the  unemployment  rate of  women  is twice as high  as 
of  men,  the youth  unemployment  rose  and  regional  disparities 
increased.  The  following  employment  office areas  had  an 
average  unemployment  above  10  %:  Normandie,  Calais,  Bretagne, 
Pointoucharentes,  Aquitaire,  Midi,  Languedoc-Roussillon  and 
Provence  Cote  d'Azur. 
From  1979  to  1980 this development  was  encountered by  an 
economic  policy which  concentrated on  structural  adaptations 
(promotion oi  nuclear  energy,  location-improvements  for 
steel production etc.),  improvements  of  the  investment  con-
ditions  by  combatting  inflation,  reduction of  public  sub-
sidies  and  compensations  of  negative  consequences  of  the 
adaptation measures  predicted to be  middle-term effective. 
The  decreasing trend of  the net credit loan of  the state and 
the  development  of  the money  supply  indicated this policy 
patterns  (cp.  Barre,  1982). - 158  -
Table  3:  Net  Credit  Loan  and  Money  Supply 
Net  credit  loan  as  Monetary quantity  (M2) 
percentage of  GNP  aim  actual  deve-
lopment 
1975  2,2 
1976  0,5 
1977  0,8  12,5  13,9 
1978  1,8  12,0  12,2 
1979  0,6  11,0  14,4 
1980  0,4  11,0  9,7 
1981  2,4  10,0  14,7 
1982  2,3 
Source:  OECD,  Jan.  1982 
In  accordance with  the cautions  intervention strategy of the 
state a  predominantly passive  employment- and  labour market 
policy was  pursued  which  included four  regulation levels: 
1)  The  improvement  of  work-placement .(ANPE) 
2)  The  faciliation of  leaving the  labour market.  This  con-
cerned elder workers,  immigrants  as well  as  women. 
3)  The  adaptation of  labour  supply to demand  by  correspon-
ding  occupational training. 
4)  The  loosening of  labour  laws  to make  part-time work  and 
temporary  job contracts possible  .. 
The  basis of  these measures,  however,  was  the  reform of  the 
unemployment  benefit which  eliminated the disparities  in 
the allocation  system  and  alleviated the  consequences  of 
voluntary unemployment  (the  unemployment  benefit was  fixed 
at  90  % of  the  last take-home  pay).  Alltogether,  these 
measures  had  the  following  effects: - 159  -
- ~he expenses  rose  drasti.cally.  In  1973  the  share of  employ-
ment  policy  instruments  of  the  GDP  still amounted  to 0,9  % 
in  1980 already  2,25  %.  The  overall  expenses  in  1980  amoun-
ted to  62  billions  FF. 
The  increase af costs,  however,  was  predominantly  caused 
by  the  increase of  unemployment  benefit  and  retirement 
promotions.  Their  share of  the total budget were  58  %. 
In  the  second  9lace  of  the expenditures,  however,  are 
promotions  of  the occupational  training with  a  total  sum 
of  18,6  % billions  FF. 
- Measures  for  maintaining  jobs  and  job-creating  schemes 
constitute  a  comparatively small  percentage. 
- Improvements  of  the  labour market  were  of  least  importance. 
The  following  survey presents  the  expenditures  for  each  indi-
vidual  measure  and  their relative percentage  of  the total re-
quirements  for  the  labour market  policy. - 160  -
Table  4:  Absolute  and Relative  Expenditures  of  the  Individual 
Components  of  the  Labour Market  Policy  1980 
Measures 
unemployment  benefit 
of which  special  supports 
Retirement  promotion 
of which  income  guarantee 
Job preservation 
Job  promotion  and  creation 
of which  funding 
of  social costs 
Employment  promotion 
Occupational  training 
of which  supports  for 
work-seekers 
Improvements  of  the 
labour market 
Total 
Figures  in 
mill.  FF 
25.817,8 
5,695,0 
10.164,4 
8.031,1 
2.361,2 
2.637,9 
1.237,9 
1.387,1 
18.554,1 
7.947,6 
942,2 
61.864,7 
Source:·  ~inistry of  Labour,  19&2. 
in  % 
41,7 
9,2 
16,4 
13,0 
3,8 
4,3 
2,0 
2,2 
30,0 
12,9 
1,5 
100,0 - 161  -
b)  The  Policy of  the Eighties 
Economic  Development 
In  the  beginning of  the eighties the  employment  problems 
became  heavier. _While  in  1980  employment· could still.  be 
stabilized by  growth  rates  above  productivity increase,  em-
ployment  dropped  in  1981.  Unemployment  additionally rose, 
however,  by still valid demographic  influences  (average 
increase rate of  the working  population at  1  %  - correspon-
ding  approximately  230.000  persons  - are expected  to  a  lesser 
extent until  the  end  of  the eighties) . 
TaqJe  5:  Growth  and  Unemployment  r·  ---··· ___  .. ____ ---·  --~------ ---------
go  9o/e  9e  u 
I  1980  1 0  3  1. 1  0.2  6.4 
1981  0.3  0.7  -0.4  7.5 
1982*  2.2  1.8  0.4  8.1 
•estimated:  all figures  in  %;  several  sources 
Legend:  g  = rates of growth;  o  = gross national product in 
real  terms;  e  = employment;  o/e  =  labour productivity 
u  = unemployment  rate 
Tt"lt2 structures of  unemployment  is nuintained because of selective 
hiring  and  dismiss  policies of  firms  and  because of  regional 
and  sectoral  developments,  as  well  as  of  institt~~ional fac-
tors.  The  following  table  shows  the  structure of  unemployment 
for  the  beginning  of  1982,  specified by  the characteristics 
women/men/young  people: ... 
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Table  6:  Structure of  Unemployment  (first quarter of  1982) 
(all figures  in per cent) 
women 
men 
young  people 
under  age  of  25 
average 
Source:  Eurostat 
share of  the  un-
employed totally 
49,4 
50,6 
40,1 
characteristic-
specific unem-
ployment  rate 
11,1 
7,3 
20,5 
8,3 
Under  the condition of  a  predicted productivity increase of 
more  than  3  % a  growth  from  1  to  2  % and  a  permanent  growth 
of  the working  population,  unemployment will  continue to rise, 
given that the  '\'lorking  time  remains  unc;hanged. 
Table  7:  Labour  Market  Balance  from  1982  to 1985 
- in  thousand 
1980 
1982 
1985 
1 
22.472 
23.002 
23.572 
2 
430 
430 
720 
3  4 
21.142 
0  21.710 
254  21.396 
5 
6,3 
8,1 
9,2 
1  - Working  population;  2  =  Increase of  working  population: 
3  = Change  of  the  number  of  jobs;  4  - Fmployment: 
5  = Unemployment  rate  in  per cent - 163  -
Other macro  economic  circumstances  of  the  labour market  - and 
employmer.t  policy, in the  70s  unknown  in this  extension, make 
a  middle-term consolidation of  the  employment  level  more 
difficult.  An  average  inflation rate of  10,5  % is expected 
for  1982  which  could rise  even  more  in  1983.  The  balance of 
goods  and  services will  n~t be  off~et.  The  balance  of 
trade deficit will  amount  to  100  bill.  FF  and  accor-
ding to all forecasts will  not  be  reduced  in  1983  either. 
Table  8:  Trade  Balance· in Mill.  US  I 
1972  1.273 
1975  1.190 
1977  -2.428 
1978  1.140 
1979  -1.178 
1980  -12.013 
1981+  -26.957 
1982+  -33.220 
Source:  OECD  Jan.  1982 
+ 
~inistry  of  Economy,  quoted  after 
'Le  Monde',  9.11.1982 
Employment- and  Labour  Market  Policy 
As  a  response  to deteriorating circumstances  and  the failing 
of  growth  stimuli  by  the world market  the government  Mitterand/ 
Mauroy  introduced its concept  of  an  offensive  combat  against 
inflation after a  period of predominantly  compensatory or 
reactive labour market  - and  employment  policy.  This  con-
cept  is classified around  four  axes: - 164  -
1)  Employment-effective  policy of  economy  stimulation: 
2)  Redistribution of  available work  load 
3)  Integration and  training of  youth; 
4)  Combat  against  inflation. 
To  1) 
The  economic  ~ecovery  should  be  based  on  the  expansion 
of  mass  purchasing  po~er and  the  stimulation of private and 
~~lie investments,  which  again  receive their energy  from 
the nationalized sector.  Instruments  of this policy are: 
Increase of  the minimum  wage,  expansion of  employment  it1 
the public sectorf  development  of  infrastructure invest-
ments,  nationalization in the  sector of  banks  and  industry 
~well as  a  selective industrial policy.  At  the  same  time 
this is designed to  improve  the  foreign  trade structure. 
To  2) 
A  reduction of working  time  is regarded to be  the  by  far 
most  employment-effective measure.  It implicates  several 
levels:  Introduction of  a  39-hours-week,  the sth vacation 
week,  restriction of  overtime,  the  expansion of part-time 
work,  early retirement  and  decentralized measures  of  'soli-
darity contracts'. 
To  3) 
The  expansion  and  specification ofmajor  employment  issues 
for  the  jntegratio~ and  training of  youth  should  take 
into  account  (inter  alia  )  the  requirements  of the  demo-
graphic  development  and  the extremely high youth  unemploy-
ment. - 165  -
To  4) 
By  a  J!l..Q.Q.era!:~  wa_g_~-price-policy the  COI!JF€titiv~ess of the Frertch 
economy  on  the  one  hand,  and mass  purchasing  power  of  the 
population on  the  other hand  should  be  guaranteed.  Price 
regulations,  retrenchments  in the  eMployers'  social security 
contributions  as  well  as  an  extra tax on  higher  income 
to compensate  the deficit of  the  unemployment  insurance 
should help to achieve this  aim  (cp.  election platform, 
January  of  1981). 
The  increase of  expenditures  for  employment-effective poli-
cies reflects this  new  trend: 
Table  9:  Labour  t-1arket- and  Employment  Policies 
- in t·1ill.  FF  -
1981  1982 
I 
Employment  programmes  49.629  72.751 
Labour  market  policies  12.794  18.582 
Total  62.423  91.333 
Source:  Ministry of  Labour,  1982 
Veranderungen 
1981/82  in  % 
49,6 
45,2 
46,3 
I 
The  employment  policy is  funded  by  an  increase of  public 
borrowing  and  assumed  surplus  revenues  as  a  result of finan-
cial effectlve consequences  of  a  predicted reduction of un-
empJ oyrnent  as  \>le.ll  as  by  higher taxes.  Deficits of  the social 
funds  shall  be  compensated  by  surplus mvenues  and  higher out-
put  rates  ..  From  1083  onward  a  labour ma.rket  contribution 
for  employees  in  the public  sector  is planned.*The  combat 
*  At  the  beginni.ng  of  1983  ·the  french  government  announced  the 
est.ablishment  of  0  s1.2rtax  over  .::1  1imi  ted  :~;eriod of  time,  havlng 
to  be  re-paid after  1985,  f<Ji:  recip:ients of  :;'i. odle  and  higher 
income. - 166  -
against  inflation shall  be  supported  by  political manage-
ment  like the nationalization of the  banking  system  and 
the  introduction of  competition  in profession  and  trade 
areas  so far  protected.  Except  for  the mentioned shifts in 
emphasis  the  employment- and  labour market policies of  the 
new  government relie on  the traditional institutions  and al-
ready existing programmes  are proceeded. 
A  comparison with the measures  of  the Barre-policy  shows 
continuity with  certain Modifications: 
- The  total expenditures  have  certainly increased,  but 
- still the expenditures  for  unemployment  benefits  add  up 
to  the highest share. 
Furthermore priority is given  to the  occupational  training. 
This  is proved  by  an  increase of the  budget  share of  28  % 
and  the  foundation  of  an  independant department. 
- The  early retirement  is  supported  furthermore. 
- The  reform of work-placement  is carried on. 
The  following  diagram  shows  the relative percentage of all 
individual measures  in  the  budget  of the  ~inistry of  Labour. ·- } 6 7  --
Didqram  4:  Shares  of  the  Individual  Programmes  of  the  Budget 
of  the  Ministry of  Labour 
(l' 
10 
unemployment 
60~~~~~~~~~==~  assistance 
1970  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80 
consultation 
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Diagram  6:  Development  of  the  Budget  of  the  ~1inistry of 
Labour 
40  absolute 
Nrd.  FF 
30 
20 
10 
1973  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82 
5  share  to the total budget 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1973  74  75  76  77  78  78  80  81  82 
source:  Projet de  Lo\ de  Finances pour  1982, · 
Ministry of  Labour - 16<1  -
The  opp0si.tion  (cp.  Barre,  1981/82)  holds  against the 
general  direction of  the  socialist/corrununist  reform policy: 
1)  The  expansions  of  the public  services would  not  solve 
the  employment  problems~  Constant  employment  could  only 
be  created  1n  the  productive  sector. 
2)  The  stimulat1on of  economy  growth  by  an  increase of pri-
vate  consumptions  would  be  dangerous.  In  the first place 
it would  not  ~ay regard to the  international  involvements 
and  would  ~herefore - since it additionally heats  up 
domestic  inflation  - lead to  increasing  foreign  trade 
deficits.  Thus,  a  currency dcvaluiltion  would  be  inevitable. 
Then  sooner  or  later only  a  restrictive economy  policy 
could  improve  t'he  general  situation.  Disadvantegous  con-
sequences  for  the  employment  wouldnot  be  avoidable. 
3)  A  working-time  reduction  could hardly contribute to the 
decrease  of  unemployment.  First of all it would  increase 
the  financial  burden  of  the  firms  and  secondly it would 
endanger  the  international competitiveness of France,  crucial 
point  of  the  French  economy  policy. 
4)  The  massive  additional  expenditures  of  the  state  (expan-
sion of  the  public  service,  nationalizations,  reduction 
of  social  security contributions of employers,  transfer pay-
ments  to households  etc.)  would  not  only withdraw pro-
ductive capital  from  private  investments,  but 
( inter alia)  would  lead to  a  dirigistic increase of the 
budget  def  :i ,;it. 
A  few  cri.tical points  obviously have  come  true  in  the first 
year of  ~~-h:_~  c;-J·.rc::I-r..rrent  Mi tterand.  Tlli~;  applies  inter 
to  thn  price development,  the  investment  activity 
and  the  budqet  .j:·,.f)rits~  The  rc~·tr:irt:!vP  rrogramme  of  June 
the  t.ime  be:i nq  l  t  .,., 't'f"d  - '··'-:"gr::-- a.nd  ·:--:•  • C'"'  f'reeze  J s  meant 
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to bring  down  inflation and thus  improve  th~  foreign 
trade situation.  The  dilemma  of  the  •circulus vitiosus' 
Aglietta and others,  1982)  of  the French  economy  policy, 
that expansive policies  lead to  high  inflation rates,  re-
strictive measures  to social troubles  acccompanied  by  extra 
claims  of  the contractual partners,  butboth do  not  induce 
growth,  seems  to be  still valid. 
The  reduction of  working  time  - as also  proved  by  the 
interruption until  the  end of  1983  - does  bring  up  employ-
ment  (within  the  framework  of  the decrease of real working-time) 
but it also  increases  the  financial  burder  for  companies.  In 
combination with  income  guarantees  and  the  increase of 
minimum  wages  the  competion  chances  of  French  economy  de-
teriorate due  to  labour-costs  increasing above-average. 
The  rise in public expenditures  could  not  stop the down-
ward  trend of  the  investment activity but only en-
larged the budget deficit. 
Are  these  programmes  being  fincanced  through an  increase  of 
social  security contributions  and  indirect taxes private 
demand  is lowered,  thus  they  have  contra-intentional 
effects. 
According  to agreeing  fo~ecasts all measures  are not  likely 
to restore  full-employment till 1985,  yet,  to government 
opinion,  they  do  prod~ce the pre-condition for.the  func-
tioning of groth mechanism by  preserving demand  and  skills 
and  through  improvements  of  the  economy  structure and  the 
financial  market.  It is unquestioned,  that the  economic  and 
social  problems  of  unemployment  would  be  much  more  drastic 
without  employment  schemes. - 171  -
In  the  following  evaluation of  the  individual  programmes 
only  t"~c·  most  important  individual  programmes  are described. 
'l'hc  stress is laid upon  the  employment  programmes  until 
1981,  because  the  expcr1ences  of  new  policy are hardly 
evaluated  so  far.  As  far  as. informations  about  actual  develop-
ments  were  available,  they  are  taken  into account.  A  re-
gistration of all measures  can  be  found  in the  appendix. - 172  -
I  INCREASE  OF  THE  SUPPLY  OF  JOBS 
1.  Wage  subsidies 
To  a  larger extent subsidies  for  the production factor la-
bour  are grahted as hiring  and  training premium  payments 
since the 1st July,  1977.  Within  the  framework  of so-called 
employment  packageR  thes~ measures  were  modified  several 
times  in their quantitative volume  and  specified in their 
qualitative basis  reference.  Since  the  1st of July,  1981 
these  programmes  ·have  been  extended and  are. now  even  more 
distinctly designed at special  problem  groups  of the  labour market 
like e.g.older long-term unemployed  or employee£  in crafts 
establishments  (programme:  engagement  of the first employed) 
and also granted in  form  of  reduced  social security contri-
butions.  In general especially the hiring of  juvenils  and 
of  special categories of  women  shall be  promoted  by  the 
employment  packages. 
With  that,a  contribution to  the  reduction of  the  extremely 
high  unemployment  of  these population  groups  shall be  realized. 
In  the first quarter of  1982  for  expample  40.4%  of- all 
unemployed  were  young  people under  25.  Demographic  trends, 
the  increase of  the women's  activity rate and  selective 
mechanisms  of the.labour narket had  continously led to  a  con-
centration of  unemployment  on  special groups. 
Wage  subsidies are of greater importance  in the socialist/ 
communist  coalition government  than  before.  Programmes  like 
that run  under  the  government  Barre were  then  s~ill criticized 
by  the  former  opposing political parties. 
These  programmes  are still supported  by  the  employers'  asso-
ciation.  Above  all the  CNPF  (employers'association) (CNPF  1982) 
refers to the  high  number  of  young  people  (approximately -- 17"3  --
1.5 mill.  between  the 1st of July,  1977  and  the  30th of  June 
1982)  who  could be  at least tempbrarily  iritegrated  in occu-
pational life by  wage  subsidies.  Moreover  the  CNPF  assumes 
that three quarters  of  the  occupied young  people  could  be 
long-term employed.  The  costs of these  programmes  are esti-
mated to be  smaller  in  comparison to the altern1tive costs 
for unemployment. 
Perrin  (Perrin  1982.)  suggests ·that ·a-pproximately half of  the 
subsidized  working~. an:d  tra'inin'g  pla>ces  are· additionally cre-
ated training places·.  > 
Trade  unioni~t groups  are  sceptical  concerning  the positive 
effects.  The . CFTC.:  ( CFTC  19  81) · s\ipports ·the programmes,  because 
working- and. training ~lace~ would  be  ~v~ilable for·  a  large 
number  of juvenil's within· thei'r  -f~rame·w·ork-.  But  they present  a 
very cri'tical view  about the  number  of· rea-l: recruitments as  a 
result of  the  agreemen't  ~  ·  ·.  · 
Even  though  trade unions  do  support those mea·sures  for  the 
promotion of  apprenticeship contracts they complain  about 
the  Pxtrcmcly  high  part of  deadweight  effects especially by 
economically  sound  companies.  On  the other hanC,  so  the 
CFDT,  the  incentive  for  economically weak  ~om~anies would 
be  to  small  as  to have  an  impact  on  staffing decisions, 
which  here means  recruiting additional  employees. 
The  strongest  critique of  wage  subsidie~ within the  framework 
of  the  employment  package  is expressed  by  the  com: .unist trade 
union  CGT.  They  criticize not  only that  firms  could abuse  the 
offered  allowances without  a  real efficiency control,  but al-
so  the only temporary character  of  the effects of  wage  subsi-
dies,  as  'dead  end'  unemployment.  Wage  subsidies  could not 
quarantee 
Yet,  beyond  the critical view all trade unionist groups  are 
supporting  the wage- and  training subsidies  in those  cases 
that are  likely to  improve  the  education  and qualification 
level of  young  people. - 174  -
Wage  subsidies within  the  framework  of  employment  agreements 
are  also subject  to  scientific evaluation.  The  following 
arguments  played  the most  significant role: 
In general  the administrative  simplicity of the  French 
model  of  wage  subsidies,  the  (partial)  exemption of  em-
ployers'  contributions·t  to the  national  insurance,  was 
emphasized to be very effective.  Since  the social  secu-
rity contributions are directly deductible,  the risks 
and  additional  costs  for  employers  are minimized when 
they  recruit  new  employees. 
There  is consensus  that the wage  subsidies without 
employment  clause have  promoted  a  great  exchange  of  em-
ployed persons  in  the first year  of  the  employment 
agreement.  The  utilization of  wage  subsicies declined 
drastically  as  in the  following  second .employment  agree-
ment  the allocation was  linked to the additional  con-
dition  that the  employment  level  altogether had to 
be  increased. 
- Figures  about  the  selective utilization of subsidies 
are statistically proved  (Pate  F.  and others  1980). 
The  unequal  distribution by  sex,  area or branch  is 
significan~:  Approximately  two  thirds of  those  who  got 
a  job by  wage  subsidies were  male.  The  subsidies were 
utilized to  a  greater extent  in the construction sector, 
for  public works,  in  commerce,  in  a  few  service sec-
tors  as  well  as  in the  food,  drink and tobacco industry.  The 
areas  in the  west  and  south-west  were  benefitting  from 
the  subsidies  above  average.  The  contrary applies  to 
the north  and  south-east areas. 
- Pate  and  others ascribe this different utilization to 
the size of  the  firm:  the  subsidies arc more  attractive 
for  smaller  firms  with  a  high fluctuation of  employed 
persons  than  large-sized  firms  with  long-tArm  planned 
training goals.  Colin:Espinassc  (Colin/Espinasse  1979) cor:.cl ude  from  s irni lar rcst'Qrch  rc~sul ts that  the  financial 
incentives probably  were  too  small as to  influence  Lhe 
personnc_l  planning  of  larger  firm~:;. 
The:  effects  for  roliefing  t.he  labour market,  t.he  selectivity 
of  the  measures  as  well  as  possible  dead  weight  effects are 
judged controversially: 
- Gaspard/Frank  (Gaspard/Frank  1981)  regar~ the net effects 
of  the  ewpioyment  agreement  (including educational-orien-
ted measures)  to the  level  of  unemployment  to be  insigni-
ficant.  This  is  due  to the fact  that  a  certain part of 
hidden  labour  force  is being  activated.  They  emphasise 
the  short-t.erm  success  of  the measures,  but criticize the 
...  :.ift cf  p:r.·~.5bl::r:1s:  no  sl:.ublc  jobs  were  created  on  a 
middle-te£~ basis.  The  measures  had  to be  renewed  con-
stantly on  a  higher  level  in order to  achieve  a  long-
term  success  for  the level of  unemployment.  The  expen-
ditures of  such  a  strategy would  not  be  bearable,  however, 
Besides  that such  a  policy would  not hit the  roots  of  un-
employment  wbich  are  located  in the macroeconomic  sector. 
Gaspard/Frank are demonstrating  in  a  model  calculation 
that  the  employment  agreements  certainly have  not  created 
more  than  5  000  durable  jobs.  Competition profits  in 
relation to foreign  competition as  well  as  a  slight iil-
crease  in purchasing  power  as  a  consequence  of  the 
agreement  have  been  taken  into account  by  them.  Jaqueline 
Simon  (Sirr.cn  1.981)  observss  on  basis  of  a  r'~search study 
for  the  ~ur~pean social  fund  thdt  59%  of  ~he persons  pro-
~o~e0 ty  wa~e subsidies  were  still with  the  firm  18 
rnor..t1~s  :.1ft,-::r  havinq  taken  up  the  job. 
-- ~.--:-~.  ~:h  ;:-t·:9ard  to possible  regrouping  of the  age  structure 
two  re  s~::-'r.:!  ,-c1:v::~  ~.::.rr·  2\!.::l i l ;:1}:;} e.  Grispard/Frank  disproved 
assump+jc-n-:-- L.L~.~  .,~_J.c  c:;i·:;-.·loy;:n;.:~~(  ~~"-jrcc.ment  would  have 
been  ab1.E:":~:~i  7:.')":'"  :-1  r·e-qroupinn,  o'!:  ~he age  structure  Of 
employees  ~~-~-~  ·. e·.:rc J. ~  ~  .... r..<._1  yo1.1ng  pncp l e.  .\  :research  of  thc-- 176  -
1'1inistry  of  Labour  (r~inistry of  Labour) ,  however, 
refers to programmes  for  the  re-integration of elder  long-
term unemployed  and  indicates thatthese special 
programmes  have  not  been very  successful  so  far.  They 
have  not  led to  a  significant  increase of  ei!lployment 
of  older employees.  On  the  contrary  deadweight  effec·ts  bad  to 
be  observed.In  more  than three quarters  of  the  ~eyed 
cases the older employees  would  have  been  given  a  job 
even without  wage  subsidies. 
Colin/Espinasse  (Colin/Espinasse  1979)  examine particu-
larly the latter aspect but distinguish  3  problem fields 
which  have  to be  paid attention to when  analysing  the 
short-term labour market  effects: 
o  The  possible . 
deadweight: 
o  the anticipation 
effect: 
o  the  substitution 
effect: 
~ngagements would  have  been 
realized even  without  subsidies, 
the  engagements  are realized 
only earlier than originally 
planned, 
instead of  regular recruitments 
subsid~ed probationers are 
hired. 
Despite considering these  factors  they calculate  a 
short-term labour market  relief effect of the first 
employment  agreement at a  scale of  loo  ooo  to  193  oo 
persons.  Possible deadweight  becomes  effective only  in 
a  longer  survey period.  The  possibility of  a  long-term 
success  as  the creation of stable not  subsidized  jobs 
is also rated  by  them  to  be  extremely  low.  Moreover  they 
see  the  risk of  segmented  labour markets:  If wage-and 
training subsidies are  not  being  continued relatively 
conditions for  the entry into the  labour market will arise 
for  not  subsidized or  no  longer  subsidized persons. 
If the  programme  is being  continued different price  systems 
of  manpower  for  subsidized  and  not  subsidized groups 
are going to emerge.  Furthermore  those  schemes  of  the - 177  -
ewloyment  agreement  that only provide  temporary  contracts 
would. lead  to  a  solidification of  exactly this part 
of  che  labour market. 
According  to the model  calculation of Colin/Espinasse 
t.he  macroeconomic  effects are  only  low.  The  consumption 
of  private household  raises  by  o.l6%,  the gross  domestic 
product  increases  by  o.l%  during  the  survey year; 
the  balance of trade is affected negatively. 
Price-and wage  level  effects are  to neglect. 
Accordingly  impulses  on  inflation are  to  being  caused. - 178  -
2.  Job  Creation  Schemes 
There  are  two  different kinds  of  job ·creating  schemes  in 
France: 
a)  A kind of civil service  (contrats de  jeunes volontaires) 
is offered to the young  for  a  period  from  6  to  12  months. 
Inter alia jobs  in the  sector of  environmental  conser-
vation and  local  tasks  in small municipalities shall be 
carried out.  The  provided  funds  are relatively low,  however. 
b)  For  the  time  being also another  kind of  job creating 
schemes  which  aims  at the  same  direction,  is quantitative-
ly  low.  By  means  of the  "emplois d'utilite collective" 
{by  the decree of the  2nd  of October,  1981,  these pro-
grammes  are entitled "ernplois d'initiative locale") 
temporary  jobs  (approximately  10 000)  in the municipal 
administrations  and public associations without profit 
interests  (e.g.  in the child care,  in the youth work 
or in the environmental  conservation)  ·are-to· be  created 
for  young  people  between  18  and  25  in 1982.  In this  co~­
text also  temporarily not restricted subsidies are  paid 
to various  social  and  cultural associations. 
These  programmes  include considerations which were  developed 
especially within the socialist party:  promotion of  a  self-. 
governing third sector  wor~i~~~~-responsibilitv which 
!!~~~-~-E_C?t  __  l?~- ___ '1.~-~-cJ.e~- __ !.:l_~_!_t_he:;-_._]?_y  __  P.~.~y_at_~_~Qf_;it'--~nte_r.ests  __ _ 
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The  goal of these  programmes  is to create real additional 
jobs which  would  not  have  been  realized without government  aid. 
First experiences of  the  programme,  initially adopted  in  May 
1979  are  generally valued  ambivalantly.  (Baudrillart, 
Colin,  1981  Grupe  Interministeriel,  December,  1981): - 179  -
120  m1ll.  FF  were  available to create  5  000  jobs.  In  the 
planned  period,  however,  _only  3  000  jobs could  be esta-
blished. 
It could  not  be  achieved that 
- primarily additional  jobs were  created.  90%  of  the 
associations  receiving  funds  were  working  already  be-
fore  the  programme  was  issued.  Moreover  the  limita-
tion of  tnc  support  to  12  months  proved  to be  too  low 
in order  to  realize  even  a  middle-term planning. 
- persons with  low or disadvantageous  skills were  inte-
grated.  90%  of all hired persons  had  a  qualified cer-
tificate. 
Also  specific effects  for  'problem groups'  have  been ob-
served,  however: 
- The  percentage of  those  who  have  taken  up  a  job for 
the first time  amounted  to  30%,  although their percen-
tage of all unemployed  persons  was  only  24%. 
- 28%  of  t~e persons benefitting  from  the  programme  had 
been  unemployed  over  one  year.  Their  share  among  the 
unemployed  amounts  to  30%. 
According  to Colin/Baudrillart and  the interministerielle 
inquiery commission  those results do  suggest  an  improvement 
of  the  "emplois  untilit~ collective",  but  a  quantitative 
expansion,  however,  is only possible within lirited boun-
daries  for  financial  reasons. 
Some  social  groups  seem  to  be  more  optimistic:  The  CFTC 
thinks  that even  an  expansion  to  100.000  •-or  even  150.000  em-
ployed  can  be  financed  (Bannard).  The  programmes  should  be 
designed at three  sectors:  social care,  cultural and  leisure-
time activities,  old  age  assistance. - 180  -
For  1982  the official policy merely  provides  a  moderate  ex-
pansion of public  employees  of  10.000.  At  the  same  time  the 
grant  is increased  from  24.000  FF  to  36.000 per person. 
The  opposition views  such  programmes  like the  extension of 
public  employment  with heavy criticism  (R.  Barre,  1981,82): 
the  budget would  be  encumbered  furthermore  and  the public 
overhead costs would  increase when  all  resources  of  the 
country shall be.used efficiently,  inter alia for  the  increase 
of exports. 
A  study on  the  job-creating scheme  EUC  (Emploi d'utilite 
collective)  existing since  1979  (Gandin  1982)  which  is 
supporting also  new  enterprises besides activities of public 
bencfi~estimates the  employment  stability of  the first 
500  projects at  90%;  two  thirds of  these projects,  however 
had still to be  supported  by  the public  hand  one  year after 
implementation. 
A  special  type of  job creating represents the  "capitalized 
disbursement of  unemployment  pay"  which  was  also initiated 
in 1979.  In order  to  found  an  own  firm,  unemployed  persons 
are  allowed  to get their future  unemployment  pay  up  to  6 
months  in advance  up  to  a  maximum  sum of  87  000  FF.  Perker 
·  (Perker,  1981)  reports that  from  the middle of  1979  to the 
middle of 1980 already  23  000  unemployed  persons  have  claimed 
this possibility. .. 
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3.  Employment  Effects of  Public  Expenditure  Programmes  for 
the  Private  and  Public sector 
While  employment  policies  towards  the  end  of  the  7o•s  and at 
the beginning  of  the  80's  ~~$ characterized by  causious  con-
solidating efforts of  the  public  hands  since  1981  the  go-
vernment  Mitterrand gives  priority to public expenditures 
for  the private and  public  sector.  The  questions  of  funding 
tt1ese  progranunP~ and  poss.ible  inflationary effects have 
been  of  concern  elsewhere  in this  report  (g.f.  chapter I). 
Here  the  employment  effects of  public expenditure  programmes 
for  the  public  and  private sector are being discussed, 
French  employment  policy  ~takes on  both  to the  san1e  extent. 
With  the  new  socialist government  in office,  191  000  new 
jobs  shall  be  created short-dated in  railways  companies, 
post  services,  in schools  and  in the health service,  thus, 
"to  compensate  special disadvantages" -.on  the  labour market. 
According  to  figures  of"th~ Treasury the additional  jobs are 
distributed as  follows. 
Table  t..;_ 
Jobs  in the public  sector 
1981  1982  1983  total 
state  35  000  39  500  55  000  129  500 
;1ospi tals,  social  19  soo  5  000  24  500  [:>ervj_ccs 
municipal 
5  000  10  000  10  000  administration 
ot_}-;>='rs  7  000  5  000  37  000 
--- --- - ...  --~  ---·~·-·-... -----
t_ot.a.l  40  000  76  000  75  000  191  000 
-·-- ------·--~·-----------------·----
::::r)urce:  Treasury,  1982 
~0liable cost-benefit-analysis are not available yet.  The 
fo1l.owinq  survc·y.  hcHcve.(,  (~'i''·c.::-.  c-t  rcuch  uut.line. . , 
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Table  2: 
Effects  of  increase of  labour  supply  in the public sector 
1981 
Employment  +  40  ooo 
Unemployment  - 20  000 
(in  each  case at the 
close of the year) 
Unemployment 
(yearly  average)  3  750 
Net  oosts  for  the  +  0,29 
public  finances  (1) 
(in  bill.FF) 
Yearly net  costs  of  78  000 
one  unemployed  person 
(adjusted)  in  FF 
Source:  Treasury,  1982 
1982 
+  116  000 
58  000 
36  000 
+  2,83 
78  000 
1983 
+  119  000 
95  000 
73  750 
+  5,76 
78  000 
(1)  Budget  costs minus  the  amount  for  the  reduction 
of the  unemployment  insurance 
This  rough calculation  shows  that the relief effects for  the 
labour market  are estimated to be  50%.  Correspondingly the 
payments  for  unemployment  benefits are already considered 
which  means  that financial  requirements  of  2.83 bill FF  are 
expected for  1982  and  5.76 bill  FF  for  1983. 
The  calculable effects  on  the  labour market or the national 
budget  are  - although part of  the  increasing public  indebted-
ness  is associated with the  increase of  public  sector em-
ployees  (L'Expansion  3/1981)  - less controversial between 
government  and opposition,  than the political orientation 
and  the  consequences  for  the  French  social  system.  The  ex-
pansion  of  the public  sector is  linked with the nationaliza-
tion policy of  the socialist government  (cp.  Herzog  1982) 
and  subsequently  follows  a  contrary paradigm than  the  former 
government  and  current opposition  (cp.  Mouriaux,  1982). - 183  -
l)c~:;ptt.c'  the  pu!Jlic  sup}iOrt  of  tlil~  fu~;ion  Pcuqcot--Citrocn  1n 
1974  or  the re-structure of  steelproduction it was  the defi-
nitE~ objective  of  the d'Estaing/Barre-administration to re-
duce  state influence  in  thc·Bublic  sector.  Socialistic 
al':JU~rH_~nts,  .which  are  shared  by  the  big  unions  declare  that 
increasing  employment  in the  public  sector would  not  only 
reduce  unemployment  but also  improve  public  services  (Mau-
roy,  1982).  ADart  from  this agreement,  however,  the question 
of priority and  of  the  scale  of  job~ havin~ to be  created 
is extremely  controversial  (cp.  Le  Monde,  issue  1981/82). 
A  "groupe  interministerielle emplois d'initiative locale" 
concludes  from  an  evaluation  of  a  partial  programme  "Pro-
gramme  de  creation d'emplois d'initiative locale"  that in-
.su-LfiClC'!1t  v-:i.ll1.ngness  to co-operate  from  the  side of  the 
local  cmployer:-3  nhlkC!5  a  consi.dcration  of  social  needs  more 
difflcult.  Furthermore  it is  complained that during the period 
in question  (until  the  31st of  December,  1981)  only  a  third 
of  approved  jobs  (3.140)  could  be  occupied,  which  is ascribed 
to  administration deficiencies.  Concerning  the quality of 
employment it is noticed that the majority of  these  new  jobs 
did  not  follow  innovative criteria  (improvement  of  the  so-
clal services),  but  was  realized  in traditional branches  (bus-
conductor  et.c.)  (cp.  Groupe  Interministerielle,  1982). 
The  one-sided stress  on  the  public  sector within the  scope 
of  publ1c  expenditure  programmes  would  - in the  long  run  -
lead  to  a  suhsequent  burden  for  the  public  budget  that  could 
L-·--.-·t  t_-_?  cj  __  ~-:~-!~:..~c~l  \,r~_thot1t  citl:cr additional  taxction or  a  heavy 
CJrowt·h  0c~om of  the  private  sector.  In  order to stimulate pri-
vate  <;rc,vrth  dynamic  french  employment  policy stakes  on  public 
expcnd.i Lt>re  programmes  that  are  not  only  inspired  by  employ-
rncn t  l-u:  ·1  ~.  :-:~o  by  ~, tructura  1  t  .:J rgets.  French  employment  policy 
tr1r:::·  +·t_"'  ~~; r  (':·+  r1ri.vat.8  market  power  towards  socjally desirable 
,c:l-J'L:;~·t-·,_t~~·.  r"r,i.~~  primarily  <lpplies  to  research  and  develop-
ment  3.  ~- ·,c-_·  :. .  1··1  'vll-1 j ch i:rt '-: 1 1 j_g,;nt  product-s  and  modes  of  produc-
~-i;_)n  ~:;1·k11·:  :_.~_  d•,veloped for  attaining  export  effects. 1~  lhe  s0cond  period,  1983,  the  demand  policy  of  the 
government  Mitterand/r1auroy  shall  be  supplemented  by  an 
expenditure  programm  for  research  and  industrial develop-
ment  amounting  to  32~5 bill FF.  Additionally  lo,9 bill  FF 
have  been provided  for  energy  supply.  This  consequently 
follows  the  already  implemented  policy.  It is expected that 
the extension of  the  investment  volume  together with 
a  capital  inflow at nationalized enterprises would  over-
come  the desolate  investment activity of the private industry, 
~ 
thus,  help to create stable  jobs .(Mouriaux,Mouriaux,  Bar-
roux,  1982). 
According  to the initial argumentation the  new  programmes 
link up  with the  - in view of their proponents  - (Mauroy, 
1982,  Poperen,  1982)  success of  the  existing investment pro-
motion  (1982:  about  25  bill FF)  which  had  made  a  distinct 
contribution towards  the economy  growth of  2%.  Since  the 
new  programmes  shall be  financed  through an  increase of  the 
value-added tax the budget will  not be affected by  an 
additional burden.  Critical experts,  however,  question 
the middle- and  long-term positive effects of the public 
expenditure  programmes  (cp.  Barre,  1982).  They critisize the 
subordinate effects of  the  mode  of  funding  these measures 
with different approaches. 
Trade  unions  and  communists  positions refer to the distri-
butional effects  in ·favour  of  high  incomes  through  a 
value-added  tax-funding. (CGT,1982).  Experts  belonging to 
the  conservative  side point out that the  addition~! taxation 
would  weaken  consumer  demand  through which  expansive  and 
contracting trend would  neutralize  one  another  (cp.Le  Mende, 
issue  1982) 
Further more  it is being statet  (Brana,  Sept.1982)  that 
the  experiences  made  with the  current programme  would 
have  made  clear that these financial  means  were  primarily 
utilized for the consolidation of debts of private enter-
prises  and  for  the  pay-- 185  -
ment  of  lo.sses  of public enterprises.  This  critique ist not 
rejected by  the  government  side. 
In  a  critical review  (cp.  Mauroy,  1982)  it is conceded  that 
the  employers•  profit situation altogether has  not  iciproved. 
Thus,  the effectiveness of  the  new  spending policy  - in 
specifying  the  programmes  - is seen to be  dependent  on  the 
following  conditions that ought  to be  fulfilled: 
a)  an  accelerated  recovery of  the domestic  market  through 
structural changes  in the  industry and  an  improved  com-
petitiveness  in export  throu9h  a  productivity increase 
b)  the  increase of  the  technological  level of production 
and 
c)  the  new  formation of  savings activity,  especially by 
promotion of risk capital and  investment savings accounts, 
c)  an  improvement  of  social justice by  a  transfer of  social 
and  tax burdens  under  the  condition of constant global 
sums. 
Flankinq policy measures  are  necessary for attaining these  goalsD 
But  also the expenditure policy is considered to have  a 
genuine  function  to  improve  the  economic  environment.  This 
depends  on  to which  extent investments will be  done  for  the 
improvement  of  the productive basis after an  economic  con-
solidation of enterprises within the next years  and  how 
far multiplier effects will  become noticeable. - 186  -
The  extensive expenditure  policy,  that was  implemented  in 
1981,  however,  met  its limits already  in the middle  of 
1982  which  became  more  obvious  in the  beginning  of  1983. 
Even though  public expenditure  programmes  had  noticeable 
employment  effects,  the  development  of  inflation could  not 
be  controlled and  thus,  the  French trade balance worsened 
dramatically.  A  return to  "beggar-my-neighbour-policies  II 
by  deflationing the  French  franc,  import  restrictions or 
an
11achetez  francais"  orientated  policy is not  only likely 
but  can also  be  foreseen  in the beginning  of  1983.  Also 
probabJ~  and  noticeable are policies that try to  solve the 
financial  problems  of  the public  budget  by  increased  taxa-
tion at least  in  the  short  term.  Even  if additional  expen-
diture  programmes  are  being  renounced  this docs  not  deny 
employment  political efficiency of  expenditure  programmes, 
but,  for  the  most.,  is an argument  against  too  ambi tional 
targets  under  the  condition of  insecure  financing. ···  1 H ·;  -
4.  Prorrotion of private invest:.rrent 
Within  the  framework  of  the  increase of public  spending 
that have  indirect effects  on  the  stimulation of  investment 
activity in the  public  and  private sector,  special pro-
grammes  are directly aiming at an  employment  effect by 
promotion of  investments  in specific sectors  and  areas. 
That  traces  back  to measures  o.f  former  governments  which 
constantly increased the  regional  promotion  and  could prove 
remarkable  er.Lployment  effects  from  1973  to  1980.  The  follo-
wing  survey  shows  the  absolute  employment  effect of  these 
progranunes. 
'l'able  3: 
Employment  Effect of Regional  Promotion 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Source: 
Regional 
prc:.m::>tion 
PDR 
1.535 
13.560 
20.615 
18.708 
24.076 
28.920 
28.171 
31.532 
M1n1stry 
Promotion of  Research 
industry settlerrent prarotion 
PIAT  PLAR 
507 
1.896 
1.  987 
4.199 
1.432  69 
1.992  95 
1.615  0 
of  Labou-r,  1982a,b 
Prarotion of 
urbanisation 
1.558 
1.952 
2.443 
2.514 
Although  this development  seems  to  be  positive the  regional 
promotion  belongs  to the  most  controversial  em~loyment ef-
fective  measures.  The  FOR-programme  has  been  examined  by 
several  studies  (Ministry of  Labour,  1982)  which  refer 
to  nine  areas ..  According  to  that the  labour  force  participa-
tion could be  increased absolutely only  in  three areas,  but 
only  in one  area  by  the  increase of  the  active  employment  in 
the  industral  sector.  In  the other regions  regroupings  took 
place  from  agriculture  and  employment  in craft to industry. - 188  -
Two  thirds of  the  programme  were  realized by enlargening 
existing companies. 
Furthermore~tain shifts regarding the strugture of guqli-
fication were  obseryed.  In industrial areas  the average qua-
lification level declined  by  settlement of peripheral  produc-
tion  branches.  That meant  for  the steel industry,  for  example, 
that young  people  and  foreign workers  found  a  job,  but 
skilled workers  registered as  unemployed  did not.  In  a  general 
evaluation it is emphasized  that the  PDR-programme  hold the 
possibility of  stabilizing employment  in the  secondary  sector 
but does  not  support the trend towards  the tertiary sector 
{Ministry of  Labour,  July  198o) 
Further  schemes  of  regional  promotion  (PLAT  and  PLAR)  are 
of minor  importance  compard  to PDR  (cp.DATAR  1980).  In 
an  inquiry it is critisized by  firms  that the allocation 
procedure would  be  too complicated:  they prefer supports like 
tax reliefes  (Ministry of  Labour,  1982b). 
This  cri  tique1combined with the other experiences,  ·prompted the 
Comite  interministeriel d'amenagement  du  terrietoire  (CIAT) 
to  adopt a  structural  change  in the regional promotion  in Novem-
ber.Besides special goals  like the re-structure of mining  and 
production of steel,  simplified allocation procedures  were 
wo~ked out and  the responsibility and  control was  decentra-
lized.  Especially the national  but also the  international 
discussion  on  subsidizing such branches which are not 
competitive any more  like the production of steel,  prints 
to·  problems which will tend  to become  heavier  in the  future. 
On  the national  level this issue is discussed  in connection 
with the nationalization programme.  While  the government 
tries to directiy  influence· the conditions  for  and  realiza-
tions of  investment  by  the control of  banks  and  key  industries, 
the opposition  fundamentally rejects state interventions as - 189  -
they  would  hamper  private initiative.  As  an  additional argu-
ment it is brought  up  that public  investment  incentives 
within  the  framework  of  the nationalization programme  could 
only  be  financed  by  an  increase of  the  national budget de-
ficit,  that means  by  extended  loans  on  the  money  market. 
Increased interests on capital and  raised  investment 
costs would  be  the  consequences  {cp.  Problemes  economiques 
Juin,  Juillet,  1982). _,.190 
II  REDISTRIBUTION  OF  AVAILABLE  WORK-LOAD 
The  n~~  __  eco!l~I!1X  __ __F.o_~_icy  if?.  ___  ~_ocused on  the  redistribution of 
!.§po~.  In  France  this shall  be  achieved  by  the  decree  of 
17th of  January,  1982  adopting  the general  introduction of 
the  39-hours-week,  a  sth vacational week,  the  limitation 
of  overtime work,  the  expansion  of part-time work,  the re-
duction of the  general  retirement  age  and  different  forms 
of solidarity contracts. 
Thus  the  government  policy  follows  an  old  demand  of  the 
unions  for  an  immediate  reduction of  workinq  time  by  means 
of  •multiple  forms  to  combat  unemployment•  (1982  Alf,  CFDT, 
CFTC).  Nevertheless  strategies  and  conditions  for  their rea-
lization are  jugded differently by  the  individual  unions. 
Generally there are  o~ections against all strategies  con-
cern~ng  th~  flexibili~y of working  time. 
The  opposition of  the  CGT  is markedly  stronger than the  op-
position of the  CFGT.  The  individual views as  to the  ncc-
cessary scale  of  the reduction  of working  hours in order  to· achieve 
an  unemployment  effect also  vary.  Unionist calls qivc 
priority to schemes  ·  for  the  reduction of  the weekly working 
hours  (immediately:  3 5-hours-week,  CGT)  ,  at the  same  time  the  re-
duction of  the  retirement  age  to  60  years  has  been  demanded 
and  greeted by  all unions  for a  lonq time as  being of  social  and  em-
ployment political benefit.  With  more  scepticism all  forms 
of early or part-time pension  are  being  jugded,  as  also 
and  even  more  clearly  - all forms  of part-time work. 
According  to the  initial notion  of the  trade unions,working-
tirne  reduction  has  to be  combined with  a  full  wage  compen-
sation  in order to stabilize the  mass  purchasing  power  and 
the general  standard of  living.  Regarding  the question of - i91  -
full  wa~c  compensa~ion CGT  and  FO  are still uncompromising, 
whereas  ~t could be  observed that  the~  position of  the  government 
seCJI'S  to have  found  entrance  into  CFDT  considerations. 
A  greater working  intensity and  an  expansion of daily 
working  time  shall  be  prevented.  The  trade  unions  believe 
that  future  reduction of working  time  has  to be  put  through 
in  a  more  decentralized mode  because further legislation 
is not  to be  expected.  As  opposed to the trade unions  the 
employers  associations prefer  a  flexibility of working  time. 
Production capacities  should  be  fully exploited by  an  exten-
sion of  night-shift-and sunday  work.  French  employers  had 
gained positive experiences  from  20.000  ·t'n-plant  working 
time  regulations that had  been  agreed  upon by  the  end  of  the  70's: 
absent  rates  and  the rate of work  accidents  could be  reduced, 
Labour  productivity  and  job satisfaction could  be  increased. 
en  the other hand  employers  are  sceptical  concerning  forms 
of weekly  working-~ime reduction,  because they  fear  an  under-
utilization of their production capacities and  an 
tncrease of  non-wage  costR •.  Therefore  reduction of weekly 
work1ng-time  could only  be  introduced together with  a  cor-
responding  wage  reduction.  Especially  small  and medium-sized 
companies  raise heavy  objections against  a  reduction  of wor-
king  time  together with  a  full  wage  compensation because  they 
feal  threatened in their existence.  Yet, enterpreneurs  did  not 
conflict with the  reduction of  the  retirement  age  and  especial-
ly not with the solidarity contract  'early retirement'.  These 
measures  proved advantageous  because  of  a  cost-efficient 
staff exchange.  It is presumed that newly  employed  young  peop-
le are not  only  more  productive  in general  but that it is 
easier for  these  groups  to cope  with production  and 
skill  requirements  owing  to industrial modernization 
changes  (see  L'Usine  nouvelle,  44/1981). - 192  -
The  employers associations  print to  two  problems  which  are 
explaining  their refusal  of  the  reduction  of  working  time 
from  their point of  view  (Le  Guern,  1981).  First of all their 
international  competitiveness would  suffer and  secondly  em-
ployers  would  not  be  able  to  employ  any  additional  manpower 
because  already  now  they  have  to face  a  lack of  certain gua-
llfications on  the labour market  - this inspite of  unemploy-
ment.  To  support this argument  employers  refer  Lo  the fact 
that already Pefore tre  working  time  reduction was  out  throu~h working 
time  per  annum  was  very  low  in  comparison with  the  USA  and 
Japan.  A  study of  the  employers  association  shows  that the 
real working  time  in Japan  amounted to  2.016 hours,  in the 
USA  to 1.822 hours  and  in France  to 1.679 hours  (L'Usine 
nouvelle,  29/1981).  On  the other hand  proponents  of  a  wor-
king  time  reduction are argueing  that the real working  time 
in the  European  neighbour. countries  - direct competitors 
of France  - is  remarkably  lower than in France.  1979  in 
Italy it amounted  to 1.660 hours,  in Germany  to 1.641  and 
in the Netherlands  to 1.626.  Furthermore the productivity 
per  hou~ the labour costs  as well  as  the  increase of produc-
tivity in consequence  of  a  working  time  reduction have  to 
be  taken  into account  (Perret,  1981).  Against  the  argument 
of  a  potential shortage of  labour  force it is held 
that it is necessary to enforce training  schemes  and  the 
mobility of the unemployed  (Le  Due,  1982). 
First scientifical estimations  are proving the success of 
individual measures.  Nevertheless profound  ·analysis on 
the  realized employment  effects of  the different forms  of 
working  time  reduction are still outstanding.  Especially the 
limitation of overtime  work  is jugded  as  a  success of the 
French  employment  policy.  A  research  committee of  the Mini-
stry of  ~ur  estimates the potential net  employment ef-
fect at 50.000 persons  (Mauroy  et Auroux,  cit.  L'Usine  nou-
velle,  29/1981).  The  effect of  a  weekly working  time  of 
39  hours  is judged ambivalently.  Especially the question of -193  --
wage  CO.ctpcnsat.ion  i.s  subject to controversial  discussions: 
studles  of  the  Commissariat  au  Plan  and  of the  INSEE  (Le 
Monde,  1982)  about  a  weekly  working  time  of  35  hours till 
1986  suggest that there is  a  reciprocal  relation between 
wage  compensation  and  employment  effects.  On  the other hand 
(CGT,  CFDT)  hope  is pinned  on  the positive macro-economical 
feedback  effects of  a  wage  compensation.  At  least the main-
tainance of  the overall  demand  is  considered as  being  ab-
solutely necessr- ---'Y  for  the  expansion of production  and  em-
ployment. 
The  legal  option  between  an  one-hour-reduction  of  working 
time  or the  payment  of  an  overtime  allowance would  have  led 
to  a  lower  production  in  cases  of  working  time  reduction  and 
in  cases  of  overtime  allowances  to  a  rise  in  costs  (see 
L'Usine  nouvelle,  29/1981).  Optimistic estimations  are  sup-
ported  by  reports  of  the  CEE  (Centre  d'etudes  de  l'emploi, 
Ministry  of  Labour),  which  prove that the productivity in-
crease caused  by higher  working  motivation,the reduction of 
the rate of  absence  and  work  accidents  as  well  as  measures 
for  rationalization would  have  compensated the additional 
costs  (see o.p.  cit.  and  Duval,  1982). 
The  study of  Jean  Marc  Le  Due  (Le  Due,  1982;  Duval,  1982) 
illustrates that  t.he  ad option  of  reduced  working  time  is 
accompanied  by  drastic  rnod~.f.~c?_~-~9_~.?  __ ?!  __ !~-~-<?_rganization of 
work.  In  this  report  four  typical  plant~'  (Renault  car pro-
duction,  Rhone-Pulenc-Chemie,  Godet-delivery  and  ~he laundry 
of  a  hospital)  of  one  labour office area  (Roucri,  Haute-
Normandie)  are  analyzed  regarding  their response  to  th~ re-
duction  of  working  time.  Only  in  the  laundry  an  expansion  of 
the staff could  be  observed.  As  for the  remaining  cases 
poor  market  conditions  have  led  to  employment  losses.  Yet, 
fr  was  also  found  out,  that there are  no  technical  or organi-
sational obstacles against  further  reductions  of  working 
time.  Under  the  condition of  further  reduction  of  working 194  -
time  completely different  forms  of work  organization for 
an  improved utilization of  production  plants(expension of 
the production time  together with the  introduction of  new 
shift  systems~  Renault,  Rhone-Poulenc,  Godet)  have  to be 
expected. 
Concerning  the different types  of  agreements  on  working  time 
reduction  as  set up  in the 'solidarity contracts'the following  -- .. -----· 
results are available:  The  solidarity contract  'early retire-
rent has had positive effects  (est.  10C,QCX)-e:npl.).  ~he general' accep-
tability' ·  of  this measure  is pointed out as  a  further  ad-
vantage.  Employers  and  employed  express their satisfaction 
with this measure,  with is also illustrated by  the high per-
centage of  early retirement  arrangements  within the'solida-
•  rity contracts.  Only  between  February  1982  and August  1982 
more  than  10.000 out of  10.304  solidarity contracts  included 
the early retirement.  These  regulations offer several  ad-
vantages  for  employers:  dismissal of elder employed  seems 
to be  financially  advantag~ because costs are minimized. 
At  the  same  time processes of  restructuring have  been  made 
easier for  employers.  Though  companies  are obliged to keep 
up  the employment  level,  they are not  obliged to employ  the 
same  skills  (European  Industrial Relations  Review,  1982). 
Thus,  not only unionist  representatives  express their fear 
that the early retirement  system runs  the risk of  lowering~ 
qualification level. 
Weekliy working  time  reductions  have  hardly been  set up 
in the  'solidarity contracts'  so  far.  According  to Rigaudiat, 
Bevan  (1982)  this on  account  of  insufficient financial  incentives 
especially for  industrial sectors. 
Neither the solidarity contract  'part time  pension'  nor the 
expansion of part time  work  in general .are  successful  regarding 
employment  effects.  Problems  conderning  the organization 
of  work  as  well  as  an  increase of  fixed  costs l ss -
related to  the  individual  employee  would  have  prevented  em-
ployment  pffects  so  far. 
Thus, it can  be  sunmarized  (Mercerau,  1982)  that  a  reduction 
- ------------·~-----· --------· 
of  "!_5?._r kin  0.  .... _t. ime  _ w  a  ~-~-':1.  <?cess f ~I  ___ _:i:_l2__.!_  h<?~~_£~  .  .? e ~.J:E which  __la_!L 
in  som~sol_~darJ._"t:.Y~~ntrac~ it ~as  linked  ~o an  expan-, 
sian __ (r_~sp.  mail!tainance)  of  t_he .  .!l~mbe~ of  employees  together 
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The  expansion of part time work,introduced  1980 with the 
part time  act  ~or employees  in  the private sector,  is also 
jugded  ambivalently.  Proponents  of this measure  are  refering 
to  the  labour market  situation and  point out that only  one 
job is offered for  five part  time  job seekers.  They .also 
plead for  improved  legal  conditions  for  part time  work. 
Critical voices,especially expressed  from  union  representa-
tives,  base their argument  on  a  clause which  is  likely to 
modify  both positive evaluations.  Subsequent to the  new  law 
the  establishment of  new  part time  jobs  (all  jobs  done  below 
the  normal  working  time)  does  not  need  the  approval  of the 
Committee  of  the  Enterprise  (Comite  d'Entreprise)  anymore, 
h0nce  it can  not  be  prevented  that full  time  jobs  are  sub-
stituted by  part time  jobs. 
Undoubtedly  the  situation on  the part time  job market  has 
been  eased  temporarily by  the  increase of  employment  in the 
service sector.  As  to which  extent the  assumed  substitutional 
effects have  been materialized,  the qualificational structure 
of  part time  work  has  improved  and  the  new  part t:  .ne  jobs 
guarantee  a  secure occupation  in  the  long  run,  :1as  not  been 
analyzed  sufficiently so  far  (see  Fiecht.er,  1981;  Archam-
bault,  1981;  Perret,  1981;  Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin,  1982). 
The  fiscalization  of  higher  contributions  for  the  employment  of 
two  part-time  instead of  one  full-time  worker  has  promoted  the 
introduction of  flexible  working  time  (job-sharing). / 
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III  ADAPTATION  ST:RATEGIES 
1.  Adaptation of  Skills 
During  the  last five  years  key  issues  of  vocational  training 
policy were  determined  by  the measures  of  the  already  above 
mentioned  employment  package.  Thus, social political conside-
rations  could be  connected with  la'!:our  market  reauirements.  The 
socialist-communist coalition has  adopted  instruments of the 
former  government  but modified  them  in  some  aspects.  Job-
trainee contracts  have  been  expanded  considerabely,  the pro-
motion  of  in-plant work  ecperience  has  been  reduced  drastically 
and  is  now  being  put  down  by  the  latest employment  agreement. 
The  duration of  the thereto attached educational measures 
has  been  increased,  female  ~orkcrs were  planned  to be  incorporated 
to  a  larger extent. 
The  decree of  March  26th,  1982  includes  an  additional  intro-
duction of  an  alternating training for  disadvantaged  young 
people  from  16  to  18.  It can  last up  to two  years  and  is 
meant  to offer 100.000  young  people the opportunity to ac-
complish  a  qualified vocational training. 
The qualificational orientated measures  of the  employment 
aqreanent were approved  by  the  employers  without  any  objections 
(Ceyrac,  1980):  continuing  (further)training would  be  the 
only protection against  unemployment  in  a  time  of  permanent 
new  technologies  and  of  international competition.  The  vo-
cational  training measures  should  be  decentralized and  of-. 
fered  in all different  forms.  To  guarantee  a  close contact 
to the world  of  labour  in-plant  work  experience could  not-be dis-
pensed with.  In  an  opinion poll  72%  of  the employers  declared 
their intention to  keep their trainees at the  end  of  their 
training  and  to offer  them  a  job  (Perrin,  1981).  Furthermore 
I 
employers  stressed the  convincingly quantitative  success 
of  the measure  and  the  small  amount  of  costs  for  the public. - 197  -
·Trade  union  representatives  present ambivalent  views: 
Generally  they greet  such measures  which  are actually likely 
to  increase  the qualification  l~vel of  youth.  Those  are pri-
rn<Jr:ily  the  wo1h:  trainec:-contracts,  but  also  the alternating 
practical training preparing  for  a  job.  So  far  also  plans 
for  vocational  training  programmes  for  disadvantaged  young 
people  between  16  and  18  meet  a  general  approval.  Especially 
the  CGT  has  discussed  these  prograrrunes  very  intensively 
(CGT,  1982).  Yet, is being criticized  that in-plant work 
experience  UP~ally does  not  contribute  towards  raising 
the vocational  training of  youth.  Employers  would  have  mis-
used  young  people  as  cheap workers  instead of giving  them 
a  fair vocational  training. 
Scientific reports  concerning  the  consequence  of  the  educa-
tional  und  vocational  training  schemes,  especially the  in-
pLJnt  work  c~Xl!C:riencc  within  the  frame....-work  of  the first 
employment  agreement  are  available  since  recently. 
Generally it is agreed that qualjfication  adaptation mea-
sures  are primarily  aiming at  a  higher  productivity 
of  manpower.  Nevertheless questions  concerning  the kind  of 
qualification adaptation  remain  controversial.  On  the  one 
hand it is  claimed that the technical  development  demands 
production-specific  and  general  knowledge.  In this case th0 
training place  'company'  has  to  be  combined with the training 
place  'school'.  In  accordance with  this principle  of qualifi-
cation adaptation, in  France employment-training contracts 
and  uorkshops  for  the  preparation for  fu-
ture  jobs  have  been  established.  On  the other  hand it is as-
sumed  that certain skills can  only  be  acquired within  the 
production,  within  the  company  (on-the -job -training).  For 
this  reason  '\riO'!"lt::-experience  was  being  promoted. ·~ 
As  quoted  in  a  report of  the Ministry of  Labour  (Mi~istry of 
Labour,  1979)  61  % of  the probationals  had  participated 
in the  normal  production process.  Only  38  % were  being re-
garded  as  probationals.  These  figures  do  not  apply to 
workshops  for  the preparation  for  future  jobs  since this 
temporarily  takes  place  in skill centres. 
Pate  a.o  ..  (1981)  also assume  that  a  considerable part of  the 
probationals  substitute normal  employment  without  influen-
cing the  level  of  total employment  significantly.  Shortdated 
they  certainly do  have  contributed to  tt.e  reduction of  unemploy-
ment.  60  to  70%  of  thosebenefitting  from  both kinds  of work 
experience, schemes  would  have  been  unemployed  without  the 
subsidies.  Furthermore  Pate a.o.  found  out that the  number 
of participants who  already  had  undergone  a  certain vocatio-
nal  training was  overproportionally high.  The  number  of par-
ticipants  who  did  not  have  any  vocational  training only 
amounted  to  10  to  16  %.  Additionally an  increase of the qua-
lification level of  the participants when  entering the pro-
gramme  could be  noticed during  the  running  time  of  the first 
employment  agreement.  Almost  half of all participants could 
prove  work  experience. 
The ~Qrk cxperi~nc~-- took  place  in  smaller  companies 
of  commerce  and  in  some  service sectors, whereas  2/3  of the 
,work-training-contracts were  concluded  in  the  industries. 
Nevertheless  reverse developments  can  be  observed.  The  vo-
cational training programmes  are  concentrated on  smaller 
firms,  approximately  60  % of all participants  were  employed 
in  companies  with  less  than  50  employees,  more  than  40  %  in 
companies  with  not  more  than  10  employees. - 1 ~9  -
The  individual  use  of  the  combination of  work/training  seems 
t0  be  cc~paratively satisfactory  (Simon,  1981):  about  7  months 
after  lhe  end  of  the work-training-contract  79%  resp.  86% 
of  all participants  had still maintained their  job.  Concer-
~ing the work  experience  those  figures  amounted  to 
62  and  65  %,  four  resp.  six months  after  the  end  of  the prac-
tical work.  Yet,  as  an  inquiry  from  1978  suggests,  the 
workshO!)S  for  the preparation  for  future  jobs  could only 
achieve  little success:  ten months  after the  end  of  the mea-
sure  only  51  o/.  were  employed. 
As  far  as  the  remaining  with the  training  company  js concer-
ned,  this  is  reciprocal to the  size of  the  company.  In  smal-
ler firms  an  employment  could be  maintained_compamtivly rare-
ly  (Pate).  The  possibility of  making  use  of the  acquired 
skills  through  the  wo~k-training contract proved  favou-
rable.  Those  who  remained  in their training  company  could- to a 
\. 
grov.ring  extent -take 'up  a  skilled job.  Those  who  left their 
company  often  found  a  job as  a  salaried employee.  The  latter 
are  almost  identica+ with  those  who  already had  work  experien-
ces  befure.  Neverthele~s  having  work  experience  did  not al-
way~ pay:  6  % were  still unemployed  6  months  after their 
training.  Thus,  their unemployment  rate  was  still higher 
than  the rate of  thbse, .who  had  st~rted without  any  experi~ncc. 
Thbre  is  ~vidence to assume  that the work-training  con-
tracts hardly  improved  th6  labour market  chances  of  persons 
with  low qualification acquirements.The  unemployment  rate 
of  this group  is  above  average after the  end  of  t~e training. 
Yet, on  the  whole, the  labour market  risks  of  the participants 
in  the work-training measure  could be  moderated.  As  for the 
for  the  preparation  for  future  jobs it was 
2.lso  found  that  those  who  had  started wi  t.h  more  job experien--
ces  and  a  better vocational  training were  more  likely to 
find  a  long-term employment. 
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Colin et al.  (1981)  .conclude  from  the  report of  Pate a.o. 
that probationals were  recruited instead of  normal  employees. 
This  serves  as  an  explanation  why  a  great  number  of  proba-
tionals  were  not  dismissed after the  end  of  the  contract. 
However,  they are printing to the  negative  consequences: 
especially the  in-plan~work experience  has  hardly  reduced 
the  insecurity of  the  employment  situation for  young  people. 
55  % of all probationals left their company at the  end  of 
the  programme,  21  %  found  a  new  job.  As  far  as  the work-
tralning contract  is concerned  the  number  of  those  who 
changed  their company,  14  %,  was  markedly  smaller. 
The  efforts of qualification adaptation processes  in the 
traditional  framework  of  AFPA  - open  also  for  non-youth  -
are  judged  even more  critical~  Thus  1979,  28  % of all par-
ticipants  in work  experience organized by the  AFPA  were  un-
employed  6  months  later.  1974  this rate had  only amounted 
to  5,7  %.  The  following  table  supports  the discussed results. • 
'I  I 
Table  1:  Result  of· Studies  on  the Outlet of  Xoung  People  Being  Promoted  by  Schemes  of  the 
'pacte pour  l'emploi'  - in per  cent  -
l 
measures  time  of  period bet- situation at the  moment  of  survey  I 
leaving  ween  leaving  in·· emnl ovmPnt  seeking  em- ·1 different  sum 
and  begin of  remaining  in  dif  ployment  situation·  a  sum  survey 
with the  ferent  again 
I 
~  ...... - ...... ""'n"  .ronmn!:llnv  L----·  -.  A  ·,oo- . 
work-trai  May-June  ¢  7  months  72  14  86  5  q  I  }rn 
ning  con- 1977  I  tract  April-May  I  _.:• 
1981  6-8. months  65  14  79  14  7  !  :i.ro 
-
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I 
work  e_x- 1978 
; 
i  perience 
I 
i 
r--1ay  1980  ~ 6  months  44  21  65  23  1  /.  ;  l(Y)  .  I 
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workshops 
.I 
! 
I 
:  for  the  April-June  '~ 10 months  - - 51  36  1  3 
I 
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Source:  Simon,  J.,  Ministry of  Labour,  1982 
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Al  ~~o  in  tho~~c·  prograrrunes  which  are  provided  by  the  permanent  J y 
existing public vocational  training centres  (CAFPA)  a  change 
of  emphasis  can  be  noticed:  from  further  education  and  re-
training to the training of  young  people.  From  1972  to  1979 
total  expenditures  increased at  a  rate of  73  %,  yet  from  1975 
to  1979  only at  1  %.  The  percentage  of  expenditures  for the 
integration and  training of  youth  increased to  55  %  between 
1977  and  1980. - 2rn 
Financial  aids  for  the  improvement  of  the  regional  mobiliEY_ 
have continuotLsly growen  since  1974  with  an  annual  increase 
rate of  approximately  25  %.  Also  the  volume  of  approximately 
315  ~il.  FF  in  1981  indicat~that this measure  is of  signi-
ficant  importance  in the  framework  of  labour market  and  em-
ployment  policy.  Unfortunately there are  no  effectiveness or 
other analysis  available,  which  would  allow  an  evaluation 
(Ministry of  Labour,  1982).  Thus  estimations  can  only  be 
gathered  from  the  rate of utilisation of  the mobility grant. 
1Q80,9.200  pcrE;ons  obt~:nncd  <::1  movin~]  a[>Sistance  and  more 
than  35.000  young  people  a  mobility  allowance.  The  last figure 
ju~ped from  approximately  2.00  in  1974  to more  than  4.000 
in  1977  and  17.000  in  1978  to the  mentioned  35.000  in  1980. 
Since  1979  grants  are also offered for  the  removal  to  foreign 
countries.  No  analysis  are  available concerning the signifi-
cance  of this  progra~~e beside its financial  equipment. 
These  measures  have  been  implemented  in  connection with the 
development  of  regional disparities  and  labour market  un-
equilibriances.  The  promotion  of  mobility will  gai~ impor-
tance  consj.dering  continuously  growing  disparities which  are 
forc:::;een  because  of  a  di fferent.iatcd  economical  dt=:velopmcnt 
(see  OECD,  1982)  and  regional policies.  But  also  in  connec-
tion with  the  reduction  of  working  time  the  importance  of 
1:iobiJ ity <]rants  will  increasE with respect to  the  adaptation of 
demand  and  supply  on  the  labour  market  (Le  Due,  1982). -·  70 4  -
3.  The  Improvement  of  the  Efficiency of  the  Employment 
Service 
In  order to  jugde  those measures  which  are designed at the 
improvement  of  the work  of  the  national  labour office 
(Agence  Nationale pour  l'Emploi  = ANPE)  the  changed  function 
of  the  labour office has  to be  considered.  When  the  ANPE  was 
set  up  in  1967,  its task was  to  secure  the  labour  supply  for 
the well  balanced  economic  growtl1  which  was  the  aim  of  the 
VI.  economy  plan.  But  already with  the  economical  upswing 
during  the  following  years  which  had  not  been  expected,  the 
organization  proved  a  need  for  a  reform.  Funds  and  staff 
were  tripled.  Yet,the  labour administration  ~as not  able  to 
cope  with  becoming  an  agency  for the  implace-
ment  of  unemployed  during the recession.  The  implacement 
rates  decreased erraticly.  The  following  figures  illustrate 
the  serious  situation of  implacement:  1974  ANPE  could  im-
place  151.000 of  2,6  mil.  registered unemployed.  1980 the 
ratio between  unemployed  and  implaced  was  3,45  mil./217.000. 
1974  there was  one offer for  1,5  job seekers,  1980  one  offer 
for  15. 
The  reforms  from  1979  und  1980 were  - according to the  new 
function  - aiming at decentralization,  a  better control  and 
an  increase of efficiency by  incorporating employers  and 
employees  as  well  as  the  regions  in the  implacement  process. 
The  budget  of  1982  created  1.500 additional  jobs for  the 
ANPE  (Mouriaux,  1982).  According  to the  jugdement  of experts 
the  decentralized  labour offices are  - in  connection with 
the mobility grant  aiming at the  improvement  of  implacement 
circulation  - operating more  efficiently;  yet,  analysis 
which  could  support  this  statement,  are stfll out-
standing.  Also  because  of  the general  structure of 
the  implacement  system  an  evaluation of the  implacement 
function  has  to  cope  with quite  a  number  of difficulties. - 20.5 --
Besides  the  immense  number  of  further  public  institutions 
which  have  certain partial functions  for  controllina the  la-
bour market,  the  public  sector  competes  with various pri-
vate  labour  implacement  agencies.  Thus,the not yet existing 
coordination of  single activities,depending on  an  improve-
•.  ~(- .i•<:.  of  ava·~ lable  information,  is pointed out  as  a  major  re-
form  step  (L'-1inis·try  of  Labour,  1982;  Schmid,  1975;  Laufer, 
Lcinge,  Burland,  1979). •  - 206  -
IV  JOB  PRESERVATION  MEASURES 
Short  time  allowances  are  installed as  a  measure  to  reduce 
cyclical effects.  The  expected effects refer to the main-
tainance  of  human  capital  investment,  to the  avoidance  of 
dismiss  and  hiring  costs  as  also  to avoid  the  social  fund 
(Sozialkasse)  being  charged with  unemployment  benefits. 
The  heaviest utilization of this programme,  which  was  pro-
vided with  330 mil.  FF  in  1980,  was  in  1975,  1977  and  1979. 
According  to estimations of the Ministry of  Labour,in  1980 
unemployment  benefits to  46.000 potentially unemployed  could 
have  been  avoided  (Ministere  du  Travail,  1982  a,b). 
The  utilization of  short  time  work  allowances  was  concentra-
ted on  few  sectors:  only  1980 engine building,  textile in-
dustry,  metal  production  and  electrical engineering  claimed 
62  % of all lost working  days.  Since these branches  are not 
only  suffering cyclical adaptation problems,  but are also 
seriously hit by  the  structural adaptation crises,  the  cha-
racter of  this  instrument  turns  towards  a  structural aid, 
yet,  without  considering the  causes. 
In  1981  short time  work  had  reached  its highest level  since 
the beginning of its statistical recording  (1952):  1981 
more  than  17  mil.  working  days  have  been  lost,  which  is an 
average  of  1,3  day  per person.  In  comparison with the pre-
vious  year this is  an  increase of  72  %.  In  the 
11Statistiques 
du  travail"  (Statistiques  du  travail,  fasciculle  speciale, 
95/1982,  s.  23)  this is led  back  to the  expansion  of  short 
time  work  in  small  and  medium  sized  firms.  In  the  same  ana-
lyre.s  it is  refered to  the  fact  that short  time  work  can  be 
found  in different  forms  depending  on  branche-specific  con-
ditions.  In  the  car  industry it is  spread over  the year 
whereas  in  the  building  industry it only occurs  seasonally. 
It might  affect parts or the whole  of  the staff.  In  any  case -207 
it is  a  specific  form  of  subsidized working  time  reduction. 
In  labour equivalents  the  reduction  amounts  to 0,1  hours 
per  week.  Financing part-time  work  in  long-term recessions 
is considered  the  major  problem besides  not precisely 
qunnitied  (and  not  quantifiabl0  since  they  are  subject to 
1~~crnal  caicula~ions)  abuses  (employers  can
1 for  example1 
~anipulate capacity utilization limits).  In  those  cases the 
labour  market  effect has  to be  modified because unemploy-
ment  of  the  affected employees  cannot  be  prevented  in  the 
long  run. 
According  to analysis of  the Ministry of  Labour  (Hinistere 
du  Travail,  1982  a,b)  special grants  for  mountain  regions, 
have  proved  successful  as  a  regional  job maintaining measure 
as  well  as  in other  branches  bad  weather  allowances  for  the 
corr,pE;r:.~:;at lOn  of  weather  conditions. . . 
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CONCLUSION 
As  the  following  table proves  during  the  70s  absolute  and 
relatives expenditures  for  labour market  and  employment  po-
licy increased erraticly: 
Table  1: 
Development  of Expenditures  for  Employment  Policy  (1974-1980) 
Selected Areas  - 1974  =  100% 
1974  1976  1978  1980 
implacement  100  167,4  270,0  366,3 
vocatiunal training  100  154,8  319,3  352,1 
unanployrnent 
benefit  100  363,9  652,6  473,2 
\'Ji  tl1drawel  fran 
laoour market  100  213,9  461,9  872,4 
creation of new 
jobs  100  131,2  278,5  439,0 
rre..intenance of 
. jobs  100  1348,1  1646,0  3099,4 
total  100  247,0  467,4  687,0 
Source:  Colin,et al.  in:  ~1inistry. of Labour,  1982 Facing  this  development  questions  arise about  the  reasons 
of  the  expenditure  increase  and  the effectiveness of  the 
measures.  Has  the effectiveness of  the  increased expenditures 
improved?  Do  the different measures  distinguish with  regard 
to the cost-benefit-effects? This  question raises the pro-
blem of measuring  efficiency.  Theoretically,  economic  wel-
fare-analytic  or cost-benefit-analytic measuring  methods  come 
into consideration.  As  Schmid  (Schmid,  1982)  points out  in 
his  evaluation  study  referred to  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger-
many,  labour  market  policy  largely resists  such  strict cri-
teria  ,  however.  Labour  mar1~et policy often  aims  very  speci-
ficly at  social  improvements  of  disadvantaged  individuals 
and  social gropus  by  means  of  a  redistribution of  resources. 
Thus  it st.rivcs  for a negative
11pareto-sub-optimum"  state ac-
cording  to welfare-theoretical  considerations.  Comparatively 
problematic are exact  cost-benefit-comparisons.  Even  though 
expenses  can  be precisely determined they usually fail, 
because  on  the  other hand benefits neither  can  be  quanti-
fied  nor  isolated because  of  various  objectives  (high  em-
ployment  effect,  equitable  income  distribution,  improvement 
of  qualification etc.).  Furthermore  the opportunity costs 
and  side-effects  (possible deadweight etc.) are mostly  unknown. 
In  spite of  these general  objeclions  the  problem  subjec~ of 
both  analysis  methods  is helpful  for  the  evaluation of  the 
labour market- and  employment  programmes  being  discussed  in 
the preceding paragraph:  on  the  one  hand  allocational aspects, 
on  the other hand  an  alternative use  of  expenditures  are the 
main  subject of  a  comparative  anulysis8  The  summary  of  the 
preceding  paragraph,  however,  has  - under  consideration of 
these  aspect.s  - to  be  restricted to the interconnexion of argurcEr1ts. 
This  is  also required  beyond  the general  considerations, 
since  no  comprehensive  comparative  evaluation studies  are 
available which  could  be  referred  to  (cp.  Ministry of  Labour, 
1982  a,b). .. 
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The  precondition for all kinds  of  efficiency  analyses  is 
to  identify the goal  dimensions.  In  following  the classifi-
cation of periods  proposed  by  colin and others  (Colin  et. 
aliter, 1982),  two  stages  of the  French  employment  policy can 
bedistinguished  from  1974  to  1980:  a)  The  policy of  safeguar-
ding  employment  (1974-1977)  and  b)  the  increase of  industrial 
employment  and  the  regualtion of  the working  population. 
From.  1981  onward  c)  the  "combat  against  unemployment"  (Mit-
terand)  became  chief target of  the  employment  policy. 
a)  The  Policy of Safeguarding  Employment  (1974-1977) 
In  the  beginning of this period the  French  government  was 
confronted with  a  development  which  had  been  unknown  since 
the  end  of  World  War  II:  a  real  decline of  industrial acti-
vity  (cp.  philosophy).  The  defensive  employment  policy was 
focused  on  three  aspects  with  regard  to this problem: 
financial  support  of  the affected companies 
safeguarding employment 
- transf~r of costs  of  safeguarding  employment  to the state. 
The  financial  support  was  realized  in different ways.  The 
regional  promotion  as  the most  important  measure  is being ex-
tended,  however.  The  published  figures  of  the  Department  of 
Employment  prove  the  high  employment  effects  (cp.  preceding 
paragraph).  Yet,  these  refer-on  an  aggregated  level~, not  to 
udditionally created  jobs,  but  to  the preservation of  indu-
strial  employment  (decreasing total figures  provided). 
Restructuring  the  industry was  supported.  Guiding principle 
for  conside~ations on  efficiency is the  confrontation of  ex-
penditures with  the  increase of  employment. - 211  -
Table  2:  Expenditures  and  Employment  Effects  of  Regional  Pro-
motion  (PDR)  - increase rates  in  %  compared with the 
preceding year 
r 
I  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
~~  ~·  --
l 
expenditures  -25  49,3  2,2  34,3  1,3  -2,2 
employment 
effect  52,0  -9,3  28,7  20,1  -2,6  11,9 
Source:  Ministry  of·  Labour,  1982a,b 
Besides the  increase of  expenditures  for  regional  promotion 
expecially short-time allowances  were  applied.  The  expendi-
tures  increased from  32,9 mill.  FF  in  1974  to  220 mill.  FF 
in  1975.  In  1975  jobs of  220.000  employees  could be  safe-
guarded  by  this measure.  Also  in the following  years  the  as-
sistance of  short-time work  continued to  p~yan important 
role  to stabilize employment  and  to avoid costs'originating 
from  unemployment. 
By  safeguarding the  real  income  in cases of dismissal  for 
economic  reasons  the living standard of the employees  could 
be maintained as well as  in-plant rationalizations were  made 
possible.  A  dramatic  increase of  redundancies  in'the following 
y~~rs coupled with  a  high  increase of costs,  however,  indi-
cated the  limited ability of this instrument because it alle-
~iates short-term cyclical  slumps  only. • 
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Table  3:  Costs  of  Income  Guarantees  in  Cases  of  Redundancies 
expenses in  expenses in con- praroted  oosts for 
current prices  stant prices  persons  ea~  praro-
ted person 
current  oonstant 
prices 
1973  455,2  455,2  31  362  14,514  14,514 
1974  836,9  736,1  48  994  17,082  15,024 
1975  1.427,2  1.122,9  66  440  21,481  16,901 
1976  2.014,7  1.446,3  86  827  23,204  ·.  16,657 
1977  2.582,8  1.694,8  96  266  26  830  17,605 
1978  4.3301  2.605,3  132  568  32,663  19,653 
1979  6.073,3  3.298,9  155  313  39,104 .  21,24C 
1980  8.031,1  3.842,6  186 100  43,155  20,648 
Source:  Ministry of  Labour  1982a,b 
The  government  expanded  not at last with  reference  to these 
experiences  the occupational  trainin~ measures  for  unemployed 
as  an  instrument of  a  long-term nature.  They  should guarantee 
the basis  for  the expected economic  recovery  from  the  supply 
I 
1 
side  by  the  improvement  of general  knowledge  and  specific skills. 
Two  factors,  however,  impeded  the effectiveness of  the training 
measures: 
- the possibility of  participants to manipulate 
~·chain re-training••)  was  exceptionally high  (Rapport  du  Comi-
te  - Ernploi  Travail  - du  VIIe  Plan,  1976,  p.  200). 
more  than  three quarters  of  the participants  in  courses  of 
occupational  training and  further-training,  were  young 
persons  between  16  and  25  .A great part of this group 
had  no  work  experience at all so far. 
These  factors  constitute the  main  reason  for  the reduction  of 
participants  in  the  occupational  training programmes  (1974: 
23.000  compared with  1975:  10.000  (cp.  Colin et.al.,  1982)). - 213  -
b)  The  Tncrca~H"'  of  Industri.CJl  Employment  and  the  HP.gulation 
of  the  Workinq  Population 
With  the presentation of  the  VII  economy  plan  (1976)  the poli-
cy  for  the  recovery  of  the  industry was  intensified.  Supports 
for  restructuring  and  rationalization should  improve  the 
world  market  position of  France.  Training measures  were  re-
inforced  and  received-beside its function  to  improve qualifi-
cation  - the  function  to alleviate the  increase of  demand 
for  labour  (cp.  Colin  and  others,  1982).  Beside  that the  ex-
penditures  for  job-creating measures  rose,  especially on  the 
regional  level.  Analysis  concerning  the effectiveness of this 
policy print  to  the  costs which  increase with the duration 
of  the  recession  and  with the  problem region.  By  the  Fonds 
sp~cial d'Adaption  Industriel  (FSAI)  21.000  jobs  could  be  crea-
ted  in  1978  for  example.  Each  of  these  jobs  cost  100.000  FF, 
however  (L'Industrie  francaise  face ala Crise,  Le  Mende,  No. 
84,  Octobre  1981). 
Dismissals  contributed to  a  lesser extent to the  increase of 
unemployment,  however,  than  new  entrants  due  to  demographic 
developments.  In order to relieve the  labour market,  the fol-
lowing  policies were  established or  intensified: 
- early  retirement 
supports  for  return migration  of  foreign  workers 
- training of  youth 
improvement  of  the  placement  system 
- improvement  of  the  unemployment  benefit. 
The  early  ret:_irement  regulations were  implemented  in two  forms 
(GRL  and  GRD).  Both variants were  largely claimed.  In  1972  the 
number  of  persons  supported  by  the  GRD  -regulation  amounted 
to  20.000;  in  1976  for  the first time  the  100.000-limit was 
exceeded,  in  1980  140.000  persons  were  promoted.  The  income 
Quarantee  (GRD)f  existing  since  1977,  was  claimed  by  10.000  pen-
sioners during  the  year  of  its introduction,  in  1980  by  130.000, 
wh1ch  meant  tl1at  the  costs  rose  to  8  milliards  FF  in  1080  and 
thus,  worsened  the  financing  problem. .. 
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In  the  same  year  (1 977)  the  French  government  offered  rct:.urn_ 
migrati~~J2E~m~u~ to  foreign  workers  (ca.  l, 5  mill.).  The 
premium  was  10.000  FF.  In  spite of facilitated eliqibility 
to claim  the  premiums  the  forecast  could-by  far-not  be  full-
filled:  instead of  the predicted  1  million people till July 
1981, this  programme  only  stimulated - 93.000  per-
sons  (including  the members  of  their families)  to return to 
their native countries. 
The  "pactes  pour  l'emploi  des  jeunes",  which  intended to  sup-
port  the absorption  of  annually  750.000  to  800.000  school 
leavers,  were  pursuing  two  goals: 
reduction of wage  costs  by  fiscalisation of national  in-
surance  contributions  and  grants  for  recruitment, 
- productivity  increase  by  improving  the  skill level. 
For  the first  "pac_!:--=.__p~~--!::-~em_ploi"  from  1977, 4  billions  FF 
have  been  made  available,  for  the  second  and  third one  bil-
lion  FF  in  1978,  2,2 bill.  FF  in  1979  and  3,4 bill.  FF  in 
1980.  The  labour market  relief effects of the first  "pacte" 
are estimated to be  100.000 until  1978;  the effects of  the 
first  campaign  of  the  third one  of  35.000  (Gaspard 1  Frank, 
1981).  Assumptions,  that young  people would  have  displaced 
older employees,  did  not materialize:  during the  running 
time  no  significant  increase of  unemployment  of employees 
above  25  years  has  been  obs0rved  (Colin  and  others,  1982). 
The  long-term effects were  estimated  favourably:  68  % of the 
youths  found  a  job one  month  after the measure  was  terminated. 
In  comparison  to that,  64  % of the participants  in occupational 
trainings  and  86  % of the  programme  "contract emploi-forma-
t.ion"  had  taken  up  employment  one  month  after finishing trai-
ning  . The  number  of  job-seekers  in further-training- and  re-trai-
ning  measures  aiming  at elder unemployed  grows  since  1976  by 
ca.  8,7  %.  The  integration quota  remains  high,  although it 
falls gradually.  In  1979  17,9  %of  the participants were 
still unemployed  six months  after finishing  the  courses;  yet, 
in  1974  this  figure  amounted  to only  5,7  %.  This  development 
is primarily attributable to  the  fact that the  construction 
industry  and  the  tertiary sector which  could  absorb 
manpower  in  previous  years,  were  also  showing  a  negative  ba-
lance  of  employment  owing  to the  incessant  economic  reces-
sion. 
The  modification of  work  plac~ncnt became  necessary with  a 
dropping  placement  quota.  Improvement  efforts were  particu-
larly concentrated  on  an  increase of staff and  an  expansion 
of  informations.  Without  quantifying  the results this policy 
is  judged positively  (  cf.  Ministry of  Labour,  a,b  1982). 
c)  The  "Combat  Against  Unemployment 
11 
Under  the  new  government  Mitterand/Mauroy active  components 
of  the  labour market- and  employment  policy were  expanded. 
·rhe  j ncreasc  of  employment  and  thus  the  reduction of  lJncmploy--
mcnt  should  be  achlcvod cxpecially by  three factors: 
1)  increase of  demand; 
2)  creation of  new  jobs; 
3)  reduction of  working  time. 
Beside  the  rise of  pensions  and  family  allowances  the  increa-
se  of  demund  was  particularly realized  by  lifting the  minimum 
waqe  (SMIC) .  Unanimously  all experts attribute to the measure 
a  short-term  employment  effect.  Basicly  the  increase of  the 
minimum  waue  at  10%  helped  to  produce  the  0,~  % real  economy 
nrowth,  RchicvRd  in  1981,  and  thus  prevented  a  greater re-
dnctj_on  of  crnrloyment. - 216  -
As  an  intended side-effect  income  justice has  improved.  On 
a  middle- and  long-term basis this measure,  however,  also 
will  bring about  - under the condition of  low  economic  growth 
rates  - further  state interventions,  in particular to  con-
trol  inflation.  Are  the additional  costs taken  over by  the 
state,  like it is provided  in the  SMIC  legislation,  the 
additional  expenditures must  be  compensated  through 
higher taxes;  the  aggregated  demand  correspondingly drops. 
Similar problems occur  by  expanding  public  employ-
ment.  Under  the  condition of  stagnant  revenues it can  only 
be  financed  through  an  increase of  budget deficits.  The  ef-
fectiveness  of  this rneasure,  however,  depends  not  only  on 
direct costs  and benefits,  but  also  on  middle- and  long-term 
social cost-benefit considerations. 
The  expansion  of  public  employment  is being  performed  in 
fields  of  social needs,  this because it is  intended not only 
to moderate  unemployment,  but to  improve  the  social  infra-
structure. 
The  reduction of working  time  is realized in different ways 
(life-time -,  annually-,  weekly  working  time).  Major  mea-
sures  are  the  lowering  of  retirement  age  and  the reduction 
of  weekly  working  time  (39-hours-week  by  law).  The  effective-
ness  mainly  depends  on  the fact  whether  the working  time 
reduction will  be  accomplished with or without  wage  compen-
sation.  With  the  introduction of  the  39-hours-week full  wage 
compensation  was  agreeed upon.  The  branch- and  sector-speci-
fic effect is different.  Aggregated,  however,  it has  to be 
faced  that  through  a  higher  financial  burden  and  with  constant 
demand  the  import  share  on  competition markets  has  in-
creased considerably .. Thus,public measures  to protect the 
domestic market  are  necessary for  ensuring  the  medi_um-
tcrm  employment --efft)Cts. - 217  -· 
For  r0ducj.ng  the  financial  burden  of  enterprises  some  public 
enterprises  (e,g.  telephone  producer  CIT)  proceeded  to  con-
clude  labour  agreements  with working  time  reductions  without 
w~gn compensation.  The  income  losses  amount  to  4,5  %  for  a 
3S- and  1  % for  a  38-hours-weekly working  time.  Concerning 
Clrl'-l-.lcatcl  400  of  1. 100  planned  redundancies  could  be  pre--
vented. 
This  comprehensive  outline of  the  most  important  stages of 
development  suggests  a  trend of  reactions  of  the  French la-
bour  market  policy  to  economic  problem pressure.  Frictional 
and  seasonal  unemployment  prevailing  in  the beginning  of  the 
70'n  is predominantly met  by  supply-orientated policies  (re-
trainings etc.).  Labour  market  policy to  combat  cyclical 
slump~ like  they  were  predicted  from  1975  until  the  end  of 
the  7o•s,  primarily favours  - besides  the  compensation  of  the 
consequences  of  unemployment  - employment-safeguarding  mea-
sures  and  ~~traditional••  ideas  of  an  active  labour market  po-
licy  (mobility  aids,  early retirement etc.}.  Economic 
crises  assumed  to  be  of  a  long-term nature  encourage  the  re-
distribution of  labour,  supply- and  demand-orientated  as  well 
as  laLour market-rPlicving  meaHures. 218 
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0.  &~ALYSIS AND  EMPIRICS  OF  ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
Stabilization Policy  Problems 
If one  follows  the interpretation of the Confederation of 
British Industry  {CBI)  cited in the morining  news  of the 
BFBS  on  28th  March  1983  the British economy  has  overcome 
the  perhaps  most dificult phase of the post war period.  The 
CBI  expects production  and  employment  to rise over the next 
months  and  thus  the  bottom of the recession persisting since 
1979  will  be  passed.  Although  even  according to  the  indica-
tors of  the  Department of  Employment  the gross  domestic  prod-
uct  stagnated in 1981,  it showed  a  slight upward  trend in 
the first three quarters of  1982  (DE  Gazette,  2/1983). 
If this,  however,  is the beginning of  a  new  period of growth 
for Britisch economy,  appears  questionable:  past growth 
trends  have  been  toounsteady,  too  strong the  setbacks of the 
past years to speak of  a  turning point already  now.  A  look 
at the  development of the gross  domestic  product of the  70s 
and  80s  shows  that the  - as  compared with other countries  -
traditionally growth-deficit British economy  had  to put  up 
with  a  strong downward  movement  in the area of  economic 
growth. 
Table  1: 
Real  gross national  product  - changes  against last year in 
- changes  against last year in percent  -
74  75 
+3,1  -1,2  -0,8 
1)  average  annual  change 
2)  estimated 
76  80 
+4,2  -2,0 
81 
-2,2  +0,5 
Source:  SVR,  Council  of Advisors,  Annual  Report  1982/83; 
for  1973  Annual  Report  1978/79 - 221  -:-
As  compared with  the  in the statistical average quite satis-
factory  growth  trend of the  60s  the  following  decade is cha-
racterized by  two  severe  setbacks.  The  first has  been  brought 
by  the  economic  crisis of  1974/75.  The  Britisch economy, 
~owever,  had  been  able  to recover  from  this recession by 
1976  and  realize  growth  rates,  which  generally were  below 
the  average of the  EC  countries,  but which  continued the 
development  prior to  the crisis of  1974/75.  A  turning point 
took place until 1979/80 with  a  repeated decline of the  GOP. 
This  trend  increased in  1981  and  a  reversal of this develop-
ment  of  the  past years  is hardly perceptable. 
At  the  same  time  a  significant rise of the productivity per 
employee  can  be  observed: 
Table  2: 
Real  Gross  Domestic  Product  per  Employee 
- seasonally adjusted,  1975=100  -
1972 
99,9 
74 
101,5 
75 
100,0 
76 
102,6 
80 
107,0 
Source:  Reportment  of  Employment  Gazette 
81 
108,3 
Falling growth  rates and  rising unemployment  have  been  ac-
companied  by  a  positive demographic  development  in the  70s 
-~at was  reflected  ~n an  i~crease of the working  population 
by  more  than  1  million persons.  This  increase is,  however, 
'.::i vided  into  a  moderate  decline of  the  male  working  popula-
tion  (over  the total period)  and  the entry of  large  numbers 
cf women  into  the  labour market. '' 
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Table  3: 
Development of the Working  Population  1970-82  - in thousands 
borking 
1970  1980  1981  1982 
25  3081)  26  716  26  633  26  392  population 
men  16  3711) 
women  8  9371) 
Source  :~par1:Jtalt of Fnnployment  Gazette  1  1)  Central Statistical 
Office  (1970) 
--
Although  in the  period  1970-1979  the  number  of  jobs  increased 
by nearly 0.5 million,  the  industrial distribution of  job 
was  subject to  heavy  changes.  While  manufacturing,  mining 
and  agriculture lost about  1.5 million  jobs,  employment  in 
private and  public services  rose  by nearly 2.0 million. 
Table  4:  Development of  employment  1970-79  - in thousands  -
1970  1979  1970-1979 
Enployees in errploynent  22  478  22  920  +  442 
men  14  009  . 13  380.  - 629 
waten  8  470  9  540  +1  070 
agriculture  466  367  - 99 
mining:  - 410  - 346  - 64 
manufacturing 
total  8  342  7  176  ·-1  166 
(roochanical  engeneering)  (1  106)  (914)  - (192) 
(vehicles)  (842)  (749)  - (93) 
(textiles)  (678)  (478)  - (200) 
(clothing and  foobJear)  (455)  (382)  - ( 73) 
construction  1  339  1  292  - 47 
gas, electrici  t:t,  water  391  346  - 45 
transport,cammunication  1  1  572  1  494  - 78 
private services  8 477  10 281  +1  804 
(distribution trades)  (2  675)  (2  826)  +  (151) 
(insurance,  banking etc)  (3  854)  (4  962)  +(1 108) 
(hotel,  catering)  (  698)  (  914)  +  (216) 
(others)  __ (1  250)  (1  579)  +  (329) 
public services  1 481  1  619  +  138 
Source:  Central Statistical Office - 223  -
The  development  of  unemployment  is characterized by  a  con-
tinous  increase that has  only  twice  - 1973/74  and  1978/79  -
been  shortly reversed.  The  creation of appr.  450.000  jobs  is 
faced  by  a  working  population  growth of appr.  1.1 million 
persons.  The  social distribution of  unemployment  is also 
due  to the  development  of  the  employment  structure.  The  un-
employment  rates of  men  are considerably higher then  those 
of  (registered)  women.  The  destruction of  jobs most  of all 
affects male  occupations  (see  above:  mechanical  engeneering), 
which  expanding  industries at least largely create  female 
jobs.  The  strong  increase of  female  participation,  however, 
leads  to  a  relatively stronger increase of  female  unemploy-
ment. 
Table  5: 
Development of  unemployed  - 1970-1982  -
year  unemployed  %  men  %  women  % 
total 
1970  555  2,6  475  3,3  80  0,9 
1975  866  4,1  707  4,9  159  1,7 
11976  1  359  5,7  1  023  7,1  336  3,5 
r980  1  664  6,9  1  180  8,3  484  4,9 
1981  2  520  10,7  1  843  13,1  677  7,1 
~ 
l~Y82  2  916  12,5  2  133  15,5  783  8,3 
")·..1rcc:  1970-75  Central Statistical Office, 
1977-82  Department of  Employment  Gazette 
l!..s  a  summary it follows:  The  recession of  1974/75  had direct 
effects on  the  labour market,  the  unemployment  rate rose  rapid-
ly.  In the  absence of  a  compensating demographic  development 
unemployment  did  not fall in the  slight upswing that  followed, 
but with the exception of  1979  continued to rise.  In  the  pe-
riod considered,  economic  growth  and  unemployment  did not 
r•::.".·e  l.n  opposite  direc+~ionr.;  anymore,  but  an  increase of  the 
GDP  -went  parallel to  a  rise of the  number  of  unemployed. - 224  -
Economic  strategies solely aimed  at abolishing unemployed 
by  raising growth  rates  do  not operate convincingly against 
this background.  It is rather likely that they  increase  un-
employment  by  promoting rationalization processes rather  than 
achieve  the desired full  employment. 
Another  stabilization problem was  posed  by  the development 
of pricesover the last years: 
Table  6: 
Consumer  Prices 
- Increase Against the Last Year  in Percent  -
rl973 
t9,4  +15,9  +24,2  +16,5  +18,0  +11,9  +9,0 
74  75  76  80  81 
1)  estimated 
Source:  SVR,  Council of Advisors,  Annual  Report  1975/76, 
1981/82  and  1982/83 
The  table shows  that the price stabilizing effect of reces-
sion has  not  been  large  enough  to fall  short of  a  certain 
rate of price increases  - say  8-9%  - lastingly.  The  new  mo-
netary policy of the Thatcher  Government  as wellms at least 
not  proceeded  any  fast effects,  as  the  years  1979-81  demon-
strate.  Although  since 1981/82  a· turning point appears  to 
be at hand,  price rises  go  down,  this does  not admit of 
the conclusion on  the durability of the  successes  scored  in 
the  combat  against inflation.  Furthermore the fall of infla-
tion rates is partly due  to falling  raw material prices since 
the late  70s  and  not ~wing to the  successes of monetary 
policy. 
In  in addition to this  a  significant,  although  not sufficient 
reduction of price rises is to  be  paid  for  with  3  million 
unemployed,  then  under  an  equal  valuation of  the full  employ-
ment  target and  the target of price staq·ility such  a  policy 
has  to be  rated economically  inefficient  and  therefore inac-- 225  -
ceptable.  The  references to the  medium  and  long term advan-
tages of  a  policy strictly directed at fighting inflation 
is no  avail  as  long  as it cannot  be  specified with analyti-
cally and  empirically substantiation,  how  long  the period for 
the  simultaneous  attainment of full  employment  and  price 
st~·llity within  the  framework  of monetarist policy will be. 
Finally a  look at the external position of Great Britain 
Table  7: 
Data of  an  External Position 
Jahr  1974  1980  1981  19824) 
-· 
LBS1)  - 8  079  +  6660  +  12  127  +  5000 
HBS2)  -12  513  +  2755  +  6  054  +  400 
DM/  3)  z  6,055  4,227  4,556  4,2325) 
1)  Balance of goods  and  services  in mill.  US-Dollar 
2)  Balance of trade  in mill.  US-Dollar 
3)  Pound  Sterling Vassa-Mean-Exchange-Rate  in  DM  Frankf./Main 
4)  estimated 
5)  second quarter 
Source:  SVR,  Council of Advisors,  Annual  Report  1981/82(for 1974) 
1982/83  (for  1975  etc.) 
~he table shows  that until 1979  on  the world market  Great 
dritain has  constantly been  in the position of  a  country 
~hreatened with devaluation owing  to deficits.  Balances of 
trade  a.nd  goods  and  services  have  shown  a  deficit almost 
without exception.  Great Britain had  not  been able to finance 
traditionally high  imports  through exports.  The  exchange 
rate of  the  Pound  Sterling crumbled  therefore against the 
US-Dollar  since exchange  rates were  allowed to floate without 
however,  being able  to  secure  the British competitive posi-
tlon on  the world  market  through  rising exports.  The  improve-
ment  of  the  balances of trade  and  goods  and  services :  ~ 
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is largely due  to increased North  Sea oil production  and  the 
growing  capital  inflows  from  foreign  countries  as  a  reac-
tion to the  policy of high interest rates.  With this the 
exchange  rate of  Pound  Sterling stabilized and  Great  Bri-
tain will hardly have  to ask  for  IMF  loans  - as  in the 
mids  70s.  Also  the  London  financial  sector always  inter-
ested in  foreign  capital has  experienced considerable gains 
from  this development.  But  the opportunity for  an  export 
offensive procured  by  favourable  prices  has  been  cut off 
from  industry. 
Export driven  growth  (Kaldor,  1971)  as  an  economic  strate-
gy  is ruled out under  these conditions.  Therefore  the  medium 
term growth prospects of the  industrial sector and  accor-
dingly the  chances  for  a  rapid  improvement  of  the  employment 
situation have  to be  judged rather pessimisticly. 
With this short  summary  the  problems  by  any  economic 
strategy in Britain are outlined.  Insufficient growth,  mass 
unemplyoment,  only partial successes  in stabilizing price 
level and  an  external position promising  no  relief from  a 
bundle  of problems  make  high  and  partly contradicting demands 
for  a  suitable policy design.  In  the  first instance there-
fore  a  short  survey over  the  economic  strategies of the 
70s  is given,  before  a  more  thorough  analysis  and  evaluation 
of  the monetarist policy persued  in the last years  and  pos-
sible alternatives are  undertaken. 
Economic  principles 
The  current economic  policy of  the Thatcher  government  is 
more  than.a gradual  shifting of priorities that are left 
open as  choices  by  economic  target systems.  James  Qilaghan 
the  last labour  Prime  Minister prior to Margret  Thatcher 
has  left no  doubt  about  a  positive  fundamental  attitude - 227  -
towards  the basic principles of capitalist systems.  "Industry 
must  make  a  profit"  (quoted  in Bacon/Eltis,  1976).  The dif-
ference  between  the  economic  policy of  the  last Labour  go-
vernment  and  the  current Conservative  government  is of 
ra_ther  - as would  be  said in Germany  - "ordnungspoli  tischer 
Natur"  (regulated political nature). 
The  conservative election propaganda diagnozed  in 1979  -
in concurrence with central statements of modern  menetarisim 
an  excess of public expenditure,  excessive taxation and  too 
extensive state regulations of  economic  activity.  The  therapy 
accordingly  aimed  at the  revival of self-regulating market 
processes,  a  restraint of  economic  policy on  bringing about 
the  framework  for  private  economic  activity,  but expecially 
on  a  steady and  antinflationary monetary policy.  In addition 
to this the conservatives  aim at restraining trade union 
influence both on  company  level  and  in participating in 
economic  dec~sion processes.  This policy design is an  attempt 
for  an overall  laissez-faire-approach for  improving the 
_£onditions  for  the  supply side of  the  economy  (Coutts et al., 
1981) .  The  reduction of production cost and  the  increase of 
productivity are  to be  attained with  the  acceptance of mass 
unemployment.  This  strategy breaks  - at least in its direc-
tion  - with  the economic  policies employed  by  Tory  as well 
as  Labour  government  in the post-war period.  The 
11stop" 
and  "go"  of expansive  and  restrictive monetary  and  fiscal 
policies,  nationalizations  and  reprivatizations attempts 
to regulate  incomes  policies and  structural policies are 
strictly rejected.  In  the  view of the actual  absence of 
continutiy and  of  the  failure of not  steadily employed 
economic  policies it is therefore not  surprising that the 
conservative  programme  gained  a  political  maj~rity~(This, 
of course,  is not  judgement of  the  economic or social  adequacy 
of this economic  policy). - 228  -
Let  us,however,  look  back:  As  a  common  economic  practice for 
conservatives· and  Labour  governments  alike  a  "post-war con-
sensus"  developed.  Proceeding  from  Beveridge's  1944  White 
Paper  on  Unemployment  the control of  unemployment  and  the 
maintenance  of  a  high  employment  level was  the  primary goal 
of economic  policy acknoledged  by all parties.  Based  on  the 
experiences of the great depression of the  30s  political 
parties and  electorate alike developed  a  very  strong sen-
sitivity in Great Britain. 
The  almost total realization of  the full  employment  goal  un-
til about  1970 was  the result of  a  complex policy design 
basing on  this  "post-war consensus••.  The  control of  the 
levels of production,  investment  and  employment  was  assigned 
to monetary  and  fiscal policy,  the raising of productivity, 
the  improvement  of  supply  side conditions were  subjects of 
industrial policy and  labour market  policy was  responsible 
for  the  economically efficient allocation and qualification 
of  la,bour.  Under  this policy pattern an  open  and  t¥  no  spe-
cific economic  policy occupied external  flank  is clearly 
visible.  Tendencies  for  the  import pressure characteristic 
for  the British economy  in times  of  an  economic  upturn to-
gether with  the  impending  endangering of  the  Pound  Sterling 
exchange  rate connected with that then  inevitably led to the 
revision of expansive,  on  the domestic  economy oriented po-
licies.  This  exactly  formed  the ratio of the  "stop-and-go-
cycles"  of  economic  policy and  had  a  fatal consequence: 
The  externally caused,  regularly repeated restrictitive po-
licies impaired  the conditions  for  the  growth of the British 
economy.  Each  taking back  of  an  expansive  course operated 
as  a  blow against  inland  investment capacity and  thus  con-
tributed to the  - internationally seen  - weak  position of 
Great Britain. 
Examining  the  70s  more  thoroughly it becomes  apparent that 
the  conservatives  under  the  leadership of  Edward  Heath  in - 229  -
office  from  1970  to  1974  started similar to  the  1979  govern-
ment with the  programme  to  reduce  government  regulations 
of  economic  activity. Declared taget was"less state in favour of better 
qna  .li  ty~~ (  Blackaby, 1978)  • 
that  the  fre-c--p"fay  of market  forces  would  indeed destroy 
inefficient jobs,  employment  policy was  conceived to the 
effect that,  if the  government  was  kept  out  of  the  economy 
competitive  jobs  would  be  created.  One  means  for this was 
the abolition of  regional irvestments grants which  were  re-
placed  by  a  differential  system of  tax allowances  for ex-
penditure on  investment. 
Another  target of  the  government  was  to control  inflation 
that had  been  heated  up  by  strong  (10-12%)  wage  increases 
during  the first year of office.  This  trend was  intended 
to be  reversed  owing  to the fact  that companies  that were 
not able to resist such  wage  demands  ran  the risk of not 
being  saved  from  bankruptcy  by  the government.  In particular 
the behaviour of  public enterprices  and  the public sector 
was  intended to  be  exemplary for private sector companies. 
Pressed  by  growing  unemployment  as well  as  by despite govern-
ment  efforts  continously high levels of inflation the govern-
rr~nt  decided  f~r  ~  ~ildly reflationary budget  build on  the 
lowering of taxes  hoping  that this would  cause  sustained 
-~conomic growth.  The  government,  however,  linked this to the 
comment  that  unemployment  could only  be  lowered  successfully 
if wage  demands  were  also lowered.  Strongly  increasing  unem-
ployment,  however,  forced  the government  to start larger 
expenditure  programmes  and  to lower  the purchase tax.  Finance 
controls  were  also  relaxed  in  favour  of  stimulating economic 
gro,-.rth. - 230  -
These  measures,  however,  did  not  prove  very effective and 
the  government  changed  its policy  in  favour  of  more  active 
employment  policy.  The  most  important  instrument was  the 
1972  Industry Act  allowing  a  direct  intervention into the 
economy.  Also  labour market  and  employment  policy experienced 
a  new  stimulus-mainly due  to the creation of  the  Manpower 
Services  Commission  (MSC)  . 
The  MSC  was  responsible  for  the placing of  job searchersand 
the operation of  vocational  training courses.  The  Employment 
Service was  reorganized  and  separated  from  unemployment  be-
nefits.  It was  intended  to get  rid of  the old  "dole-queue 
image"  and  to motivate  unemployed  persons  to  a  more  active 
job search by  means  of  a  modernized  appearance  and  a  more 
attractive  information  about vacancies. 
Occupational  training was  regarded  as  a  means  to  combat  un-
employment  and  was  expanded  accordingly.  Instead of abolishing 
the  "levy and grant"  system it was  strengthened.  Occupational 
training outside companies  was  extended with  a  target of 
100  000  participants annually to the Training Opportunities 
Scheme  (TOPS)  in 1974/75. 
T~e MSC  was  also charged with the development  of  Labour  market 
policies to increase  and  maintain  employment  levels.  Conser-
vative policies were  successful  inasmuch  as  they actually 
lowered  unemployment  levels  and  maintained  them  - even  if 
at  a  higher level  than  in the  60s  - although  inflation still 
continued to rise and  the  PSBR  kept  growing  from  the .second 
year of office on. - 231  -
Table~_;_ Expenditure  on  labour market  policy 
I  G~neral 
74/75  75/76  76/77  77/78 
I  .  1) 
45  ·.  Serv1ces  32  36  43 
Em~loyment 
Re  ab1litation  43  44  45  43 
SpPcial  2)  10  130  268  Measures  --
I"'lSC  212  346  426  469 
Others  3)  129  208  211  210 
Total  416  644  855  1035 
1}  Career Guidance,  Community  Industry and  STEP 
2)  Including  job standardization measures 
3)  Mostly  redundancy  payments  and  occupational  safety 
Source:  Walker  (1982) 
78/79 
60 
44 
254 
512 
200 
1070 
Despite  of its efforts the  Labour  Government  could  not  prevent 
unemployment  from  rising,although it was able to stabilize it 
eventually.  Not  until  19?,the economy  grew by  more  than  2%, 
but  this  had little effect  on  employment  levels,  since pro-
ductivity also grew. 
On  the  whole  the growth stimuli proved  too weak  to provide 
those entering  the  labour market  with  jobs,  especially since 
the  above  mentioned  changes  of the  employment  structure 
effe_.cted that certain groups  were  not  able to find  jobs 
any  longer  (mainly  male,  manual  full-time workers) . - 232  -
The  labour government  following  the  Conservatives  was  again 
faced  by  a  strongly increasing unemployment.  To  reduce this 
increase  Labour  installed a  multitude of  programmes  using 
the  instruments provided  by  their predecessors:  The  Temporary 
Employment  Programme  (TES:  1975-1979),  the Job  Creation Pro-
gramme  (JCP:  1975-1976),  the  Work  Experience  Programme  (WEP, 
1976-1978),  the Special  Temporary  Employment  Programme  (STEP: 
1978-1980)  and  the  Youth  Opportunities  Programme  (YOP:l978-1982). 
In addition to this  a  number  of  wage  subsidies were  adopted 
-Recruitment Subsidy for  School  Leavers  (RSSL),  Youth  Employ-
ment  Subsidy  (YES),  Adult  Employment  Susidy  (AES),  Small 
Firms  Employment  Subsidy  (SFES)  - as  well  as  short-time 
allowance  - the Short-Time Working  Subsidy  (STW)  -,  the 
opportunity for early retirement  - Job  Release  Scheme 
(JRS)  -,  and  a  further expansion  of  occupational training 
- 100  000  participants  in  TOPS  in  1978 -. 
Accordingly public expenditure  as  a  percentag=of the gross 
~stic  product grew significantly during the first year 
of office. 
From  1976 it became  obviousthat this level of  expenditure 
financed  by  a  continously growing  PSBR  could not  be  sustained 
in  view of  the high  inflation rates.  Spending  reductions 
undertaken  as  a  result of this mostly  applied to public 
capital  investment,  whereas  expenditure  for  labour market 
policy continued to rise because of  rapidly growing  unem-
ployment  levels. - 233  -
Sununarizing 
- insufficient growth 
- high rates of inflation 
high  wage  rises 
- a  weak  external position 
- high  and  rising unemployment  and 
- rising deficits 
emerge  as  the  economic  heritage for  the Thatcher government. 
As  already pointed out above  this government  decided  for 
a  radical  break with the  "post-war-consensus"  on  economic 
policy in Britain.  It tried to  formulate  answers  to  two 
questions:  The  unsuccessful  interventionist incomes  policy 
was  to be  replaced by  a  regimentation of trade unions  on 
two  level 
- through  legal regulations  to  reduce  the  frequency of 
strikes and 
- through  the  smashing or at least weakening of the British 
collective bargaining eminently  important structures of 
the(trade union)  representation of interests on  the  shop-
floor-level  through  high  unemployment. 
The  second  answer  applies  to the  problem of external safe-
guarding.  This  was  to be  achieved  through  a  policy leading 
to  an  inflationfree growth of cost efficient,  profitable 
production  and  thus  to stable employment.  This  policy design 
the  elements of which will be  presented below is explicitely 
medium  term.  In  the short term the costs of this stabili-
zation process are  to be  accepted:  production falls,  a  collapse 
of  investment activity,  mass  unemployment  and  the missery 
connected  therewith  - everything an  acceptable sacrifice to 
escape  Hayesk's  "Road  to Selfdom
11
•  To  avoid being misunder-
stood this is no  objection to  a  steady,  on  the  medium  term 
orientated economic  policy per  se is to be  made,  but this - 234  -
does  not prejudice  any monetarist strategy that is willing 
to sacrifice the present for  an  uncertain  future  and at a 
price that  human  beings  as  economically highly developed 
system do  not  have  to  pay. 
As  a  serious  argument  stays that the  proponents of moneta-
rist policy cannot  make  any reliable statements on  the 
period necessary  for  a  successful stabilization of an  eco-
nomic  system in an  inflationary state.  As  an  indication 
might  stand that Milton  Friedman  once  set the  "long term" 
to  25  years;  this throws  a  light on  central aspects of cer-
tain economic  concepts. 
Exactly on  those  concepts  of monetaristic ideas  the  economy 
policy of  the  conservative  government  Thatcher relies on. 
This  is based  on  data,  which  have  been set out within the 
middle-term financial  strategy of  1979.  Priority was  given 
to the  target of beating inflation through the attempt of 
a  restrictive,  strictly money  supply orientated policy. 
The  development  of the  money  supply,  determined  by the mo-
netary indicator Sterling M3,  newly established,  were  to be 
approved  with the development  of public expenditure  and 
the public net credit loan.  The  following  survey  shows  the 
middle-term financial  strategy of  the government  Thatcher. - 235  -
Table  9:  The  Middle  Term  Financial  Strategy of  the  Government 
Thatcher 
---- -~-------- ~-- - ~---- ¥-·  - ·-- ------ ----~-----·--- --- -·-· 
1978- 1979- 1S80-
r  ,.  '131)  ;.)tf'!".--l.J1:::1  ••  _  _.. ____  ,_  .. __ 
t;.u qet. val  t..llTe  8-12 
real volume  1 3  , 6 
pUblic  expend:i;t:crre~---· 
planing 3/80  .7 7 
planing 3/81 
?;)laning  3/82  I 
80  81 
7-11 
11 '0 
78 
'88,75 
7-11 
19,5 
77,5 
91 '5 
92,H 
1981-
82 
6-10 
~ 14 '5 
76,75 
91,5 
104,5 
1982-
E3 
8-12 
1983-
84 
7-11 
75,25  75 
90  A7,5 
114,~  120 
10Ct_  _.,  .... -
85 
6-10 
12ts 
1-
)  3)  j  ·-----------------·---------
state rcveni 
78,5  planing 3/81 
planing 3/82 
public net creditt 
82,5 
94 
84 
109 
84 
121,5 
85 
130  143 
loan  j 
a)  1 
b) 
10 
5 
11,5 
6 
8 
4,25 
6,5 
3,25 
4 
2' 
6,5 
2· 
1)  average annual  growth rate in %,  since 1982,  quoted after: Financial Times 
2)  in bill UKL.  On  account of different basic data the figures are not to 
corrparable precisely.  They make  sense as irrlicating a  tendency. 
3)  in bill UKL,  from  1982  onward after: Financial Times 
~;  Public sector borrowing requirerrents  (TSBR) 
a)  in bill UKL 
b)  in of hundred of GDP 
Figures on 1984/85 relate to the Financial Times 
Source:  OEX:D,  Econanic  SUrvey,  United Kingdan,  July 1981;  Financial Tiires 
10.3.1982 
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Those  data clearly illustrate the  main direction of  conser-
vative  economy  policy.  A  gradual  decline in the  increase of 
money  supply,  following  an  assumed  slowing  down  of  inflationary 
tendency,  should  in the  end  lead to growth  largely being  free 
of  inflation.  The  expenditure planning implicated  a  cut in 
government  expenditures.  The  revenue  planning mirrowes  the 
confidence of  the  government  Thatcher,  in being able  to ra-
pidly attain appropriate grwoth rates after a  short period 
of katharsis.  Tax  revenues  were  to  increase even at decrea-
sing tax rates,  given  a  successful  stimulation of private 
growth.  Under  these conditions also the public net credit 
loan was  to be  set back  gradually. 
Yet,  the envisaged middle-term financial  strategy could  not 
be  sustained,  because  the expected growth  dynamic  failed to 
materialize.  Since  1979  the  money  supply is extending drama-
ticly,  estimated by  the  target orientation.  The  revenue  los-
ses within the  public  budget,  unavoidably  leading to an  in-
creasied public borrowing,  were  major  factors  for  the  failure 
of this policy.  The  industry,  confronted with tight spots  in 
financial  resources,  looked  for  intensified credit-entries, 
the  high interest rate policy contributed to  the  necessary 
expansion of money  supply.  Thus,  the policy of  the government 
Thatcher  was  sharply criticized by the monetaristic  school 
{Friedman),  because  the british policy aimed at controlling 
the rates of interests and  the money  supply .. Yet,  rationality 
of monetaristic policy is exactly determined  by letting·rates 
of interest be  established on  the market  and  only controlling 
the  money  supply. 
The  development  of  the public budget did  not  follow  the  pro-
jected trend.  The  expected  tax revenues  did  not materialize 
due  to  the failing of  growth  dynamics,  the expenditures  for 
social  security,  especially payments  for  unemployed  increased. 
Employees  of public  service were  able  to put  through higher 
wage- and  salary claims  than  assumed,  the high  interest poli-
cy did  not  remain without  consequences  for  the  interest bur-- 237  -
den  for  the  budget.  In the  budget  1981/82  the government  That-
cher  responded  to these developments  by  adopting tax increa-
ses,  only  for  small  companies  selectiv tax relieves  were 
granted.  The  development  of  the expenditure  side  could  be 
staLilized to  a  large extent,  a  policy which  has  to  be  va-
lJed  as  a  restrictive budget political strategy facing  the 
growing  recession.  Even  though  the  budget  1982/83  does  involve 
financial  facilitations  for  investments  and  labour market 
programmes,  it is not  a  turning point towards  an  expansive, 
employment  orientated budget policy. 
~n evaluation of british economies,  only  linked to empirical 
findings,  has  to  come  to the  conclusion,  that it was  not  suc-
cessful  in stabilizing enterpreneura1  expectation with  the 
target  of  an  effective expansion of private  investments. 
Government  incentives  for  the  supply  side,  relying on  a  cut 
in  th~ maxinnun  income  tax rate from  83  %  to  60  %  and  the 
reduct1on  of  government  control  like for  instance  on  the 
establishment  of enterprise  zones,  proved to  low.  The  demand 
side  was  lacking the  impulses  arising from  an expansive  bud-
get policy.  Finally the  high interest rate,  in connection 
wlth the  impulses  on  the  balance of  payment  induced  by  the 
increasing oil-production in the  north-see,brought  about  a 
revaluation of  the british pound,  which  contributed to the 
~~akening of  the  international trade situation and  to  a  de-
~line of  the  employment  level,  especially in the manufactu-
:ing industry  (Coutts,  1981) . 
.  \ccording  to tre assumption  of  supply orientated and  mone-
taristic version of  economic  policy limits of  an  expansivly 
designed  employment  policy are also to explain with  crowding-
out  effects to  be  expected.  Crowding-out  effects relate to 
the  possible displacement  of private activity by  increasing 
public activity;  it is being discussed  in details  in connec-
tion with  the  employment  effects of public  expenditure pro-
... - ..  ~·-·r.~,_-;;  in Grea  ...  :=.ri.:.::i~ ••  \t this point it is only printed - 238  -
to  an  argument,  that essentially is being presented  by  Keyne-
sions.  Is it true,  that the overall  saving volumen  depends 
on  the  level of  the overall  income,  savings  increase to  a 
larger extent than  income  in cas  of  a  vitalization of the 
overall  demand  and  production  induced  through public  indebted-
~  ness.  Vice versa,  savings decrease  to an  overproportional 
degree  in case of 'Weak  economic activity and  an  additional 
retrenchment  of the net credit loan.  Thus,  savings  theore-
tically being available for  the private credit loan,  are 
not available any more.  Instead of  crowding-out effects  a 
crowding-in effect arises  (Kaldor,  1982). 
With  view to the  income  policy  ('workers  should  not price 
themselves ot of  jobs')  the post-keynesian debate  is refer-
ring to the  inconsistency of  the monetaristic policy  (Kaldor, 
1982).  Monetaristic positions,  so  the  argument,  print,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  a  money  supply-induced  increase of  inflation,  on 
the other  hand  to  a  cost-induced price pressure.  An  employ-
ment  orientated,  expansive  budget policy,  safeguarding the 
open  income political flank,  seems  more  reasonable  than  a 
strictly monetaristic money  supply- and  budget policy  (cf. 
below the discussion on effects of public expenditure pro-
grammes). 
Naturally ±n Great  Britain there are drafts of alternative 
economics.  Those  arguments  (The  London  CSE-Group,  1980; 
Coutts,  1~81;  Begg,  1981)  stake  on  an  expansive public budget 
policy with  increasing debts,  supported  by  a  coinciding mo-
netary policy.  Quite  following  traditional Keynesian analytic 
it is assumed,  that through  an  extention of the overall de-
mand  induced  by  the public  budget,  private growth  dynamic 
will  also rise;  the  upswing  following  thereupon  leads  to 
higher  tax  revenues,  the  budget  can  be offset in middle  terms. - 239  -
From  the  discussion on  the  third generation of  modern  macro-
economy  it is known,  that demand  policy can  rapidly heat  up 
inflation,  even  under  not fully utilized production capaci-
ties and  unemployment,  thus  the cyclical upturn  linked to 
the  volume  of  production fails to materialze.  For this rea-
son,  representatives of  an alternative  eco~c strategy plead 
for price controls  in Great  Britain  (Godley,  1979).  The 
concept  is being  suplemented  by attempts  to draft demand 
policy selectively with the  aim of  contributing to  a  re-
structuring of  the production equipment  (development  of in-
telligent products  and  modes  of production) . 
Apart  from  social political considerations  on  abligatory 
planning agreements,  nationalization of  key  industries and 
nationalization resp.  strict public supervision of the big 
financial  institutions,  alternative economic  strategies re-
quire  the control of  the external  instability.  The  access of 
the  financial  sector to international credit markets  ought 
to be  limited;  the restructuring of the production equipment 
demands  a  alteration of  the rate of  exchange  and  an economic 
safeguarding through  temporary  import  controls.  All  propo-
nents  of this concept are  stressing the  only temporary  cha-
racter of this protectionist economy  (Coutts,  1981;  Godley, 
1979;  Begg,  1981). 
The  here  roughly outlined alternative economic  concept  is on-
ly being analysed  in this report  in relation to the discussion 
on  the  employment political efficiency of expansive  budget 
policy  (see  below discussion on  public expenditures).  Yet, 
it has  to  be  drawn  attention  to the fact  that price controls 
have  not  proved  very successful  so  far.  Facing the external 
trade  involvements  of Great  Britain,  not  only within the  Euro-
pean  Community,  also  a  temporary  protectionist economy  seems 
dubious  and little realistic,  this also  by referring to 
the domestic market. - 240  -
I.  INCREASE  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  JOBS 
1.  Wage  subsidies 
Wage  subsidies  have  not  been  attached  any  considerable  impor-
tance  in the  employment  policy of  the  current government. 
This  is in clear contrast to the policy of the preceding 
government  that based its employment  policy to  a  large de-
gree  on  wage  subsidies  as  a  means  to control  unemployment. 
The  conservative government,  however,  come  up with  a  - al-
though  comparatively small  - programme  subsidizing the 
employment  of  young  people  in January  1982  (cf.  appencis). 
Wage  subsidies  can either relate to the total  employed  la-
bour  force  (general  subsidies) .or to specific groups  of 
employees  (marginal  subsidies)  (Kaldor,  1936;  Layard/Nickell, 
1980;  Metcalf,  1982).  They  can  serve as  instruments  for  the 
retention or creation of  jobs or as  instruments providing 
or maintaining employment  for  problem groups  {Calame,  1979}. 
Although  general  subsidies  are not denied  a  degree of ef-
ficiency,  marginal  subsidies are  considered more  favourably 
because  the  sum  per person  spent will  be  greater for  any 
given  expenditure  {or  renunciation of  revenue}  and  thus  the 
incentive will also be greater  {Layard,  1981,  Layard/Nickell, 
1980,  Metcalf,  1982}. 
The  debate  on  the efficacy of wage  subsidies essentially cen-
tres on  the  following questions: 
the  influence of wage  subsidies  on  companies;  labour 
costs  and  demand  stimulations  for  labour  caused thereby; 
- the  financial  strain for public  funds  caused  by  subsi-
dies; 
distributional  and productivity effects; 
- deadweight  and  displacement. - 241  -
The  question  about  the  employment  effects of  wage  subsidies 
is answered differently.  The  neo-classical paradigm will  re-
fer  to the  changes  of  relative costs:  the  factor  labour be-
comes  cheaper  relative to the  factor capital,  according  to 
~  demand  function  oriented along marginal  productivity 
theorems  the  demand  for  labour  could  be  expected to rise 
(Nickell,  1979;  Layard,  1981;  Metcalf,  1982).  Keynesian  cri-
tics of this argument  hold  against this,  that  company  de-
cisions about hirings and  dismissals  depend  on  product mar-
ket  conditions.  Given  labour costs  and  a  ma~k-up determined 
by  expected profitabilities companies  take staffing deci-
sions  according  to market  conditions.  These  being unfavourable 
wage  subsidies  and  a  thereby caused  reduction of the price of 
labour will  not effect any  additional  employment  (Calame,l979). 
This  argument  appears  to be  true:  Only  if companies  react to 
the  reduction of  labour  costs  caused  by  the  subsidy with price 
cuts,  an  expansion  of the market  caused  sales opportunities 
will  be  likely.  In  view of the  anyhow  low profitability of 
small  and  medium-sized  companies  and  the rather  oligopolistic 
price-setting on  many  markets  price~cuts seem  rather unlikely 
(Calame,  1979).  It should  be  pointed to the rigidity of prices 
to move  downwards.  If this holds  true,  wage  subsid~es cannot 
be  expected to  cause  employment  to rise.  This  argument,  how-
ever,  must  be qualified with  view to the effects of wage  sub-
sidies  on  the balance of  trade.  This  is made  clear by  avai-
lable evaluation of  the  Temporary  Employment  Subsidy  (TES). 
Employment  effects of wage  subsidies with  regard to external 
trade therefore  can  be  clearly evaluated:  Whenever  inland 
industry,  in this case the British example,  is under  heavy 
international wage  cost competition,  wage  subsidies  should 
have  stimulating effects  on  employment.  At  the  same  time it 
wust  be  noted that not  only the  wages  determine unit wage 
costs,  but  that wages  always  have  to be  seen  in the  connexion 
with productivity.  A  policy of  wage  subsidies attempting 
to  solve  internal  e1nployment  problems  by  improving  inter-
national  competetiveness  at the  same  time  accepts  low  pro-- 242  -
ductivity as  is the  case  in Great Britain. 
The  fact that wage  subsidies  are actually export subsidies 
(Nickell,  1979)  effected that  for  those  industries using 
TES  mostly the balance of  trade  was  positively affected. 
In the period 1975-1978  the export performance  improved, 
whereas  import penetration was  reduced,  against the fore-
going period 1970-75  (Metcalf,  1982).  This,  however,  provoked 
objections by competing  EC-member  countries eventually lea-
ding  to the  folding of the  programme  in  1979. 
The  industrial distribution of  TES  is remarkable.  43%  of  all 
subsidized  jobs were  in textiles,  clothing and  footwear,  al-
though  only  4%  of all workers  are  employed  there  (Metcalf,l982). 
This  is obviously  caused  by the  demand  conditions for the 
goods  of these  industries.  They  are  under heavy external  com-
petition and  are highly labour intensive. 
This  leads to the  second  argument  the effects of wage  sub-
sidies on  productivity and  income  distribution,  Evaluations 
of the  two  largest measures,  SFES  and  TES,  reveal that wage 
subsidies  do  not  contribute to  economic  inefficiency with 
regard to reducing producti.vi  ty or continuousl:l'  low  levels of 
it  (Metcalf,  1982;  Calame,  1979).  In addition to this the eva-
lutation of  TES  shows  that according to  information given 
by  companies  the majority of  them  would  have  had  closed  down 
without  the measure.  Again,  however,  it must  be  noted that 
this evaluation is based  on  industries  standing under  con-
siderable international  cost pressure  {clothing etc.). 
It must  also be  examined  how  wage  subsidies  are  financed. 
Some  studies  assume  that certain  subsidy measures  are ob-
viously  and directly financed  by  the  employees  themselves. 
This  means  that the  programmes  themselves  imply  wage  cuts 
directly affecting the  employees.  This  holds  true for  the - 243  -
Young  Workers  Scheme  (YWS)  as  has  been  proposed.  This  pro-
gramme  intends to promote  youth  employment.  It is based  on 
the  assumption that the hiring of  youths  is hampered  by  too 
high absolute  and  relative wages.  Precondition for receiving 
the  subsidy  is therefore  a  wage  offer by  the  company  that 
is not  allowed to exceed  a  specific limit.  The  programme  thus 
provides  an  incentive for  wage  cuts,  since the  maximum  wage 
payable to receive the  subsidy lies  somewhat  over  50%  of 
the  average  wage  of this group. 
Studies  on  deadweight  and  displacement  are available on  the-
oretical as well  as  on  empirical  levels.  With  regard to  YWS 
it is  assumed  that considerable  displacement will  take  place 
(Metcalf,  1982).  Affected  by  this will presumably  be  in the 
first place unskilled and  female  workers  and  young  persons 
above  18  (the  maximum  eligibility age) •  Furthermore it is 
hardly assumable  that  YWS  will  lead to the creation of stable 
employment  for  youths,  since the young  persons are likely 
to be  replaced by  subsidized yongsters  once their subsidi-
zation  has  ended. 
Empirical  research on  deadweight  and  displacement  under  TES 
and  SPES  is available.  Deadweight  relates to this effect of 
a  wage  subsidy that would  have  retained  employment  without 
the  subsidy as well.  Displacement  effects are those that are 
obtained  because of the  changed  competitive positions between 
subsidized and  non-subsidized employees.  The  net-result of 
the actually maintained or created  jobs  due  to the  subsidy 
is generally  lower  than  the  number  of  jobs  supported.  The 
studies differ considerably with regard to net-results.  They 
vary  between  66%  of all  jobs  supported  (DE  Gazette,  1977)  and 
in  consideration of  further effects  (domino)  and  39%  (Deakin 
and  Pratten,  1981).  Independetly of  the exact quantity it 
becomes  evident by  the  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence 
that  a  considerable  6~grce of deadweight  and  displacement  has 
to  be  reckoned with. - 244  -
Deadweight  and  displacement, of  course,  affect estimates a-
bout  the net  costs of  the  programme  per  job supported.  Ac-
cording  to the considerations  about quantitative dimensions 
of  these effects the  statements  on  costs differ.  With  regard 
to  SFES  and  assuming  deadweight  of  about  60%  without  con-
sidering displacment effects  some  studies estimate net  costs 
per  job created to amount  to appr.  UKL  750.  Since only  every 
:.~~  ~  ).....  i  " 
second  job is filled with  an  unemployed  the net cost per 
person off the  unemployment  register amounts to  UKL  1500 
(DEGazette,  1977).  The  figures  forTES  are  UKL  625  per job 
or about  60%  of gross  costs for  1977/78  (Deakin  and  Pratten, 
1981).  Despite  considerable  degrees  of  deadweight  and dis-
placement  both  programmes  can still be  considered cost effi-
cient  compared to other programmes  (Calame,  1979,  also see 
the chapter comparing  programmes  in this volume).  Under  an 
expanded version of  recruitment  subsidy  some  authors  reckon 
with the creation of  250  000  jobs with net costs of  UKL  2000 
p.a.  per  job  {Layard,  1981). - 245  -
2·  Direct Job Creation  Schemes 
Although presently  job creation  schemes  are  in operation, 
they  have  been  of  secondary  importance within the  framework 
of  employment  policies. 
The  discussion about  job creation  schemes  is dominated  by 
two  arguments.  Firstly there exist studies  on  long-term 
unemployment  (MSC,  1980b)  indicating the negative social 
effects.  These  concern the  loss of ~pational qualification, 
but also  - and  maybe  more  important  - the  loss of general 
skills reducing  the work  capabilities of  the  long-term unem-
p~ed thus  leading to  a  vicious cycle  for  the affected: 
long-term unemployment  leads  to the loss of skills,  loss of 
skills reduces  the chances  of  re-employment.  These  job crea-
tion  schemes  seem to be  a  way  to break  this cycle  and  to 
provide  these persons with the opportunity  to enter into 
employment. 
The  other argument  bases  on  the  consideration that it is 
unrea.sonable  to finance  the  idleness of persons,  while  these 
prefer productive activities  (Musgrave,  1980;  Metcalf,  1982). 
Expecially Musgrave  asks  for  an  extensive  job creation pro-
gramme  offering all who  want  to work  a  place.  Wages  should 
be  similar to unemployment  benefit but slightly above  to 
be  attractive to potential participants.  It,  however,  must 
be  guaranted that participants are  always  available for  the 
regular labour market.  Furthermore it is necessary  - trade 
unions  refer to it - that  these  jobs  do  not  compete with 
regular  jobs  and  then displace  them  because  ~f the cost 
advantages  ensueing  from  low wages. - 246  -
Job  creation  schemes  have  been  of  less  importance  since the 
Thatcher government  took office.than in the late 70s.  Ex-
periences with  job creation  schemes  therefore  relate to older 
programmes  such  as  the Job  Creation  Scheme  (JCP) ,  the  Work 
Experience  Programme  (WEP)  and  the Special  Temporary  Employ-
ment  Programme  (STEP).  These  programmes  were  designed to pro-
vide  young  people  and  the  long-term unemployed  with  tempo-
rary  jobs  in the public and  in  some  instances  also  in the 
private sector.  As  far  as  these programmes  were  targeted at 
young  people under  19  they were  succeeded  by  the Youth  Op-
portunities  Programme  (YOP)  in  1978  (cf.  II.l.). 
Since  in the appendix under  the  head±ng  policy measures  only 
those  programmes  are  summarized that are of current  impor-
tance,  the  te~ted progra~es JCP,  WEP  and  STEP  have  to be 
outlined here.(Department of  Employment  Gazette:  on  JCP  March 
1977;  on  WEP  March  1978:  on  STEP  MSC  1977). 
The  JCP  is designed as  a  genuine  job creation scheme  with 
temporary  jobs  in the local public sector.  The  jobs related 
to activities in environmental  services  (one  third),  in 
construction  (one  sixth)  and  in social  and  education fields 
(one third).  Of  the appr.  47  000  jobs  the majority of parti-
cipants were  young  people  under  18  (appr.  50%,  appr.30%  of 
employees  were  aged  19  to  24) •  Skill levels were essential-
ly  low  {Layard,  1979.  Brushe/Casey,  1982).  Experiences with 
this programme  pointouttwo  problem fields;  On  the one  hand 
it is questioned,  if the  jobs offered economically and  so-
cially useful  productions.  Local  authorities set up  jobs 
although the public  demand  was  low  {Layard,  1979,  House  of 
Commons,  1977).  On  the other hand it is pointed out that 
given  the generally  low skills of  affected workers  and  the 
temporal  limitation  a  rise of  the skill  level hardly took 
place.  This  is also mirrored  by  the fact that only  few  par-
ticipants moved  on  into stable employment after leaving  the 
programme  (Layard,  1979;  Hill,  1981). - 247  -
The  WEP  has  been  more  highly designed to raising the skills 
of  participants.WEP was  targeted at the  young  unemployed. 
They  were  to be  supplied with work  experience  through pro-
vision of  jobs with private  employers.  Wage  bills were 
taken over  by  the  government,  the  companies  were  not  given 
any  subsidies.  Since  the  prograrrune  was  especially making 
accord with training,  it seems  to have  obtained better results 
than the  JCP  (Layard,  1979;  Smith/Lasko,  1978).  Among  other 
things this is proved  by  the fact that  36%  of  the young  people 
stayed  in the  same  company  in stable employment after com-
pleting the  scheme,  29%  were  employed  by other companies  and 
still  85%  of all participants were  employed within  6  months 
after leaving the  scheme.  The  close coupling to skill raising 
activities thus  appears  to be  the essential positive feature 
of  job creation  schemes.  It remains  to be  mentioned that 
about  34  ooo  persons participated in January 1978  (Layard,  1979) . 
When  the JCP  was  terminated the STEP  was  intended to provide 
temporary  jobs  of  community benefit to unemployed  persons 
over  19  (House  of  Commons~  1977).  Similar as  in the JCP  the 
difficulties on this programme  lay therin to obtain the 
private sector's interest in providing  jobs  in areas of 
social value  and  to find  the equlibriurn between  promoted 
and  normal  jobs.  It was  complained that normal  jobs were 
being  replaced  by  temporary  job-creation-scheme  jobs 
(Hill,  1981). 
The  current  job. creation  programme  the  Community  Enter-
prise  Programme  (CEP),  offers  long-term unemployed persons-
defined  18-24  years  old registered unemployed  for  more  than 
6  months  and  over  24  years  old registered unemployed  for  more - 248  -
than  12  months  - jobs  in activities that serve the public 
benefit.  Jobs  are usually sponsored by  local  authorities 
and  non-profit organizations,  although  now  private companies 
can  also participate,  provided that any profit they might 
make  is clearly secondary to  "the  community  benefit".  The 
jobs usually deal with environmental protection and  energy 
saving measures  as  well  as  with  care  for  the  elderly and 
cultural activities.  Wages  are approximated to the usual 
local  wage  rate,  but are  limited to  UKL  89  per week  for 
regular  employees.  The  projects are organized by  the parti-
cipants  themselves,  instructors  and  managers  earning more. 
One  point of criticism about  the  CEP  is its small  size 
{Metcalf,  1982),  since with about  30  000  places  available 
only  2  to  3%  of all eligible persons  can be  served.  But also 
the  low degree of occupational training  - most  activities 
~re for unskilled persons  and  usually do  not help participants 
to expand existing skills- is heavily criticised  {MSC,  1982c). 
This  point also  leads to the question of  employment  after 
completing  CEP.  The  percentage of  those  employed after 
leaving  CEP  amounts  to 18%  {MSC,  1982c) ,  although it cannot 
be  said if this means  an  improvement  against non-participants, 
because  no  comparative  figures  are available.  The  fact,  however, 
that  CEP  participants and  thus  long-term unemployed  are most 
unskilled workers  allows  the  conclusion that employment  chances 
are  improved  in that CEP-participants  are searching for  employ-
ment  more  actively,  but that the  chances  of actually finding 
a  job  remain generally  low because of  low skills. 
The  new Voluntary Services  Schemes  can  be  regarded as  a  reac-
tion to this criticism.  Target  of this  is the provision of 
jobs  for  long-term unemployed.  As  opposed  to the  CEP  the pay 
is not  approximated to the usual  local  wage  rate but to un-
employment benefit.  Furthermore  not all jobs will be  full-time 
which  also will mean  differences  in pay.  Part-time employees 
will  then  be  encouraged  to participate in occupational training 
courses. - 249  -
Thi:s  should. have  ef-fects  on  the  co·s.t  efficiency of the pro-
gramme  ..  Whi,l:e  tb'e  net  colft:  o~£  CE·P  were  around  33%  a·ccording 
to the  estima'te·s: of  the  M·S·c  (198lk•),  it would  not  appear 
unreasonabJ.:e  to assume  that  th~y will be  lower  under the 
new  progr-amrne. - 250  -
3.  Employment  Effects of Public  Funding  Programmes  on  the 
Private  and  the Public  Sector 
The  debate  on  the opportunity of the government  to increase 
employment  levels  through public  spending  programmes  not 
only  on  a  short-term,  but  also on  a  long-term basis is cha-
racterized by  the  sharp contrast of  two  schools of thought 
(Artis,  1982).  On  the one  side  stands the monetarist  con-
viction that any  expansionary fiscal policy can only  lead 
to  a  short-term increase of  the  employment  level,  but that 
in the  long-term due  to the instability of the Phillips-
curve  the  employment  level will fall back to the  "natural 
rate of  unemployment".  This  is based on  the assumption that 
expansive fiscal policies cause  the  speed  of price level 
increases to accelerate.  While  for  a  Keynesian grounded·. 
macroeconomic  policy the adaptation process will be  com-
pleted with  a  higher level of  employment  and  a  higher rate 
of  inflation,  monetarists  assume  that because of  some  hypo-
theses  on  price expectation behaviour in the private sector 
subjects  (most  sharply defined is the thesis of rationally 
anticipated of price expectations)  the  rising.employment 
level will  lead to an  accelerating inflation.  Under price 
expectations anticipating actual rates of  inflation employ-
ment  falls  to the  level of  the natural rate of unemployment. 
Further expansive expenditure policies would  have  to be 
paid for the price of ever faster rising inflation rates 
with ever  lower  employment  effects.  Both positions  - the 
Keynesian  and  the monetarist  - can  be  found  in the current 
debate  on  public expenditure programmes  and are in  incombatible 
contrast to each other  (Artis,  1982;  Cripps,  1974;  Currie, 
1978;  McCallum~  1975;  Price,  1978;  Tobin/Buiter,  1976;  Ward/ 
Neild,  1978;  Kaldor,  1982). 
~~  The  Thatcher government  obviously relies more  on  those  con-
siderations doubting  the efficiency of  public  spending  for 
~  raising  employment.  On  the  one  side it is attempted to re-- 251  -
duce  the public expenoiture quota  through staff reductions 
in the public  sect.or.  At  the  sarne  time public expenditure 
for  the private economy  is subject to considerable cuts. 
Affected  by  this are largely housing  programmes.  Because of 
increasing restrictions to limit outside  financing  the public 
co~porations as well  have  reduced their investment activities. 
Thus  the general  philosphy of British expenditure policy is 
characterized by  the  ~eduction of  the aovernment  expenditure 
guota  for  the public sector and  renunciation of public ex-
penditure  as  a  means  to stimulate total demand.  Instead the 
Thatcher government  stakes  on  supply orienta.  ted  measures  to 
improve  the market position of private industry and to re-
ceive private  investment activity. 
The  scientific debate  on  a  too  high or too  low  share of the 
public  sector excentially relates to three arguments: 
On  the  one  hand it is emphasized  that traditional Keynesian 
policies that dominated  economic  and practical policy most 
of all in the period  1964  - 1973  were  not  able to stimulate 
private growth  dynamics:  The  desired effect of multiplying 
processes  for  the private sector as  well  due  to the expansion 
of  employment  in the public sector did not  take place  (Eltis, 
1976).  This  conception is,  however,  denied  (Kalm,  1977). 
Furthermore it is printed out that the  long-term expenditure 
plans  were  based  on  growth expectations  for  the British econo-
my  that were  unrealistic.  The  third and  most  important  argu-
ment  refers  to the efficiency of  the public sectc: in  compa-
rison  to  the private  (Eltis,  1978).  The  lower efficiency of 
the public sector as  against  the private is considered to be 
due  to  lower productivities,  but also to high  wages.  Especially 
for  the public secotr trade  unions  credited with  an  aggressive 
bargaining policy. 
It is certainly true that  in  Britain  a  e_bift of  p_;:_<_?£_uction 
and  em-.l2!_oyment__f!""o~_!..l!~  _  _Eri  vate:  _  _i._!l_1:o  non-market-sector has - 252  -
occured  (Bacon/Eltis,  1978;  Bacon/Eltis,  1979).  The  empiri-
cal  evidence,  however,  does  not  replace the analysis of  the 
economic effects.  Analyses,  more  cautious,  with regard to 
the size of the public sector and  productivity and  growth 
effects therefore point to the necessity to intensify state 
activity where market mechansims  obviously fail  (Madison. 
1978;  McCracken,  1977).  The  discussion made  perceptible that 
absolute measures  for the size of the state functions  allo-
cation,  distribution and  stabilization are not  available 
(DIW,  1982).  In contradiction to the conception that  a  reduc-
tion of the public  sector would  raise employment  levels  in 
the  medium  and  long  term therefore stand calls for the stabi-
lization or expansion of  the public sector.  The  advantage of 
these measures  is seenin the  improvement  of  the  labour market 
situation.  On  the  one  hand  the state could use  through its 
entanglement with the private sector its  "locomotive effect  ..  to 
to stimulate total activity  (Kahn,  1977).  On  the other hand 
pressing social needs  could be  satisfied whose  realization has 
been  impossible because of public sector cuts  (TUC,  1982). 
With  these  arguments  even  an  expansion of public employment 
by  up  to  300 ooo  jobs is asked  for  (House  of  Lords  Committee 
on  Unemployment,  1982). 
The  controversy about the scale of public  spending  programmes 
relates not  only to considerations  about  the size of the  pub-
lic sector,  but also to the effects of public expenditure  on 
the private sector.  In the debate  on  the  employment effects 
of expansive fiscal  policies  crowdi~SL~out effects play  a 
dominant  role.  Crowding-out  effects mean  the possible displace-
ment  of private activity by  expansion  fiscal policy.  Displace-
ment  can  taken place through rising interest rates,  effects 
on  private property composition  and external trade factors 
due  t~ising inflation. 
Empirically  founded  research work  on  crowding-out  effec~ in - 253  -
in the United  Kingdom  is available,  These  relate to  simu-
lations of policies  in econometrically  founded  macro  models 
of  the  London  Business  School,  the  National  Institute and 
the  Reasury  (Laury/Lews/Orrnerod,  1978).  In  these models 
crowding-out  is determined quantitatively as  the relation 
of  the  induced  change  in the  scale of private economic  ac-
tivity to the  change  in the  scale of public  sector activi-
ty.  The  crowding-out  debate  than refers to the  sign  (plus 
or minus),  the  size and  the  time  horizon  caused  by  govern-
ment  activity.  The  results  in all three models  mentioned 
prove  that under  expansive  spending  policies private demand 
is  lowered  by  a  rising interest rate,  when  it is elastic with 
regard to  interest rates.  This  is true most  of all for 
private construction activity,  This  effect of  interest rates, 
however,  is qualified by  an  effect on  the structure of  in-
comes:  Due  to dept  repayment  private  income  and  private con-
sumption  are  stimulated.  Assuming  that prices  remain  un-
changed  and  exchange  rates  are  constant it follows  that an 
expansive fiscal policy raises  employment  and  economic  ac-
tivity  (Bladen/Hovell,  1982).  This  assertion must  be quali-
fied whenever  flexible prices  and  exchange  rates are allowed. 
On  these conditions it follows  that in the different models 
mentioned  the quantitative significance of  crowding-out  is 
valued differently.  This  depends  most  of all on  the time 
horizon. 
Referring to the rather optimistic reasons  for  the efficiency 
of  an  expansive  fiscal  policy  (Cripps/Godley/Fetuerstone, 
19747  Ward/Neild,  1979;  Tobin/Buiter,  1976)  a  renunciation 
of  a  contractive fiscal  policy is called for.  Since private 
growth  dynamics will  not  be  able to close existing and  fu-
ture  investment  gaps  in the short  and  medium  term,  an  employ-
ment  effective public expenditure package  is asked  for 
(TUC,  1982).  The  TUC  estimates that with  an  expenditure  volume 
of  UKL  8.3  billion  677  000  jobs  could be  created equivalent - 254  -
to  a  fall of  registered unemployment  of  575  000.  These  posi-
tive effects,  however,  would only be  lasting,  if it would  not 
be  a  one  time  action,  but if it would  be  flanked  by  corres-
ponding  measures  over the  following  years  as well.  In addi-
tion to this it is argued  that the  inflationary effects of 
such· programmes  would  be higher than under present govern-
ment  programmes,  but that at the  same  time  the public  spen-
ding  borrowing  requirement  would  be  lower  in the  long  term. 
Another  study  (House  of  Commons,  1979)  also  shows  that higher 
expenditure would  lead to  increased employment.  Assuming 
that expenditure would  be  increased by  UKL  1000 million 
(in 1975  prices)  as  against  government  plans  unemployment 
would fall by  200  000 persons  annually  (ibid.). 
Of  considerable  importance  for  the evalutation of public 
expenditure  programmes  remains  then the  open  incomes  policy 
flank of Keynesian policy.  Since Keynesian  fiscal policy is 
aimed at influencing demand  (demand  management)  cost in-
creases  due  to an  aggresive wage  bargaining policy might 
reduce  the employment  effectiveness of  expansive fiscal 
policy.  Which  agreement exists  in that the political problem 
of  incomes  policy  for the  improvement  of the efficiency of 
public  expenditure policies in Britain must  be  solved· 
(Artie,  1982:  critical to that:  Coutts,  1981;  Wilkinson,a2 
Positions emphysizing the  open  incomes  policy flank of  tra-
ditional Keynesian  demand  management  point then to the distinct 
system of industrial relation in Great Britain as  opposed to 
other European  countries.  It must,  however,  be  pointed out 
that  a  number  of arguments  has  been  presented  denying  a  cau-
sal  connexion  between  union bargaining policies  in Great 
Britain,  inflationary effects  and  resulting  from this limits 
to expansive fiscal  policies  (Wilkenson,  19 82). 
The  question  about  the efficiency of  expansive  fiscal  policy 
is in the  end  determined  by  the  relationship between  con-\ 
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currently -observed  short-term employment  effects  and  effects 
on 'the  price level that in the  medium  term through adapta-
tions of price  exp~ctations and  external trade  influences 
under nationally differing inflation rates  make  adaptations 
of the  exchange  rate necessary.  The  state of the scientific 
controversy is currently determined  by  such strict dicho-
tomies  between  Keynesian  and monetarist  creeds  that  an 
evaluation can only cautiously be  undertaken.  The  evaluation 
refers to this that  an  expansive fiscal  policy to  increase 
employment  levels  through  demand  mandagment  measures  cannot 
be dispensed with,  but that the  scale of this policy must 
not  be  out of proportion  and that they must  be  soundly 
financed.  The  combination with  supply side oriented mea-
sures  is as  well  as  external trade  and  incomes  policy safe-
guards  are necessary. 
.. .. 
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4.  Promoton  of  private Investment 
The  promotion of private sector investment activity for main-
taining or raising  employment  is mostly practiced within the 
framework  of  regional  policy.  The  most  important  instruments 
for this are the  Areas  for  expansion  specified  in· the  1972· 
Industry Act  and  the  1973  Employment  Act,  the  number  of which 
has,  however,  been  reduced  in August  1982.  These  areas  are  sub-
divided  into Special  Develnpment  Areas  (SDAs) .  Development 
Areas  (DAs)  and  Intermediate  Ar€as  (IAs).  Central aspect of 
this is a  system of  investment grants available in  SDAs  and 
DAs  complemented  by  additional  assistance  ~lso open to IAs. 
In addition to this  a  number  of  programmes  offering support 
for  innovation  investment  (cf.appendix)  are of  importance. 
But  also the  Tax  system with its opportunity for  100%  for 
allowance  for plants  and  maschinery  in the first year  and 
a  79%  tax allowance  for  industrial buildings  in the first 
year  (24%  for hotels)  and  4%  in the following  represents  a 
kind of  investment  promotion. 
The  most  important  innovation  in the  system of  investment 
promotion has  been  the establishment of  Enterprise  Zones 
(EZs).  They  are based  on  the  assumption  that government 
interventions are obstructive to investment.  Accordingly the 
advantages  offered to companies  moving  into EZs  primarily 
are reductions  of these  and  only secondarily of  a  monetary 
kind  (see  appendix) . 
The  discussion about  Enterprise  Zones  can  be  used  examplarily 
for  the discussion  about  investment  promotion  in general. 
The  establishment  based,  as  mentioned  above,  on  the  assumption 
that administrative  interventions because  of  being  involved 
with costs for  companies  are· obstructive to investment.  The - 257  -
target is to create  jobs  by  means  of  new  investment.  It,  how-
ever,  appears  questionable whether  investment  in  EZs  would 
not  have  been  undertaken without  them  (Taylor,  1981),  i.e. 
whether  benefits occuring to it represent 
11Windfall profits" 
and  thus  only  some  kind  of  deadweight.  Furthermore it is 
not  laid down  that  the enterprises moving  in actually create 
jobs.  And  the kind  of  advantages  offered acutally appears 
to effect the opposite  (Taylor,  1981),  so that  job creation 
could only be  e~pected through  follow-up effect.  In  addition 
to this Taylor points out,  that the majority of  expected in-
vestment will  not  be  undertaken  by  new  companies,  but  instead 
already  existing ones le~ing old production places.  The  ad-
vantages  of  EZs  could also  lead to the displacement  of  non-EZ 
firms  that are not  subsidized accordingly. 
Deadweight  and  displacement effects will  thus  be  considerably 
high  in the case of  a  regionally oriented system of  invest-
ment  promotion which  would  be  of particular importance with 
regard to costs.  For if the  number  of actually created  jobs 
is only  small,  the  costs will  be  very high.  But  also with  systems 
differentlyoriented these effects  should  also  be particularly 
high,  the  more  so  as  with  a  prograrnm like the Microprocessor 
Application Project  job destroying rationaliziation takes 
place,  because  only  insignificant effects for  inland  demand 
will  be  obtained,  since most  orders will  be  to outside companies. 
Although  some  jobs will  be  safer,  because  they  are more  produc-
tive  and  competitive,  the workers  made  redundant  by  this will 
not  find  any  vacancies  in  capital  goods  industries. .. 
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II~  ·•  REDISTRIBUTION· OF  AVAILABLE  WORK  LOAD 
Measures  to redistribute the available work-load are  conduc-
ted only to  low  degree  in Great Britain.  The  Job  Release 
Scheme  (JRS)  is so far the only initiative towards  this 
direction.  The  1st January  1983,  however,  the Job Splitting 
Scheme will be  introduced encouring  companies  to establish 
part-time jobs. 
The  discussion about  work  redistribution is conducted under 
the aspect of  labour supply reduction.  It essentially centres 
on  the  question,  whether  labour  supply  reduction is pre-
ferable  to expand  labour  demand. 
Five  reasons  against  labour supply reductions  are given 
(Metcalf,  1982,  but also Layard,  1981):  First,  if the lost 
hours  were  not  completely  replaced by  unemployed workers  or 
if productivity were  not  rising accordingly,  the national 
product would fall.  Consequently those retiring early and 
those still in training or education would  have to be  financed 
from  a  smaller national product,  living standards would fall. 
Secondly,  workers  willing to work  a  given number  of hours 
at a  given wage  obviously value the product of their last 
hours  higher than  the leisure they give  up.  Then it would 
not  be  economical  to encourage  them to accept  more  leisure. 
Thirdly~the distribution of  work  also means  the gistribution 
gf  income.  It,  however,  appears unrealistic to expect  trade 
unions  to agree to  income  reductions.  Constant wages  implying 
hourly wage  increases  according  to the  degree of working-
time  reductions  could  only be  compensated  by  productivity 
increases of exactly the  same  degree  to avoid  inflationary 
pressures. - 259  -
Fourthly,  shorter weekly  or  life-time working-time  would 
hardly  be  reversible,  a  point,  however:  that would  only  be 
of  importance  when  unemployment  had  fallen dramatically. 
And  lastly Metcalf  argues  that the current high  levels of 
unemployment  are necessary to combat  inflation.  If this 
were  the  case,  the  same  level  of  unemployment  would  be 
necessary,  if labour supply had  been  reduced.  The  reductions 
would  only cause  additional  leisure,  while  increased labour 
demand  would  create an  additional  product. 
The  reduction of  labour  supply  could only then  be  judged 
positively if two  conditions  were  met:  net cost per  job 
must  be  lo~er than  in  the  case of  labour demand  stimulation 
and it must  be  mqx.e  selective  ~ban increasing  labour  demand. 
Lo~r costs are only  imaginable  if a  complete  replacement 
ta~es place,  i.e. working-time  reductions are  compensated 
by hirings. 
The  effectivity of early retirement  programms  thus  depends 
on  the degree of utiliziation and  the degree of  replacement 
(Metcalf,  1982).  Utilization is dependant  on  ~he scope  of 
eligibility,  the  pension  paid  and  the social attiudes towards 
early retirement.  Replacement  would  be  affected by  product 
market  conditions.  If these were  good,  replacement  would 
occure,but would  be  problematic,  since  labour  demand  would 
be  high  due  to good  market  conditions.  If these were  bad, 
no  replacement  would  occu~ This  would  imply that either 
production  and  employment  would  fall  or that  production 
might  be  kept  up  because  ~o rising productivity. 
The  Job  Release  Scheme  is linked to condition that for  every 
employee,who gives  up  his  job,  a  new  employee  has  to  be  hired. 
Replacement  must  notbe  direc~ ie.employers  can fill the 
vacancy  through  internal  promotion  and  put  the  new  employee 
to the  end  of  the  line.  This  fact  makes  the monitoring  of 
the  programme difficult.  It is estimated  (DEGazette,  July  1982) - 260  -
that about  30%  of  jobs  opened  due  to the  programme  are not 
filled,  a  percentagefuat is even likely to rise in the future. 
But  still the programme  is considered rather  inexpensive.  Net 
Costs  per person leaving the  unemployment  register were 
estimated at  UKL  676  in 1978.  This  is about  a  third of what 
a  general  working  time  reduction would  cost. 
As  already mentioned  above  measures  for  reducing weekly 
working-time are  considered to be  a  matter of collective 
bargaining.  Nevertheless the government  has  put up  a  programme 
encouraging part-time work.  The  Job-Splitting-Scheme offers 
companies  a  grant if the splitting of  a  job leads  to the 
recruitment of  a  person  registered unemployed. 
A  general  reduction of  weekly working-time,  as it es particu-
larly asked for  by  the  TUC  (1982a),  is not  in any  case an  ad-
equate  instrument  for raising employment  levels.  Firstly,  a 
great part of the hours  lost would  be  made  up  by  additional 
overtime  (40%)  (Allen,  1980).  Secondly,  work  sharing means  in-
~  sharing  (see  above).  If workers  were  not willing to renounce 
the  income  equivalent to the hours  lost,  this would  mean  in-
creased  labour costs that as  a  second  round effect would 
destroy all the postive effects of working-time  reductions 
Thirdly,  the positive effects of working-time  reductions  could 
only be  realized if the level of  production would  be maintained 
by  more  employees.  Some  developments,  however,  might oppose 
this:  in  a  recession  some  companies  might  find it more  favourable 
to  reduce production  in line with working-time or they even 
might  be  forced  to  reduce production,  because they cannot  find 
replacement  on  the  labour market.  From  bhis it follows,  that 
with unchanged  employment  levels  a  lower  national product  would 
be  obtained.  Fourthly,  increased unit  labour costs would  be 
compensated  by productivity increases.  It is estimated that these 
would  absorb  35%  of  production  losses.  (Lesley  and  Wise,  1980, 
DE,  1978).  The  question,  however,  remains  why  this rationalisation 
does  not  take place  anyway. - 261  -
III  ADAPTATION  STRATEGIES 
The  adaptation of  the labour  supply to labour demand  plays 
according to the  supply side oriented economic  policy consistand-
ly the by  far most  important role within  the  framework  of 
labour market  policy.  Since  youth  unemployment  besides in-
creasing long-term unemployment  currently represents the 
biggest problem for the government,  training measures  are 
mostly targeted at this group. 
The  system of occupational  training is currently subject to 
a  large scale change.  In the long  term the  Mew  Training 
Initiative  {NTI)  is intended to lead to a  raising of skill 
levels.  This  goal  is to be  met  by  two  approaches:·firstly, 
through  the  improvement of initial vocational training; 
secondly,  through  improved opportunities  for occupation 
further training. 
The  first area ·consists of the expansion of already existing 
opportunities like the Youth  Opportunities  Programme  {YOP), 
Unified Vocational  Programme  (UVP)  ,  Training for Skills 
(TSPA)  and  Training Opportunities  Programme'  {TOPS).  The 
biggest measure  is the transformation of  YOP  into the Youth 
Training  Scheme  {YTS),  which  lays greater emphasis  on  training. 
The  YTS  will guarantee  (from  September  1983,  when it will be 
fully  in operation)  every  school-leaver,  who  is unemployed 
the opportunity for  a  one-year-basic training course that 
is intended to  improve  their. employment  chances  through the 
attainment of  a  skill level oriented toward  recognized occupa-
tional requirements. - 262  -
Evetn.  mor.e  important  than  the  YTS  is the  promotion of voca-
tional training according to  recognized  standards  like for 
example  apprenticeships.  Fo·r  this  on  the  one  hand  already 
existing programmes  like UVP  and  TSPA  are  expanded  and  on 
the other hand  the  so  far prevailing system of  promoting 
occupational training through  Industrial Training Boards 
(ITBs)  is changed  in  that  the  ITBs  now  only assist such 
training programmes  that correspond to this goals. 
The  other area,  the  improvement  of opportunities  for  occupa-
tional further training,  is intended to be  obtained by  an 
adaptation of the opportunities  TOPS  as  well  as  TSPA  already 
offer to actual  industrial  requirements.  This will  be  reached 
by  limiting course offers to those  teaching skills in real 
cl8rnand.  Also  an  adaptation of training opportunities to the 
individual ability of trainees  is aimed at.  This  ought  to be 
achieved  through handling training opportunities more  flexible 
thereby  even  using modern  techniques  for  home  use. 
Discussions  about  these trainings measures  centres  on  the 
question about  the  sense of training  (particularly for  young 
people)  and  about  the effects of these measures. 
Training is an  investment  into future productive  capability 
that is,  however,  only profitable,  if these skills are  in 
demand.  Particularly Moon  (1982)  points at the dubiousity 
of training young  persons,  when  at the  same  time older workers 
disposing of the  same  skills are unemployed.  Occupacional trai-
ning without  subsequent  employment  will  be  of little use, 
especially since  studies about  long-term unemployment  (see 
above)  refer  explici~y to the  loss  of skills.  Also  a  CBI 
survey  shows  (CBI,  Industrial Trends  Survey  1981)  that  for 
manufacturing  industries  no  lack of qualified employees  is 
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Metcalf  (but also Layard,  1982)  point to the destruction 
of  normal  hiring channels  by the  YTS,  because  young  persons 
not  participating in this programme  are less likely to 
find  employmente  Thus  this programme  prolongs  the  time  of 
non-availability to the  labour market  therefore amounting 
·to  a  labour  supply  reduction  (Musgrave,  1980). 
It can  also be  asked,  wether because of  the  financial  support 
for occupational  training  (of  youths  as  well  as of adults) 
costs  for  the  companies  are not  externalized.  For  just the 
parameter  for the  success  of  these programmes,  the  number  of 
placings proves  that for these skills demand  by  employers 
exists,  that hence  these would  pay  for  them.  As  unquestionably 
positive features  of these programmes  are considered the main-
taining of  skills(and expecially for  youths)  the integrative 
effects  (Moon,  1982;  Metcalf,  1982;  Richardson  and Stringer, 
1981;  Duffy,  1981). 
According  to the priority attached to the 16  to  17  year old 
school-leavers about  three quarter of  YOP  participants are 
recruited  from this group.  The  majority of places is occupied 
under  WEEP  (work  experience  on  employers•  premises)  •  Major 
test for  the success of  the youth Opportunities  Programme  (YOP) 
is the percentage of  those moving  into employment  subsequent 
to  programme.  The different opportunities  show widely differing 
success  rates:  WEEP  just below  35%,  PBWE  about  15%,  TW  below 
30%  and  CS  below  35%  for  school-leavers  and  below  10%  for 
non-school-leavers  (O'Connor  1982).  Because these figures 
were  for  the first half-year of  1981  and  in general  (except 
for  school-leavers  taking part  in  CS)  it can  be  noticed, 
that the probability of  finding  employment  is inversely propor-
tional  to the development  of total  unemployment,  it must  be 
assumed  that at the  time  of writing  (second half-year 1982) 
these  figures  are  considerably below. - 264  -
The  WEEP  moreover  proves  to be  the major  instrument  for  the 
above  me~tioned destruction of  normal  hiring channels  for 
young  poeple.  Deadweight  and,displacement  amount  to approximate-
ly  29%  of all employed  among  this  programme  (Metcalf,  1982). 
Duffy  (1982)  even  suspects that because  of  the  transformation 
of this  programme  into the  YTS  and  simultaneous  reductions 
of  the  MSC  personnel  responsible  for monitoring this percen-
tage will rise.  Moreover  this author foresees  that this kind 
of  work  experi~nce will provide employers  with the  chance 
to make  future  employees  subject to  a  free  "screening  ... 
In  1979/80 the net  costs of  the  programme  amounted  to  UKL  1.065 
per place.  Except  for  TW  the other four  mentioned opportunities 
range  somewhat  below this.  With this,  however,  it must  be 
kept  in mind  that the training input of this opportunity is 
considerably higher  than for  the others. 
The  Training Opportunities  Programme  (TOPS)  offers opportuni-
ties for  occupational  further training.  Among  TOPS  a  variety 
of  chances  to  renew  or expand skills for  a  number  of occupations 
is provided. 
Froml979/80 to 1981/82  the  programme  has  been  cut by  13  000 
places to  6  000.  This  is mostly  due to  a  reorientation of 
the  contents  of  the offered  co~~ses.While in 1979/80  35%  of 
all courses  were  in Clerical  and  commercial  fields,  their 
share  is planned to be  reduced  to below  20%  in  1982/83. 
Instead skills demanded  by  companies  using  or  producing  modern 
technologies will  be  increasingly taught. 
Participants to  TOPS  courses  are predominantly unemployed 
(O'Connor,  1982:  52,5%;  MSC,  1982:80%).  59%  are male,  41% 
female.  Courses  teaching  technical skills are mostly  taken 
by  younger  male  participants,  while  clerical  and  commercial 
skills are mostly  acquired  by  older and  female  persons. 
• v  .... 
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The  moving  into employment  after TOPS  is again heavily depen-
dant  on  the general  labour market  condit~ons. Still 80%  of 
participants are  in employmen·t  15  to 17  months  after comple-
tion  (in  comparison  68%  after  3  months);  only  6%  had  not 
had  any  employment,  that·means  the half  of  the  number  that 
could  have  been  expected without  TOPS  (O'Connor,  1982). 
The  skills gained  through  TOPS  are actually used  by  58%  of 
former  TOPS  participants.  This  number  is,  however,  falling 
for  some  fields  (e.g.  eonstruction).  The  employment distri-
bution after TOPS  reveals  that more  than  40%  are employed 
in  companies  employing  less than  25  workers,  while only 
13%  work  in  companies  employing  more  than  500.  Also  remarkable 
is the fact that more  than  60%  find  employment  one  month 
after completing  TOPS. .. 
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IV.  · CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the above  described measures will  be  compared 
with regard to their efficiency.  Efficiency means  in this 
context:  costs,  stability of  employment,  effects on  produc-
tivity,  general  labour market  effects,  reception  and  pmssible 
conflicting targets. 
Costs 
The  costs per job or participant can  roughly be  arranged  in 
the  following  order:  job creation  schemes  and  youth  programmes 
with little training-input,  early retirement,  wage  subsidies, 
training  schemes  and  finally expenditure  programmes. 
In this connection it must  be  kept  in mind  that this order 
is only valid for the measures  considered  and  by  no  means 
natural.  So  the cost  can  be  increased  (or  reduced)  by 
raising  (reducing)  direct payments  that in  some  cases make 
up  the  largest part of the costs. 
Table  1:  Cost per participant - in  UKL  -
YOP 
CEP 
SRS 
TES 
SFES 
YWS 
TOPS 
TUC-proposal 
{1)  Net  costs 
(2)  1981/82 
'.  {3)  1978 
Source:  own  estimates 
568  (1) (2) 
1.030  (1) (2) 
676  (1) (3) 
625  (1) (3) 
1.500  (1) (3) 
1.200 
2.370-5.340  {1) 
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The  costs  of  for  instance  job creation  schemes  located in 
largely  labour  intensive areas  obviously heavily depend  on 
the wages  paid.  Accordingly  the  wages  paid  in the  new  Communi-
ty  Programme  are  lower  in order to  serve  more  persons with 
comparatively lower  funds. 
Also it should  be  considered when  thinking  about  costs that 
these are  likely to rise once  programmes  are expanded 
(Metcalf,  1982).  It should  be  warned  against  simply multiplying 
the  figures  giv~n in Table  1  with  any  higher  number  of par-
ticipants.  In the  same  way  the net  costs of  job creation schemes 
are likly to rise,  if these were  expanded to  new  areas,  be-
cause displacement  effects  should rise then  as  well  as  some 
deadweight  cannot  be  excluded once  these  schemes  are  opened 
to private sponsors. 
As  for wage  subsidies it must  be  observed that subsidies 
granted to avoid  unemployment are less costly than  those  for 
recruitment. 
Stability of  Employment 
The  effectivity of  job creation  schemes  and  youth  programmes 
with  regard to the creation of stable employment  must  be  re-
garded  as  relatively low,  when  the thus maintained or created 
skills are not  in  demand  on  the  labour market  after completing 
the  scheme.  Since this is not the  case  in the current recession, 
this means  that  individual  success.may  be  achieved,  but for 
the majority of participants only unsatisfactory results  can 
be  obtained. 
Early  retirement  programme  linked to the  condition of recruit-
ment  like the  JRS  result at least largely to stable employment. 
It.  however,  cannot  be  excluded that the  new  employees will 
soon  be  dismissed  because  of  lacking  seniority. - 268  -
The  employment  stability created by wage  subsidies is rela-
tively high.  Even  if a  higher  number  of  jobs  may  be displaced, 
the  surviving should have  a  good  market position. 
Occupational  training and  further education are only success-
ful  in creating stable jobs,  if the acquired skill are actually 
in demand.  As  the placing rates  for  TOPS  show  (MSC,  M82b) 
this  demand  falls.  The  chances  of finding  a  job after comple-
ting  a  course are  30%  now. 
The  stability of  jobs created or saved  by  expenditure pro-
grammes  heavily depends  on  the continuity of expenditure  and 
the rate of  capacity utilization.  Because  no  studies on  this 
are available,  any st~~ents can only be  speculative. 
Productivity 
Positive effects on  the productivity per employee obviously 
are  a  feature  of all programmes  including  a  high training-
input,  i.e. occupation training and further education measures 
as well  as  youth  programmes  and  -assuming that they brush up 
already  ex~ing skills - job creation schemes. 
Recruitment  subsidies also  lead to higher productivity - for 
the whole  industry.  Assuming  that subsidies paid for  a  stock 
of  employers  displace other  - less productive  jobs,  this can 
also result in  a  higher productivity on  a  national  scale. 
While  for expenditure  programmes  again  no  statements  can  be 
made,  it can  be  assumed  that the  JRS  does  not effect produc-
tivity in any  way.  If early retirement,  however,  is uncoupled 
from  the obligatory recruitment,  it would  be  imaginable that 
this measure  possibly involves negative effect,  if particular-
ly in  small  firms  just the most  experienced workers  have  to 
be  replaced by  new,  has  productive  ones. - 269  -
General  labour market effects 
Job  creation  schemes  lead  to  the  conservation possibly to 
the  improvement  of  the  individual skill profile that is thus 
available in  the  case of  a  qyclical  upswing.  The  importance 
of youth programms  on  the  contrary must  be  regarded  to lie 
in the  integrative effects for this  group which  otherwise 
would  only  find its way  into society with difficulties. 
The  essential  ~haracteristic of early retirement programmes 
is the  fact  that no  jobs are created,  but that available 
jobs will  be  occupied by  those that search for  work  (the  un-
employed)  and that instead  those  abandon  jobs  who  prefer 
leisure before  work  (older employers).  This,  however,  is 
only true,  if it is like the  JRS  a  voluntary measure.  A  obli-
gatory reduction of retirement age  could on  the other hand 
le~d~- t6  the  displacement of  a  population group  from  a 
sphere  (work)  which it values  higher  than  the sphere assigned 
to it. 
Recruitment  subsidies  can  cause  encouragement effects,  unless 
no  condition is  made  that the  new  employees  are  recruited 
from  those  registered unemployed. 
An  already mentioned effect of the  Young  Worker  Scheme  as  a 
subsidy  for  a  particular group  of  the working population is 
the preservation of normal  hiring channels  for  this group 
that are destroyed  by  other measures  operated. 
Reception 
The  reception of employment  and  labour market  policies obvious-
ly depends  on  the  level of wages  (or other payments).  One 
print of criticism of  the  CEP  oftenly brought  up  by partici-
pants  referred to the relatively low wages.  Accordingly  the 
group  specific distribution of  JRS  utilization reveals  that 
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the  amount  paid to retires is not  suited to make  the pro-
gramme  attractive to those  in upper  income  groups. 
For wages  subsidies also the  amount  granted is of  great  im-
portance.  It must,  however,  kept  in mind  that subsidies  can 
be  paid for  the stock of employers  as well  as  for specific 
groups  of.employers.  With  a  given  sum  the  amount  available 
per  c-em.ployee  will be  larger for  the latter,  this subsidy 
therefore more  attractive.  This  assumption appears to be 
supported by  a  comparison of  TES  and  SFES.  Although  SFES  was 
in operation  for one  year less and  was  limited regionally as 
w~ll as  with regard  to  cbmpany  size,  more  than  a  third of the 
number  getting  suppo~t from  TES  were  assisted. 
Incompatibility 
A  critique oftenly expressed about  YOP  and  YTS  is the de-facto 
prolongation of school  that is caused  by  the massive  expansion 
of the  programmes.  School-leavers without this additional quali-
fication that especially YTS  offers will hardly be  able  to find 
jobs. 
But  job creation schemes  are also problematic.  On  the one  hand 
an  expansion of these measures  should lead to a  displacement 
of  normal  empl9yeesunless it is counteracted by only  employing 
entrants  in areas  not supplied by private competitors.  Because 
this,  however,  will mostly  take place in  "dead-end  jobs  ..  like 
tidying  up  grave-yards,  it should be detrimental  to the  goal 
of maintaining or even  improving  individual skills. 
On  the other hand  many  activities located in social fields 
(environmental  work  or even  for  the  elderly)  are likely to 
be  regarded necessary even  in times  of  an  economic  recovery 
so  that these  services possibly cannot  be  dispensed with then. 
This  in turn could tie up  needed  labour  causing inflationary 
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The  conflict arising  from workin§-time  reducing  (life-time 
as  well  as  weekly)  would  be  their irreversibility which  would 
only  be  of  important if the  economy  actually picked up. 
The  efficancy  of  wage  subsidies  is essentially caused  by 
cost  advantages  against  competitors.  These  can either be 
foreign  companies  or different groups  of  the working population. 
In  the first case  the  foreign  companies  will resist this  by 
either pressing for  subsidies  themselves  or by  raising tariffs. 
The  second  case will  result in  the  displacement  of non-
subsidized,  similarly qualified groups.  The  YWS  for  instance 
will,as mentioned  above,  lead to the  replacement of  (un-skil-
led)  women  by  young  people or to the  replacement of  (un-skil-
led)  youths  by  those elegible to the subsidy.  The  short-term 
positive effects will  be  reversed in the  long  run. 
The  target of occupational  training and  further education 
measures  is to  clear.crowded  (secondary)  labour markets  and 
instead to  increase  the supply  in empty  (primary)  labour mar-
kets.  In  a  deep  recession  as  the current,  however,  with al-
ready  crowded  skilled labour markets  this will  not  happen. 
Instead the  new qualified persons will stay unemployed or 
displace others.  The  unemployment  resulting  from  this will 
again  lead to  a  dequaification supplying already overcrowded 
secondary labour markets with  new  persons. - 272  -
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0.  ANALYTICS  AND  EMPIRICS  OF  ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
In  the Federal  Republic  active  labour  market policy was 
developed  in the beginning of  the  70s_  in connection with 
a  keynesian orientated  employment  policy.  While  employment  poli-
cies  should  serve  the  maintenance  of  a  high  level of  demand 
for  labour,  labour market  policies were  meant  to balance out 
structural discrepancies on the  demand  as well  as  on  the 
supply  side.  Facing  increasing  unemployment  and  - especially  -
increasing deficits of public  budget,  conditions  for  state 
intervention aiming at the  compensation of private  investment 
deficiencies and at active  labour market policy have  become 
more  difficult.  Thus  a  turn from  expansive expenditure policies 
in  favour  of consolidating measures  could already be  noticed 
under  the  social-liberal coalition.  Under  the  CDU/CSU/FDP 
coalition this  tendency became  governmental  programme;  priority 
~ow  __ E~i:!!9  _  _e!~ced on  supply-orientated  financial  and  employ-
~ent policy.  In order to classify the  special expenditure 
programmes  this development  - devideP in  5  periods  - shall be 
outlined in the  following.  Prior a  brief  survey about  the 
main  data concerning  the economical  development  is presented. 
While  the  development of  employment till 1973  was  characterized 
by  a  steady  increase of dependent  employed  as well  as  the 
working  population  in general  - 1973  also was  the peak of 
foreign  wor~ers and existing workplaces- (see  Kuhl 11983) 
employment  fell during  the crisis 74/75  due  to recessive 
production. 
SUpply-orientated policies  intending  the  reduction of  the  number 
of  foreign  worker.s  were  overcompensated by  the  increase of 
the  German  working'population  since  1976  onward.  Thus  the 
latter is seen  as  one  of  the  reasons  accountable  for  the  lack 
of  succes  in  lowering  the  level of  unemployment  during 
1978-1980  significantly,  although at that time  employment 
did  e~pcrience a  slight increase. - 275  -
Table  1: 
Development of  employment  total  in  thousands 
1971  1974  1976  1978  1980 
\"V'Qt:king  popu-
lation total 
27.000  27.147  26.651  26.692  27.165 
activity rate  44,1  43,7  43,3  43,5  44,1 
employment total 26.817  26.565  25.591  25.699  26.276 
employees  in  22.606  22.640  21.939  22.264  22.960 
employment 
foreigners  2.128  2.381  1.925  1.857  2.018 
unemployed  185.072  582.481  1060.336  992.948  888.900 
unemployed  rate  0,8  2,6  4,8  4·, 3  3,8 
Source:  SVR,  Jg.82/83 
Under  the condition of only moderate  growth  and still _average 
productivity  rises  redundancie-s  especially in the 
processing  industry could  be~~ieviated less·and less by  an· 
expansion of  employment  in the public sector;  additionally 
the situation was  sharpened because  the  annual average working 
time  reduction of  1  % between  1970-71  fell back  to 0,4  % 
between  1975-80. 
Table  2: 
Development of growth,  employment  and productivity  - in  %  -
GOP  employment  productivity 
1971  3,23  - 0,08  3,32 
1974  0,54  - 1,83  2,41 
1976  5,16  - 6,83  12,86 
1978  3,22  1 , 1 0  2,10 
1980  1,92  1,67  0,24 
Productivity as  GOP  1970,  GW  1000000  - GW  from  GOP  and  employment 
Source:  Sachverstandigenrat-Gutachten,  own  estimates - 276  -
Essential  reason  for  the  weak  economical  growth was  the 
decrease of gross  fixed  investments;  they constituted a 
continiously declining part of  GNP  during  the  70s.  The 
structure of  the other demand  elements  shows  an  increase 
of  public  consumption,  a  long-term stabile part of private 
consumption  and  a  fluctuating  export  surplus. 
Table  3: 
Utilization of  GNP  - in  % - (prices  frore  1970) 
private  consumption  gross  fixed  export  import 
consumption  public  investm~nt 
1971  55,1  16,4  26,3  23,1  21,5 
1974  54,0  17,3  22,5  28,0  22,5 
1976  55,7  17,8  21,8  28,4  25,1 
1978  56,2  17,5  22,4  28,9  25,9 
1980  55,4  17,4  23,7  30,3  28,7 
~urce:  SVR,  Jg.80/81,  Wirtschaft und  Statisti~ 3/81 
The  cyclical downturn  from  1980 9nward brought about  a  more 
difficult situation on  the  labour market;  the  number  of 
registered unemployed  rose to  2  million by  the  end of  1982; 
th~ thereto attached cost§,  also the direct ones  - almost 
totally budget-financed  (1982  app.  10  bill.DM)  because of 
the  long existing deficits of  the'Bundesanstalt  fUr  Arbeit' 
(BA-federal  institut of  labour)  - hampered  the _as  necessary 
regarded transfer  from  consumptive  to  investive state ex-
penditures. 
In addition  to mere  quantitative problems  the  s~tuation on 
the  labour market was  characterized since  the beginning of 
mass  unemployment  197~ through  steadily growing  structural 
problems.  On  account of  selectivi~Y of hiring and  dismiss 
policy,  that affected mainly  unskilled  workers,  'problem 
groups'  became  a  persisting problem  fo.r  the  labour market; 
their long-term re-integrati..9n  __  ;!._n.  ___ J:~  .. he  w_qrk_12.rocess  has  to 
face  increasing difficulties,  this even  under  the condition 
of active  labour  rr.arket  pplitj,.~al __ 9..§.Si§tan_G.§_.  'The  formal 
structure of  unemployment  is  shown  in the  following  table. - 277  -
Table  4: 
Structure of  unemployment  - in  % -
1971  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982 
foreign workers  0,6  2,9  5, 1  5,3  5,0  12,0 
women  1 , 1  3,1  5,8  5,8  5,2  8,6 
part-time employed  10,6  11 , 5  10,4  11 , 0 
average  0,8  2,6  4,6  4,3  3,8  8,  2. 
men  0,7  2,2  3,9  3,4  3,0  7,9 
youth  under  20  y.  4,3  3,2  7,6 
Source:  ANBA1 2/82 
Full-employment will  remain pra:lominant  concern of  state 
policies;  .yet,  an  improvement  of  the  en~loyment  situa~ion is 
hardly to expect due  to following  reasons:  little optimistic 
prospects  regarding  economic  growth,  most  probably  a  steady 
rise of productivity on  at least the  same  level of previous 
years  and  continious increase of  workin~ population. 
Economic  policy till 1973 
The  'Stabilitatsgesetz'  described the goals of state policy 
as:  full-employment,  growth,  balanced  foreign  trade account, 
price stability.  With  the adoption  of  the'labour promotion 
act',  so far  only fragmentaryly  used  instruments of  labour 
market  policy were  institutionalized and  extended.  After  the 
crisis of  1966/67,  which  had  been  successfully overcome 
through  government  demandmanagement,  a  broad  consensus  about 
the  concept of  'Globalsteuerung'  was  developed  - rreaching 
from  SPD  to  CDU  and  lasting up  to the beginning of  the 80s. 
State's policy during  1974/75  -
Role  of  'Bundesbank'  (federal  reserve  bank) 
The  financial political reactions of  the  community  bodies  to 
the  cyclical setback 1974/75  were  closely related to the 
money-supply  and  interest policies of  the  'Bundesbank'  before 
and  during  that  time. - 278  -
The  attempt  of the  Bundesbank  from  1969  to  1973  to  combat 
inflationary tendencies  by  raising the  key  interest rates  and 
the minimum  reserves ratios wascounter-acted by  the fact that 
until the abolishment of  the  Breton-Wood-System such measures 
were  followed  by  an  inflow  of  foreign  money  capital which 
again  forced  the  Bundesbank  to purchase  foreign  currency; 
thus  an  effective limitation of  the increase of money  supply 
was  not  achievab~~- After floating  exchange  rates were  adopted, 
the  ~esbank changed over to  a  more  restrictive policy in 
the  second half of  1973,  thus,  during  a  time  when  production 
indicators already  showed  a  deterioration of the  economic 
~~uat~on~ At  the  same  time,  as  target  range  for  the  growth 
of  Central  Bank  money  stock  (CBM),  a  middle  term potential 
orientation was  introduced.  It became  possible to relate 
credit volumen  closer to money  supply  (Ml). 
Table  5: 
Monetary  development 
increase in  %  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
federal  reserve  fund  11 '9  13,5  7,8  6,2  10, 1 
money  supply  (M1)  12,3  14,6  1,  9  11 , 6  13,5 
credit loans  13,9  16,0  10,2  7,2  4,6 
consumer prices  5,3  5,5  6,9  7,0  6,0 
NP  (prices  1970)  3,3  3,6  4,9  0,4  -1,8 
1.  Currency  in circulation  (in  no~ksectors) plus  minimum 
reserve ratio 
2.  Currency  in Circulation  (without  cash balance of banks) 
plus  sight deposits  of domestic  non-banks  (without central 
bank  funds  of public budgets) 
3.  of credit institutes at domestic non-banks 
Source:  SVR~  Years  of publication  1979/80:IMSF,  1976 - 279  -
The  government  administrations  responded to the period of 
economical  upswing  beginning  in the  second half of  1972  with 
a  limitation in the  increase of public  expenditures  and 
further measures  of  regaining stability - 'Stabilitatszuschlag'  -
'Stabilitatsanleihe',  'Investitionssteuer'.  Estimated by  public 
demand  stimuli,  already  1973  they  had  a  restrictive impact  of 
about  10 bill.  DM  on  whole  economy. 
In  December  1973  the stability programme  of  early the  same 
year had  been  suspended to  a  large extend,  followed  by  an 
extension of directly demand  effective public expenditures 
as  well  as  by  the preparation of  additional  investment pro-
grammes.  Budget  policy of  f97~/75 was  - acco~ding to the 
£Q_l!Cept  of the  go~e~_nmen_!_:!_~owe_;- - designed at goals put 
up  by Keynesian  demand  management.  Vesper  (Vesper,l978) 
,regards this policy as  havin9  an  ove.rall  only moderately  e.x ten-
sive design.this critic is being ba3ed  on  the assumption 
that public demand  incentives  had  not  been sufficient as :to 
stabilize the degree of utilization of the production poten-
tial of whole  economy.  Other authors  regard the fact that 
financial political activities had  been  counteracted by  a 
restrictive monetary  policy of  the Bundesbank,  as  a  further 
reason  for  the insufficient effectiveness  of the policy at 
that time  - beside expenditure  increase of too little volume. 
Proponents  of  a  keynesian orie.ntated  ·  financial  policy share 
the opinion,  that the federalistic structure of  the Federal 
Republic  is  a  handicap for  a  solidly working  economic  policy. 
Exoecially, the  communi  ti_~§....._as  the main  investors  q ~  the 
public  hand  are  charged with  a  'plan like'  orientated 
procyclical  expenditure policy. 
In  accordance with  the renaissance of  neoclassical  theory 
the  - represented by  economic political councils of  advisors 
(Bundesbank,  Sachverstandigenrat etc.)  - effectiveness of 
keynesian oriented  full-employment  policies  became  subject to 
increasing doubts;  beside  printing to  the  negative effect .... 
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of-by  Federal  Republic  standards  - still fairly high infla-
tion rate,  it was  argued that an  over-utilization of produc-
tion potentials by  the state leads to  •crowding  out'  effects 
and  therefo~e to an  obstruction of whole  economy  development. 
Table  6: 
Public  expenditures  and  public debts 
1971  1974  1975  1978  1980  1981 
expenditures  in  247  370  429  530  613  660  bill.DM 
net credit loan  in 
1 ' 1  -13,6  -59,8  -34,5  -51,1  -69,9  bill.DM  -
in  % of  GDP  - 0,2  - 1 14  - 5,8  - 2,7  - 3,4  - 4,5 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt  VGR,  aus:  OECD-Survey,  1982 
The  development of  the active  labour marked policy, till 1973 
one- sidedly,focused on  further education and re-training 
measures,  was  determined by  the confrontation with the  new 
problems.  Short-time work,  job creation schemes  and  - little 
later - wage  subsidies  became  main  instruments  since  1974. 
~he increasing use of  the  therefore provided funds  by  un-
~mployed,  resp.  those  threatened by  unemployment,  corresponded 
~o changed conditions on  the  labour market.  The  employment 
effect of all instruments  amounted  to averagely  230.000  jobs 
for  the  period  from  1973-1979.  The  annual distribution and 
effect of  the  individual  measure  is to be  found  in table  7. - 281  -
Table  7: 
Utilization and  employment effect of  the most  important  labour 
market political  instruments 
1973  1975  1979  1981 
A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
short-time work  44  16  773  223  88  29  347  122  550  193 
yes  2  4  l6  41  51  86  38  63  25  41 
vocational  1 )  108+  training  100  100  127  127  73  73  108  85  85 
total  146  h  20  916  391  212  188  493  293  660  319 
changes  in em-
ployment  t-68  ~sag  +338 
whole  economy 
A)  Utilization  (persons  by  1.000) 
B)  Employment  effect  (persons  by  1.000  estimated) 
1)  -Full-time measures 
+  Estimated 
1-236  -460 
Source:  Bundesanstalt  ftir  Arbeit,  aus:  Jtirgen  Ktihlt  Analytische 
und  empirische  Aspekte  der Beschaftigungs- und  Arbeitsmarkt-
politik seit 1975  (Ktihl,  1983) 
The  change  in  the utilization of  the  individual  instruments 
were  - beside decrees of  the administration body of the 
Bundesanstalt  - caused  by  financial political influence of 
the  government.  Thus  the  'Sonderprograrnm stabilitatsgerechter 
Aufschwung'  (special  programme  for  a  stability-maintaining 
cyclical upturn)  from  12.12.1974  implicated  500  rnill.DM  for 
wage  subsidies,  the  'programme  for  the  promotion of construc-
tion and other investments'  from  27.8.1975  included  a  job crea-
tion  scheme  at 600  mill.  OM;  on  the other hand  the  funds  for 
further  education  and vocational  training were curtailed 
within  the  'Haushaltsstrukturgesetz  1975'  (budget structure 
act) • 
State policies between  budget consolidation and  demand  regulation, 
- 1976-1980. 
In  the  following  two  years  1976  and  1977  the financial  policy 
fo.s;_g_§..§ed_  on  the  consol idation  __  o_:_f  __  __p_~blic  budgets, 
this under  the  impression of  a  'record deficit'  of  the  public 
budget  from  1975  (68  bill.DM)  and  fed  by  a  growing  neoclassical 
criti<lue. - 282  -
This  in spite  of  the fact,  that further special expenditure 
programmes  - including the  programme  for  the  'promotion of 
construction and  other  investments'  at a  volume  of almost  6  bil-
lion  :CMu·,- were  carried out  ..  The costs of this and other expendi-
ture· programmes  als well  as  the financial effects of other-
w~se important financial political decrees  are  summarised 
in table  8  (a  detailed specification of  individual measures 
and  their financial effects can be  found  in the Jppendix) • 
Table  8": 
The  most  important financial  decrees  since  1974  and  the 
financial  effect for  the  period from  1976-1979,  in mill.DM 
Instrument 
revenue  side 
business cycle policy and 
growth political measure 
other measures 
total drop  in revenue 
exEenditure  side 
busiuess cycle policy and 
growth political measures 
other measures 
total additional 
expenditure 
1976 
-4.250 
650 
-4.900 
+4. 550· 
-5.000 
+11.500 
1977  1978  1979 
-5.400  -15.850  -29.550 
+1.250  +  8.250  +12.850 
-4.150  - 7.600  -16.700 
+1.300  +  4.650  +  6.750 
-6.650  - 7.800  - 8.850 
+10.800  -12.550  +14.000 
Source:  G.  KOhl,  Analytische  und  Empirische Aspekte  der 
Besch~ftigungs- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik seit 1975 
The  here  indicated costs of political measures  do of course 
not coincide  . ·  with  demand  effective  influences of the public 
budget  in general;  according to  estimat~of the  DIW  on  the 
whole  those were  restrictive  1976  and  1977,  this to  a  degree 
which  was  sufficient to at least compensate  the  volume  of 
programmes  not being part of regular budget;  in addition  to 
that,  communities misused extra  funds  for  financing  investments 
that were  planned anyway. - 283  -
Tabl<?  9: 
demand  impulses  of  public  budgets  (in bill.DM)  1) 
1976 
- 13,4 
1977 
- 13,7 
1978 
8,3 
1)  by  definition of  national  accounts 
1979 
8,0 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt,  Berechnungen  des  DIW 
aus  Altvater  (1981) 
The  government  signaled  a  turn  in  financial~icy when 
passing  the  tax political decrees  of  1977  and  - especial!¥  -
the  programme  fo~owth political provision'  (ZIP)  of  the  same 
~· 
Consolidating efforts of  1981/82 
The  recessive economical  trend since  1980,  followed  by  a  fall. 
in  employment  and  a  further worsening  of the  labour market 
situation,  created a  new  dilemma  between  the  target of budget 
consolidation and  demand management  for  the maintenance  of 
employment.  Facing  the  threat of  a  public deficit of  70  bill.DM 
- constant expenditures  provided  - and  under  the  impression of 
a  far-reaching  discussion  about  public borrowing,  within the 
coali~,t9n_~_ consent  could be established about  keynesian orientated 
pol icy pat  terns.  Further rrore optimistic proqnoses  (the'  sachverstandigenrat' 
expected  an  increase of  GNP  of  1  1/2  % for  the  second half of 
1981)  suggested  a  cyclical upturn,  since this did·not  come 
true,  also the consolidation larget failed.  The  financial deficit 
of the  state sector amounted  to approximately  70  bill.DM,  which 
is 4,5  % of  the  GNP  (  according  to  OECD).  Further restrictive 
influences had  their source  in  the monetary  and  intzrest policx 
of  the  'Bundesbank'_,  which  tried tocope  with~  beginning flight 
of capital.  b;t  ___ _grad~_ally  risin_g____!_I'!_terest  rates. At  the  same  time 
this monetary  course  was  designed  to attenuate  losses  in  the 
balance of  goods  and  services. 
Also  the  'work  pr_~~oti~!'l  consolidati_~--~·  enacted Jan.lst, 
1982  which  confined  important  instruments  of  active  labour 
market  policy as  well  as  the right  for  unemployment  benefits, 
gave  evidence  of  the efforts of  the  government  to consolidate ..  .... 
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its budget.  Now  the eligibility for  unemployment  pay  depends 
on  a  proceeding  employment  of  12  months  (before that:  6  months), 
for  unemployment  assistance  on  100  days  (before that:  40  days). 
A  cut  in Job  Creation  Schemes,  less subsistence  payments  for 
full-time vocataional  training measures  and  the limitation 
of grants  for  wage  subsidies  to  60%,  plus  a  new  regulation 
for  the eligibility for  short-time work  payment  are the most 
significant  restri~tions within active  labour market policy. 
Since also 1982  the development  of  the whole  economy,with 
exception of  rapidly  increasing foreign  demand  in the begin-
ning of the yea, was  stagnan~ and  the predicted upswing  had 
not  come  into sight,  the  government  issued the  "Beschaftigunsts-
forde~~!_l_9sgese:.~~-- .<employment  pr~~~tion act),  focused  on  the in-
yestment grant,  which  was  designed to  comb~!  th~_generally 
low  __ propensi  ty to invest.  Critical voices  of this  investment 
grant of  10%  - limited for  one  year  - say,  that the best possible 
effect could be  a  premature realization  of  such  investments. that 
were  planned  anyway.  This  even  more  as  already  in the  second 
year the development  of  the overall  demand  was  negative because 
of the relative decline  in public expenditures  and the abso-
lute decline  in private demand.  The  DIW  critizises the more 
restrictive financial political course of  the government  since 
1980  under  the  following  aspect:  cutting dgwn  o~public invest-
ments  f~r  consolidat~ng reasons  leads to considerably smaller 
reductions of the deficit and  to more  negative  influences  on 
the  development of  the whole  economy  than generally thought; 
also it is to put more  emphasis  on  the relationship between 
public investment decisions  for  financial  political reasons 
and  the  development  of monetary policy.  They  make  calls for 
an  extension of public investments,  accompanied  by  a  more 
offensive monetary  policy and mention  Japan  as  example,  where 
such  a  policy had to be  financed with only  a  short-term de-
preciation of the Yen. - 285  -
The  ecnnomical  policy of  the  new  government 
The __  l')_ew  _soa~_~_tj~-~-9~f  i_f?.~s  _  -~-t-~-..  -~?J.!l_  ta!":g_~t::. _  .§_~ _ tg  ___  £_9_l~lsolida  te 
?.tqte  finances  and  to bring  down  unemployment,  both shall 
in  the first place  be  achieved  by  s~pply  orientat~ policy 
am 
~~~erns which  are centred about  growth  st~muli.  Some 
elements  of this policy are:  reduced  costs  for  personnel 
in the public sector,  expansion of public  investments  as 
far  as  this is  ~ossible within limited budget  funds  with  a 
planned net credit loan  of  42  bill  DM,  in this connection 
restrained social  (security)  expenditures;  furthermore  a 
general  promotion  of the  investment  power  of private enter-
prise  - funded  by  the  planned  increase of value-added tax 
- and especially the promotion  of  residental building  - this 
partially to be  financed  by  a  forced  loan  from  recipients 
of  higher  income. 
The  concept  does  not  include  employment  political initiatives, 
this neither within the  sco~f  ge~uine labour market  policy 
n()r  by  means  of  ex_E~_~di  t_1:!_re  prog_Eammes.  The  fact that invest-
ment  promotion  is restricted to construction  industry is 
critizised by  the Sachverstandigenrat  (SVR):according  to his 
assumption  a  promotion of further  areas  - e~pecially the in-
vestment  goods  industry  - would  be  necessary  under  employ-
ment  politicruaspects.  The  total budget  plan  and  the thereto 
attached financial  political decrees  are being  judged contro-
versiaL  Th~_!TlaiQ_ri  t_y_  of the  -~~unci  1-members  regards  the pro-
grai!:l!!!._~  ___ ?s  _  _!l_olc'!_:!:_~__!he  p_9Sf?_ibi l.~.o~_so];._ying the most pressing 
~C()_!!5?!D~c;:a_l  and  soci?..!_E._roble_ms.  P..ccordj ng  to Hans -Jtirgen  Krupp 
(member  of  the  council)  !:_!"l~~el!!.~!!-~_1?~1 ~~i  C?_t_~_is~E..J~ich  ~~~ 
also  seen  .l2.Y__!:]1~~~~-grj:!-_y_.Q_~_tl]_~~-ou_~~_il .  overlap  th~_growth 
political incentives.  As  far  as  the  unemployment  insurance 
is concerned  the  new  coalition has  presented concepts  that 
favour  the principles of  subsidarity;  thus it was  discussed 
to  combine  the  rate of  unemployment  benefits with the duration 
of  previous  employment.  An  other possibility to  lower  the  immense - 286  -
deficits of the  BA  is seen  in linking the eligibility for un-
employment  payment  to  a  proceeding  employment  of  18  months 
(now  12  months).  Regarding active labour market  policies 
no  special activities are planned,  though it can  be  assumed 
that the discussion  - as  also being carried out within the 
CDU  - about  the question,  if not at least the  Job Creation 
Scheme  especially for  older unemployed  should be  extended, 
will  emerge  into respective decrees. - 287  -
I.  INCREASE  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  JOBS 
1.  Wage  Subsidies 
In  the  Federal  Republic of Germany  wage  subsidies are gran-
ted within  the  institutionalized labour market policies ac-
cording to the  'Arbeitsforderungsgesetz•  (work  promotion 
~  act,  in the  following  AFG)  by  means  of initial training-in 
allowances  and settling-in allowances. 
In addition to this,  wage  subsidies constitute  an  important 
part of  the special  grogramme  from  12.6.1976  (see  appendix), 
also  they are used  for the  integration of evacuees. 
Training-in allowances  are only given in combination with 
measures  for  further  in-plant training.  Settling-in allo-
wances  should serve the better placement of disadvantaged 
groups  on  the  labour market.Withregard to the so-called 
•activelabour market policy•  both  instruments,  especially 
the settling-in allowance play an  increasingly important 
role  (see  Schmid  -Semmlinger,  1979). 
~cientific research distinguishes  between  three potential 
levels of wage  subsidy: 
1.  on  the macroeconomic  level  - predicted effects of an 
assumed  global  wage  subsidy 
2.  potential consequences  of  wage  subsidies regionally li-
mited 
3.  effect of selectiv wage  subsidies regarding structure of 
employment  and  unemployment. - 288  -
"Crucial  point"  of  the  theoretical discussion  o.n  the 
effects of  general  wage  subsidies  is the  concurrence  resp. 
the denial  of  the  theory  of  relative prices of capital and 
labour:  following  the  arguments  of proponents  of this theory 
(eg.  the majority of the  council  of advisors)  the~cessive 
costs of  the  product~on factor  labour  count  for  under-employ-
ment.  Yet,to alter the relative prices of  labour  and  capital 
the council of advisors  favours:  "Moderate  wage  settlements 
by  collective bargaining".  Wage  subsidies are  supported as 
a  labour  mark~t policy  instrument within the existing scope, 
but as publicly sponsored general  wage  subsidies they prove 
the  consequence,  that they have  to be  financed either by 
net credit  loan or  by  taxation,  according  to the majority 
of  the  council of advisors  both would  counteract the tar-
geted  improvement  of  supply conditions. 
As  a  supply-as well  as  demand  effective instrument,G.Rehn 
(Rehn,  1975)  interpretes his proposal of temporary wage  sub-
sides that has  been discussed and modified  in the Federal 
Republic  by  Hackmann/Keiter  (Hackmann/Keiter,  1976)  and 
c.ch.  von  Weiszacker  (C.Ch.v.Weiszacker,  1976). 
General  wage  subsidies are rejected by  demand  side orientatet 
theorists  like,  e.g.  the Memorandum-group;  its representa-
tives regard  a  redistribution of  unemployment  as the best 
possible effect of existing wage  subsidies. 
R~~o_!lally_}_~_!ni  _!:ed  -~~_ge_  su~~_.!-~ies  have  been granted in the 
Federal  Republic  twic~ so  fa~,  1974  (see  appendix)  in re-
gions with  an  unemployment  rate 0,5  % above  the  average  un-... 
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employment  rate and  1979  as part of  a  special  programme  for 
regions with special  employment  problems  (see  appendix); 
the latter with expanded settling-in allowances  and  promo-
tion of further  in-plaE.!.  ___  t:_~ainin~-- resp.  re-training that has 
become  necessary as  a  result of  new  installations due  to 
changes  in technology. 
Whereas  the first programme  did  not meet  the expectations 
eventually due  to a  lack of  information of the  employers 
in question  - the efficiency of  the  above  mentioned programme 
(Schmid  /Freiburghaus,  1977), part  I, is being  judged in  a  more 
detailed way.  The  effects which  might  ease  the pressure  on 
the  labour market,  especially the  intended effect of bringing 
down  rotational  unemployment.are  expected to be of little  ~ 
~cess, whereas  importance is placed on  the qualification 
effects.  In this  conte~the integrat~on of marginal  gr~ups 
as  well  as  the possibility of acquiring general  certificates 
are stressed. 
However,  inharent structural-political effects have  to be 
considered in case of  a  wide .implementation of  such or other 
programmes  for  wage  subsidies. 
The  relative improvement  of  the situation of those  companies 
which  are granted the described wage  subsidies,should be  in-
tegrated in structural political planning.  A  chan~ of  em~ 
phasi~-~-~-1:..~-- ha-y_~_ ~~- _b_~  __ _p~_!:_E_~  __  -t:?e  d~J?end~_!_;_£i~  __  be~ween a_~~.!-~ 
!.<ii_!'<?~.t;-~a.r:~~-t  _p~_~_i_cy  ___ ai).d  ___ ~_!.r~c_:-~1.:1:.~~-l____pQ~-~-cy. (see  Schmid /Frei-
burghaus,  1977). 
The  existing measures  of wage  subsidy according to AFG,  sett-
ling-in allowances  and  training-in allowances,  show  a  great 
regional  ucviation,  which  is only partially attributable to 
the  unemployment  rate and  its selective structure.  A significant 
effect also is being noticed  iri  the processing industry of 
the  region  in question  (Schmid  /Semmlinger,  1980).  How  far - 290  -
this might  lead to  the  conclusion  ~hat an  expansion of this 
instrument is hardly to  accept because of unequal  distribu-
tional effects,  remains  questionable. 
The  most  important problem deals  with  the question,  if this 
measure  allows  the  integration of marginal  groups  in the 
labour market.  Concerning this question  we  are  confronted 
with the  following  positions:  The  first position claims 
that  th~--~nequa~~~-~!:.~ib_'!_!:_~~~--of_  ~~~!!_~E§:~-~~-- ~1!~-J.:~bp_ur mar-
ket  --~-~  _  _par-t:.l~_C.~'~~~~- b:i_  __  Ci  rigid  --~age-:_c9sts.._.-struc;_~_~re. 
That  means  that disadvantaged groups  remain  excluded  from 
the labour market;  thus  a  flexible  system of selectiv wage 
~ubsidies  targe~orientated tQwards  those  groups  is to he  implemented, 
The  opposing position is based on  the assertion  that under 
the  condition of  a  total lack  of  demand  nothing else will 
~achieved by  structural assistance than transferrina 
problems  from  one  field to  another.  Further more  the repre-
sentatives of this position claim as  another disadvantage 
of wage  subsidy policy as  now  being persued,  that permanent 
subsidizing of certain  •problem groups•  might  lead to  a 
'drug effect•,  this especially in periods  of  a  cyclical 
downturn  when  - for  instance  - young or elder people only 
have  the  chance  of  taking  up  work  in case of subsidies being 
granted.  (Schmid  /Wilcke,  1980;  Schmid  ,  1982). 
The  relatively heavy  use of subsidies  for  the  implacement of 
young  people is also being criticized in so  far as  those 
measures  are not  tied to  training  schemes,  al-
though  the  authors  admit  that a  strong rotational  unemploy-
ment  is to  be  preferred to permanent  unemployment. 
The  latter mentioned positions are partly based  on  empirical 
data,  partly they are  a  result of  above  mentioned  research. 
Some  single results  shall be  subject cr  the following part. .-
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There  are qualitative as well  as  quantitative analysis. re-
garding the effectiveness of  settling-~n and  training-in allo-
wances,  further more  a  cost-benefit analysis of settling-in 
allowances is available. 
Generally the lesser utilization of training-in allowances 
compared  to settling-in allowances  is  being explained 
with its linkage  to further training  schemes. 
It is assumed  that the  increasing utilization 
of training-in allowances  during  the last years  goes  back 
to the fact that the training specifications have  been wide-
ly ignored  (Schmid  /Semmlinger,  1977). 
They  propose stricter administrative regulations  for trai-
ping measures  in order to avoid  - as  happened  in case of 
settling-in allowances  - prolonged  'Werkbanke'  (tool  tables 
-assisted employees  are  used  as  unskilled workers).  Quali-
tative evaluations of settling-in and  training-in allowances 
can  be  resumed  as  follows: 
Problems  of  implacement  are concerning both  instruments.  The 
~ercent of hard-to-nlace  unemployed  has  gone  up  considerably, 
in the course of the  employment  crisis,  caused  by  recognizable 
selectivity in hiring and  dismissal processes.  The  require-
ments  for  job applicants  have  become  harder to fulfill on 
account of technical  reasons  and  business  economic  rationa-
lity,  both relating to  job specific as well  as  extra-func-
tional abilities.  The  required skill often surpasses the 
needed  skills for  the  specific  job.  There  are also cases 
known  that the regular staff raises objections against  a 
'problem case'  being hired because  lower efficiency is ex-
pected as well  as  a  worsening of the working  atmosphere. 
Both  instruments only influence  'normal'  business  economic 
calculation but do  not  reach the entire complexity of the 
existing problems. ~  instruments also prove  increasin~ 
deadweight effects,  especially  settling-!~ - 292  -
allowances;  in case of  training-in allowances mainly  on  ac-
count  of  labour offices being  'forced'  to  take  over  job 
specific training-in costs,  regarding settling-in allowances 
in that sense  that actually not disabled unemployed  like 
young  or elder people without handicap are only being 
irnplaced- 'problem cases'  hardly at all- under  the  condi-
tion of granted settling-in allowances  (see  Schmid·  /Sern·~ 
linger,  1979). 
Table  1: 
Cost-benefit Analysis  of Settling-in Allowances  in the 
Federal  Republic  1974-1980 
1974  1976  1979 
1)  ex.peuC.itures  of  BA  17  186  616 
2)  assisted persons  in 1.000  10  58  88 
3)  persons  costs 
1.801  3.075  6.055 
4)  employment effects  ?  ?  ? 
5)  effects  on  unemployment 
3  15  22 
25  25  25 
6)  costs  per~avoided un-
employed  6.003  11.889  24  .. 221 
1980 
574 
63 
7.468 
? 
16 
25 
29.406 
3)  estimated according  to table  f2,  p.  244  of  the  SVR  Study 
1981/82  about  the  development  of consumer prices 
5)  a)  and  b)  conclusive assumptions 
Source:  1)  and  2)  ANBA,  diverse  years  of  periodical: 
3),  5)  and  6)  Schmidt,  1982  .... ... 
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The  same  authors  presented  a  quantitative analysis  of the 
effect of both  instruments,  the  one  for  settling-in allowances 
containing  a  multivariate analysis  of use  and  effect. 
The  used  method  tries to illustrate dependencies  between 
cause/reaction,  in order to  be  able  to  isolate the  influence of 
a  specific factor of particular interest  (Schmid  /Wilcke, 
1980) • 
The  results of this work  constitute the  basic for  the follo-
wing  aspects  which will mainly  concern  settling-in allowan-
ces. 
To  a  large extent the utilization is determined  by  problem 
pressure  (regional  unemployment  rate) .  The  regional  structure 
of wage  costs  appears  as  another influencing factor,  which 
means  that settling-in allowances  are  predominantly being 
used  by  such  labour intensive  firms  of the processing in-
dustry in which  the costs of wages  play an  important  role. 
A  similar policy in the likewise labour intensive service sec-
tor is not to  be  found,  which can  - so  the  authors  - be  credi-
ted to the existence of  an  internal  labour market.  The 
noticeable  underrepresentation  of.  women  in  this 
programme, . seems  to  be on  account of the  almost total  lack 
of suitable part-time  jobs,  yet,  also certain women  dis-
criminating practices  by  the  labour office administrations 
are  assumed. 
Regarding  the total  amount  of  jobs provided  under  this pro-
gramme,  the  implacement of  young  unemployed  seems  the most 
successful,  yet it has  to be  considered that these implace-
ments  are  not  likely to open  up  permanent  jobs  but tend  to gene-
rate  rotational  unemployment  for  young  people. 
Concerning the  implacement of elder people  we  find  the re-
verse situation:  Settling-in allowances  d-~~  actually brinq 
down  the  number  of  perman~nt unemployme~.  That  this  instru-- 294  -
ment  is being applied rather rarely for  this  category of 
persons  seems  to be  due  to the  fact that here  wage  costs 
play a  less  important role. 
The  most  important results of  the existing analysis are: 
1.  settling-in allowances  show  no  significant effect re-
garding  the  category of persons of permanent  unemployed, 
who  actually represent the target group of this instru-
ment. 
2.  Settling-in allowance  is no  adequate  instrument  for 
bringing down  unemployment;  this statement is done  under 
the  condition of limited possibilities of empirical re-
search in this field. 
3.  The  increasing use of both instruments is accompanied 
by  a  'drug effect',  which  means  that in order to accom-
plish the  same  effects  a  permanent  increase of provided 
means  will  be  necessary.  Qualitative analysis  claim that 
experts of the  labour offices regard this effect as par-
tially self-induced. 
Generally it is given  consent  to wage  subsidies  for serious-
ly disabled,  even  though there is doubt  about  their sufficien-
cy  in times  of crisis.  Those  doubts  base  on  the experience 
with the hiring practice of  companies  as  above  described in 
connection with other hard-to-place groups.  Those practices 
affect the group of seriously disabled even  more;  as  a  solu-
tion  it is printed to administrative regulations. 
(Moller/Lticking,  1977). 
Models  and proposals  aimed at the potential  improvement of 
those  labour political instruments  shall  be  discussed in the 
summary  because  they  usually include  further  schemes .. 70 
75 
80 
81 
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2.  Job  Cr~ation Schemes 
Job  creation schemes  (in  the  following  JCS)  are  aeopted ac-
cording  to AFG  (work  promotion  act)  §  91  and  as  parts of 
special  programmes  of central government  and  federal  govern-
ments. 
Even  though  job creation schemes  had  been  installed before 
the  AFG  was  passed,  they were  of  no  significant importance 
till 1974  (1.500- 3.000 assisted persons  annually).  Du-
ring  1975/76 it was attempted  to support  the  construction 
· industry,  which  is highly sensitive to economic  £luctuations 
by  means  of  job creation  schemes.  As  unemployment  was 
growing,  job  creation  schemes  became  an  increasingly  im-
portant factor till 1979  (1979:  52.000 assisted persons). 
The  subsequent declining process must  be attributed to 
financial  restrictions and  a  growing critical view of this 
instrument.  Both together was  the background for issueing 
new  JCS-regulations  codified in the  amendment  of  the 
•work promotion act'  - 'work promotion  consolidation act• 
(AFKG). 
Table  2: 
Significance of JCS 
total expen- operative  · JCS  J.CS 
cij.ture_s of  ·BA  payrrents  in  JCS  in  in  enpl.  ~1.  ( 100%)  A  B  '  v.A..  % 'lA. % v.a  p.%  UE 
3.907.279  2.304.624  59.0  13.721  o. 4  0.7  1.645  10 
17.835.893  6.441.675  36.2  128.707  6.8  ~.2 15.810  14 
21.674.477  7.613.562  40.5  1.025.441  4.7  11.9  41.251  46 
28.165.067  11.239.423  39.8  1.053.882  3.7  9.4  38.461  30 
Source:  Mettelsiefen/ Seifert WSI  6/82 
own  estimates - 296  -
AFKG  includes operative restrictions.  Now  public employers 
are  excluded as  sponsors of  JSC  with  the exception of infra-
structural  improvement  measures.  In  addition  to this the 
category of persons  eligible for  JCS  has  been  tightened,  as 
well  as  the main  area of promotion  was  subject to  a  modifi-
cation.  1975/76 priority was  put  on  the  industrial sector, 
here  mainly measures  on  this field of  transport that has 
an  impact  on  construction industry,  whereas  today  JCS  are 
predominantly utilized in the service sector,  especially 
social services. 
The  average  length of promotion  has  been  prolonged  from  77 
weeks  (up  to  1978)  to currently  (about)  six months. 
According  to scientific opinions  JCS  can  have  the  following 
effects:  the.net employment  effect of JCS  is positiv. Dead-
weight effects do  hardly·occur  in the private but in 
the public sector.  The  social political and  integrative 
effects of JCS  are  considered  posit~It is criticized 
that those  groups  towards  the instrument is targeted,are 
not  reached  to the  degree  initially disired,  but possible 
improvements  concerning this aspect are  admitted. 
Yet1it has  to  be  taken  into consideration that dissenting 
views  are presented regarding influence  and  scale  of  those 
effects~  The  employment  effects of  JCS  were  subject 
of  e~pirical studies;  here  an  lAB-study  (Institute for  Labour 
Market  and  Vocational  Training)  from  1978/79  is to mention 
as  one  of the completest  (Spitznagel,  1979).  This  research 
is based  on  the  following  assumptions: 
For  the  evaluation of  employment  effects  a  certain percentage 
of  the  skeletmstaff has  to  be  added  to  the JCS-employed 
because  without working  in  a  JCS-promoted  company  they might. 
have  been  made  redundant.  Since  the  nu~ber of  skeleton 
workers  is extremely high  in the  building  industry,  lower 
in the  social  services,  the  declining relation between  the - 297  -· 
number  of  JCS-promoted  employees  and  employment effects  can 
be  explained;  in relation to  100 promoted  jobs  there are 
53  in the sector of surface construction,  64  in public uti-
lity,  in  the  transport industry  50 maintained regular  jobs. 
Further  to those direct effects there are indirect effects 
composed  by  two  elements:  increase in  demand  due  to inter-
mediate  goods· and  services  and  increase  in demand  for  consumer 
goods. 
Table  3:  Job  Creation  Scheme  1978 
areas  assisted  in  % 
persons.  from 
A 
J\griculture  10.554  20.6 
Coastel con- 358  0.7 
servation 
Fbresty  5.174  10.1 
Trans!;X)rt  1.998  3.9 
Construction  5.379  10.5 
Public utility  1.793  3.5 
Arfmi n; strati  on  17.112  33.4 
Social  servi~  6.250  12,2 
Others  2.561  5.0 
!btal  51.236  100 
1)  assisted employees 
2)  regular workers 
3)  indirect effect 
B_loo  g  gross em- in  % 
A  A  ployrrent  frOPl 
effect  B 
72.0  1.49  15.752  17.5 
70.1  1.45  518  0.6 
75.4  1.56  8.084  9.0 
138.2  2.86  5.708  6.3 
150.7  3.12  16.809  18.7 
172.5  3.57  6.403  7.1 
. 65.2  1.35  23.124  25.7 
70.1  1.45  9.057  10.1 
86.5  1.79  4.573  5.1 
20.7  1.78  90.000  100 
Source:  Mitt.  AB,  2/79, 
own  calculations 
structure 
of B  in  % 
.1  2  3 
67  9  24 
69  13  18 
64  6  30 
35  18  47 
32  22  46 
28  20  52 
74  9  17 
69  8  23 
56  15  29 
- - -- 298  -
Those  total  effects,  defined as  gross  employment  effects, 
are  facing  a  number  of restrictions.  According  to Hellmich 
(Hellmich,  1982)  the total  volume  can  only be  quantitized 
on  the basis of  'well-founded  assertions•.  Tbis·restric-
tion provided
1we  find  the  following picture: 
Table 4:  Employment  Effect of  JCS 
1976  1978 
gross  employment effect  75.000  90.000 
percentage of promotion  40  %  60  % 
net  employment  effect  30.000  54.000 
Source:  Spitznagel,  MittAB  2/79 
The  above  calculations  do  not  include potential acceleration 
effects  (see Spitznagel,  1979),  as  well  as  influences due  to 
allocation effects of  JCS  are necessarily neglected.  But  in-. 
spite of these  imponderabilities the cost-benefit-relation 
of  JCS  is considered positiv  {Schmidt,  1982:  Hellmich,  1982). - 299  -
Table 5 :  Costs/Efficiency-Analysis of Job  Creating Scheme 
1974/76/79/80 in  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany 
1974  1976  1979  1980 
1)  expenditures of  BA  41,6  267,8  1.201,2  1.367,8 
in mill.  DM 
2)  JCS-assisted.persons 
in 1.000 
3  29  51  41 
3)  persons  costs in  DM  14.690  8.853  20.375  27.345 
(1975) 
4}  employment effect  8  75  86  68 
in 1.000 
5)  effects on  unemploy-
ment  6  58  75  59 
200  200  147  144 
6)  costs per avoided  7.344  4.427  13.855  19.002 
unemployed 
4)  effected by  demand  due  to intermediate  goods  and  services 
and multiplier effects on  basis of an  input/output model, 
by  Spitznagel,  1979/80 
5)  estimation based on  JCV-promoted  employers  plus  2/3 of 
the  regular workers  and  2/3 of indirectly additional  em-
ployed 
Source:  IAB  1978/79,  SVR,  Schmid,  1982 - 300  -
Also  on  basis of  a  comparison  between all costs  (promotion 
and  sponsor • s  payment)  safings  (unemployment  benefits)~- and 
revenue  (tax and  social security)  JCS  show  a  more  favourable 
p.ict.ure  than  unemployment. 
For  the evaluation  of  the  accuracy of  JCS  (in  the  sense of 
reaching the  target  groups)  the  following  data are available: 
Table6  :  Relative  Employment  under  JCS 
Shares  of  Unemployment  - 1980 
JCS 
women  38.6 
youths  under  the  age  of  20  8.9 
elder people  26.0 
I  part time  employed  10.3 
-·  ... --
Source:  Hellrnich,  WSI  2/82 
unemployed 
52.0 
9.9 
30.2 
18.4 
For  the period of  1975/76  Spitznagel  (Spitznagel,  1979) 
found  an  overrepresentation of persons with 'risk 
property•.  The  employment possibilities  for such  groups 
are mainly located in the service sector,  which means  that 
the  ex12ansion  of JCS  in this sector led to  a  greater accuracy 
i~  react~~he targeted persons.  As  for  the  SVR,  he  shares 
':his  opinion. (SVR,  1980/81).  Even  though  the achieved effects 
a..:-e  still considered to  be moderat.e,  in  comparison  to further 
AFG-instruments it is agreed  that JCS  clearly hold the most 
potentials  (see  Hellmich,  1982).  Along  with  the-modification~ 
of  JCS  according to the  AFKG,  restricting the  category of 
persons eligible for  this programme,  the  accuracy has  been 
imp~oved,  wb_er_:~~-~-at  the  same  time parts of  the original- ~'?bj  ~c:. 
ti  v~_§_  h<?-_~e _  £>~~-12 _  dr_C?_Pf>~~. - 301  -
'I'he  cr£§_~.-i~-~--£?.f  perll]ane~t  jobs  - by  the  AFG  outlined as  the 
aim of  JCS  - has  hardly  been  analysed empirically.  Neverthe-
less  the evaluation of the  'special programme  1979'  (see 
appendix)  suggests,  that this  instrument will probably not 
~e successful  in realizing this aim  (for only  8  % of all 
JCS-jobs  good  opportunities are seen  for  a  transformation 
into permanent jobs)(see  Hellmich,  1982).  On  the other hand, 
the .need  for  JCS  is  growing~ it is the only  instrument of 
labour market  policy that is regarded  as  to have  an effect 
on  unemployment  resulting from  growth deficits  (see  Schmid 
1982). 
Emphasis  is also laid upon  side effects of  JCS  - like the 
~ntainance of human  capital  and  social  security  (see 
Schmidt,  1982;  Spitznagel,  1979;  Hellmich,  1982,  etc.)  -
nevertheless  the  OTV  criticizes that JCS  produce  'second 
class workers'  who  are excluded  from  collective labour 
agreements  and play the role of  'wage  pushers'.  Another 
point of critic  prints to  the aspect that JCS  does 
not  create  skill patterns in consistent 't:lith  the  demand 
of the market;  highly qualified unemployed  receive  a  fairly 
high salary when  taking  up  a  job under  this programme;  thus 
needs  are  induced regarding status,  salary etc.  which  cannot 
be realized on  the  free market. 
The  here mentioned  authors generally agree that these points 
of critic including the abuse  of  JCS  do  not  sum  up  to fun-
damental  objections against this  instrument,  since those 
would  be  avoidable  by  according operational specifications. - 302  -
3.  Employment  Effects  of  Public  Expenditure  Programmes 
for  the  Private  and  Public Sector 
The  discussion  about  the possibilities to  increase the 
1(.)vel  of  employment  by  public expenditure  prograrrunes  is 
being carried out  in the Federal  Republic  by  referring to 
analys~  on  funding  possibilities,  the effects  on  quan-
ti  tatives  and  prices an9  the effi£ienc_y_<?i_Eublic versus 
pr~v~!-~~~~~vities.  Paradigmatically more  keynesian orienta-
ted positions  can  be  distinguished  from  more  monetaristic 
orientated theories.  The  pleading  for  keynesian policies 
aims  at the necessity of  additional  public  bnrrowing,  the 
utilization of  financial  resources  by  cutting  down  on  sub-
sidies and the t.axati.on of higher incorre.  Contrary to that mo-
netaristic positions refer to the financial  burden put 
on  the private sector if a  rise of top-tax rates is being 
exercised  and  to  ~~crowding out effects"  under increased interest 
rates  induced  by  public deficit spending;  they also print 
to  the higher degree  of  efficiency of private compared 
to public activity. 
Since  the  beginning of  the eighties,  and  even  stronger 
since the  new  CDU/CSU/FDP  coalition came  in  power  in the 
Federal  Republic  the policy design is characterized by  in-
tensified measures  to consolidate the budget and ·thus by  ~er:unciation 
of~E)ic expenditur~Fogrammes. Minorities  like for e.g. 
the  DGB,  but  recently also markedly  stronger  the  SPD,  claim 
for  the  expansion  of public  expendi  tur:E:  programmes.  I.  a. 
a  new  future  investment  programme  with  a  total  volume  of 
50 bil.  DMand  a  running  time  of  five years  is demanded. 
The  programme  structure is to follow  t_;le  concept  of quali--
tative growth.  In general it is true that all proposals for 
an  expansion of  expenditures  of  the public hand  include  con-
siderations  for  financing. - 303  -
Elsewhere  (see analytics  and  empirics  of  economic  policies) 
the  theoretiedl debates  on  pubLic  expenditure pro-
grammes  are being  reviewed.  ~ere only  the  employment effects 
public expenditure programmes  are of  concerq.  In this con-
text naturally the  lay-out of public expenditure programmes 
plays  an  important role:  on  the  one  hand  programmes  which 
directly operate with view to governmental  expenditures  for 
the production of  goods  and  services  in the public sector, 
on  the other hand  expenditure  programmes  aiming at the 
promotion  of  growth  dynamic  of the private sector and are 
to  induce  a  self-substained growth. 
The· attempt to solve the  employment  problems  by  means  of 
expanding the employment  level  in the public sector has  been 
abandoned  already towards  the  end  of the  SPD/FDP  coalition. 
As  priority is given to budget  consolidating efforts.  con-
sumptive  expenditures  are cut back and  a  reduction of staff 
is intended.  Still up  to 1975  the  number  of employed persons 
in the public budgets  (statef  community bodies,  social in-
surance,  Bundeswehr  - not  railway and  post)  was  continously 
increasing.  The  extension of  employment  in this sector  did-make 
a  coptribution towards  the alleviation of falling employ-
ment  rates  in the manufacturing  industry.  This  function  is 
not  being ful-filled any  more  since  1979.  The  development 
of wage  - salary and  employment  is shown  in table7 - 304  -
Table 7  : 
Public  Wage  Burden  (Community  Bodies  and  Social  Insurance) 
- Employment  Shares of Sectors  -
-· 
1970 
1975 
1980 
absolute;+- in  %  of 
total ex-
penditurs 
61,42  31.3 
118,11  32.8 
161.14  31.8 
:f- in bill.  DM 
++  in  1  000 
1)  all enterprises 
publ.sec-
tor empl. 
absolut~  ++ 
--
2978 
3512 
3798 
2)  goods-producing  industry 
3)  st:ate 
source:  SVR;  WPI  9/81,  own  estimates 
% 
1 
83.6 
80.4 
79.3 
% 
2 
55.1 
50.8 
48.8 
% 
3 
13.4 
16.5 
17.1 
Facing this situation the council  of advisors  - more  markedly 
the employers'  assocciation- but  also parts of  the  CDU/CSU 
and  FDP  point out that the blow  up  of the public sector has 
limited employers'activity range  considerably because the  increa-
sing public  indebtedness  and the  thereto attached tax rise and  in-
creased interest rates meant  a  special financial  burden 
for  the private sector. 
In  view of this position the state will  have to cope with 
its task to shift - with remaining level  of total expendi-
ture  - the expenditure structure from  the consumptive to 
the  investive area,  this either by postponing  income  adap-
tations  (BlUm-proposal)  or reducing the staff.  The  DGB 
- especially the  ~TV (trade union  for public employees)  -
the Memorandum-group  and  the  SPD  hold against this that 
first there is still a  considera~le need  for  social ser-
vic~ (Hellmich,  1982;  Wagner,  1982)  and  that  secondly 
the  assumed  mechanism between  a  expansion of state activities 
and public debts  resp.  crisis of the market  does  not exist 
(cf.  DGB/WPI,  1981).  (More  detailed in  I,  4.). - 305  -
At the rrarent operative expenditure programnes are the following. 
According  to the  'employment  promotion act'  1982  the  additional 
expenditures  for  energy  saving  technologies  in public buildings 
and  - somewhat  unclearly belonging  to this category  -
expanded  investment activities by  the  Bundespost.  Parts of 
proceeding  programmes  as  the  programme  for  'promotion of eco-
nomic  and  employment  development•  from  14th of Sept.1977  are 
still of  some  effect.  Thus  the  subsidies  for  investments  in 
Energy  saving  technology  in residential buildings have  been 
prolonged as well as  special parts of  the  'Future  Investment 
Programme'  (ZIP)  where  further assistance was  granted  main!~ 
within  federal  and  regional  range. 
In general only programmes  of  the central government  are being 
presented,  forced  by  the  lack of  respecti~information and 
also due  to the fact that the  volume  of  regional special 
programmes  of  federal  governments  is  comparati  vly  low  .. 
As  a  matter fact  the expenditures declared as  special  programmes 
of  the central government  play a  relatively minor  role  compared 
to the budget  volume  resp.  its variations,  with  two  exceptions 
- ZIP  (Future  investment  programme)  20  bill.DM,  programme  for 
promotion of construction and other  investments  5,75  bill.DM. 
Table  8: 
Volume,  expenditure  programmes  and  budget 
Year 
1975 
1977 
1978 
special  programmes 
A 
2.6001) 
1.2502) 
4.4503) 
budget 
B 
158,80 
172,39 
189,66 
A  in  % of B 
1,64 
0,73 
2,33 
1.  regional  and  local assistance of  employment  74 
2.  promotion of  emPbyment  and  growth  74 
3.  promotion of construction and  other  investments 
2.  like  1)  and  ZIP  1977 
3.  like  2.  and  programme  for  saving energy 
Source:  J.Klihl  82,  SVR,  ownestimates - 306  -
Little empirical  data  is given  for  backing  up  the political 
and  theoretical discussion about  the  feasibility of  such 
programmes;  thus  the existing data  mainly relate to the  already 
mentioned  programme  for  the  'promotion of construction and 
other  investments.' 
M0st  of all an  empirical  investigation about effects of 
expenditure  programmes  executed  by  the  DIW  (german  institut 
for  economic  research)  and  JAB  is to be  mentioned.  For  the 
evaluation of  the effectivity of  the  programme,  the  production 
and  employment  effects  have  been  estimated  on  the basis of  an 
input/output  model  (disaggregated  in  56  industrial branches) 
broadend  by  a  keyneasian  income-multiplier. 
Table  9 
Programme  fer  the  promotion of  construction and other 
investment3 
--···--------------·-----
prog  ranune 
1 •  corrmunal  infrastructure and 
city modernization 
2.  housing rrodemization 
3.  refinancing of  'Bausparvertrage' 
(building loan contract) 
4.  state investrrents 
5..  job creation schexres 
c~.ntralgovernrrent, federal 
gover1'llrei'lt,  camru.ni  ties 
- in mill.DM -
2.450 
700 
300 
1.200 
600 
6.  loans for financial assistance of ccmnunal 
invest.nEnt and prarotion of the ERP-enviro-
ment conservation programmes  - total  500 
5.750  total prograrrrne 
(1)  Communities  themselves  participate with  500  rnill.DM, 
bookes  in this  own  budget-
Source:  Bundesratsdrucksache  522/75  vorn  5.9.1975,  8.2, 
aus  Spitznagel,  1976 
Production  and  employment  effects were  distinguishea in  3 
operational  levels.  The  first level  of effects concerns  so 
called directs effects resulting  from  the original financial 
incentives which  directly  yield  the  respective  areas  of  industrie - 307  -
The  indirect effect are  those  which  are  a  result of  intermediate 
goods  and  services  as  provided to satisfy the directly  induced 
demand  and multiplier induced effects.  The  latter show additional 
effectscaused by  income  and  consumption effects.  They  can again 
be distinguished  in direct and  indirect effects,  which  cor~espond 
to  induced  consumer  expenditures  and  the thereto attached inter-
~rediate goods  and services. The  production effects of  the entire 
programme,  disaggregated according  to this classification, 
is  shown  in table  10. 
Table  10 
Production effects 
extended  input-output model  direct 
multiplier  induced 
indirect 
total 
direct 
indirect 
Source: Estimations of the DIN; 
amount  - mill.DM  -
4.930 
2.680 
2.011 
4.210 
13.851 
Progranne for the irrproverrent for the construction a.  o.  investm:mts 
The  next table  shows  the distribution for  the  individual 
economic  branches 
Table  11 
Production effects regarding  individual branches  in  % 
mining 
basic  industrie 
investment goods 
consumer  goods  industrie 
food,  drink,  tobacco 
whole  industrie 
whole  construction 
others 
% 
0,77 
16,33 
12,79 
5,54 
3,86 
39,29 
30,03 
5,75 
Source: Prograrnre  for the improverent for the oo113tnlction  and other 
invest:Irents estinations of the DU'l,  estinations Spitznagell976 
In  the  next  two  tables corresponding classified employment 
effects are  shown. Table  12: 
Employment  effects 
direct 
multiplier  induced 
direct 
indirect 
indirect 
total 
- 308  -
persons  total 
125.069 
54.582 
36.674 
66.598 
282.923 
Source: Proqran:ne for the i.rrprover.ent  for the construction and other 
invest:r."ents  estiMations of the  nn~7,  estinations Spitznagel 1976 
Table  13: 
Employment effects regarding  economy  branches  in  % 
mining 
basic  indu.strie 
investment  goods  industrie 
consumer  goods  industrie 
food,  drink,  tabacco 
whole  industrie 
construction 
total 
% 
0,68 
7,10 
9,75 
4,43 
1, 14 
23,10 
38,18 
100,00 
Source: Progranr:l2  for the i.r.19roven:!11t  for the constructi()n and other 
investrrents cstirrations of the  Oil~,  estimations Spitznagel 1976 
The  different distribution of  employment  and  production effec-
tivity is mainly  to be  seen  on  account of  productivity 
differentials,  but also of  presumptions  about  'branch-typical' 
patterns  in  hiring  and dismiss-policies;  those  presumptions 
base  on  the confrontation of extrapolated  and  projected 
to  subsequent  dates  work  volume  coefficients,  that indicate 
the degree  of utilization of  emPbyed  work  volume  regarding 
individual  branches  (see Spitznagel  1976) - 309  -
The  programme  for  'growth-and  enviroment political provision• 
(ZIP)  from  October  1977  and  effecti~mainly in the  period 
between  1978-1981,  was  planned to have  a  volume  of  16  bill.DM. 
Table  14: 
ZIP-programme  planning 
areas  planned  (1)  Investment 
mill~DM 
transport and  communication 
public heating  supply 
gas  energy water 
residential enviroment 
vocational training 
(1)  Planned  investment:  public budgets 
Sruttce: W.MeiBner,  E.Hodl,  1982 
3.319 
823 
4.006 
3.885 
600 
The  extremely heavy utilization, especially in the areas of 
public heating  supply,  water,  residential infrastructure led 
to an extension of the  programme  finally  amount~ to  20  bill.DM. 
Table  15: 
Programme  for  ZIP-expenditures  - in mill.DM  -
improvement  in transport 
soft energy 
future  water  supply 
improvement of  residential 
enviroment 
vocational  training 
expenditures  (1) 
till 31.12.81 
3.087,9 
781,5 
1.643,0 
1.397,3 
285,7 
5.890,4 
(1)  Central  government  funds 
total investment 
volume 
3.890,4 
3.567,5 
5.981,4 
6.741,0 
816,2 
20.996,5 
Source:  Aktuelle Beitrage zur Wirtschafts- und  Finanzpolitik 
Nr.  21 I 198 2 
Concerning  two  aspects  the entire operational process of  ZIP 
is basically being  judged positively.The first aspect refers - 310  -
to the  fact that the beginning as well as  the  implementation 
of  ZIP  was  realized  sooner  than  expected.  The  second aspect 
regards  the  final  volume  that exceeded  the originally planned 
volume  with  4  bill.  OM. 
The  experiences gained  from  the  realization MeiBner·and 
Hodle  (1982)  summarize  as  follows: 
In spite of  the  short-dated development  and  the different 
departmental  responsibilities for  ZIP  the operation was  per-
formed  considerably frictionless;  this even  under existing 
disparities between  programme  concept  and  inter~of fede-
ral resp.  department  management.  Th~ ~hort initial. period 
- about  1/2  year  - after which  the planned  volume  had al-
ready  been  exceeded,  suggests  ~hat deadweight must  have 
played  a  considerable role  (operation of  'stored'  programmes). 
As  for  the  medium-term lay-out of the porgramme,  time  could 
have  been  gained  for  planning  new  operation~  which  is acbu-
ally being  proved  by  the distribution of  funds  since  1978. 
The  fact that it was  possible to extend the financial  means 
of the year  1979  ~ as  the  'Konjunkturrat•  had  recommended 
- signals,  that medium-term programmes  are comparatively  eas~ 
to control.  Yet,  since the construction industry was  fa-
voured,  1978  (cyclical upturn)  tight  spot~ of capaciting 
were  to  face  which  led to price increases.  For  future 
programmes  the capacity utilization plus  the elasticity of 
supply of potential contracters  should  ~e subject to more 
detailed analysis before it is being decided on  the  volume. 
ZIP  shows  a  remarkable  time difference  between the placing 
of orders  and  settlement of  account.  Till  1979  only  4  bill.DM 
were  booked,  this under  the condition of already high pro-
duction  and  employment effects. - 311  -
Table  16: 
Operation of order volume 
Order volume 
1977  ca.  4,5  mrd.DM 
1978  ca.  6,3  mrd.DM 
1979  ca.  4,2  mrd.DM 
1980  ca.  2,0  mrd.DM 
1981  ca.  3~0  Plrd~Dl-1 
Source:  w.  MeiSner,  E.  HBdl,  1982 
It  ispr~ily  on account of additional expenditures of  federal 
governments  and  communities  that the total volume  is 25  % 
above  the orginally planned volume;  however  the  ~ncorporation 
of  privatesponsors was  insufficent,  eventually  awing  to  the 
specific contexual oriention in  the selection of projects. 
A different mode  of  selection could have enabled the!ncor-
p~ration of privateenterprise even within the  given organisa-
tional structur.  The  production effects are  shown  in the table 
below,  the disaggregation corresponds with the  ohe  already 
described  in connection with  the  programme  for  the  'proMotion 
of construction and other  investments'.~owever the expanded 
~nput/output model  of  HWW~  (Hamburger Weltwirtschaftsarchiv), 
which  formed  the basis for  the estimation of  the  production 
and  employment effects of  ZIP  does  not correspond with  th~ 
DIW  model  that has  been developed  for  the evaluation of  the 
employment effects of  the  programme  for  the  •promotion of  con-
struction and  other  investments'.  The  income modificated  effects 
of the  HWWA  model  are  lower  which  means  that poth models  can 
9nly be  compared with certain restictions. - 312  -
Table  17: 
Gross  production effects of  ZIP  according  to  input/output 
model  (in mill.  DM) 
direct effects 
indirect effects 
total  (not  extended  input7output model) 
income  induced effects 
total production effects  (extended 
input/output model) 
(Prices of  1977) 
16.868 
13.783 
30.654 
16.398 
47.398 
Source:  HWWA,  Analyse  der  strukturellen Entwicklung der deut-
schen Wirtschaft,  Hamburg  1981,  aus:  W.  MeiSner, 
E.  Hodl.,  1981 
The  degre·a  of  disaggregation of production effects of  the  indi-
vidual  branches  shows  e<tremely  significant direct effects 
for  buildings.  (11.965  mill.DM,  so about  71  %) 
The  distribution of  the  total production effects can been 
found  in table  19,  together with  the distribution of employment 
effects.To serve  the maintenance  of  employment  was  only one 
of  several objectives when  ZIP was  enacted.  Yet,:  with  the  intensifi-
cation of  employment  problems,  this  aim  became  more  and  more 
the  focus  of attention.  The  administration did not present 
an  analysis concerning  employment  effects.  Nevertheless  there 
is an  analysis conducted  by  the  HWWA,  avaible about  the employ-
ment  effects of  ZIP.  Based  on  DIW-estimations,  Tofaute  (1977) 
~~~!.!~~~_9  ___  the  emplo¥~en_!:  _  _::~!ects per unit of expe!ld~ture rather 
low  in  comparison  to regular publlc expenditures. 
Table  18: 
Employment  effects  (persons) 
non-extendet  input/output model 
extendet  input/output model 
total 
305.373 
144.209 
457.150 
Source:  HWWA,  Analyse  der strukturellen Entwicklung  der  deut-
schen Wirtschaft,  Hamburg  1981,  aus:  W.  MeiBner, 
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The  distribution of  production  and  employment effects can be 
found  in the  following  table,  based  on  estimations of  the 
same  institut. 
Table  19: 
Distribution of  production  and  employment effects of  ZIP 
according  to the  extended  input/output model 
agriculture 
chemicals 
distribution 
of  production 
2.6 
1 • 4 
bricks,  poltery,  glas,  cement etc.  3.6 
iron and  steel  5.8 
mechanical  engineering 
electrical 
toys 
furniture 
clothing 
food,  drink,  tabacco 
building 
wholesale 
railway 
Bundespost 
insurance,  banking  and  finance 
hotels etc. 
miscellaneous  services 
domestic 
others 
total 
3.3 
2.9 
1 • 2 
3.3 
1 • 0 
2.2 
26.1 
3.5 
0,5 
1 • 6 
1 • 4 
1 • 6 
8.2 
0.5 
29.3 
100  % 
employment 
effects 
6.8 
1 • 2 
2.7 
6.0 
3.2 
3.0 
1 • 2 
2.4 
1 • 5 
1 • 2 
33.3 
1 • 3 
1 • 2 
1 • 5 
1 • 3 
1 • 8 
9.3 
1 • 4 
19.7 
100  % 
Source:  HWWA,  Analyse  der  strukturellen Entwicklu.ng  der deut-
schen Wirtschaft,  Hamburg  1981,  aus:  w.  MeiSner, 
E.  Hodl,  1 9 81 - 314  -
Surrunarizing  the presented  evaluations  on the  employment  ef-
fects  of public expenditure programmes  two  conclusions  can 
be  drawn:  an  expansive  financ~al policy  cle~rly reveals 
~m2J_~yment effects  under  a  middle-term  desig~- (DIW,  1982). 
J~.f  -~-h-~_  mo_t:leta_r:.:L._.E_oli~y  course is li  t_tle  restrictive  crowdi~ 
£2}:lt: __ ._Q.ffectL~..r~on1.Y_to exEect  to  a  small  extent  (DIW,  1982) .. 
Nevertheless it has  to be  considered that an  expensive fis-
cal  policy is confronted with the  dilemma  of  a  short-term 
success  and  the necessity of middle- and  long-term oriented 
structurepolicy.  !i_expansive expenditure policy wants  to 
be  __ _g_t"-!~~_gce~_s  in short  ·term  iJ:.  has  to trie to stimulate 
tho_~-~--_9-~ma~_g  effective economical  branchesJ  __  !ihich suffer 
spec:_~_f_~-~--~~E_!_oy_f!l~_n~:- problem~  (Bolle,  1977).  If, on  the other 
side  not  only  those  sectors shall  be quasi-subsidized which 
cannot  be maintained profitably in middle  and  long terms 
also  an~~~~nsive employment policy has  to be  substantiated 
stru_~~!~~pol~_~ically  (Scharpf;  1980;  Tofaute,  1982).  Finally 
it is to take  into consideration that an  expansive  financial 
policy,  aiming at employment political effects might  re-
quire  such skills of  labour  force  which  do  not  coincide 
with  the skills disposed  of  by  the  unemnloyeq~_Thus,  an  extensive 
expend_~~!:!!'_~_ policy h?s  to be  flanked  by  measures  for  the 
promotion  __  ~!:  mobility and  flexibility of  the  labour market 
(Bolle,  1979). - 315  -
4.  Promotion  of  private  investment 
Public  instruments  for direct promotion  of  investment  are  -
under  the  aspect  of  employment  policy  - general  investment 
grants,  subsidies of different means,  amortization possibi-
lities,  tax policies  and all  instruments  for  regional  economy 
promotion. 
Since  1970 general  investment grants  have  been offered in 
the  Federal  Republic  twice.  First 1974,  for six months  at a 
rate of  7.5%;  second within  'the employment  promotion act 1982' 
at a  rate of  10%  of  the  investment  volume  and  for  the period 
of  the entire year.  In both  cases  a  time  limit was  set up 
according to the date  of  order,  which  had  to be  completed  one 
year after.  With  the  emergence of this act governmental offi-
cials expected  a  premature  additional  investment  volume  of 
40 bill.  DM  from  the  investment grant  'Operation 1982'  as  being 
the core  of  the  'employment  programme  '82 • . 
The  theoretical and political discussion  about this and pro-
ceeding  investment grants  focusses  on  the question,  if such 
grants actually provide  incentives  for  investment activities, 
as  such that employment  will  increase  by  induced  m\'l tplier 
effects,  of if investment grants  only generate  an anticipation 
of  investments  which  would  have  been  done  anyway. 
Proponents  of this  instrument print to the  financiAl  burden 
for  employers  as  being the essential cause  for  investment 
barriers,  thus,  favouring all measures  taken towards  a 
reduction of  these barriers  including the  investment 
grant;  yet,  it is only  regarded  as  a  resonable  measure 
in combination with  further  supply orientated measures.  (Arbeits-
gemeinschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute, 
1982). 
Although  employers  share this positiv judgement  in general 
-one step towards  the right direction  - (BOA-employers' 
association}  they are critizing that-only those  companies  with 
• - 316  -
an  investment  volume  exceeding the one  of the  proceeding 
three years  are elegible to the grant.  Thus,  such  firms that 
have  - for  instance  - also  invested 1980  and  1981,  which 
means  anticyclically  and  therefore of  economical  benefit,  would 
be  discriminated.  The  fact that this grant is only offered 
for  1982  is  being criticized,  since first of all, this runs 
the  risk of  .. inducing  a  short-term boom  in  1983,  fol-
lowed  by  an 
11 investment  hole",  and  tsecondly  that  sizable 
technical projects with  a  long-term running  time would  be 
unsufficently considered through  the current specification. 
The  decision-making process  that has  led to  a  refusal of 
the  investment  grant act  by  Baden-Nurttemberg,  Rheinland 
Pfalz  und  Bayern  in the Deutsche  Bundesrat, rnirrows  the 
latter menti.oned  argument.  Further this side argues  against 
the  funding  of the measure  through  income-tax  and  "Korper-
schaftssteuer"  (corporation tax).  The  financiel  burden  of 
4 2. 5%  of  t.otal  expenditure  upon  federal  governments  and 
15%  of total expenditure  upon  communities  resulting from 
thj.s  mode  of  funding,  are not  met  by  planned additional re-
venue  (Der  Rheinland-Pfalzische  Mini~ter flir Wirtschaft 
und  Verkehr,  1982). 
Critical voices  of the  investment grant  are based  on  analy-
sis that suggest  insufficient sale expectations of enter-~, 
p rises  .  ~s the predominant  cause for the disinclination 
to invest.  Thus,  the  funding of an  investment grant by in-
come-tax  and  K5rperschaftssteuer is  just  a  redistribution 
of  wor~e;-__ ~-~- -~ages into  entreprcre:~r 's profit,  without  these 
Ero~i~?  le~9ing to  a  middl~~term increase_ in  investment acti-
vi-t:.Y_(Memorandum'82).  An  another distributional effect is 
critisized by  the  WSI-Economic  and  Social  Institute of the 
DGB  (Tofaute,  1982):  they  argue  that  smaller firms  are dis-
criminated  because  of their  averagely  lower  investment  vo-
lume  as  well  as  of their limited ability for  long-term  finan-.;_ 
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cial planning.  By  the  DIW  (German  Institute for  Economy) 
(DIW  '82),  it is being criticized that the  investment goods 
industry would  benefit the most.  Positions closely related 
to trade unions  are objecting to the  ·non-selective lay-out 
of  the measure  (neither specification regarding sort of  in-
vestment  nor  regarding categories of  enterprise).  Rather, 
the  experiences gained  from  the  investment grant  1975  and 
the  following  trade recession prove  that  a  selective growth 
policy is necessary. 
Despite  some  estimations on the  employment effect of  invest-
~ent grants  (the  DIW  regards  the additional  volume  of  invest-
ment  of  40 bill.  DM  as  estimated by  the  government  as  being 
too high) and  some  partial reviews  a  lack of  research is to 
be  noticed,  that is only insufficiently covered by  the work 
done  by  the Institut flir Wirtschaftsforschung  (IFO)  (institute 
for  economical  research),  Mtinchen(Gerstenberger/Neumann,  1976; 
Gerstenberger,  1977). 
Results  of this study  on  the  investment promotion act of  1975 
(Gerstenberger 1977)  prove,  that little more  than half of the 
firms  have  placed  o~ders shortly before the deadline of  pro-
:rrotion.  The  demand of the industry for  investment goods  during the 
time of operation has  indeed  increased compared to the assumed 
investment activity without grants.  It  would  have  been at 
a  8  bill.  DM  lower rate.  on  the other hand  95%  )f the more-
investing  firms  have  just done  their long-termplanned  invest~. 
rnents  earlier.  An  overproportional  increase of  receipts of 
orders  in the motor vehicle construction was  apparent,  this 
probably on  account of su~idizing the purchase of business  -
and  duty  cars  (see  Stabbatin,  1977). 
Factual  employment  effects  have  not  been  proved.  Potential 
employment  effects have  inithe first place been  compensated 
by tanporal adaptation  strategies  (see  Hemmerich  1982) •  Further 
price adaptations  could  be  observed.  The  potential  employment - 318  -
effects also  have  to  be  distinguished  as .to  different  sorts 
of  investment:  strategical  investments  - in the research 
sector,  administration etc.  - are  determined  by  long-term 
(~xpcctations for  tl1e  future,  which  means  that these  invest-
n:cn~:_s  are  not  influenced by  short-term grants. 
Obligatory  investments- thosefuat are  imposed  by  the govern-
ment  like technical  safety measures  etc  - are placed earlier 
and  such might generate  short-term employment  effects but 
do  not  promote  employment  in the  long  run .  Premature ratio-
nalization  investments  induce  an  increase of  orders  in the 
investment  goods industry,  which  can  either be  translated 
into employment  effects or  into  an  extension of the real 
weekly  working-time. In rationalizing firms  a  decrease  in 
employment  is  assumed  which  could be  met  by  long-term  em-
ploylltent  effects  through  an  inprovement of international 
competetivene.c:-:s. 
Ex_:p<?:!]._~_~on  !_nvestments  are  eventually realized sooner  and 
th\_:!_~-~-~~El__~-~~-t  effective because  of multiplier  c!nd  accele-
rator effects  (see  Hemmerich,  1982). 
Regarding  the  investments grant  1982  similar effects can 
be  presurred  this  in spite of  a  longer  period of validity 
(12  instead of  8  months)  and  a  higher  allowance  (10%  instead 
of  7. 5%)  •  Q.~-~-~~~-!_g_ht_L~l!~!:  co_~]..§  _ _!!_ave  _be~!._l---~-!?~e~ved  in }974  ~ 
is  ___ only  _pa!~-~-~-~blY~"Y.9_~ded  by tighter promotion  specifica-
tions  (the investrrent voll..liTe  , t.o  pro'Ti::'te  has  to be  above  the 
average  of  the  last  3  years):  firms  are settling up  leasing-
companies  anc~ thus  evade  the promotion  specifications 
(Spiegel  36/82). 
Based  on  these points  of critic and  the  recognized mechanisms 
such  concepts  have  been  developed,  that  tie  the  investment 
grant tc stricter criteria  for  instance  only  for  energy 
saving  and  energy  substituting  investments  and  for  smaller - 319  -
and middle-sized companies  (Roth  1982).  Other  ideas  suggest 
the  linkage  of investment grants to an  evident  increase of 
employment  and  the  approval  by  the workers  council. 
Regional  Promotion 
In the  Federal  Republic  the promotion  of  regional  economy 
structure is mainly performed on  the  basis  of the  'common 
task for  the promotion  of regional  economy  structure',  but 
also through  the  EEC  regional  fond  and  by special plans of 
federal  governments.  Since  the  Federal  Republic  only receives 
6%  of all EEC-funds  and  the allocation of  funds by-federal go-
vernments  is of  negligeable  volu::n.e  plus not available · · 
in  disaggregated data,  the  following  only refers to expen-
ditures  of  the·  'conunon  task' .  In this context it might  only 
be of  interest that the  Federal  Republic with exeption of 
West-Berlin  and  the  'Zonenrandgebiet'  {region boardering 
on  the  DDR)  is considered  as  "main  land"  according to  EEC-
definition,  what  means  that the  promotion of  investment  is 
not  to  exceed  20%  of total  investment  volume.  The  "10  Rah-
menplan"  (  scope - plan )  with a  validity period 
lasting from  1981  to  1984  intends  the  promotion  of  72  900 
jobs to be  created and  209  200  jobs to be maintained.  As 
before,  this shall  be  realized through the possibility of 
increased  depreciation  staggered according to the necces-
cities  of the  promoted area.  Further subsidies shall be 
given  in  form  of tax free  investment  aids  and  general grants. 
At  least in  comparison with other types,  ~e quality of 
this kind  of  subsidisation finds  general  approval  with  respect 
to its aim  in view  and  to its  bureaucratic  coordination 
(Political Party  Comment). - 320  -
Nevertheless  the official data  being cited for  proving the  suc-
cess  of this policy  so  far,  have  been  doubted.  The  7th  sub-
sidy report quotes,  that  from  1972  to  1978  investments  of 
industrial  trade have  been  promoted  with  .§__~ ~5  ___  bi)..l.  __ _!?1:_1  _  _!/_hic;h 
(~'-?.0_t_  r~_~_u!:~~<?  .. _  t._o  __  ·t~e_ -~~-~~_!:j._~I?-___  '2~---~~Q  ___ _9_QQ  _  _j_Q~~---an_Q_llel~_!.Q 
.rr.a:i r~~~~Jn  ______  'Z_~_Q_. ~??.Q_~~~-~E.gered  _jgbs.  Yet,  the  same  report prints 
to the  lack of efficiency control  which  promted the 
DIW  to  study the  employment  effects.  According to the eva-
luation of  the  DIW  (DIW,  6/82)  a  significant  impact  of 
the  investm~_!!._L_QE.Qmot_!S?E~ii?:~e:~-~ment activities could not 
have  --~~er:  _  _pro'::.ed . ... 
• 
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II  REDISTRIBUTION  OF  AVAILABLE  WORK-LOAD 
In  connection with  forecasts  about  economic  growth rates  com-
tinuing to stagnate 
11the  controversing without  end"  (Mettel-
siefen,  1979)  on  working-time  reduction  has  been  revitalized 
in  the mid-70s.  Indiscriminatingly presented position led 
to  a  situation equalling "religious strife".  Proponents  of 
working-time  reductions  initially based  their arguments  on 
trivial models  of the  following  kind:  in 1978  with  21.6 million 
employees  the  number  of hours  worked  amounted  to  approximately 
37.5  million.  The  actual  annual  working-time  per employee 
was  thus  1,733  hours.  Distributed among  52  weeks  this  results 
in  a  weekly working-time of about  33  hours.  A  reduction of 
this weekly working-time  by  one  hour  adds  up  to an  employment 
gain of  672  000 persons  given that the  number  of hours  worked 
remains  unchanged.  These  models  initially abstracting from 
different  forms  working-time  reductions  were  enlarged by  ex-
tended  calculations that,  however,  led to greatly differing 
results  as  the  following  comparison  shows. 
Deviations of the anticipated employment  effects of  50%  are 
mainly  due  to differing assumptions  on  the difference between 
bargained and  actual working-time  and  the  transformation of 
working-time  into employment • - 322  -
Table  1: 
Anticipated Employment  effects assuming different forms 
of working-time  reductions 
Measures 
One  hour per week 
One  week  of holidays 
Introduction of the 
mandatory  lOth year of 
school 
Flexible retirement age 
for  men  at 60  and  for 
women  at  58 
lowering retirment  age 
Model 
jobs 
600  000 
500  000 
300  000 
300  000 
I  Model 
jobs 
300  000 
250  000 
150 000 
'  ... -
by  2  years  250  000 
20%  more  part-time work  300  to  400  000 
Voluntary  part~time work 
Child-care year  300  000 
Reduction  of overtime 
Source:  Model  I,  Mertens  1982 
Model  II,  Vilmar  1982 
1.300 000 
150  000 
II 
Opponents  of working-time  reductions most  of all point at the 
cost effects.  One  subject of primary  importance  in union 
calls for working-time  reductions is full  wage  compensation. 
(cf.  Vilrnar,  1982),  whereas  employers  point out that parti-
cularly the realisation of this  rmns  the greatest risk to even-
tually being counterintentional.  If the  companies'  costs were 
rising further  - so their argument  - the substitution of labour 
by  capital would  be  likely to rise or the canpetitive position would 
be  deteriorate dramatically.  In  each of  those cases  employment 
effects would  be  compensated  (cf.  Esser,  1982).  Recently this 
argument  seems  to  have  found  entrance into trade  union  consi-
derations  about working-time  reductions.  The  notion of full 
wage  cornpensatio~ is modified,  in  some  cases this notion is 
completely  disavowed  (cf.  Grottian,  1982).  This  is  supported 
by  surveys  showing  that on  the one  hand  the solidarity of those 
in employment  with those  out of it has  been  rising and  that 
., 
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on  the other hand,  the preference for  additional  leisure also 
rose,  so that nominal  and  real wage  cuts  in proportion  to the 
reduction of working-time  would  be  accepted  (cf.  Vilmar,  1982). 
One  problem not yet  solved in this  context  in particular apply-
ing to the public sector is  a  guarantee  for  additional hirings 
through  the savings  (cf.  Seifert,  1977). 
In  the meantime,  however,  well-grounded  studies  on  the  em-
ployment  --and  cost ·  effects of different forms  of working-
time  reductions  are available that contributed to making  the 
discussion more  matter-of-fact.  Studies  of  the  Institut ftir 
Arbeitsmarkt- und  Berufsforschung  (Mertens,  1979,  Bach et al. 
1978),  of the  HWWA-Institut  ftir Wirtschaftsforschung Hamburg 
(Wohlers,  1981)  and  the  Forschungsstelle  ftir  sozialokonornik 
der Arbeit  (FSA),  Berlin  (Bolle et al.,  1982a,  1982b).  In the 
studies analysing quantitive effects mentioned it has  been 
proven  that reductions of the nominal  contractial working-
time  also reduce  actual working hours.  The  most  important re-
sult of these  analyses  is that reduced  contractual hours  have 
effects on  actual working  hours.  Speculations that working-time 
reductions  might  be  completely  compensated  by additional over-
time  have  not  been  confirmed to the extent that pessimistic 
analysts  (Mendius,  1978)  had  assumed.  Empirical  research on 
statistical and micro  levels has  shown  that overtime  and  sur-
plus work  are  company  instruments  to cope with  short-term 
labour  requirements.  If this short-term disequlibrium turns 
out to be  long-term,  companies  react to -this with hirings. 
A  gros  employment  effect of  60%  of  the working-time  reduced 
has  been  forecast  as  a  reference date  (Bolle,  1982a,b). 
Measurable  employment  effects however,  do  not  only depend  on 
the  transformation of contractual  into actual  working  hours, 
but also on  working-time  induced  productivity gains.  These 
can  be  expected because of increased utilization of  labour 
and machinery  following  working-time  reductions.  Industry 
studies have  revealed that  the differing  production  require-
ments  and  employment  conditions will  lead to different em-- 324  -
ployment  effects resulting· from  this feature's  mode  of ope-
ration.  Addi tiona!  costs (non wage  costs) will be reduced by those 
EE~~uc~ivity  ~~jn~ Differing conditions  due  to  technology 
an6  work  organisation modify  these costs  (cf.  ibid).  Since 
equal  working-time  reductions  have  varying effects,  it  is 
oQ_~~-t,.Q_:Y,_§  ___ t~--~§-_!!_f:Q!:_ the  imp_lem~_~:!:_~tion of  __  ind~?try specific 
1'@-Y§  _ _Qf__w:Qfki_:gg-time  reductions. 
The  discussion  on  effects of different  forms  of working-time 
reductions 
The  mentioned  mechanisms  operate at all  forms  of working-time 
reductions.  But  by  taking  the  lowering of retirement  age  and 
part-time  work  or job-splitting resp.  being  the most  promising 
and  most  passionately discussed alternatives to reducing 
weekly  hours  as  examples  some  special  problems  can  be illu-
strated  (cf.  Offe et al.,  1982). 
The  reduction of  life-time working  by  means  of early retirement 
is discussed in different variants  and  has  already been  im-
plemented  in  some  industries.  This  form  of working-time  reduc-
tions  is basically possible  through  legal  and collective bar-
gaining arrangements.  Common  to all of  these,  however,  is 
that the period until readhinggenerar  retirement  age  has  to 
be  bridged financially.  Some  proposals  (e.g.  contractual 
retirement pay  in  the  tabacco  industry)  combine  early retirement 
with  an  option  for  a  reduced weekly working-time. 
That  the opportunity for early retirement would  be  taken  up 
by  eligible employees,  is generally not  questioned.  A  study 
by  the  Institut ftir  Arbeitswarkt- und  Becufsforschung  revealed 
tl}§_t__a.pproxim~!:-~_ly~O~___Q_f  ___ t:l.ll  -~I_!!E.!_9yed  woulct be  interested in 
early  retir~n:te~~-~yided that  ~heir living-standards were 
~u~fi£ieE~ly_~~f~~gua£ded  (Betr.AP,42.2).  Ktihlewind  (1977) 
estimates that the  implementation  of this option would  lead 
to  the  ~t~?r~~al 91  280  000 pe!sons  from  the  labour  market. - 325  -
Considering,  however,  that in  1980 only  264  000  men  aged  60  to 
65  were  employed  (women  generally are  not  considered  in this 
discussion,  since their legal  retirement  age  is 60)  actual 
take  up  should be  considerably  lower  (cf.  Backer  and  Naegele, 
1981).  Backer  and  Naegele  estimate  that onlr 110  000  persons 
would  make  use  of early retirement.  On  the  reasonable  assump-
tion of  a  70%  rate and  that  20%  of this would  be  from  the 
hidden  reserve  they  foresee  "a  reduction of registered unem-
ployment  by  61  600 persons  (ibid.,  p.  688).  This  cost account 
would  accordingly turn out  ~~  b~  conside~ably ~orse than 
that calculated by  Vilmar  (~9~2) :_~hil~  th~ retirement  insurance 
would  be  charged  ___ with  an  a~_di!._~onal  DM  1. 716  billion,  unemploy-
ment  insurance would  only  be  relieved by  DM  739,2 billion.  This 
would  necessarily have  to be  financed  by  reducing pensions 
and  raising contributions. 
But  other disadvantages  of early retirement are pointed out 
as  well.  Older persons  could be marginalised in the  long  rund, 
the  cornpanies'age  structure could be  changed,  rationalizations 
would  thus  be  encouraged  (Blume  et al.,  1979).  The latter 
arguments  would  also be  true for  reductions  of retirement age 
by  bargaining agreements.  Aggravating  things  further would  be 
that only financially  sound  firms  would  be  able  to cope with 
the additional  costs  incurred.  An  effect necessarily detrimental 
to  the  social order would  be  the furtherdispersal of the re-
tirement  age  system  (compare  with Backer  and  Naegele,  1981). 
The  so-called  '59  rule'  that had  been  incorporated in  some 
regional  agreements  during  the  74/75  economic  downturn  can 
serve  as  an  illustration for  the  advantages  as  well  as  dis-
advantages  of this way  of work  redistribution. 
An  advantage  would  be  that,  especially in the  trade-unions' 
view,  redundancies  had  been  avoided.  For  the  companies,  however, 
ealry retirement proved to be  a  problem after the recession, 
because  the necessary qualified employees  could only  be  hired 
under  high costs.  This  experience is often  cited by  employers -·  3 26  -
when  pointing at the irreversibility of early retirement.  It  -------
is  feared  that because of  the loss of  qualified workers  in-
vestment  into labour would  be  devalued  and  that therefore 
productivity would  dramatically fall  (cf.  Frankfurter Rund-
sche:.,J,  19.6~1981). 
Like  the  lowering of  retirement  age  the promotion of part-
time  employment  and  as  a  special  form  thereof  the  job-split-
ting  (making part-time work  more  flexible)  are heavily 
disputed. 
Part-time  jobs  have  increasingly  been  set up  in  the public 
sector as  well  as  in private companies.  The  hitherto existing 
regional  promotion  programmes  (s.  appendix),  however,  ex~ 
elude  public  authorit.ies  and  usually public corporations  as 
well.  The  debate  on  the promotion  of part-time  employment 
therefore  deals  mainly  with  the private sector  (exception: 
Strauch,  1979). 
Although,  as  mentioned,  part-time work  is encouraged  in  five 
federal  states,  only Rhineland-Palatine provided  for  accompany-
ing  research.  Other  results refer to evalutations  and  empirical 
reports.  Common  finding is on  the one  hand  a  prevailed uti-
li~~~on by manufacturing  firms  employing  less than  50 persons 
and  on  the other hand  by  almost  100%  female  ~loyees •  Skill 
requirements  differ.  While  the Hessian  programme  requires  occu-
pational training for  41%  of  promoted part--time  jobs,  the 
Rhineland-Palatine  programme  set up  uo  educational or training 
requirements  for  90%  of the  jobs.  An  extension of part-time 
employment  to groups  with  higher skill  levels or male  workers 
could not  be  realized.  Regarding  the promotion  of additional 
part-time work  through  financial  support  Gaugler et al.  (1980) 
express  pessimism.  They  estimate  that deadweight  - that is 
the  number  of  jobs  created anyway  - add_§_..J:l_p  __ ~_!:_wo  _th:~_rds of 
all  jobs  __  S~J?I?9.rted. (Weitzel  and  Hoff,  1981).  vJeitzel  and  Hoff - 327  -
{1981)  concluded that the hiring of part-time employers  would 
have  taken place in the  same  extent even without  assitance 
by  public  funds,  because  no  other personnel alternative had 
been  open  to the  firms". (p.53). 
These results  - together with additional considerations  -
caused the trade unions  (despite  some  internal quarrels) 
to  take  up  a  negative  pes  i tion alx>ut  this .subject.  The main argu-
ments  of the  DGB  against further  expansion of part-time work 
are:  part-time  employment  is a  form of  ~~~~~~g-time  red~ction 
without  wage  compensation,  it is concentrated  in unskilled 
areas heavily depending on  the  business  cycle,  it reduces  the 
employment  chances of those  unemployed  searching for  full-
time  jobs  and it consolidates  the traditional  separation be-
tween  men  and  women  in working  and  family  live  (DGB,  1981). 
Employers  on  the contrary favour  part-time employment.  This 
argument  fucuses  on  the  demand  for part-time employment  by 
job-searchers  (BOA,  1980).  The  opportunities for  setting-up 
part-time  jobs are not yet exhausted,  but  employees  must 
adapt to  company  requirements  more  flexibly.  The  BDA  report 
(ibid.)  points out,  that the willingness  to work  at other 
times  than  in the morning or part of the week  or the month 
resp.  should  be  promoted  by  adequate working  time offers.  ,,~ 
The  Arbeitsring Chemie  has  worked  out this suggestion to an 
initiative for  job-sharing  (Arbeitsring Chemie,  1980). 
These  initiatives were  followed  by  a  wide  scientific contro-
versy.  Scientists favouring  job-sharing emphasise  the  con-
~~r~nc~ of  indivi~ual  an~_~o~any preference~ (e.g.  Strlimpel, 
1979,  Mertens,  1979),  critics print_ to the  negligabl~ employ-
ment  effects and  to increasing work  intensity  (e.g.  Rose  1980, 
Taube!,  1981}.  Gabriel  (1982)  questions  the  assumed  process 
of the  concurrence of working-time preferences of  companies 
conditions of  segmented,  especially internal  labour markets, - 328  -
the  absence  of mobility and  skill flexibility of workers. 
Strategies to  reduce or make  working-time  more  flexible there-
fore  have  necessarily to be  tied to political strategies to 
overcome  segmentation,  to  increase skills and  implement  them 
on  a  company  level.  To  reduce  unemployment  competence  and 
control extensions,  interference with  the  autonomy  in staf-
fing decisions of companies  and workers  participation must 
not  be called for alternatively by  complentarity  (ibid.). 
Opportunities  for  action by  public authorities 
Working-time  is regulated  on  an  industrial level  by collec-
tive bargaining agreements,  on  a  regional  level  by  skeleton 
agreements  and  on  company  level  by  company  agreements.  Agree-
ments  on  working-ttme reductions  and their implementation are 
primarily subject to collective bargaining.  The  state,  however, 
can  promote  working-time  reductions with the  following  instru-
ments: 
- through the  amendment  of  the Arbeitszeitordnung  (Law 
regulating working-time)  as  proposed by MUchenberger  (1982) 
the  "normal  working-time"  can  be  reduced  legally.  ln ad-
dition to this over-time could  be  limited by  statute 
and  the general opportunity for  job-sharing could be 
opened  (quota  regulation). 
- By  reforming  social security law  unfavourable  consequen-
ces of part-time work  with  regard to social security re-
gulations could be mitigatived. 
- Under  the Promotion of Employment  Act it woulq  be  con-
ceivable to reimburse  employers  for  the costs of  sett+-!  -· 
ling up  part-time  jobs  pattern."  after the  promotion of 
part-time work  operated by  some  federal  states. 
- As  an overall measure  the  government  could  by  amending 
the active economic  stability act and  by  reviving the 
"Konzertierte Aktion"  make  strategies working-time  re-
ductions  subject of tripartite negotiations  (Vilrnar,  1982). -- 3 29  -
III  ADAPTATION  STiffiTEGIES 
1.  Adaptations of  the skill of  labour  supply to  demand 
In  the Federal  Reputlic exists  a  "dual  training system"  in 
which occupational  training is regulated within  the  scope 
of statutory rules  (federal act on occupational  training 
etc.)  by  industrial  agreements.  It is the authorities'  duty 
to  provide  the  trai1~ing  takin~ place  parall~~Y  ~~ Berufs-
schulen.  The  BA  the1efore  has  only  few  opportunities to in-
fluence  the initial  Jccupational  training.  The  BA  is limited 
to  finance  the trairing of apprentices or unemployed  persons 
according  to  §  40  ard.  §  40a  of  EPA,  to proviede  work  pre-
paration  schemes  either independently or in coorperation 
with other sponsors,  to provide grants  for  the establishment 
of training workshors within the  scope of the  institutional 
promotion of occupational  training and  buid  and  maintain 
institutions for wor ~.-preparation schemes,  especi.ally employ-
ment  rehabilitation.  Despite  these limitations the  fact that 
the  AFG  insti  tutione:1lized  measures  for  occupatio~_~_!___!.ra_i_ning 
is gener_ally  con~idcred to be  the  core  of the  1.~-.Pour  market 
~licy !eorientatio~ of  1969.  Against  the  background of the 
prevailing labour  su9ply deficits the qualitative importance 
of retraining and  furhter  education measures  can  he  explained 
as well  as  their  qtia
1ttitative  utilization until  1975.  As 
labour  market  problens  were  reversed after 1973  other  instru-
ments  like  job creation  schemes  and  wage  subsidies gained 
prominence.  The  allocation of  funds  for occupational  training 
was  adapted  to the cianged  situation,  funds  were  cut  in 
accordance  with the  ~udget structure act of  1975  as  well 
as  unter  the ~FKG of  1982  (cf.  Seifert/Mettelsiefcn,  1982, 
Seifert 1982).  Accoriing  to  growing  structural problems  on - 330  -
the  promotion was  concentrated on  groups  with special problems 
in order to  improve  their employment  chances.  The  promotion 
9~ upward  mobility  and  the regard  for  individual  job pre-
ferences  were  heduced  (cf.  Hofbauer,  1981). 
Table  1: 
Expenditure of the  BA-occupational  training 
Year  Expenditure on active  Expenditure on occu- 2 as % of 
labur market policy  pational training and 
in actural prices  retraining ace.  to 
in IMn  to §§41-50 EPA 
1  2  3 
1970  2.728  590  21,6 
1973  4.517  1.582  35,0 
1977  6.420  1.200  18,9 
1980  11.019  2.483  22,5 
Source:  Schober,  Mitt J\B  4/80 
The  total programme  is divided into schemes  for  further edu-
cation,  work  preparation measures,  motivational  promotion  for 
the  reintegration of unemployed  persons  and  the  promotion 
of occupational  training.  The  effecitivity and  utilization 
of the existing equipment  was  subject to a  number  of empi-
rical studies mostly done  by  the Institut fUr  Arbeitsmarkt-
und  Berufsforschung  (IAB).  The  results of  these studies can 
be  summarized  as  follows: 
Seifert  (Seifert,  1982)  finds  a  conceptional  change  in occu-
pational  further training  (furhter education and  retraining} . 
Emphysise  is not  laid on  global  employment policy as  in 
1974/75,  but  instead on  an  selective use of  funds  for  speci-
fic target groups.  Occupational  furhter  training serves  less 
the adaptation of  labour  supply to  changed  demand  profiles 
due  to  technological  change,  but  is increasingly used  to 
prevent  individual  unemployment. .. 
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The  share of participents breaking off or  completing courses 
unsuccessfully,  however,  is significantly high  (1978:  19%). 
Above  average  young  persons,  those without  leaving certifi-
cates,  unskilled workers,  unemployed  persons  as  well  as 
participants to long-term schemes  and  retrainees finish 
without certificates.  This  group oftenly becomes  unemployed 
after completing courses.  Table  2  shows  that these measures 
are only barely successful  in preventing individual  unemploy-
ment. 
Table  2: 
Participants in occupational training schem=s  (full-tirre)  conpleting 
successfully and unercplo~t before and after participationg,  subdi-
vided into sex and kird of scheioo. 
sex/kind of 
schene 
Total 
Men 
W::m:m 
Further educ. 
Retraining 
\'hrk prepar. 
SUccessfull participants 
Carpleting betweel 
1.7.  and  30.9.1980 
1 
total 
140  271 
86  371 
53  900 
94  581 
19  355 
26  335 
l.me:rployed before 
entering in % 
60.1 
51.2 
74.4 
58.7 
68.4 
59.0 
Source:  Karin Schober,  Mitt AB  4/80 
Unemployed  after 
ca:cpleting 
as percent of oolumn 
1  2 
7.2 
5 .. 8 
9.6 
8.2 
11.0 
1.2 
12.1 
11 .. 3 
13.0 
13.9 
16.1 
2.1 
The  IAB  study  (cf.  Hofbauer,  1979)  reveals that the chances 
for  reintegration into the labour market  are  inversely rela-
ted  to educational  achievement.  The  success,  however,  is more 
dependent  on  the  aims  of retraining or further  education 
schemes  (occupational qualification  (cf.  ibid). 
The  duration of  unemployment after successfully completing 
training schemes  decreases  by  an  average  of 10.5  weeks  for 
further  education  schemes  and  by  12  weeks  on  average  for - 332  -
retraining compared  to non-participants.  "Success"  is direct-
ly related to age. 
In  these  studies evaluated  employment  adequate with regard 
to  the training received  is an  important criterion for  the 
effectivity of  further  education.  About  70%  of  successful 
participants had  been adequately  employed  one  to  two  years 
after completion.  While  the kind of measures  is relatively 
insignificant with  regard  to  in-trade placement,  training 
contents  show  greater differences.  The  effecitivty of retrai-
ning for  employment rehabilitation  shows  only negligable 
differences regarding  unemployment  or adequate  employment 
after completion to the  placement rates of  non  disabled 
trainees  (cf.Hofbauer,  1981). 
Besides  further education and  retraining the  reintegration 
of  unemployed  persons  and  of disabled or otherwise disadvan-
taged  youths is one major activity of  the  BA.  Two  closely 
related instruments  "work  preparation cources"  and  the"year 
of basic occupational training"  have also been  subject to 
empirical research  by the  IAB  (Schober,  1980,  Mollwo,  1980). 
Out  of  the variety of courses offered by  the  BA  divided  into 
promotion  cources  (F),  course to  improve  reintegration chances 
(V)  and  basic training courses  (G),  those measures with the 
greatest quantitative  importance were  chosen.  They  primari-
ly relate to the reintegration of young  people  that are 
disabled or  lack the maturity to enter working life. 
The  target group defined according to each course's descrip-
tion is actually reached  to  a  large degree.  Disabled  persons 
and  participants of promotional  cources with  few  excetions 
usually enter directly after leaving school;  in basic trai-
ning  courses  for  unemployed  young  people  the  number  of  those 
entereing after a  period of  unemplyment  or unsucessful  job 
search prevails.  In  F  and  V courses  appr.  88%  complete,  in 
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the basic training course  invest~gated about  75%  complete. 
Of  the  reasons  responsible  for  breaking off transition into 
apprenticeships of ~mployment are  the most  frequently cited. 
The  break off quota  for  female  participants is lower  than 
that of male  participants  in all three  types of courses. 
The  following  table provides  a  survey over  the  movements 
of courses  empletors: 
Table  3: 
Participants of work  preparation courses  according to course 
type,  first labour market movement  after completion  and 
selected features  (in percent) 
M::>verrent  after 
c::x:mpletion 
GR.-course  n=lOO 
in-plant training 
school training 
nonnal employzoont 
\.inenployed 
not \\Orking 
F-Oourses  n=l~ 
in-plant training 
school training 
oonnal employnent 
Ul'le.I11?loyed 
not working 
V-courses n=lOO 
in-plant training 
school training 
nonral employm:mt 
Ul'le.I11?1oyoo 
not w::>rking 
total 
1  018 
10.0 
1.2 
36.3 
48.8 
3.6 
630 
48.1 
6.5 
15.7 
25.4 
4.3 
573 
20.6 
3.8 
42.4 
29.7 
3.5 
male 
582 
12.0 
36.3 
48.8 
2.1 
423 
56.7 
3.8 
13.5 
22.9 
3.1 
323 
26.3 
4 .. 6 
40.9 
24.8 
3.4 
Source:  Karin Schober,  Mitt AB  4/80 
female  without ·  --- ·  with 
leaving certification 
432 
7.4 
36.~ 
48.6 
5.8 
203 
30.1 
12.3 
20.7 
30.5 
6.4 
246 
12.6 
45.1 
35  .. 8 
644 
4.8 
37.7 
54.7 
2.3 
511 
47.6 
5.5 
16.1 
26.4 
4.5 
524 
20.2 
3.8 
41.6 
30.9 
3.4 
361 
19.4 
33.5 
39.1 
5.5 
108 
52.8 
11.1 
13.0 
19.4 
37 
37-:-9 
35.1 
27 .o 
The  degree  to which  the set targets are acchieved  correlates 
exc~ for  sex  and  educational  achievement also with  social 
backgrqund  and  tyEe  as well  as  sponsor of the course;  it must - 334  -
be  noticed that courses with  a  lower  number  of trainees have 
highe~ integrative chances. 
The  evaluation criterion lastly decisive  for  the  success 
of  the  courses is the stability of  the  ensuing  labour market 
integration.  Table  4  shows  types  of employment  integrative. 
The  feature  "usability" is an  indicator for  the quality of 
a  cource  according to the  subjective  judgement of participents. 
It shows  to what extent the contents of a  course were  appro-
priate for occupational  requirements. 
Table  4: 
Participants of  work  preparation courses  and  type of course 
and  type of  employment  integration - in percent  -
Type  of  course  F-course  V-course  G-cource 
St..abile in trai.Tling and  31.5  1.2.3  7.1 
usability 
12.6  5 .. 0  3 .. 2  Stabile in training without 
usability 
3.7  14.8  9.1  Stabile in employrrent and 
usability 
3.2  9.4  7.1  Stabile in employment 
without usability 
44.6  53.1  63.4  Instabile in training/ 
anployroont 
4.4  6.0  10.2  ~  integrated 
Source Mitt AB  4/80 
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A  comparative  study of participants and  non-participants  in 
work  preparation courses  revealed that labour market inte-
gration of participants was  just insignificantly higher  than 
that of  non  participants.  To  this result it was  objected 
that both  groups  were  not sufficiently comparable,  therefore 
a  conclusive evaluation of  the  courses'  success  was  not yet 
possible  (cf.  Schober,  1980). 
Except  for  the  above mentioned  courses  there exist workpre-
paration  schemes  that have  developed  independently in the 
federal  status and  are consequently offered under different 
names  and  concepts.  Common  to  them is that they  have  grown 
in size over  the last years.  For different types of.operation 
can  be differentiated:  a)  basic occupational training year 
in cooperation with employers,  b)  basic occupational training 
year  in school,  c)  occupational preparation year  (in  school, 
different sponsors),  d)  one-year specialized vocational 
school. 
Measuring  the  success of  the basic occupational  training by 
the  number  of  young  people moving  into further occupational 
training the  following picture evolves: 
Table  5: 
Participants total 
non-successful  completion 
successful  completion 
100% 
31% 
69% 
successful participants  69% 
of which  in  company  traing  84% 
full-tim vocational  school  16% 
Source:  I.  Mollwo,  Mitt  AB  2/80 - 336  -
The  high  share of  so-called problem groups  in the partici-
pants  and  the  high concentration of unsuccessful  completors 
among  specific social  groups  (children of un- or semi-
s%illed workers  etc.)  (Mollwo,  1980)  led  the  Minister for 
Science  an~  ~~ucation  ~  set up  a  programme  for  socially 
disadvantaged  youths  on  1st June  1980.  In its conception 
it follows  older models,  trying to  find  new  ways  of  integra-
ting socially disadvantaged youths  (among  the vocational 
training in project  - e.g.  housing renovation,  part-time 
employment  of girls as  workers  with part-time  schooling 
according to  "Waldorf-pedagogics").  The  results of  these 
models_ar:~  ___ .EQ_Si"t:ive_;h_~-- judged  (see  Berufsbildungsbericht 1981). 
A  trnnsfer of this evaluation appears  problematic,  because 
the  target groups  were  defined differently.  Results of atten-
dant  research are still outstanding. 
With  the  5th AFG  amendment  and  the therin introduced  §  41 
the  BA  had  been  equipped with  an  additional  instrument to 
improve  the  placing chances of unemployed  people,  so-called 
motivation courses.  In  these courses  the  unemployed  are  in-
formed  about  the  labour market  situation,  individual further 
training opportunities etc.  for  up  to  6  weeks.  In  1981  al-
ready  some  25  000  persons participated.  The  efficiency of 
this new  type of measure has  been  studied by  the  IAB  (cf. 
Hofbauer,  1982).  According  to this the  following  characte-
ristics are  underrepresented  among  participants  in  compari-
son  with  the  unemployed  in general:  women,  foreigners, 
married people,  persons with higher  education,  short-term 
unemployed  and  persons  that  have  neither been workers  nor 
white-collar employees  prior to becoming  unemployed.  16% 
of all participants  leave  premature.  The  following  reasons 
are  responsible  for  this: ~ 
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Table  6: 
Reasons  for  Premature  Leaving 
resons  for  leaving  in  % 
employment  23 
health reasons  32 
course did  not  bring any 
new  information  20 
others  reasons  (2)  25 
·ta-tai  100 
number  of  (Q ..  es  180 
number of replies  243 
(1)  More  than  one  reason  could have  been  given 
(2)  e.g.  family  reasons,  disagreement with other 
participants,  financial  troubles,  conflict with 
course staff. 
Source:  H.Hofbauer,  Mitt  AB  4/82 
The  career patterns of participants after completion can 
be  seen in the  following  table: 
Table  7: 
Career Patterns of Participants to Measures  According 
to  §  41a  AFG  after Completion  - in  % -
situation at time  of questioning 
in employment 
in  job creation  scheme 
in training scheme 
unemployed 
others  (1) 
23 
5 
14 
53 
5 
(1)  e.g.  not employable,  maternity leave,  house 
wife,  retire 
Source:  H.Hofbauer,  Mitt  AB  4/82 - 338  -
Another  negative  feature  noted  was  that a  high  percentage 
of persons  (23%)  that had  taken  up  employment  aft.er  comple-
tion had  been  unemployed  again at the  time  of the  survey. 
A  favourable  feature  would  be  that participation in  such  a 
measure  improves  the  readiness  to enter in another training 
scheme.  This  is also true  for  persons  usually not training 
prone.  If placing  chances  for participants acutally differ 
from non-participants,  could not  be determined  by  the  study. 
The  participants  thernselve  voted  the  functions  of training 
for  their occupatnial activity  a~ follows:· 
Table  8: 
very useful 
partly useful 
not  useful 
don't  know 
total 
17% 
23% 
52% 
8% 
100% 
A  further  field of  labour market activities is the  promo-
tion  o,;_~2_cupational_ training by establishing out-of-plant 
training  institutions and  training workshops  by  the  BA.  While 
building and  maintenance of out-of-plant training institu-
tions  serve  to  overcome  global  training place deficits  -
and  as  such  represent  an  important part of discussion on 
the  general  improvement of occupational training -,  traini.ng 
workshops  are mainly  an  instrument of  selective labour market 
policy to  ~mprove the Placing  schemes  of unemployed  persons. 
The  present size of out-of-plant training  i~stitutions is 
Tw-elcomed  from  ,9-_~_1.__- sides.  This  is quali  f5. ed j,:n  as  .1UIJ.C~1  as  the 
CDU/CSU  and  the  employers•  associations  point  to  the  fact 
that an  additional extension could  endanger  the  system of - 339  -
dual  training  (CDU-comment).  In opposition to this the  DGB 
calls for  the extablishment of adequate  capcities in di§-
advantaged  regions  and  whereever possible vocational  schoo2s 
in plant training facilities  and out-of-plant training to 
~~~~blish an  integratet plan in order  ~rantee the  nesses-
~X:  __  appretish_~ places (  Gewerkschaftliche  Bildungspoli  tik  7 /82) 
Training workshop  not  specially serving the training or 
further training of young  people  are evaluated by  Semlinger 
and  Pohl  (Semlinger/Pohl,  1982)  with  reservation as  follows: 
the placing for  work  or further training is facilitated by 
courses  in training workshops.  The  -~ig~--nuJ?b~:r of __  .pr~mature 
~ave~~~eveals that the  authorities  had  not yet  succeeded 
in designing the  programme  ~dequte for  the target grou£.  The 
efficiency of-training workshops,  however,  cannot solely 
be defined by  premature  having rates or placement.  Rather 
a  stabilisation function,  i.e. skill losses  and  tendencies 
of  fatalism are worked  against and if at the  same  time  an 
expansion of the  individual action competence  takes place,it 
can  be  seen as  a  positive function of training workshops. 
The  scientific discussion on  the empirical  findings of 
occupational training or further  training stands  in connec-
tion of  a  general debate  on  the  economic of education. 
Assessments  that interprete the  above  average  share of un-
employed without skills as  a  consequence  of entrpreneurial 
selectivity processes  hold  that  occupationa~-- tr~ini~g and 
further  t~aining increases allocativeefficency,  but will not 
~lu~~an~global empl~yment effects  u~~er slack demand 
bu'L_~_!l-~t~~-<:!--~~.!.Y_!:~----~--:;--~~istribut~o~-~~--l..!_~employment.  Accor-
ding to  supply-side oriented interpretations  a  considerable 
portion of  unemployment  is  "search"  or  "voluntary unemployed" 
The  improvement of training  ~ill thus  automatically lead to 
a  rise in employment.  The  so-called  bottle-neck theory says - 340  -
that the  lack of skills on  the  labour market  hampers  growth 
potential  in only  a  few  sectors  (cf.  on  this debate  Schmid, 
1982).  Especially small  and  medium-sized  companies  appear 
to  suffer  frorn  these skill bottle-necks  (Scharpf,  1980}. 
One  aspect of  the effects of occupational  and  further trai-
ning is not  included  in these  positions,  Schmid  is pointing 
at:  Despite  the  impossibility_to_~estore full  emplyment  by 
tJ!~a!l~  ___ Q_f_,  __ _.t_;r.:-?_i...!}.;!.,~g  measures  this  policJr.  is still acceptable, 
sinQ~-~ h~lP~_tg relieve the  lapour market  on  the  short 
run  (Schmid,  1982).  A cost benefit analysis of further trai-
ning provided  by  the author  in this  conne~ion yields  the 
following  results: 
Table  9: 
Cost/Benefit Analysis of Further Training 1974-1980 in the 
Federai  REpublic  of  Germany 
r=-
- -· 
11)  Ex  penditure  by  the 
BA 
2}  Pa 
Pe 
fu 
j_n  DMir,  .:?, 
rticipating 
rson  in  1000 
11  tim equivalent 
ost  3)  c 
in 
per person 
DM  (1975  prices) 
4)  Em ployment  effect 
i n  1000 
5)  R elief effect 
a )  in  lCOO 
a)  in  1000 
b)  in  %  of  2) 
6)  c  ost  per unemplyed 
-
i 
!  a voided  ( J : 5)  in  DN 
(1975  prices)  - l 
1974  1976  1979  1980 
.. - . 
1 .. 917,5  1.917,9  1.903,8  2.482,6 
131  114  95  110 
15  .. 505  16.130  17.336  18.499 
115  97  73  86 
79  76  60  70 
60  67  73  64 
25.712  24.196  27.448  29.070 
1 
~)Including expenditure  on  institutional promotion,  excluding 
expenditure  on  the  promotion of occupation training 
2)Average  number  of participants  in full-time  training plus 
1/4  of  the participants  in part-time  schemes  (estimated full-
time  aquivalent  to calculate 3)) 
4)Number  of  persons  to  be  replaced  in employment  system equals 
the  number  of  person  in full-time  training 
Source:  ANBA,  various  issues,  SVR  Autorengemeinschaft,  1981, 
computation  by  Schmid,  1980 - 341  -
!he  co~parison with the costs of  unemploymen~ shows  t~ 
the  cost  per  person is lower  than  the cost per  unemployed 
for  __ tl!:_l?_~q_ci~l  securi  ty_~stern  {  1_~_~!_- a12E_~l?!i_~-~ 000) . 
Despite this certainly too  simple  comparison cost/benefit 
considerations  found  entrance  in calls for  the expansion of 
occupations  training and  further  training  (cf  DGB,  Gewerk-
schaftliche Bildungspolitik,  7/82} 
The  training plan deficit for  the years  to  com~ caused~ 
cyclical as well  as Eem~~rap~ic reasons,  however,  poses  a 
problem that in the  medium  term  can only  be  alleviated by  an 
increased  supply of apprenticeships  by  private  industry. 
CDU/CSU  and  FOP  therefore  propose  to stimulate private 
initiative by  appeals,  social contracts  and  relieving com-
panies of  the costs of training and  by  taking back  admini-
strative injunctions  {CDU-Stellungn.l982, FDP,  1981).  Further-
more  incre~~~d subsidization or grants  for  companies  increa-
sing this  number  of training places are discussed.  Programmes 
of this kind are already operated on  regional  levels.  Of 
particualr interest is a  programme  operated  in Bavaria, 
there  companies  training young  people with  low  school  achieve-
ments  in excess of their acutal  needs  receive  a  grant of 
DM  15  000  per training place  - i.e.  more  money  than  they pay 
trainees during training.  The  DGB  {Bildungspolitische  In-
f~rmation 7/81)  and  parts of the  SPD  (SPD-Stellungnahme,  1982) 
favour  a  levy collected to  finance  training or  a  training. 
liability by  companies.  In  the medium  term,  however,  the 
DGB  believes that the  demand  for  training is considerably 
larger than what  can  be  supplied by private  industry.  For 
this  see  table  10. - 342  -
Table  10: 
1980  1981  1982+ 
1  '~ 
'I  }oung  persons  to be  1  533  701  1  572  900  1  652  500 
supplied 
2)  of which  receive 
only work  preparation  97  000  78  300  76  400 
3)  lacking t.raining 
places total  331  901  352  200  408  400 
+)  prognosis 
Source:  Conunent  of the  DGB  on  the Berufsbildungsberichte 
1981  und  1982  as well  as  calculations by  the 
'Memorandum  Gruppe' 
On  the basis of  the  thus  appraised training place  problem 
.t_he  P..§J3  calls  _fg~  __ _§_tate  intervention of  financial  as well 
'-\_§_ __ .3:?.0!.!1-ist.ra ti  ve  kind.  Employers'  associations reject these 
prop_o~-::=~  --~_!:_a  i::::__~~!_::_~_yentions  because  the  training problem 
will be  solved once  the  economy  picks  up  and  by  demographic 
developments  (cf.  DGB  Stellungnahme,  BDA-Stellungnahme). - 343  -
2.  Promotion  of regional  mobility 
According to the'work promotion act'  the regional mobility 
of  employees  is supported on  basis of  §§  53  "Forderung der 
Arbeitsaufnahme";  in detail this  contains  allowances  for 
application costs,  moving-allowances,  separation-aids,  re-
settlement allowances etc. 
The  promotion of regional mobility has  primarily played  a 
moresignificant role within the  labour  market  discussion 
in connection with  supply defic·tts.Also during  the first 
years  of higher  unemployment,  when  for  the first time,  regional 
structural discrepancies  had  become  more  stronqly marked  (specific 
shortage of skilled workers  with  unemployment  in many  regions), 
this  instrument was  regarded as being of  importance for over-
corning structural weakness  of the  labour market. 
Meanwhile it is  established that the general under-utilization of 
labour force  reserves,  connected with selectivity in hiring 
and  dismiss policies have  brought  about  such situation 
in which  supply-deficits-only play a  negligeable part. 
Also it is stressed that  in order to preserve resp.  to take  up 
a  job the willingness of employees  to put  up with personal  re-
strictions has  grown with the  changed situation on  the  labour 
market  (Engelen-Kefer,  1982).  It is on  account of a  different 
weightening  of  the  individual elements  that  - in spite of 
a  recessive  development  - the level of mobility grants  remains 
relatively high.  As  less  funds  are  claimed for separation-aids 
they are increasingly demanded  for  application-journeys.  The 
modification of the  "Zurnutbarkeitsregelung"  {specification 
of what  can  be  expected  from  someone  who  seeks  a  job),  is 
often  defined as  a  measure  that  increases  the readiness  towards 
regional mobility by  force. - 344  -
§  103  of the  "work  promotion act
11  defines what  someone  who 
is unemployed  in the sense of the  law is obliged to;  this 
particularly refers  to the  specification of what  can  be  ex-
pected  from  a  job seeker.  The  according specification of the 
Bundesanstalt  fUr  Arbeit  (BA)  lays  down,  which  work  someone 
unemployed  can  refuse resp.  has  to accept,  in order to be 
qualified for  receiving  further unernployrxmt  pa:yxrelts.  The definition 
of what  can  be  expected  has  been modified several  timessince 
the  emergence  of the  "work  promotion  act 
11 
•  Especially the 
latest  amendment  which  was  undertaken  by  the  BA  with 
the  outcome  of the  "work  promotion  consolidation act",  was 
subject to heavy  controversies,  mainly  between  trade  unions 
and  employers.  The  new  regulation,  bhat defines which work 
has  to be  accepted with  regard to the working-time,  earnings, 
the  demanded  qualification and  the  location of the  new  occu-
pation,  was  greeted by  employers  for  the  following  reasons: 
The  new  regulation  lays  down  clear standards  for  how  to decide 
in  individual cases.  The  claim of those  who  pay  into the 
unemployment  insurance  fund,  to expect  from  an  unemployed per-
son  the  same  as  from  someone  in employment  has  been put 
through.  Employers  do  not  expect to solve  unemployment  pro-
blems  through this re-definition or ,to aiminuate  tpe ceficits 
of the  BA,  thus  they  find  the principle adopted,  tnat the 
obligatory  performance of those  who  pay  into the unemploy-
ment  insurance  fund  is limited to  a  reasonable degree •. 
According to the opinion expressed by  trade  unions  the re-definition 
of what  can  be  expected serves  - given  the  bad  employment  situ-
ation of  present  days  - as  an  instrument to force  em-
ployees  to  such  adaptations,  that are not  backed  by  social 
reasons  or the labour market  problems.  In detail  they mention 
the  following  facts:  The  ratio  between  the  number  of un-
employed  and  the  number  of vacancies  is becoming  dramatically 
unfavourable;  the period after unemployed persons  are  forced 
to accept  job-offers which  they  are overqualified for  has  been 
lowered. -:: 
l  • 
..  -
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The  analysis of the  labour market  shows  a  remarkable  readi-
ness  of  unemployed persons  towards  mobility. 
-~u~-~J:'l~r  trade  unions  fear that the  re-definit_~-o~--~i_ -~he  ____ _ 
"Zumutbarkeitsregelung
11  contributes to  an  increasing displace-
ment competition on  the labour marketi  employees  with 
higher skilli  levels displace  those  with  lower  skills 
part-time workers will  be  forced  to accept full-time  work, 
thus  - if the personal  situation does  not  allow full-time work-
being expelled  from  the group of benefit recipients,  unem-
ployed are  forced to  a  social decline after just a  short 
period of  unemployment  (see  Engelen-Kefer,  1982).  Furthermore 
the trade union  regards  this new  regulation as  a  violation 
of paragraph  12  of the 
11Grundgesetz
11  which also guaranties 
freedom of choice of occupation. 
The  president of the  BA,  however,. values the  new  specifica-
tion as  a  clearly arranged rule for employees  of the  labour 
offices to fill vancancies  and  find  jobs  for  unemployed  as 
soon  as  possible  (Arbeit  und  Beruf  IV,  1982) • - 346  -
3.  Improvement  of the effeciency of  eMployment  service 
The  executive institution of  labour market policy in the 
Fed. Rep.  is  the  Bundesanstalt  flir  Arbeit  (BA);  a  statut.ory 
corporation whose  autonomy  is supervised  tripartitely by  ern-
oloyers,  trade  unions  and  canm.mity bcxlies.  The·  BA  follows  a  {X)licy as 
outlined  in  the  "work  promotion  act".  Within  these boundaries 
the  according  arrangement  is in  hands  of  the self-governing 
bodies  of  the  BA,  certain administrative  regulation are  to 
issue  in  accordance with the  Ministry of  Labour  and  Social 
affairs whi.ch- on  the other hand  - is not  allowed  to  cancel 
or modify  resolutions  once  accomplished  by  himself~ 
Even -though t..he  BA  is obliged to an  active  labour market  policy 
by§  1  of  the  .. work  promotion  act"1because of its juridical 
construciton as  an  insurance coporation measures  of active 
~D~ec{entio~y a  minor  role in  favour  of  unemployment 
D.ene  f_i t s~ 
Often  complained  consequence  of this relation  (Mettelsiefen/ 
Seifert,  1982,  Seifert, 1982,  Schmid/Semlinger, 1980,  a.o.)  is, 
that with  increasing  unemployment  the  anyway  reduced  revenue 
is absorbed  by  unemployment  benefits while at the  same  time 
no  funds  can  be  provided for operative measures.  A  possible 
solution of this dilemma is seen  by  the  Wissenschaftszen-
trum Berlin  (Presseerklarung,  Sept.l982)  in  an  alteration 
of the  financing structure.  According  to this proposal  unem-
ployment  benefits shall  be  covered  by  an  insurance  fund  and 
operative performances  by  special  funds  of  the  federal  budget. 
Thus  Seifert  (Seifert,  1982)  doubts  whether  such  a  seperatcd 
financing  is likely to stabilize the available  funds  for 
operative performances;  he  points out,  that already through 
the  given  financial  dependency  of  the  BA  from  the  federal 
budget the  funds  for activ labour market policy  - as  through 
'the budget structure act'  and'work  promotion  act'  - are 
subject to  a  ·severe  limitation. • 
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Table  11  illustrates this problem: 
Table  11:Funds  of the  BA 
exrendi  ture.  GovernrrentaJ  Reserve  TJnanployn-ent 
in mill. Il\1  grant in  furA3s  benefits in 
mill. w  (at the enc  mill.  0·1 
of the year) 
1973  6.807,1  - 5.441  1.502 (+  9  .. 8) 
1975  17.835,9  7.272  1.754  8.803(-129,0) 
1978  17.522,4  - 3.394  7.886(- 0,  1) 
1980  21.674,5  1.840  373  9.856(+  5,7) 
Source:. _ M:rt.telsiefen /Seifert;  WSI, 6/81,  estimates 
Fachtcgung 1982 
EXpenditures 
for labour 
JTICl.rket  policy 
mea~nres in 
mill.  IM 
3.  791 (+ 21,0) 
6.441 (+ 43, 1} 
5.657(- 15,6) 
8.  771 (- 15,2) 
According  to Schmid/Semlinger  (Schmid/Semlinger,1980)  the 
capacity of the  BA  carrying out activities  (data processing) 
is sufficient,  but they notice weaknesses  within the inter-
nal  range  as  for the registration of demand  potentials. 
Following  an  opinion poll of  the  OTV  those  employees  of the 
BA  that .are organised in the  ~TV make  complaints  about  the 
dramatic  w-orsening  of the  employment  situation within the 
BA  and  the  hitherto existing working effeciency.  The 
staff/unemployed person ratio has  deteriorated from  1:8  1973, 
to 1:34  in  1982. 
Proposes,  that are dealing with the  BA  as  a  whole  resp.  con-
cepts  for  new  policies of the  BA  and models  for  improved  im-
plementation patterns are presented  in  the appendix • - 348  -
IV  JOB  PRESERVATION  MEASURES 
In  the  Federal  Republic  the  statutory underpinning  for  short-
time  "Vlork  allowances are  §§  43  ff.  and  162  ff.  o'f  the  'work 
promotion act'.  The  economical  function  of  short-time work 
allowances  is to help employees  to keep  their jobs  and  to 
enable  employe~to keep their experienced workers.  The  social 
political effect is to reduce  income  losses  in  case of 
unyoluntary  une~ployment.  During  the  recession of 
1974/J5  short-time work  was  for the first time  a~lied as 
A  employment  political instrument to  a  larger scale.  So 
far  1975  was  the year  of  the heaviest utilization with  an 
annual  average  of  773  000  short-time workers,  thus,  almost 
the  number  of  unemployed  was  reached.  From  1976  to 1979 
the  number of short-time workers  dropped  down  to  87  000  (1979). 
Primarily short-time work  is being used  in  regions with 
a  high  share of contracting industry branches  (see  Schmid/ 
Semlinger,  1979). 
Under  a  detoriating economic situatitm the nl.mi:>er  of short-tirre  ·workers 
is again  increasing since 1980.  The  meanwhile  given  figure 
of  above  1.00 000  can also be  explained  by  referring to 
selectivity processes that have  reached  such  a  point where 
employers  try to keep their skeleton staff.  The  currently 
heavy utilization also suggests,  that the amended  short-
time  work  regulation within  the_ 'w~~~-~~~otion consolida-
tion act'  has  not made  this  instrument  less attractive; 
similar comments  are being  voiced  by  the  employers'  asso-
ciation  . (Co~ent BDA,  1982).  The  fact  that the utili-
zation of  short-time work  is concentrated on  the manufactu-
ring industry,  explains the overproportiona1  degree  of  male 
workers  among  short-time workers  (see  Flechsenhar,  1979). 
The  regional  deviation of  short-time work  - under the fe-
deral  average  (1978):  Berlin,  Schleswig-Holstein,  Hamburg 
and  Baden-Wtirttemberg;  above  average:  Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz  and  Nord-Bayern  - becomes  more  strongly 
marked  during the  recession. - 349  -
The  financial  consequences  of short-time work  affect six 
parties: 
1.  Professional 
associations 
2.  Health  insurance  -
3.  Community  bodies  -
4~  Federal  Institute 
of  Labour 
5.  Employees 
6.  Employers 
(see  Flechsenhar,  1979a) 
loss of  contributions 
payment  of  short-time work  allo-
wance  in  case of sickness 
loss  of  taxes  and  loss  of degres-
sion 
short-time work  allowance,  taking 
over parts of the  social  security 
payments,  loss  in contributions to 
unemployment  insurance  fund 
loss  in  income  (short-time allowance 
68%  of the potential  take-home  pay) 
but  reduced  through  saving on  tax 
through  remaining  labour costs  (especial-
ly the  non-wage  costs  are  not  reduced 
through  short-time work)  partially  direct 
wage  costs  remain  through collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 
In  spite of  a  great  number  of affected persons  there is no 
discussion at the moment  about  retrenching or abolishing 
short-time work  allowance. 
over-all  Schmid  (see  Schmid,  1982)  judges the social  securi-
~unction of  short-time work  allowance positively.  Accor-
ding to  him  there is an  average  income  loss of  15%.  The  dis-
tributional effect of  short-time work  is ambivalent;  on  the 
one  hand  economically caused  redundancies  are  transformed 
into partial unemployment  for  more  persons  instead into full-
time  unemployment,  which  would  affect  less persons,  on  the 
other hand  long-term short-time work  tends  to  induce  a 
strengthening of  internal  ~abo~r markets  and  thus  to an 
exclusion of external applicants.  This  argument  is being 
supported empirically by  the effect-analysis of  Schmid/ 
Sernlinger  (Schmid/Semlinger,  1980).  According  to this  study 
regions  with  a  high utilization of  short-time work  allowan-: 
,· 
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ces  show  a  youth  unemployment  rate  above  average. 
The  decision of single employers  to use  short-time work,  is 
being  determined through  3  factors:  First their production 
structure and  cyclical  demand  fluctuations,  second theoost-
calculation between  short-time work  and  dismissals  (the 
higher the  human  capital  investment,  the stronger the ten-
dency  towards  short-time work) ,  third the middle-term ex-
pectation of the  company's  management,  since  on  account  of 
the  remaining  non-wage  costs  in the  long  run  short-time 
work  is less favourable  - even  under  the condition of high 
human  capital  investment  than  dismiss- and  hiring costs. 
This  fact  leads  to strong  sectoral  unbalances  in the utiliza-
tion of short-time work,  as  well  as  between  the  individual 
economical  branches,  with mining  and manufacturing as  main 
user;  but also to  a  strongly unbalanced distribution within 
the manufacturing  industry itself.  In the selective employment 
effect of short-time work  men  are prefered to  women  (see 
Schmid/Semlinger,  1980). 
The  ratio costs/effectiveness has  been  evaluated by  Schmid 
{Schmid,  1982)  in referring to calculations of the  IAB. 
The  following  survey confronts the most  important data. - 351  -
Table  1:  Cost/Effectiveness-Analysesof  Short-Time-Work 
1974  - 1980  in the  Federal  Republic 
1975  1978  1980 
1)  Expenditures  of  BA 
in mill.  DM  2.207,1  596.4  471.2 
2)  Untilization/persons 
in  thousands  773  191  137 
3)  costs  per short-time 
work  - in prices  1975  2.855  2.811  2.819 
4)  employment  effect  223  50  46 
in thousands 
5)  relief effect  147  33  30 
a)  in thousands 
b)  in  %  of  2)  19  17  22 
6)  costs per  avoided  15.014  16  .. 267  12.875 
unemployed 
4)  The  employment  effect of  short -time \"lor)c  allo'tflances 
is evaluated by  the  IAB  by  converting the  work  volume 
that is  lost by  short- time  w~rk into employed  per-
sons. 
5)  The  relief effect is estimated as  being  2/3  of the employ-
ment effect,  because  experiences  show that  a  drop  in 
employment  causes  2/3  unemployment  and  1/3 hidden  reserve. 
Source:  ANBA,  several  issues,  SVR~ estimates  Schmid,  1982 - 352  -
Schmid/Semmlinger  (Schmid/Senunlinger,  1980)  found  out,  that 
in cases of demand  shortage as  a  result of  growth deficien-
£ies and  in cases of structural transformation  processes within 
a  company  short-time work  is used  as  a  'parachute•  for  a 
socially more  acceptable reduction of  employment.  Even  though 
this function of short-time work  contrasts with what  is cur-
rently specified in the  •work  promotion act',  both authors 
perceive this as  being reasonable if in  such cases a  combi-
nation of short-time work  and  further vocational training 
could  be  implemented. 
With  reference to positive experiences  gained  from  a  similar 
measure  in Sweden,  Schmid/Freiburghaus  (Schmid/Freiburghaus, 
1977)  had  already been  printing to  the possibility of ex-
tending  the  instrument. 
Productive winter construction promotion  and  bad-weather 
allowances  - both belonging to the category of  'job main-
tenance measures' - are not  subject to controversial discus-
sions,  since they are only policies  for  seasonal  purposes. "'  I .... 
. 
--. 
~ 
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.V  CONCLUSION 
The  expenditures  for  active  labour market policies are no-
biceably  increasing in the. Federal Republik for the first time 
1970 after passing the  'work  promotion act'.  Increases  re-
main  moderate till 1974,  they are primarily  a  result of ex-. 
tended vocational training and  re-training.  A  changed  labour 
market  situation causes  a  significant  increase  from  1974 
till about  1979,  that lasts till 1981  to the  same  extent. 
Job creation  schemes,  wage  subsidies  and  cyclically fluc-
tuating short-time allowance  become  major  labour market  po-
litical instruments. 
Table  1:  Expenditures  for Active  Labour  Market  Policy  -
in thousand  -
year  1980  1981 
vocational training  1.380.682  1.667.591 
wage  subsidies  759.897  615.102 
JCS  1.025.441  1.053~882 
short-time allowance  471.226  1.284.581 
Source:  ANBA,  Jahresstatistik 1981 
Governrrental  special expenditures  of the public hand  increased 
during the  70s  from  73  bill.  DM  (1971)  to  161  bill.  DM  (1980) 
(at 
the 
ket 
cial 
been 
ding 
current prices,  SVR).  Further to these expenditures  of 
BA  funds  for public special  programmes  for  labour mar-
policy have  to be  added.  Within  the  scope  of  these spe-
programmes  during_  1974 till 1982  1.738 mill.  D~1  have 
spent for  JCS,  1.715 mill.  for  wage  subsidies  (inclu-
integration of disabled),  500 mill.  for vocational 
training of  youths  and  250 mill.  as  mobility assistance. - 354  -
Public  expenditure  programmes  designed to  combat  growing 
employment  problems  are  increasingly adopted  since  1974. 
During  1975-1979  these expenditures  amount  to  18.850 billo 
(these  prograrrmes  are partially overlapping the ones  prior 
mentioned  in connection with labour market policy). 
Was  it true for  the majority of  the  programmes  that they 
possessed  a  ?hort-t~rm target orientation designed to over-
_co~~-~l~~al and  structural disparities,  at least  ZIP  from 
1.27 1_ __  ~9~J!l~-~!_1_t  to_~_t~!?.!J.  i ~~_E_ubl  ic  derna.!l9_~_!1  middle-term 
,per.§....Q~ct-!_ve._Twice  (1974  and  1982)  limited general  investment 
grants qua  tax reduction were  offered as  being  an  instrument 
of  cyclical political influence. 
According  to  Ktihl  (Klihl,  1982)  the  losses  in  revenue  on ac-
count  of  the  investment grant  1974  amounted  to 9.550 bill.  DM; 
revenue deficits resulting from  the  investment grant  1982 
are  rated  to be  higher.  Additionally to these general  in-
vestment  grants  investment aids  are granted as  sectoral  and 
regional  subsidies.  The  volume  of  sectoral subsidies is dif-
ficult  to estimate.  According to statements of the  DIW  they 
amounted  to  85  bill.  DM  in  1978,  for the  same  year the  sub-
sidy report  of  the government  talks about  43  bill.  DM. 
For  1980  the Memorandum  group as  well  as  the  HWWA  estimates 
the volume  of  subsidy grants  at  approximately  80 bill.  DM. 
Region~l_g~ants are primarily given within  scope of the 
.£Qmrn_9_!L_ ___ ~?~~s for  the  'improv~_!!.!e..~t  ~-~~-q!Qnal ecpnomy. 
prom~tion'.  According to the  7th  subsidy  report of the go-
vernment  between  1972  and  1978,  68,5 bill.  DM  have  been 
spent  for this sort of  subsidy. -
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The  employment  effects of all here mentioned political 
packages  are controversial.  The  employment  effects of  the 
major  labour market  political instruments  are to be  found 
in table  2. 
Table  2:  Labour Market  Political Instruments  of  1980 
employment  costs  selectivity 
effect  per  ernpl. 
- in thousand  - effect 
short-time  46  10.244 
JCS  86  20.110 
wage  sub-
sidy  16 
vocational 
training  86  28.870 
Source:  Seifert,  1982;  Ktihl,  1983;  Schmidt,  1982; 
own  estimates 
It is apparent that the absolute  emplo~ent effects of  the 
individual  instrument is at variance with the selectivity_ 
of their operational possibilities.  It applies  to all instru-
rnents,  that an  increase in volume  also runs the risk of inereased dead-
weight, as well as it can  be said that expenditures  increase 
progressivly with the employment  effect. 
Similar exact evaluation like  .on  the effects of instru-
ments  of active labour market policy are  still outstanding for 
the  oth~r measures.  The  employment  effect of  expenditure 
~  programmes  have  been analysed  by  the  IAB  in co-operation 
with  the  DIW  and  HWW~. - 356  -
A  comparison  of  these studies is only limitedly possible, 
since the underlying  input-output-model  broadened  by  a  keynesian 
income-multiplier is not  identical. 
Table  3:  Costs  and  Employment  Effect of  Expenditure  Programmes 
A 
costs 
ZIP  ( 1)  19,6  Mrd.DM 
construction 
and  other 
investments  ( 2)  ca 5 , 8  Mrd. DM 
(1)  estimated by  JO-Model  HWWA 
( 2)  ~fC--Model  of  the  DIW 
B 
employment 
effects 
457.150  Pers. 
282.923  Pers. 
Source:  Spitznagel,  1976;  HWWA  Strukturbericht  '81 
c 
A  B 
ca.  42.874 
20.500 
Potential  programmes  designed at the  increase of  employment 
in the public sector have  to consider the limited absorption 
capacity of public institutes and  are levelled against  a 
long-term trend towards  a  reduction of  public employment. 
Primarily it is on  account  of  two  factors,  that the expan-
sion of  employment  within the  coummunity  bodies 
compensated. to  a  growingly  smaller extent redundancies 
within the private sector during the  70s.  For one  thing the 
available financial  resources  did not  increase at the pace 
as  they used to because of the  slackening of  growth  dynamic. 
Secondly under  overall capital productivity growing  faster 
than  labour productivity,  especially under  the condition 
of  low  wage  differentials,  service sectors have  to cope 
with relatively higher  expenses  for  personnel,  this to 
an  extent,  which  exceeds  the  scattering of  labour productivity. -~ 
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If the allocation of  a  single  investment  grant  in  1974  and 
1982  caused positive employment effects,  cannot  be  answered. 
Regardingthe  subsidy grant of  1974 it can only  be  concluded, 
that  a  short-term increase of the  investment  rate could be 
achieved  towards  the  end  of the promotion period  - in this 
_c~~~-~~..!:  __ _!:h~_ir:vestmen! grant is _perceived  as  h_~y_!ng_ a  posi-
.tive cyclical effect  - but  a  middle-term  increase of  the 
investment rate could not  be  noticed. 
The  employment  maintaining effect of other investment aids 
is also uncertain;  even  though  the  7th  subsidy report of the 
government  states,  that between  1972-1978  through subsidies 
amounting  to 68,5 bill.  DM  560.000  new  jobs  have  been  crea-
ted, in addition to  760.000 maintained  jobs;  these  figures, however, 
are to be  questioned  considering  a  study conducted  by  the  DIW  (6/82) 
that  d±d  not  reveal  a  significant relation between the 
mentioned subsidies  and the  regional  investment  yolume. 
With  even more  scepticism the allocation policy of the sec-
toral  investments  have  to be  reviewed.  It is not  doubted 
that those billions  indeed  maintai~ed jobs  - at least in  a 
Ehort  run.  But  no  studies are available,  which explainif 
th~ ratio between  employment  effects and  such  immense  costs 
is justified. 
Neither within the scientific nor political debate  there is 
a  consensus  about  how  far the given  employment  crisis can 
be  solved through  a  re-distribution of available work-load, 
Especially the question,  which  of the possible re-distribu-
tion strategies might  have  the best possible effects,  is dis-
cussed controversially.  Subsequent  costs of  a  reduction of 
working-time  depend  on  the  dynamic  of  labour market  and  wage 
policies.  The  estimated employment  effects of different 
types of working-time  reduction differ widely  according to 
the model.  As  a  basis  for discussions  serves  the  following 
lAB-estimation. ,· 
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Table  4:  Employment  Effects  of  Different Kinds  of Working-
Time  Reduction 
measure 
one  hour per week 
one  week  holidays 
introduction of  10.  mandatory 
year of  school 
reducing  retirement  age 
for men  to  60 
and  for  women  to age  of  58 
lowering of retirement age 
by  two  years 
v·oluntary part time work 
one  child-care year 
reduction of overtime 
Source:  Model  of I.  Mertens,  ·1982 
jobs 
600.000 
500.000 
300.000 
300.000 
300.000  - 400.000 
300.000 
Under  the  condition of current employment crisis the employ-
ment  effects of eadhindividual political packages  are of 
main  concern within the target projection.  Yet  they are de-
signed to achieve further objectives.  This  i&  primarily the 
social  integration of  so-called  •problem groups•  of the la-
bour market  and  social security of  employees  also in times 
of temporal  or permanent  unemployment.  According  to Schmid 
(Schmid,  1982)  with  unemployment  due  to growth deficits in-
tegrative effects  can primarily be  achieved through wage 
subsidies  and Job Creation  Schemes. .~ 
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Yet  Job  Creation  Schemes  possess  negative  side effects.  On 
one  hand  deadweight effects tend  to undermine  the increase of non-pro-
moted  work-offers,  on  the other hand  JCS  might  roll back 
the allocational and distributional effects of  contractual 
rights that have  been  fought  through. 
Short-time work  payments  possess  a  similar integrative ef-
fect only under  the condition of  une~~oyment due  to cycli-
_q;i_!_downturn,  here as well  negative  side effects occur  ·if  the 
allocation-hampers necessary structural adaptations.· 
The  social  security function  of labour market political in-
struments  is primarily  a  result of  side effects that again 
are mainly  caused  by  the  insurance  system  (re-gaining of 
eligibility for  unemployment  benefit).  One exception is the 
updating  of skills,  a  measure,  that also helps  to  improve 
the social position of participants in the  long  run. 
The  distributional effect of  JCS  is considered positive, 
the  one of  short-time work  only with certain restrictions 
because it tends  to prevent rotational unemployment,  which 
means  that potential external applicants  are displaced  from 
a  job. 
The  social securtiy function  of  the other employment politi-
cal  instruments  is  jugded  by  Schmid  as  follows:  The  increase 
in the  supply of  jobs  in the public sector increases this 
function  in cases  of  unemployment  due  to structural resp. 
growth deficits.  How  far this  can  be  achieved  by  public 
expenditure  programmes,  investment grants or certain ways 
of working-time reduction,  depends  on  the evaluation of their 
employment  effects. - 360  -
The  allocational effects of  an  increase  in the  supply of 
jobs  in  the public sector are primarily perceived as  being 
negative.  Public expenditure  programmes  hold  - according 
mncepts  and  implementation  provided  - _tn~. _pQ_s_sil?i.lity  ___ Qf  __ .in=-_ 
.Ll1J.s,;_g_Qi.ng_ the_  ..  __ geyclopment  of allocation ...QQ§_:i. tiyel.;I.  Those 
restrictions,  as  of what  kind  the  respective assistance  is, 
also have  to be  taken  into account  when  dealing with  invest-
In··~"'+- grants.  It would  obviously be  wrong  to assume,  that  .. _  -
the  current allocation policy that is mainly  focused  on 
preservation subsidies,  could alleviate structural deficits. 
Regarding  the re-distribution of working-time  and  an  ex-
tention of  the  supply  in  the public sector,  less positive 
distrlbutional effects are  considered.  The  integrative ef-
fect  of  these  instruments  depend  on  their employment  ef-
fects.  The  social political function of most  of the  instru-
ments  c:.re  ambivalent,  only expenditure  programmes  are 
jugdcd  positively~  but also this statement  is  subject to 
different  interpretations  according to the  social political 
position  and  its certainty can  be modified through  broadened 
economical  analysis. CONTINUATION  II 
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